Толстый и тонкий

[namenski]

За Андурила, од грађана Русије:

 

[Budja]

Znaci, sada si stigao do tacke da atmosferu u kojoj se ubijaju politicki protivnici i novinari uporedis sa Fergusonom radi relativizacije kao ovaj lik dole? Dobro.

 

 

 

Relativizacije cega ?

 

"Atmosfere" kao lukavog nacina da se ubiju politicari a za to na keca optuzi vlast bas zato sto se ne raspolaze nikakvim cvrstim dokazima (za sada)?

O, da. Relativizovacu takav bedni retoricki trik, takvo bedno uopstavanje uvek.

Edited March 8, 2015 by Budja

[dillinger]

Pa imam svrhe da se nerviram jer postuješ ratnohuškačke tekstove protiv moje druge domovine.

 

I drugo, nisi stavio tekst pa rekao "ovo je mejnstrim, a ja sa sa ovim ne slažem", nego stavljaš konstantno tekstove koji prizivaju vojnu intervenciju protiv Rusije, koji prizivaju ekonomske sankcije protiv jedne zemlje gde žive ljudi koji su moji prijatelji i ponašaš se kao da stojiš iza tih tekstova.

Prema tome, oladi malo s ratnohuškačkom propagandom.

 

 

Preteruješ. Anduril postavlja itekako relevantne tekstove iz Ekonomista, Gardijana itd. A nismo još došli do stadijuma gde se može staviti zabrana na baš sve što dolazi sa mejnstrim zapada, i da se tretiraju kao Kurir. Ako ništa, to pisanje utiče na živote milijardi ljudi.

[urkozamanje]

Sve ostalo na stranu, ali Rusija jeste izvrsila oruzano pripajanje dela zemlje ciju je bezbednost garantovala.

Aj nevezano za sve ostalo, kako je to krim pripojen oruzano? Koliko ima mrtvih, proteranih, pohapsenih i poslatih u logore? Mis'im znam kako zvuci, ali cak i da ne uzmemo u obzir istoriju istog i odnos sa Rusijom, ipak je bez obzira na sve 1 cinjenica da je Krim otisao bas glatko i ne vidim i ne cujem da stanovnici istog imaju problem sa tim.

 

DNR i LNR kritike stvarno razumem, ljudska nesreca je u pitanju. Ali ponekad mi stvarno nije jasno kukanje nad Krimom. Ok, ovima sa druge strane sahovske table sigurno jeste trn u oku i jasno mi je gde zulja, ali nama posmatracima.. bas ne razumem.

[Аврам Гојић]

Ne znam šta da ti kažem.

[dillinger]

Elem, zašto nije moguće da neki novi Monsters of Rock u Moskvi 2021. nakon pada Putina pohodi dva miliona mladih Rusa:

 

 

Russia’s anti-U.S. sentiment now is even worse than it was in Soviet Union

 

MOSCOW — Thought the Soviet Union was anti-American? Try today’s Russia.

 

 

 

After a year in which furious rhetoric has been pumped across Russian airwaves, anger toward the United States is at its worst since opinion
polls began tracking it. From ordinary street vendors all the way up to the Kremlin, a wave of anti-U.S. bile has swept the country, surpassing any time since the Stalin era, observers say.

The indignation peaked after the assassination of Kremlin critic Boris Nemtsov, as conspiracy theories started to swirl — just a few hours after he was killed — that his death was a CIA plot to discredit Russia. (On Sunday, Russia charged two men from Chechnya, and detained three others, in connection with Nemtsov’s killing.)

There are drives to exchange Western-branded clothing for Russia’s red, blue and white. Efforts to replace Coke with Russian-made soft drinks. Fury over U.S. sanctions. And a passionate, conspiracy-laden fascination with the methods that Washington is supposedly using to foment unrest in Ukraine and Russia.

