BrExit?

[Tribun_Populi]

Naravno da ce praviti kompromise i vec ih uveliko prave - Nemacka nema potencijala za weltmachtanje i francuska armija ili desnicarska istocna Evropa ce malo sutra biti nemacki pioni.

 

Merkel/Sojble se percepiraju kao problem za EU iako se radi zapravo o majstorima kompromisa uprkos nedovrsenim strukturama. No, to je prosto tako ako ne postoji volja za federalizacijom - neko mora da vodi te vecne diskusije i pravi dilove.

 

Kada bi neki nacionalistickiji desnicari ili levicari zasedli u Nemackoj na vlast (slicno onima u istocnoj Evropi ili Grckoj), stav Nemacke oko para bi bio mnogo slicniji stavu istocne Evrope oko izbeglica.

 

Apsolutno.

 

Još važnije, u slučaju federalizacije bi taj prenaduvani nemački uticaj, koji se uglavnom svodi na pare, bio sveden u mnogo razumnije okvire.

[Anduril]

^^Pitanje je samo zbog jednog: ta država nikada nije prošla demokratsko legitimisanje u normalnim okolnostima i na federalnom nivou.

 

U hipotetičkoj situaciji u kojoj secesija nema podršku spolja (već upravo suprotno) a Milošević ne može da se razmahne zbog prisustva Slovenije i Hrvatske, možda bi i preživela.

 

Glavni impuls za raspad su dali Nemci, bez daljnjeg. Što je, uz američki ambivalentan stav, dovelo do zahuktavanja.

 

Da, osim sto se Milosevic razmahao uprkos Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, tj. razmahao se direktno na njihovim teritorijama posto je pre toga vec kontrolisao polovinu Predsednistva a i JNA mu se pridruzila.

Mislim, kao da raspad SFRJ nije fakticki poceo 1988/89. preuzimanjem pokrajina i CG, nego tek 1992. 

[Dagmar]

^^Pitanje je samo zbog jednog: ta država nikada nije prošla demokratsko legitimisanje u normalnim okolnostima i na federalnom nivou.

 

U hipotetičkoj situaciji u kojoj secesija nema podršku spolja (već upravo suprotno) a Milošević ne može da se razmahne zbog prisustva Slovenije i Hrvatske, možda bi i preživela.

 

Glavni impuls za raspad su dali Nemci, bez daljnjeg. Što je, uz američki ambivalentan stav, dovelo do zahuktavanja.

 

Ta država nije trebalo ni da postoji. Praviš državu gde se zarad mira u kući pređe preko bacanja stotina hiljada ljudi i dece u jame i dečije konc logore. Kao ništa nije bilo, četnici&ustaše. I onda u zgodnom trenutku stari prijatelji cinično priteknu u pomoć mladoj demokraciji, surprise surprise. Elem sami smo si skuvali kašu.

 

Što se EU tiče, racionalno bi bilo da opstane i da se mi tu negde kao prvi komša na EU koliko toliko istabilišemo - da ima neke vizije. S druge strane, u emocionalnom smislu, kao što rekoh, da živim na nekom Marsu, i da moja porodica živi na Marsu, lepo bih se zavalila na ležaljku, gledala ih kako se rimejnolivaju, uzela koktel, i uživala. Samo ironično, mojoj zemlji potrebnija je stabilna EU nego samoj EU. I to je taj neki zajeb, zbog kog mi ovo ne prija da gledam, i zbog koga ne mogu da se radujem ako komšiji malo crkne krava.

[Tribun_Populi]

Da, osim sto se Milosevic razmahao uprkos Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj, tj. razmahao se direktno na njihovim teritorijama posto je pre toga vec kontrolisao polovinu Predsednistva a i JNA mu se pridruzila.

Mislim, kao da raspad SFRJ nije fakticki poceo 1988/89. preuzimanjem pokrajina i CG, nego tek 1992.

Raspad je počeo 1971. federiranjem federacije i svođenjem Jugoslavije na SOUR, raspala bi se ona još tad samo nije bilo švaba da poguraju, a bilo je rusa spremnih da utrče.

 

Slovenci su još 1985. radili feasibility studiju izlaska, sa merenjem potencijalnih ekonomskih gubitaka.

 

Milošević je posledica, nije uzrok.

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

Javite mi kad dođemo do bitke na Kosovu.

