Izrael, Palestina i arapske zemlje

[yolo]

S obzirom da je Keri popio omrazu jer je navodno sleteo na Ben Gurion sa mapom nezavisne Palestine, zanimljivo je procitati kako po tom pitanju komuniciraju Cipi Livni i Naftali Benet, dva moguca pretendenta na mesto Bibijevog naslednika:

 

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/politics/14896-livnis-facebook-reply-to-naftali-bennett-shows-true-face-of-israeli-moderates

 

 

Livni's Facebook reply to Naftali Bennett shows true face of Israeli 'moderates' 

Ben White 
Monday, 27 October 2014 14:24 

  58  113 

 

  0  179

 

Tzipi Livni

The Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu is a coalition that includes open opponents of Palestinian statehood. Many of these hard-right rejectionists, supporters of expanding the illegal West Bank colonies, occupy senior positions within the cabinet.

 

Given this political reality, some politicians and analysts in the West suggest that if only the Israeli government was led or at least more influenced by 'centrists', then progress in negotiations with the Palestinians would be possible.

Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, who has also been serving as Israel's chief negotiator in the collapsed US-led peace talks, is often considered the kind of 'moderate' that everyone from Brussels to Washington – and indeed, Ramallah – would prefer as premier.

Last Friday, Israel's Economy Minister Naftali Bennett took to Facebook in order to respond to comments from Livni about ceding territory in the context of a deal with the Palestinians. Bennett affirmed that his position on the matter was informed by both political rationale, as well as his belief that "the land of Israel belongs to the people of Israel."

Livni's response was instructive. Posting on her Facebook account, Livni accused Bennett of opposing a peace agreement even at the potential "cost" of "the international isolation of Israel, economic collapse and ostracizing." She continued:

You know what, Bennett? I too believe in the historical right of the People of Israel over all of The Land of Israel, but unlike you I also believe in the right of young people and the future generations to live in a Jewish and democratic state, [a] secure [state], with recognized borders and [a state] being a part of the free world, a state which [they] can take pride in, and in Zionism which had established it.

Livni then added: "My interest is not to establish a state for the Palestinians, but to give our young ones this state and this future in The Land of Israel."

Israel's Justice Minister, in other words, believes that all of historic Palestine belongs to the Jewish people – on this, Livni and Bennett are in agreement. In addition, Livni is clear that she is not motivated by a desire to establish a Palestinian state. Rather, her priorities are to protect both Israel's international standing, and Israel's Jewish majority.

Nothing here about international law, still less the Palestinian right to self-determination. Instead, it's all about the settler-colonial obsession with demographics, and a presentable apartheid. And this, from an Israeli 'centrist'. No wonder the boycott continues to grow.

Thanks to Ofer Neiman for translation.

[Roger Sanchez]

Tzipi je tu jako kvarno i zlo protumačena, mislim, imaš ti iskustva u tome, trebao bi to prepoznati. I to za riječi lansirane u vrlo suženim okvirima političke polemike.

 

Laconica Telefonica

[yolo]

Mislis da google translate laze kada mi izbacuje prevod sa hebrejskog " I believe in the right of Israel to Palestine with Israel as a whole"?Pa to je tranzicija prema 1-state solution koju upravo gledamo kao novi Bibijev policy. Moguce da sam nasamaren prevodom, mada ja Tzipi posle svega uopste ne razumem koja je njena pozicija. Internet se ubi od naglasavanja da je ona moderate, reasonable bla bla a ja ne procitah nijednu njenu izjavu koja je nedvosmisleno to, sem ako nije neka neodredjena komparacija sa Libermanom i slicnim.

Edited October 29, 2014 by gazza1

[Roger Sanchez]

S telefona vidim da bi i Tzipi jako voljela Eretz do Jordana, but she thinks of the children, pa teške duše će da uzme i granice koje bi i svi zainteresirani Arapi priznali. To onak s telca.

 

Laconica Telefonica

[Gandalf]

Khaled Abu Toameh @KhaledAbuToameh

Hamas employees began receiving salaries from the Palestinian Authority government. Money came from Qatar.

[Roger Sanchez]

Carevi zatvorili al-Aqsu za sve vjernike. UFN.

:ziga:

 

Laconica Telefonica

[yolo]

Palestinci lansirali igricu u kojoj ekipa iz Gaze oslobadja celu Palestinu. 

 

Samo oruzje, nista diplomatija.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPTcvbne2gc

 

Haaretz pise:

 

A new computer game developed in Gaza, “The Liberation of Palestine,” invites players to liberate Palestine by all means at their disposal, including force.

In a promotional Arabic-language video trailer that was translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute, the game is depicted as teaching players that force is preferable to negotiations. Players are also required, however, to forge diplomatic alliances within the region and arrange prisoner swaps.

The game’s broader aim, the developers say, is to develop “a spirit of resistance among Palestinian children.”

Games dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have aroused a great deal of controversy. During last summer’s fighting between Israel and Hamas and its allies in Gaza, Google removed from its Play Store several downloadable computer games featuring the bombing of the Gaza Strip. Among them were “Bomb Gaza” and “Gaza Assault: Code Red.”