The anger is a challenge for U.S. policymakers seeking to reach out to a shrinking pool of friendly faces in Russia. And it is a marker of the limits of their ability to influence Russian decision-making after a year of sanctions. More than 80 percent of Russians now hold negative views of the United States, according to the independent Levada Center, a number that has more than doubled over the past year and that is by far the highest negative rating since the center started tracking those views in 1988.

Nemtsov’s assassination, thehighest-profile political killingduring Vladi­mir Putin’s 15 years in power, was yet another brutal strike against pro-Western forces in Russia. Nemtsov had long modeled himself on Western politicians and amassed a long list of enemies who resented him for it.

The anti-Western anger stands to grow even stronger if President Obama decides to send lethal weaponry to the Ukrainian military, as he has been considering. The aim would be to “raise the cost” of any Russian intervention by making the Ukrainian response more lethal. But even some of Putin’s toughest critics say they cannot support that proposal, since the cost is the lives of their nation’s soldiers.

“The United States is experimenting geopolitically, using people like guinea pigs,” said Sergey Mikheev, director of the Kremlin-allied Center for Current Politics, on a popular talk show on the state-run First Channel last year. His accusations, drawn out by a host who said it was important to “know the enemy,” were typical of the rhetoric that fills Russian airwaves. “They treat us all in the same way, threatening not only world stability but the existence of every human being on the planet,” Mikheev said.

Soviet rhetoric was officially anti-Western, but it couldn’t repress ordinary Russians’ passion for the Beatles nor their enthusiasm for getting news from jammed Voice of America broadcasts. Those positive feelings spilled over after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

But the list of perceived slights from the United States has long been building, particularly after the United States and NATO bombed Serbia, a Russian ally, in 1999. Then came the war in Iraq, NATO expansion and the Russian-Georgian conflict. Each time, there were smaller spikes of anti-American sentiment that receded as quickly as they were built.

Putin cranked up the volume after protest movements in late 2011 and 2012, which he blamed on the State Department. It wasn’t until last year, when the crisis started in Ukraine, that anti-Americanism spread even among those who once eagerly hopped on planes to Miami and Los Angeles.

 

Fed by the powerful antagonism on Russian federal television channels, the main source of news for more than 90 percent of Russians, ordinary people started to feel more and more disillusioned. The anger seems different from the fast-receding jolts of the past, observers say, having spread faster and wider.

The years of perceived humiliations have “led to anti-Americanism at the grass-roots level, which did not exist before,” said Vladimir Pozner, a journalist who for decades was a prominent voice of the Soviet Union in the United States. More recently, he has to explain the United States inside Russia. “We don’t like the Americans, and it’s because they’re pushy, they think they’re unique and they have had no regard for anyone else.”

Anti-American measures quickly suffused the nation, ranging from the symbolic to the truly significant. Some coffee shops in Crimea stopped serving Americanos. Activists projected racially charged images of Obama eating a banana onto the side of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Russians cheerfully flocked to exchange Western-branded clothing for T-shirts with pictures of an Iskander missile launcher that said “Sanctions? Don’t make my Iskander laugh.”

“This anti-Western propaganda radically changed the atmosphere in the society,” said Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, the opinion polling firm. “It has become militarist.”

Many Russians tapped into a deep-rooted resentment that after modeling themselves on the West following the breakup of the Soviet Union, they had experienced only hardship and humiliation in return.

“Starting from about 1989, we completely reoriented toward the West. We looked at them as a future paradise. We expected that once we had done all that they demanded, we’d dance for them and they would finally hug and kiss us and we would merge in ecstasy,” said Evgeny Tarlo, a member of Russia’s upper house of parliament, on a Russian talk show last year. Instead, he said, the West has been trying to destroy Russia.

The anti-Americanism makes it harder for American culture to make inroads through its traditional means — soft-power routes such as movies, music and education. Last year, Russian policymakers ended a decades-old high school exchange program that offered their nation’s best and brightest the chance to spend semesters at U.S. schools. Few Western artists now perform on Russian soil.