[Tribun_Populi]

Elem sami smo si skuvali kašu.

 

To je tačno, ali nemo'š se 1991. praviti kao da je 1918. i da je nije bilo 73 godine. Dobiješ što dobiješ.

 

Msm videćemo kako će se Englezi ponašati sad, ali meni sve liči na deja vú a oni na Slovence (koji su hiljade čefurja pobrisali iz knjiga početkom devedesetih, da im ne prljaju deželu).

[Hamlet Strašni]

nemojte ovde nadugačko o raspadu jugoslavije, ima topika za to

[Dagmar]

To je tačno, ali nemo'š se 1991. praviti kao da je 1918. i da je nije bilo 73 godine. Dobiješ što dobiješ.

 

Msm videćemo kako će se Englezi ponašati sad, ali meni sve liči na deja vú a oni na Slovence (koji su hiljade čefurja pobrisali iz knjiga početkom devedesetih, da im ne prljaju deželu).

 

Nama sve liči na raspad Jugoslavije jer je to naše lično iskustvo. However, nema ovo sa tim veze, objektivno.

[Tribun_Populi]

Objektivno, institucionalni okvir koji se raspada je veoma sličan, otud i paralele. Odnos snaga unutra i intencije aktera - ni najmanje.

[Anduril]

Raspad je počeo 1971. federiranjem federacije i svođenjem Jugoslavije na SOUR, raspala bi se ona još tad samo nije bilo švaba da poguraju, a bilo je rusa spremnih da utrče.

 

Slovenci su još 1985. radili feasibility studiju izlaska, sa merenjem potencijalnih ekonomskih gubitaka.

 

Milošević je posledica, nije uzrok.

 

Uzroci su drugo, ima ih nekoliko i mogu se razlicito datirati (1943, 71, 74, 81, 86. itd).

Govorimo o tome kada je poceo fakticki i nasilan raspad SFRJ, tj. njenog federalnog politickog sistema koji je do tada garantovao mir i ravnotezu bez obzira na funkcionalnost.

Koliko je meni poznato, do 1988. je SFRJ jos uvek funkcionisala relativno mirno a stvari su se resavale dogovorima i balansiranjem kao i u svakoj federaciji. 

Od 1988. su stvari resavane mimo dogovora, tajnim sluzbama, organizovanim demonstracijama, svrgavanjima i na kraju balvanima i sa JNA.

 

P.S. sorry, nisam video upozorenje.

Edited June 17, 2016 by Anduril

[Tribun_Populi]

O tome možemo dole™.

[Prospero]

http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/64268/1984216/version/18/file/DOCUMENTS%20CIDOB_07_BREXIT.pdf
 
THE BREXIT SCENARIOS:
Towards a new UK-EU relationship
 
 

Scenario #1: Bremain (no return to the status quo)
All things considered, there are at least three areas in which it may be anticipated that the referendum will have a significant impact on the UK and the rest of the EU.
The first area in which there may be substantial changes following the referendum is the nature of the UK’s status within the European Union. The agreement secured by David Cameron in February had four key elements, broadly grouped around the themes of the eurozone and economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and free movement.
...
But in a broader sense, looking beyond the renegotiation, it might also be anticipated that after the referendum a more general shift could become evident in the UK’s approach to EU policy issues at European level. For instance, the UK has long been one of the strongest proponents (Ker-Lindsay, 2015) of enlargement, and has frequently expressed support for the accession of western Balkan states and Turkey to the European Union. However, the nature of the referendum campaign could mandate a shift away from this position.
The prospect of Turkish citizens being granted the right to move to the UK has been raised as a particular concern (Mason and Asthana, 2016) by leave campaigners and it may become politically difficult for the UK to maintain its previous support for Turkish accession, if not its support for other states such as those in the western Balkans.
Ultimately, the nature of the referendum result could have an impact on the extent to which the UK will continue to be regarded as an “awkward partner” (Daddow and Oliver,  2016) within the EU. A sizeable vote for remaining in the EU could, in theory at least, provide the British government with more of a mandate to take a leading role in European decision-making. Alternatively, a narrow vote to remain would likely tie the government’s hands further and raise unprecedented levels of scrutiny as to the UK’s involvement in future integration.
...
While the UK’s referendum will have clear consequences in terms of the country’s relationship with Europe, it will also potentially have a lasting impact on the nature of the European Union itself. One such effect could be the precedent set by the UK’s renegotiation. If the remain camp proves successful, then the renegotiation process pursued by David Cameron will also have been ratified by the British electorate. Theoretically, this might encourage other states to pursue similar renegotiations with a view to improving their own terms of membership.

