https://x.com/EleanorOlcott/status/1992952422117871855

Ceo članak:

https://archive.is/rNDK2

Mogu da potvrdim. U centru Shangaja i Pekinga tise nego u nekoj BG pripizdini. Svaka im cast.

China’s economy is likely to grow more quickly than previously forecast, helped by the government’s determination to advance the competitiveness of manufacturing and boost exports, Goldman Sachs Research finds.   

China’s real export growth is now expected to grow by 5-6% annually for the next few years, up from a previous forecast of 2-3%, as Chinese goods gain global market share, Goldman Sachs Research economists Andrew Tilton and Hui Shan write in the team’s report.

https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/chinas-economy-is-forecast-to-grow-faster-than-expected-in-2026

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trump-after-call-with-china-s-xi-told-tokyo-to-lower-the-volume-on-taiwan/ar-AA1Re5ky?ocid=msedgntp&pc=U531&cvid=69287c0473154ba7a00482751f7f143a&ei=14

Igra prestola u KPK:

Recently, a series of unusual developments have raised questions among China watchers: Is Xi Jinping still firmly in control of the CCP, or is an internal contest for power breaking out into the open? … 

The most telling signs of a power shift have come from an unprecedented sequence of purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). … 

These three waves of purges can be interpreted through several distinct yet overlapping narratives.

1. Xi’s Deliberate Consolidation: This narrative presents Xi as intentionally removing corrupt, politically unreliable, or dissenting officers. His objective is to create an ideologically cohesive, smaller elite officer core within the PLA. The purging campaign is an extension of Xi’s campaign to purify the military and ensure Party control.

2. Hijacked Purge: In this narrative, Xi initially launched the anti-corruption campaign but lost control of it as other CCP and CMC elites – likely Vice Chair Zhang Youxia and remnants of the Shaanxi Gang – redirected the purge to protect their own networks or reshape the officer core to fit their interests. The removal of Xi-aligned generals affiliated with the Fujian Clique may represent a counter-balancing effort within the PLA elite.

3. Temporary Power Loss & Retrenchment: In this scenario, Xi briefly lost influence over the purge mechanism from mid-2024 to early-2025, when the campaign turned against his Fujian clique allies. In this narrative, Xi reasserted control prior to the 2025 Victory Day parade in early September. The purges became technical, not political in nature, and subsequently were formalized prior to the Fourth Plenum to demonstrate renewed control.

4. Party Reassertion: In this narrative, the purges are not purely factional at all. Instead, they are an institutional correction to curb the over-centralization of the command and control apparatus on Xi. The reemergence of “collective leadership” and “democratic centralism” in PLA Daily articles supports the idea that the CCP is reasserting traditional mechanisms that facilitate collective decision-making control.

.. Simultaneous to the PLA purges, several PLA Daily articles, written by academics tied to Zhang, have subtly promoted “collective leadership” and “democratic centralism” – rhetoric that runs counter to Xi’s unified control. What is more, these articles openly, if implicitly, contradicted an article published by Xi Jinping in Qiushi, the CCP’s flagship ideological journal, in December 2024, reaffirming the need for centralized, unified control of the CCP’s leadership apparatus. In speeches to PLA soldiers, Zhang Youxia has emphasized the need to ensure obedience to party directives and loyalty to the CCP, but notably failed to equate the party’s will with Xi’s.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/purges-and-power-is-china-quietly-rebalancing-its-command-structure/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

E to se zove startap

https://x.com/Reuters/status/2000472141746045019

In this video, we explore the most high-tech things in the fastest growing tech-hub city in the world -Shenzhen!

Pakao

China is on track to achieve full independence in semiconductor manufacturing?

https://reuters.com/world/china/how-china-built-its-manhattan-project-rival-west-ai-chips-2025-12-17/

https://x.com/lukOlejnik/status/2001541445765742639

Edited December 18, 2025Dec 18 by vememah

https://x.com/tomshardware/status/2005656659729809871

https://x.com/alex_kokcharov/status/2011435264842125642

Smanjenje robne razmene Kine i Rusije je posledica, pre svega, Rusije koja je ogranicila uzov kineskih prevoznih sredstava da im Kinezi ne bi poptuno "potopili" industriju prevoznih vozila i visokih kamata ruske CB. AvtoVAZ je imao probleme tokom 2025, nisu Kinezi samo problem, visoke kamatne stope ruske CB su imale isto znacajnu ulogu. Kamatne stope su imale ulogu da Rusi manje kupuju automobile, pa i kineske.

Drugi razlog je niza cena sirovina, kao posledica Trampve politike, koja direktono pogoduje Kini kao velikom uvozniku sirovina poput nafte ili gasa. Ako se pogleda kolicina prodatih sirovina iz Rusije u Kinu, tu nema nekih dramaticnih odstupanja od prosle godine ali kada se ukljuci cena, onda dolazi do veceg pada u obimu novca koje Rusija uzela od Kine.

Rusija ima trgovinski suficit sa Kinom, koji se povecao ove godine u odnosu na proslu kao posledica toga da je Rusija vise smanjila uvoz nego izvoz u Kinu.