Western diplomats also say privately that they find themselves frozen out of speaking engagements and other opportunities to explain their countries’ positions to Russian audiences. And Russians who work for local outposts of Western companies say their friends and neighbors increasingly question their patriotism.

A handful of business leaders have warned that Russia risks permanently stunting its own economic development with the angry self-isolation.

“I worry that the recent crisis might drive Russia into a certain historic confrontation, hampering the country's development in all spheres,” said former finance minister and Putin ally Alexey Kudrin in an interview with TASS.

But those are lonely voices amid the torrent of anti-Western fury.

“What the government knew was that it was very easy to cultivate anti-Western sentiments, and it was easy to consolidate Russian society around this propaganda,” said Maria Lipman, an independent Moscow-based political analyst who is working on a study of anti-Western attitudes.

Even McDonald’s, long an embodiment of Russian dreams about the West, was targeted for supposed health violations last fall. Some of its most prominent locations were forced to shut down temporarily. When they reopened, McDonald’s started an advertising campaign emphasizing its local ties and its 25-year history in Russia, downplaying the Golden Arches’ global significance as a bright beacon of America.

Last week, one McDonald’s billboard in the heart of Moscow read: “Made in Russia, for Russians.”

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-anti-us-sentiment-now-is-even-worse-than-it-was-in-soviet-union/2015/03/08/b7d534c4-c357-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 8, 2015 by dillinger

[urkozamanje]

Reci mi sta mislis, normalno. Sta drugo? Ne razumem, jesam li neupucen (ne znam za strahote Krima) ili je moj stav i pogled na to toliko los da si bez teksta?

 

 

edit: ulete dilinger

Edited March 8, 2015 by urkozamanje

[kobni zelaya]

Preteruješ. Anduril postavlja itekako relevantne tekstove iz Ekonomista, Gardijana itd. A nismo još došli do stadijuma gde se može staviti zabrana na baš sve što dolazi sa mejnstrim zapada, i da se tretiraju kao Kurir. Ako ništa, to pisanje utiče na živote milijardi ljudi.

 

Gledaj, ja stvarno nemam vremena da pravim analizu i kvotujem petnaest tekstova koje je postovao, ali svako malo kad dođem ovde da čitam naletim na bar dva-tri ovakva njegova posta. Obrati pažnju na šta je boldovao, njegov komentar, kao i link koji ide iz teksta pod "providing lethal defensive military asistance". I to čak nisu Gardijan i Ekonomist, ma šta ja o njima mislio.

Čovek aktivno sprovodi kampanju za naoružavanje Ukrajine. Važi što to nije ratno huškanje.

 

 

Posto volim da nerviram Jodu sa SFRJ poredjenjima, eto jednog dobrog teksta iz te perspektive:

 

The Ukrainian School of War

VIENNA – The ongoing turmoil in Ukraine has frequently been compared to the Yugoslav crisis of the early 1990s – and, indeed, there are many similarities. But, when it comes to understanding why the conflict between Ukraine's government and Russian-backed separatists has persisted – and why, after a year of increasingly brutal fighting, a resolution seems so remote – the differences are far more important.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's tactics in Ukraine do resemble those of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Putin's misuse of World War II references in propaganda, aimed at fueling intense Russian nationalism, is often said to be a cut-and-paste replica of Milošević's disinformation campaigns in the early 1990s, which stirred up anti-Croat sentiment among Serbs.

Both Putin and Milošević empowered ethnic kin in the countries over which they wanted to assert control, before launching military invasions under the pretense of protecting those kin. Finally, both leaders secured the establishment of self-proclaimed “republics" within another country's borders.

Given these similarities, many argue that Western powers should emulate their approach to ending the crisis in Yugoslavia – and that means providing “lethal defensive military assistance" to Ukraine. After all, it is asserted, the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War became possible only after the Americans decided to arm the Croats and Bosnian Muslims.

But, of course, Putin's Russia is not Milošević's Serbia. Russia is not a footnote in history or a Balkan mini-state; it is a nuclear Great Power, against which Ukraine, however heavily armed, does not stand a chance militarily. Given this, providing weapons to Ukraine would exacerbate the bloodletting, without compelling Putin to reconsider his approach and support a lasting peace.

