Primaju i te kako.

the claim is paired with assertions that stores operating in freely convertible currency (MLC) and the tourism sector have suffered a colossal collapse, plunging into freefall. GAESA holds a significant presence in both sectors

https://cubasi.cu/en/article/tale-gaesa

With the rate of 1x24, GAESA companies can buy dollars at a bargain price, import cheap products, and then sell them in MLC as if the dollar were worth 440 pesos. It's a lucrative business.

https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-12-18-u1-e207888-s27061-nid316987-nueva-politica-cambiaria-regimen-explicada-muela

Most of GAESA’s personnel are paid salaries in national currency, while business revenues largely come from sales denominated in dollars or MLC (a so called freely convertible currency that is represented by a debit card).

https://horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu/news/gaesa-invisible-elephant-cubas-macroeconomic-stabilization

19 minutes ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Nije ni nitpicking ni sneaky, bukvalno na to ciljam. Pomenuta teza iz teksta je da GAESA eksploatiše radnike tako što ih plaća u pezosima za koje oni moraju da kupe dolare (kako bi pazarili u GAESA radnjama).

To jeste apsurd, to niko živi ne radi. Dollar-only stores su samo za ljude koji dolare već imaju (bilo da su stranci, bilo da rade sa turistima, bilo da primaju uplate iz inostranstva). Svrha im je upravo da izvuku te dolare iz sive zone. Ali da neko zarađuje pezose, onda ih menja na ulici za dolare, a onda ide da tom šakom jada kupi nešto u GAESA radnjama, to je suicidan scenario izmišljen za potrebe članka.

Ne. Izvini, ali ta teza o eksploataciji se ne odnosi na to da radnici plaćeni u pezosima "moraju" da kupuju dolare (opet: nigde u članku ne piše da oni moraju da kupuju dolare ili pazare u GAESA radnjama), već ima veze sa ovim:

GAESA’s many companies tap into the country’s foreign hard-currency revenues, and its business model keeps labor costs and taxes at a minimum, which may help explain the exorbitant hoard of dollars the military amassed even as ordinary Cubans became poorer and poorer.

I ovim:

“GAESA operates with a near-monopoly control in lucrative sectors, allowing it to set prices and conditions without real competition,” said Pavel Vidal Alejandro, a Cuban economist and professor at the Pontificia Javeriana University in Colombia who reviewed GAESA’s financial data at the Herald’s request. “Its ability to manipulate regulatory frameworks to its advantage, introducing revenue-extraction mechanisms without external auditing or oversight, transparency and accountability, contributes to maximizing its profits.”

I ovim:

Another way Gaviota rakes in the cash: Cuban labor laws don’t allow foreign companies to hire Cuban workers directly. Instead, the foreign firms pay the salaries in hard currency to government employment agencies— which pocket the money and pay the Cuban workers in pesos. Gaviota has its own hiring agency that pockets the salaries paid by Meliá and others.

Edited December 25, 2025Dec 25 by dunja

OK, cela teza o dvojnoj valuti kao uzroku eksploatacije je glupa, ja sam se uhvatio samo za deo u kom se ističe da recepcionar ne bi mogao da priušti apartman ili flašu viskija u luksuznom hotelu u kom radi (kao da to ne važi za recepcionara u Waldorf Astoria, Las Vegas.) Ali možemo i da se osvrnemo na detalje koje ti izdvajaš:

1. Da se vlasnici luksuznih hotela bogate dok sirotinja gladuje, stvarno čudo neviđeno.

2. Da vojska ne podleže formalnim mehanizmima nadzora i kontrole, stvarno čudo neviđeno.

3. Da se agencije ugrađuju u recruitment umesto da prepuste radnike blagodarnim poslodavcima, stvarno čudo neviđeno.

Pomeraš stative. Rekao si nešto što ne stoji. I to je to.

Uzrok esploatacije nije dvojna valuta, to nije ni simplifikacija, to prosto nije tačno. Niti sam to ja rekla, niti se to tvrdi u članku.

Ali da ne širimo.

Havana Times

Gasoline in Dollars: The Gap Widens Between Cubans - Hava...

Gasoline has become a scarce commodity, a privilege that divides even among car owners: those with access to dollars and those who don't.

Neki detalji iz spomenutog FT-ovog članka iz oktobra prošle godine iz drugog klipa:

Chinese trade with Latin America has grown more than tenfold over the past two decades and continues to surge: China has become the second-largest trading partner for the region, after the US. But the import of Chinese goods to Cuba fell from $1.7bn in 2017 to $1.1bn in 2022, the last year for which Cuban data is available.

The two countries do not release data on Chinese investment in Cuba, but Cuban economist Omar Everleny said it amounted to a “laughably small” proportion of the roughly $160bn Beijing invested in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2005 and 2020.

Chinese companies involved with state-backed deals were owed large sums by the Cuban state, said people briefed on the debts. Major Chinese companies such as Huawei and [bus maker] Yutong “are owed hundreds of millions of dollars each”, said an overseas businessperson who trades with the island.

Scant raw materials and an unproductive economy leave the island with little to export to China, while imports have diminished in recent years as hardened US sanctions severely aggravated Havana’s chronic late-payment problems and dried-up credit lines. (...)

Cuba today does not even feature among China’s top-tier allies in Latin America. Beijing has what it calls “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, all major commodity exporters, but not with Cuba.

China publicly supports Cuba’s right to choose its own path to economic development “in line with its national conditions”, but privately Chinese officials have long urged the Cuban leadership to shift from its vertically planned economy to something closer to the Chinese model, according to economists and diplomats briefed on the situation.