 

Scenario #2: A soft Brexit
The first difference across the Brexit studies arises from the political uncertainty attached to the nature of Britain’s future trade ties with the EU. There is no clear policy on whether Britain will get the same trade concessions that it has currently, perhaps by joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), or whether it will face a period of higher trade barriers if it exits the European Union and does not immediately receive these concessions. The second difference arises because we have imperfect knowledge of what is the appropriate model of the economy, and the model estimates we have are measured with some margin of error.
...
Around half of Britain’s trade is with the EU, making up about 13% of national income. EU membership reduces trade costs between Britain and the EU. This makes goods and services cheaper for British consumers and allows British businesses to export more. Leaving the EU would lower trade between Britain and the EU because of higher tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In addition, Britain would benefit less from future market integration within the EU. The main benefit of leaving the EU would be a lower net contribution to the EU budget.
How does all this add up, and what would be the net consequences of Brexit on living standards in Britain? Dhingra et al. (2016a) develop a structural economic model of trade in 35 sectors in the 40 major countries of the world. Using this economic model, they quantify the effects of Brexit on trade and incomes under different Brexit scenarios.
An optimistic scenario is that Britain swiftly strikes a deal that gets it deep access to the EU single market, as Norway currently has. In this Norway-style scenario, Brexit would be equivalent to a 1.3% fall in average British incomes (or £850 per household), net of the fiscal savings from lower membership contributions. The loss in income arises because Britain-EU trade faces some non-tariff barriers, like rules of origin checks and threats of anti-dumping duties, which apply to Norway too. Britain would also miss out on shaping and participating in future reductions in non-tariff barriers that are expected in important sectors for the UK economy like the services trade.
...
Combining this trade-to-income estimate with the estimated reduction in trade from Brexit, Dhingra et al. (2016a) estimate that leaving the EU and joining the EFTA would reduce British income by 6.3% to 9.5%. To put these numbers in perspective, during the 2008-09 global financial crisis Britain’s GDP fell by around 7%. Therefore, lower trade due to reduced integration with EU countries would cost the British economy far more than is gained from lower contributions to the EU budget.
...
To be very conservative, we assume a scenario where the Brexit-induced fall in FDI lasts only for 10 years and then reverts to its current level. Combining the estimated drop in FDI inflows from Brexit with the decline in growth projected by Alfaro et al. implies a fall in real income of about 3.4% after Brexit. This is equivalent to a loss of GDP of around £2,200 per household. Therefore, Brexit would have a sizeable impact on British incomes through reduced investments from abroad. The economic consequences for Britain of leaving the EU are complex. But reduced integration with EU countries is likely to cost the British economy far more through greater trade barriers than is gained from lower contributions to the EU budget. Leaving the EU would reduce trade between Britain and the EU because of higher tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In addition, Britain would benefit less from future market integration within the EU. Just from the channel of reduced trade, the effects of Brexit would be equivalent to a fall in British income of between 1.3% and 2.6%. And once we include back of the envelope calculations for the longrun effects of Brexit on productivity, the decline in income increases to between 6.3% and 9.5%. Some of these losses can be reduced by future trade and investment arrangements with the EU after a soft Brexit. But the possible political or
economic benefits of Brexit, such as better regulation, would have to be very large to fully outweigh such losses.

Scenario #3: A harsh Brexit

A collapse in trust would be seen in UK-EU relations, Britain’s own internal politics and governance, and between the rEU’s (rest of EU) member states. The problems the rEU would face serve as a reminder that a harsh Brexit would not only be about Britain. A harsh Brexit is likely to emerge should it align with another crisis in the EU such as one within the eurozone or Schengen. Such a development would leave the EU in a position where it can no longer “muddle through” the crises it faces, this being the strategy it has so far adopted with regard to the problems it has faced. The result would be the “European question” in British politics continuing to hinder the British government and the “British question” in the EU triggering larger questions about the nature and unity of the rEU.
...
The only viable option for managing a withdrawal is that set out in Article 50 TEU. The requirements of Article 50 – in particular the two-year framework to negotiate a withdrawal and the need for the rEU and European Parliament to approve a final deal –give control of the process to the rEU. The requirements of Article 50 have led some British Eurosceptics to argue that triggering the article can be delayed, thus prolonging the negotiating period, or to suggest Britain could repeal the European Communities Act 1972. Both claims have been subject to much critical analysis (Renwick, 2016). If either were pursued they would only contribute to a harsh Brexit by adding confusion, frustration and/or prolonging bitter negotiations.
...