Moreover, the geopolitical context has changed considerably in the last two decades. At the time of the Yugoslav war, the West not only occupied the moral high ground, but was also viewed as invincible, owing to its Cold War victory. Today, the West is perceived as in decline, with America's legitimacy as a global leader increasingly called into question.

In this context, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is right to oppose arming Ukraine. But she is wrong to assume that negotiations with the Russians can produce a lasting solution like the Dayton Accords, because the conflicts themselves are fundamentally different. Whereas Yugoslavia experienced a local crisis with broader European implications, Ukraine is mired in a European crisis with local implications.

Milošević had a clear strategic objective: to create a Greater Serbia. To this end, he wanted either to redraw the region's borders, or at least conclude a deal that gave autonomy to Serbian-majority regions outside of Serbia proper. Negotiations to end the Balkan wars were possible precisely because they centered on maps.

For Putin, the annexation of Crimea was sufficient, in a strategic sense. He is no longer interested in redrawing lines on maps. His actions are not driven primarily by a determination to annex the Donbas region (which is of negligible strategic importance to Russia), carve out a land corridor to Crimea, or create a frozen conflict.

Putin remains involved in Ukraine for reasons that seem largely pedagogical. He has a message for the sanctimonious West – and for the Ukrainians who craved entry into its club.

For the West, the message is that Russia will not tolerate meddling in its backyard. In Putin's view, the West must acknowledge the entire post-Soviet space, minus the Baltic states, as Russia's exclusive sphere of influence. (The Kremlin's apparent failure to anticipate China's refusal to accept such a dispensation – particularly in Central Asia, which is key to President Xi Jinping's economic vision – represents a puzzling lapse in Putin's strategic calculus.)

For Ukraine – and its new government, in particular – the message is that the country cannot survive, at least not within its current borders, without Russia's support. Putin also wants to show Ukrainians that, at the end of the day, the West does not really care about them. Americans will not fight for them, and Europeans will not provide the money that their government so desperately needs.

The West's motivations in Ukraine, too, seem more pedagogical than strategic: to show Putin that changing borders by force is unacceptable in Europe today. The hope is that economic sanctions, together with Russian casualties on the ground, will force Russia humbly to accept its post-Cold War status as a third-rate power, while sending the additional message that any effort to revise the US-led world order is doomed to fail – with serious economic costs.

Clear strategic objectives enable negotiating parties to concede that half a loaf is better than none. But two sides that simply want to teach each other a lesson lack the common ground needed to hammer out a compromise acceptable to both. That is one reason why today's negotiations on Ukraine are bound to achieve only patchy, short-lived truces, not the kind of long-term solution that was reached after the Bosnian War.

 

[dillinger]

Pa stav da Ukrajince treba naoružati nije nelegitiman, uostalom, i pobunjenici već imaju u posedu neke prilično moderne igračke iz ruskog, postsovjetskog doba.  Na stranu to što taj stav zastupaju uzduž i popreko svi od Karla Bilta do Džona Mekejna i šta sad trebamo ih sve ignorisati?

 

Anduril takođe to uvek nastoji predstaviti kao ne nešto za šta navija već ružnu neminovnost i posledicu ruskog mešanja. Tako je pre godinu mračila i druga strana kad je najavljivala brutalan ruski odgovor na Majdan, licitiralo se sa tim dokle će Rusi ići dal do Krima ili Berlina. Ne sumnjam da su mnogi i potajno priželjkivali takav scenario

Edited March 8, 2015 by dillinger

[Prospero]

^^

pa, realno, nije ratno huškanje.

Edited March 8, 2015 by Prospero

[Anduril]

 

Gledaj, ja stvarno nemam vremena da pravim analizu i kvotujem petnaest tekstova koje je postovao, ali svako malo kad dođem ovde da čitam naletim na bar dva-tri ovakva njegova posta. Obrati pažnju na šta je boldovao, njegov komentar, kao i link koji ide iz teksta pod "providing lethal defensive military asistance". I to čak nisu Gardijan i Ekonomist, ma šta ja o njima mislio.