The controversy over these games initially surfaced in the late 1980s. In one intifada game, players had to disperse demonstrations in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without killing any protesters, so that an overly left-wing government would not be elected in Israel. The game prompted objections in Israel and abroad.

In the 1990s game “Conflict: Middle East Political Similator,” participants played the role of Israeli prime minister and had to stay the course until all the surrounding countries collapsed.

A number of other games followed, some taking a more serious approach than others. “Peacemaker,” for example, in which participants were also placed in the shoes of the Israeli prime minister (or the head of the Palestinian Authority), was more oriented toward achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Games reflecting the Palestinian or Arab point of view have also made headlines. Among them were “Under Ash,” a shooting game that opens in Syria in which the player is a Palestinian fighting the Israel Defense Forces; and “Special Force,” which was developed by Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shi’ite militia.

[Roger Sanchez]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-utJek8s8o

[bigvlada]

Palestinci lansirali igricu u kojoj ekipa iz Gaze oslobadja celu Palestinu. 

 

Samo oruzje, nista diplomatija.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPTcvbne2gc

 

Haaretz pise:

 

A new computer game developed in Gaza, “The Liberation of Palestine,” invites players to liberate Palestine by all means at their disposal, including force.

In a promotional Arabic-language video trailer that was translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute, the game is depicted as teaching players that force is preferable to negotiations. Players are also required, however, to forge diplomatic alliances within the region and arrange prisoner swaps.

The game’s broader aim, the developers say, is to develop “a spirit of resistance among Palestinian children.”

Games dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have aroused a great deal of controversy. During last summer’s fighting between Israel and Hamas and its allies in Gaza, Google removed from its Play Store several downloadable computer games featuring the bombing of the Gaza Strip. Among them were “Bomb Gaza” and “Gaza Assault: Code Red.”

The controversy over these games initially surfaced in the late 1980s. In one intifada game, players had to disperse demonstrations in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without killing any protesters, so that an overly left-wing government would not be elected in Israel. The game prompted objections in Israel and abroad.

In the 1990s game “Conflict: Middle East Political Similator,” participants played the role of Israeli prime minister and had to stay the course until all the surrounding countries collapsed.

A number of other games followed, some taking a more serious approach than others. “Peacemaker,” for example, in which participants were also placed in the shoes of the Israeli prime minister (or the head of the Palestinian Authority), was more oriented toward achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Games reflecting the Palestinian or Arab point of view have also made headlines. Among them were “Under Ash,” a shooting game that opens in Syria in which the player is a Palestinian fighting the Israel Defense Forces; and “Special Force,” which was developed by Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shi’ite militia.

 

Srećom, te taktike se niko nije dosetio ranije. 

 

 

 

 

 

Cilj je pokazati susedima ko je šef, uz finansiranje opozicije u komšiluku kako bi srušila vladu, ratove i upotrebu atomske bombe. Tek bih mogao o američkom pogledu na svet u video igrama.  

[yolo]

Danas se obelezava 19 godina od ubistva Jicaka Rabina, najhrabrijeg Izraelca u novijoj povesti. Ubijen je na mirovnom skupu u Tel Avivu, nekoliko godina nakon istorijskog sporazuma sa Palestincima u Oslu. Ne znam da li je njegovim odlaskom nestala nada za mirno resenje konflikta izmedju Izraela i Palestine, licno verujem da jeste, ali nikada pre ni posle njega Izreal nije imao toliko realnog i postenog politicara, barem kada je u pitanju odnos prema Arapima.

[bigvlada]

hmm, interesantno bi bilo praviti uporedni životopis Gandija i Rabina. Obojici su glave došli "njihovi". 

[Roger Sanchez]

Ovo sa autima se sad zapatilo, vrlo su precizni i ima ih. Očekujem 1 zabranu vožnje Arapu u Izraelu.

 

Laconica Telefonica

[yolo]

Abu Lajla – pravim imenom Kais Abdul Karim – vođa Demokratskog fronta za slobodnu Palestinu (DFLP) – izrazito lijeve i utjecajne frakcije unutar PLO-a, zastupnik u palestinskom parlamentu i višedesetljetni veteran izraelsko-palestinskog sukoba komentira posljednje zaoštravanje situacije s Izraelom nakon novog vala širenja izraelskih naselja na Zapadnoj obali i posljednjeg rata u pojasu Gaze, rezultate nedavne palestinske diplomatske inicijative i međusobne odnose između različitih palestinskih frakcija. Razgovor s Abu Lajlom vođen je sredinom listopada u njegovom uredu u Ramali.

 

 

http://www.lupiga.com/vijesti/lupiga-s-vodjom-palestinskog-otpora-idemo-u-trajni-rat-ako-nam-nametnu-jednu-drzavu-za-palestince-i-izraelce

[x500]

Napad u Jerusalimu - ukupno 6 mrtivh ljudi i oko 10 povredjenih :(

http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.627084

[yolo]

HAARETZ

 

Why this is not a third intifada

 

For all the Facebook pages heralding a new intifada, the current cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence is far from a paradigm-changing uprising.