A British exit would trigger several sets of negotiations. Within Britain there would be negotiations within the governing Conservative Party to handle an outcome many of its senior ministers campaigned against. The British government would have to consult parliament regularly. The slim Conservative majority, divisions within that party and the opportunity for opposition parties to cause trouble means the possibility of a House of Commons vote to reject some part of the UK-EU negotiation would be a very real one. The British government has stated that it has not prepared contingency plans for a withdrawal (Dominiczak and Riley-Smith, 2016), meaning such plans would need to be drawn up quickly. Agreement would need to be reached over the role played by the devolved administrations and regions such as London (D’Arcy, 2016).

On the rEU side several negotiations would overlap. First, rEU-UK: Britain and the rEU would need to reach agreement over the withdrawal terms, the nature of Britain’s future relationship with the rEU and over a series of international trade deals. Britain and the rEU would discuss whatever offer is put on the table, but for the rEU this would only be one side of the negotiation. The EU’s offer would be a compromise worked out between 27 member states – with thought also given to the European Parliament and ECJ – which means EU negotiators would be able to offer few concessions.

...
First, the UK-EU relationship has long been an awkward one and recent developments provide a context in which a complete collapse in trust is plausible. Britain’s late membership, optouts and transactional approach have often set it apart from the rest of the EU (George, 1988). Granted, Britain is not the  only awkward member of the EU (Daddow and Oliver, 2016). But Cameron’s approach has worsened the situation thanks to the Conservative Party’s withdrawal from the EPP, UK indifference to the eurozone and Schengen crises, vetoing a new EU treaty, opposition to the appointment of Jean- Claude Juncker as Commission president, invisibility over the situation in Ukraine, a hostile debate about immigration that has strained relations with eastern European countries, and finally the pursuit of a renegotiated relationship using the threat of Brexit as leverage.
Cameron has failed to connect his concerns about the EU with frustration found elsewhere in the EU, instead allowing Britain and the EU to drift further apart. British political debate rarely appreciates how “the British question” has become a concern for the rest of the EU, albeit one that has not been prioritised over others such as the eurozone crisis and which has therefore seemed more of an irritant than a threat to the EU. That means the rest of the EU are to some extent unprepared for a Brexit, and until recently assumed the issue would pass.

Second, Britain’s internal politics and referendum have set the stage for a post-withdrawal UK that would struggle to handle the fallout from a vote to leave. The referendum will fail to address underlying issues behind Britain’s “European question”. The question is not a simple in/out: it is a multifaceted one connected to a wide range of domestic issues, from party politics and political economy through to constitutional and identity issues (Oliver, 2015a). The leave campaigns have offered inflated expectations of what a post-EU Britain would look like and be able to do in areas such as economics or immigration. The referendum has become a battleground for the leadership of the governing party. Cameron has said he intends to stay on as prime minister whatever the outcome, but it seems likely he would be deposed. This sets the stage for a political situation in Britain where the leadership of the governing party is in doubt, heightened expectations amongst Eurosceptics leave little room for the weakened government to pursue a range of options with the EU, and the underlying tensions that fuel Euroscepticism go unaddressed, leaving the EU as the “other” against which a range of political issues are defined.

Third, wider political, economic and social changes across Europe and the Western World would add to a harsh Brexit. The EU has managed to get through the numerous crises that it has faced thanks to a strategy of muddling through, a strategy made possible because the crises have occurred separately. Brexit could align with a Greek exit from the eurozone, migration pressures in Schengen, security challenges in the form of Russian aggression, growing nativist impulses and populism across a number of EU states, and the strained transatlantic relations that see the collapse of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and a more hawkish US president from January 2017.