Chinese officials have been perplexed and frustrated at the Cuban leadership’s unwillingness to decisively implement a market-oriented reform programme despite the glaring dysfunction of the status quo, the people said.

https://www.ft.com/content/9ca0a495-d5d9-4cc5-acf5-43f42a9128b4

Arhiviran ceo članak:

https://archive.is/tz2Sf

Edited December 25, 2025Dec 25 by vememah

Još neki tizeri za Arteovu reportažu iz posta iznad - samohranu majku Feliciju, čiji se stan u starom delu Havane obrušio, privremeno su s porodicom smestili u boksersku salu na, kako joj je rečeno, 15 dana, što dosad traje 2 godine. U salu su smeštene još tri porodice sličnih sudbina, navodno ima puno obrušavanja pa ih nemaju gde (iako vojni hoteli zvrje poluprazni). Kuriozitet su natpis "Kosovo je Srbija" i zastava Srbije i bokserskog kluba Mačva iz Šapca na zidu sale.

Edited December 25, 2025Dec 25 by vememah

1 hour ago, vememah said:

Neki detalji iz spomenutog FT-ovog članka iz oktobra prošle godine iz drugog klipa:

https://www.ft.com/content/9ca0a495-d5d9-4cc5-acf5-43f42a9128b4

Arhiviran ceo članak:

https://archive.is/tz2Sf

Oni zive nase 90te.

6 minutes ago, Mel said:

Oni zive nase 90te.

Bar nemaju zimu sa restrikcijama struje.

Konzerva of $12, Raul/geza in sisa ko ovce vrv neki junk anyways

Mada ending of Che the movie - baba plovi ka kubi da se digne revolucija; Che gleda bracu kastro - Fidel diktira a Raul hvata beleske

Kuba - Pišanje po sirotinji topik

On 21. 12. 2025. at 21:47, Bud Stonebraker said:

Pavel Vidal Alejandro, bivsi zaposleni u kub. centralnoj banci, kaze nisu (mada ovo je delom 1 spansko selo za mene - 1 appeal to authority

https://horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu/news/what-effects-do-us-sanctions-have-cuban-economy

Interesantno da dinari iz Majamija predstavljaju 6.8% GDP (mozda I vise danas?)

Zapravo kaze da jesu, za one koji citaju i za one koje ne mrzi da postage i pasus koji nisi postavio.

In summary, the econometric estimates confirmed the significant impact of shifts in sanctions policy on Cuba’s economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that fluctuations in the flows of goods, U.S. visitor revenue, and remittances from the United States significantly influenced the trajectory of Cuba’s GDP. The study highlights the vulnerability of Cuban families and the private sector to changes in sanctions policies.

While the econometric results confirm the economic impact of sanctions, they do not justify the Cuban government’s exclusive attribution of the country’s economic difficulties to the embargo. There are internal barriers that clearly limit the economy’s competitiveness, its ability to fully integrate into the global economy, and its capacity to expand exports.

However, it is important to clarify that the estimations do not seek to approximate the total cost of the sanctions. Nor do they attempt to assess the full benefit that the future lifting of all sanctions could bring to the Cuban economy.  Due to the multiple areas and channels through which sanctions restrict trade, finance, investment, and economic growth, determining a total cost for the sanctions is exceptionally complex.

Without a clear counterfactual, measuring the true impact of the sanctions is inherently difficult. Although U.S. sanctions have not succeeded in altering Cuba’s political and economic system, it is impossible to determine what would have happened in their absence.

Ja sam se pitao šta sprečava saveznike da pomognu Kubi, tj. njenom stanovništvu i evo odgovora - Kubanci, tj. trenutni kubanski režim. Kini je očigledno ekonomski interes bitniji od ideološkog ili od političkog uticaja u SAD komšiluku, što je sasvim na mestu. Ali ako Kuba neće da joj bude bolje, nemaju oni šta više da urade po tom pitanju.

On 12/25/2025 at 5:17 PM, vememah said:

China publicly supports Cuba’s right to choose its own path to economic development “in line with its national conditions”, but privately Chinese officials have long urged the Cuban leadership to shift from its vertically planned economy to something closer to the Chinese model, according to economists and diplomats briefed on the situation.

Chinese officials have been perplexed and frustrated at the Cuban leadership’s unwillingness to decisively implement a market-oriented reform programme despite the glaring dysfunction of the status quo, the people said.

Za poslednjih sto godina smo videli sve najbolje i najgore od komunizma i kapitalizma, i red bi bio da neko malo razmisli o boljem uređenju, kombinaciji najboljih segmenata iz svakog, a ne da insistira na propalim i dokazano lošim politikama.

@Budja da, laik treba da procita par puta!

Trgovina&US turisti kao deo kubanskog GDP izgleda uvek bio neznatan; ne vidim kako nesto cega nije ni bilo moze da dovede do trenutnog kubanskog kolapsa.

Vidim remittances sky high; sto vise rastu+relativno mala trgovina+turisti to su vise u bedaku (kao udeo kubanskog GDP)

Ipak, kubanci kazu da su ih trumpove sankcije kostale $5-6 milijardi godisnje lately.

Opet, kubanci kazu da su ih sankcije of fidela do danas kostale $144bil, UN $130, + gorenavedene, make it $160bil podeljeno sa 65 godina=$2.5bil/godisnje, velike cifre za malu ekonomiju

Cinici bi rekli, a koliko nas je kostao kastro?

Kubanci takodje nemaju obicaj da placaju dugove; kina oprostila nekih $6-9bil, pariski klub nekih $8.5bil, rasha whooping $32bil, Mexico&Japan $1.5 bil

kako smo krenuli, doci cemo dotle da kuba ima srece s tim sankcijama. ko zna u kojoj banani bi bili da ih nema.