 

By Anshel Pfeffer

 

The outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada, in December 1987, took everyone by surprise. On the Israeli side, they were so convinced the rioting would quickly down that then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin did not cancel a planned two-week visit to the United States. Afterward he was criticized, probably unfairly, for not cutting it short.

The Palestinian leadership, then still mostly in exile, was just as taken aback by the spontaneous escalation, and struggled from afar to exert some degree of influence over events.

Those began with protests in the Gazan refugee camp of Jabalya, over the deaths of four local men who were hit by a truck driven by an Israeli (intentionally, locals claimed), and rapidly spread to the rest of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

When the second intifada began, at the end of September 2000, both sides were much more prepared. While the timing perhaps could not have been foreseen, both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership had been girding themselves for wide-scale violence since the failure of the Camp David talks two months earlier and even before.

While the triggering event was held to be the visit by then-opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, that was at most the spark that ignited a series of explosions of increasing intensity that occurred over the next several days, most of them outside Jerusalem, that quickly blew any prospect of a speedy resolution.

It was, of course, the Palestinians who called these uprisings an intifada – a shaking-off, in Arabic – though it is interesting that, in contrast to previous Israeli-Arab conflicts, which each side named differently, in these two cases the Israelis also adopted the Arab term.

Despite their opposing perspectives, for both sides these prolonged outbursts of violence represented a change in consciousness that set them aside from other chapters of the post-Six-Day War era.

So what made these episodes intifadas? In retrospect, you could say it was their extended duration. While there is no agreement on when they actually ended, both ultimately petered out after about four years. But they were being called an intifada already in their first months, long before anyone knew how long they would last.

This wasn’t just an exercise in “branding.” In both cases it was clear, first to the Palestinians, and then the Israelis as well, that something had fundamentally changed.

By late 1987, after more than 20 years of occupation – during which successive Israeli governments of the left and right had allowed and sometimes encouraged a blurring of the Green Line between Israel in its pre-1967 borders and the territories it wrested from Jordanian and Egyptian occupation in the Six-Day War – collective Palestinian frustration in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem boiled over and resulted in a grassroots uprising.

It was not planned, and only toward its latter stages did the main Palestinian organizations – including the nascent Islamic movement Hamas – manage to gain some control of the streets.

But the realization on both sides that the Palestinians weren’t going to allow Israel to achieve a peaceful occupation and a de facto annexation was clear from those first months.

And while there had previously been long periods of violent protests and unrest, it was the first time that the demonstrations captured in such a way the imaginations of the both the Palestinians and the Israelis, as well as the outside world.

The first intifada failed to dislodge the occupation or the settlements, but it succeeded in repainting the Green Line and establishing the Palestinian claim to the occupied territories.

Ironically, while Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization tried to claim public ownership of the spontaneous first intifada, initially it claimed that the second one – for which it did have a large degree of responsibility – was popular and unplanned.

The intifada’s evolution into a concerted campaign of suicide bombings in buses and cafes within the Green Line quickly underscored just how much Arafat’s underlings and the rival Palestinian factions were organizing the uprising. But they had blown up Israeli buses in previous rounds of violence, and they had not been considered an intifada.

What changed in late 2000 was that when the 8-year Oslo process finally collapsed, there were now well-armed and organized militias in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel, of course, still had overwhelming firepower and resources, but the whole point of the second intifada was to try to prove to Israelis that their army couldn’t deliver security.

Ultimately that failed, and Arafat’s successor, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, has since clung to his conclusion that an armed struggle will not deliver a Palestinian state.

The myth of the third intifada, circulated largely on social media, was in the making as soon as the second one ended, and has been intensely hyped up since the first revolutions of the Arab Spring, in early 2011.

But for all the third intifada Facebook pages (“liked” largely by those living far from the region), it hasn’t happened, because there is as yet no great motivation for a paradigm-changing uprising.

The monopolies dominating the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and yes, even Hamas, still have too much of a vested interest in the current distribution of power.

The periodic conflagrations between Israel and Hamas in Gaza were not intifadas, and neither is the current upsurge in stabbings, terror attacks using cars, Jewish vigilante reprisals, and clashes between police and rock-throwing youths at the usual flash points on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and the Qalandiyah checkpoint, spreading at times to Arab communities within the Green Line.

They will probably diminish over time. But even if they do not, as long as the PA retains control of its enclaves in the West Bank and Hamas still has an interest in perpetuating its rule in the Gaza Strip, there will be no third intifada.

Only a (presumably Hamas-backed) revolt that is broad enough to topple the power structure in Ramallah, or a conscious decision by Abbas and his successors to relinquish control and, like Arafat in 2000, allow the PA security forces to turn their guns on Israelis, could unleash a third intifada.

We don’t have that now. All we have is another bitter cycle of bloodshed, born of frustration and leading nowhere.

Edited November 18, 2014 by yolo