A harsh Brexit would play out politically in three ways. First, UK politics would be thrown into a period of turmoil as it struggled to handle the outcome of a leave vote. David  Cameron could resign immediately or agree to stay on as prime minister until the Conservative Party elects a new leader, which would take three to four months, meaning a new prime minister would be in place by October 2016.
...
Second, the political fallout in the rEU would pave the way for a harsh Brexit because a lack of trust would emerge from the failure to prepare for a Brexit, the difficulties in reaching  agreement over what to offer the departing UK, and the fights over how the EU’s balance of power should change as part of a wider crisis facing the EU, such as over a potential Grexit.

...
Member states with smaller economic relations with Britain would view the political fallout for the rEU as more important and seek to ensure Britain is in some way punished for withdrawing. The European Parliament, Commission and the ECJ can be expected to prioritise EU unity over relations with Britain. Reaching agreement would be made harder by the rotating EU presidency handling a Brexit: Slovakia (2016), Malta (2017), UK (2017), Estonia (2018), Bulgaria (2018), Austria (2019), and Romania (2019). Britain would give up its presidency. With the remaining presidencies coming from small states, eyes would turn to larger states, and especially Germany, to offer leadership. However, German and French elections in 2017 mean neither Merkel nor Hollande would be able to offer much by way of concessions to Britain or rEU member states seeking concessions. Negotiations would become drawn-out and bitter.

Finally, a failure by the rEU to reach agreement over what to offer Britain would also be the product of manoeuvring by rEU member states to manage the changed balance of power within the rEU. Increased budgetary contributions would be required from a larger number of members, adding to the costs of the EU felt by some states. Attempts to draw up a new treaty and/or handle another crisis in the eurozone, most likely over the exit of Greece, would strain relations to the point of a collapse in trust and equitable burden-sharing between member states.
...
This paper has taken a harsh Brexit to be a nightmare one that sees a widespread breakdown in economic, political and security relations. However, it could be that having experienced the pain of a harsh Brexit, Britain and the EU eventually – perhaps after 10 years – settle into a more settled relationship with positive outcomes for their economics, politics and security. The EU has a long history of integrating through facing crises, and a Brexit could therefore drive forward integration. Rid of an awkward partner, the rEU could find it integrates further through having to face the costs of a Brexit at the same time as facing a Grexit or other crisis. Instead of muddling through repeated crises, the EU could find it moves towards a new treaty that brings a degree of enhanced unity that creates a more stable EU.

[Prospero]

http://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/do-you-think-britain-would-be-better-or-worse-off-economically-if-it-left-the-eu/

 

Po ovome ispada da je percepcija "biće nam ekonomski gore ako izađemo iz EU" još slabija nego pre 6 meseci ili godinu dana, dakle pre nego što je Kameronova vlada krenula u referendumsku kampanju. Zadnjih mesec-dva malo raste ali je pikovalo još prošle godine.

 

To je vrlo loša penetracija™ ekonomske poruke IN kampanje.

[Kampokei]

Pa i meni se cini da zastrasivanje ekonomskim posledicama ne daje ocekivane rezultate. A kao da Remain camp nema neke rezervne poruke. Ja sam malo zacudjen da se ne potencira pitanje bezbednosti na kontitentu i da EU daje okvir u kom ce se tesko desiti da jedna evropska zemlja nastupa direktno protiv druge. Mozda je uvrezeno misljenje da je za to dovoljan NATO. Na referendumu o prikljucivanju 1975. je bilo postera sa porukom: bolje izgubiti malo suvereniteta nego sina ili kcerku. Sada su te teme izgleda malo off, sve je samo imigracija i ekonomija.

[MancMellow]

Cekaj, ti to tvrdis da su za efikasno ubiranje poreza potrebne decenije? I da dotle ostali treba da placaju Grckoj racune svake 2-3 godine?

Mnogo realnije je ono sto se sada desava:

- naucite sami da placaju poreze ako hoce funkcionalnu drzavu

- neko sa strane ce ih tome nauciti konstantnim pritiscima

- nece imati funkcionalnu drzavu i bice uvek na ivici bankrota sa mnogo nizim zivotnim standardom slicniji istocnoj Evropi

Trenutno se sva tri procesa odvijaju paralelno i videcemo sta ce na kraju prevagnuti.

 

upravo sam ovaj razgovor hteo da izbegnem. pricali smo o tome. pritisci - da, ali na funkcionisanje sistema ne ludacki pritisak na budzet. Ali to vazi za Grcku. Ko ce da "pritiska" Francusku? Sami sebe. Pa ok, ali to traje.