Čovek aktivno sprovodi kampanju za naoružavanje Ukrajine. Važi što to nije ratno huškanje.

 

 

 

Sto odmah ne kazes da nisi razumeo sta pise u tekstu i sta sam zapravo boldovao. Covek kritikuje obe strane da nemaju jasan cilj i da to otezava dogovor. Sta je tu tacno toliko strasno?

Edited March 8, 2015 by Anduril

[kobni zelaya]

Pa stav da Ukrajince treba naoružati nije nelegitiman, uostalom, i pobunjenici već imaju u posedu neke prilično moderne igračke iz ruskog, postsovjetskog doba.  Na stranu to što taj stav zastupaju uzduž i popreko svi od Karla Bilta do Džona Mekejna i šta sad trebamo ih sve ignorisati?

 

Anduril takođe to uvek nastoji predstaviti kao ne nešto za šta navija već ružnu neminovnost i posledicu ruskog mešanja. Tako je pre godinu mračila i druga strana kad je najavljivala brutalan ruski odgovor na Majdan, licitiralo se sa tim dokle će Rusi ići dal do Krima ili Berlina. Ne sumnjam da su mnogi i potajno priželjkivali takav scenario

Reci mi, ko je, osim banovanago pizaza (i to eventualno) na forumu sprovodio takvu kampanju za naoružanje bilo koga. Kakav je to legitiman stav na forumu da treba nekog naoružavati? Šta je tu legitimno? Jel' naoružavanje vodi miru? Jel' to diskutabilno?

[kobni zelaya]

Pa sto odmah ne kazes da nisi razumeo sta pise u ovom tekstu i sta sam zapravo boldovao. Covek zapravo kritikuje obe strane da nemaju jasan cilj i da to otezava dogovor. Sta je tu tacno toliko strasno?

Da, a jasan cilj za Zapad treba da bude ovo (moj bold):

 

The West's motivations in Ukraine, too, seem more pedagogical than strategic: to show Putin that changing borders by force is unacceptable in Europe today. The hope is that economic sanctions, together with Russian casualties on the ground, will force Russia humbly to accept its post-Cold War status as a third-rate power, while sending the additional message that any effort to revise the US-led world order is doomed to fail – with serious economic costs.

 

Šta su "casulties on the ground"? Jesu li to ljudi ili komarci?

 

I što si stavio link na ono Biltovo proseravanje? Šta, mi kao ovde nismo jedno četrdeset puta pročitali šta za šta se Bilt zalaže?

[dillinger]

Reci mi, ko je, osim banovanago pizaza (i to eventualno) na forumu sprovodio takvu kampanju za naoružanje bilo koga. Kakav je to legitiman stav na forumu da treba nekog naoružavati? Šta je tu legitimno? Jel' naoružavanje vodi miru? Jel' to diskutabilno?

 

Nisam znao da je ovo forum pacifista.

[Anduril]

Da, a jasan cilj za Zapad treba da bude ovo (moj bold):

 

The West's motivations in Ukraine, too, seem more pedagogical than strategic: to show Putin that changing borders by force is unacceptable in Europe today. The hope is that economic sanctions, together with Russian casualties on the ground, will force Russia humbly to accept its post-Cold War status as a third-rate power, while sending the additional message that any effort to revise the US-led world order is doomed to fail – with serious economic costs.

 

Šta su "casulties on the ground"? Jesu li to ljudi ili komarci?

 

I što si stavio link na ono Biltovo proseravanje? Šta, mi kao ovde nismo jedno četrdeset puta pročitali šta za šta se Bilt zalaže?

 

Da li ti shvatas da lik samo prenosi stavove raznih strana da bi analizirao? Ono uopste nije njegov zakljucak.

Edited March 8, 2015 by Anduril