Permanentna kriza domaće ekonomije

[namenski]

Dobro si me podsetio  :)

 

Zaboravio sam ашчинице, 1 od osnovnih, u svakom slucaju 1 od glavnih oblika u kojima se manifestuje preduzetnistvo u Srbiji.

[Prospero]

Evo par crtica i zaključka iz jedne klasične studije o našem gigantu (MKS - Sartid) iz '98, zadnja rečenica vredi i danas:
 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139708412489?journalCode=ceas20

The Smederevo steel complex originated in the formation of a company called SARTID in 1913 for ore exploitation and iron working. In 1921 it began building an iron construction and waggon repair factory, with a foundry and rolling mills on site at this Danube port. In 1937 it added an open hearth steel furnace. It did not acquire smelting capacity. It was nationalised in 1946, then slowly expanded during the 1950s, so raw steel output rose from 40 500 tons in 1951 to 79 790 tons in 1961.
Most of this steel was cast or rolled into constructional sections. The site was too cramped to allow much expansion, so in 1960 plans began to be drawn up for a new million ton (magic figure!) integrated steelworks on a green-field site at Radinac village, 9 km from Smederevo. Local pyrites ore supplies were to be enriched, sintered and smelted to raw iron in an electrical reduction furnace.

This would exploit Serbia's relative abundance of brown coal, compensating for its deficiency in coking coal. (This technology was applied in Macedonia at Skopje, but failed as 'a competitive solution' there.) Project design was entrusted to a 'foreign' firm, presumably Italian, since the smelting equipment was planned to come from Italy. The Yugoslav Federal Executive Council gave the project the go-ahead at the end of 1961, but the original funding arrangement provided only for the Phase 1 completion of plant to produce 300 000 tons of raw steel and 220 000 tons of rolled flat products.

However, in 1963 the contract was placed instead with Soviet suppliers who tore up the original project and imposed their own plans for a steelworks with a conventional Soviet-designed blast furnace (again with a million tons capacity) and integrated facilities in proportion. The Soviet plan was adopted in outline in 1965, but to contain costs the Yugoslav Federal Investment Bank again insisted on building in phases. Even before Soviet re-planning, it was originally intended to start by building the smelter and an iron mine. These facilities retained their priority. In May 1964 construction started, 65 000 tons of equipment were bought, mostly on credit from the Soviet Union, but bad site management and worse financial planning caused construction schedules to lag miserably.

In 1966 blast furnace construction began at Radinac, with scaled down capacities—720 000 tons of raw iron were now to be smelted, while the converter would produce 840 000 tons of steel slab. Work on the downstream facilities was suspended in 1966 to get the blast furnace finished by 1968. Then, in 1967, to speed up construction of the steel convenors, the rolling mill plan was transferred to Phase 2 for construction 'later', when 'new sources of financing were discovered'.

Each year, new finance was procured, works would begin 'on a broad front', then seize up in May or June because the contractors had been left unpaid. MKS spent two-and-a-half years building the blast furnace to a stage of completion which similar Soviet mills reached in three months. It was blown-in in 1971. This set a pattern, as in 1977 MKS construction times were reckoned (conservatively) at about double the European average.

Without rolling mills MKS could not function as an integrated steelworks. From 1971 to 1975, when the first oxygen steel convertors came on stream, the blast furnace delivered its high-cost pig iron to other steelworks in distant parts of Yugoslavia. In 1969 East Germany offered to finance and build a small cold rolling mill, against subsequent payment in kind. Work started in 1971. The Germans were late with deliveries but the mill was completed only one year late, in 1974, because the Yugoslavs did not have to finance it themselves. In 1975, when MKS began producing raw steel, the cycle remained incomplete. So till 1979 three-quarters of MKS' raw steel was sent as slab to other ironworks, which returned hot rolled strip ('hotband') for the cold mill.

This diseconomy was airily dismissed on the grounds that it was normal for steelworks to exchange products between themselves. In view of Serbia's lack of raw materials, these exchanges made no economic sense. The 'totem' culture still flourished in 1975, when the foundations were laid for a second blast furnace, whose equipment was financed by a Soviet credit. Into them were built 3000 tons of concrete and 350 tons of equipment. In June 1976 the money ran out and construction stopped. The Soviet equipment arrived in Smederevo regardless and was 'warehoused' mainly in the open, where it deteriorated till a further construction credit was secured in 1984.

The glaring inefficiency arising from the lack of integrated processing was turned into a virtue, persuading World Bank experts to argue that eliminating the poor balance of facilities (in this and other Yugoslav mills) would provide 'high returns on a rather massive investment programme, if well co-ordinated'. In 1970 it was decided therefore to bring the hot mill back into phase I. This unit, built with $111 million of equipment supplied by Thyssen, was scheduled for completion in 1974 or 1975. This could not be achieved because of slow payment. It was only completed in 1979.

Even when the Thyssen hot rolling mill came on stream, the 'cycle' remained incomplete. Only 40% of its capacity could be integrated with the industrial demands of Serbia, mainly because the cold mill could not make high-grade car-body sheet. This was needed for the fast expanding Zastava car factory at Kragujevac, which promised to become the largest single outlet for MKS steel. In any case problems upstream perpetuated production imbalances. In 1982 MKS planned to import 90 000 tons of hotband but simultaneously scheduled the hot mill to export part of its hotband output to Western Europe. This was rolled from imported slabs, because the convertor could not provide the inputs needed.

Since planning and investment decisions were unaffected by the financial condition of the enterprise, failure to assemble the phase 2 blast furnace was irrelevant for future capital spending plans. Interest shifted to building the phase 2 cold rolling mill. In 1976 MKS put out a tender and began negotiating with foreign equipment suppliers. In 1978, the project won financing priority. The cold mill was not intended to export much steel directly, but its customers (especially Zastava) were taking on export business.

To enable consumers to produce to export standards, the planners required the cold mill to embody the most advanced technology money could buy. They designated it 'AN ECONOMIC NECESSITY' (their capitals) since only by closing the cycle would the whole MKS project be restored (hopefully) to profitability.

In May 1979 a $168 million contract was signed with Davy-Loewy (later Davy-McKee) of Sheffield for equipment and supervision of installation, with provisional agreement for a further $312 million of supplies. Davy based its offer 'upon a theoretical model (i.e. not a retrofit)'. Yugoslavia was to get 'the Western world's first new fully automated and computer controlled steel finishing mill'. Cold mill construction and installation began in August 1979. Davy expected to complete construction in three years, 'followed by seven years production, and hopefully operational profit'.

The Yugoslavs said in public that they expected completion by August 1982, but the planners less sanguinely envisaged a start-up in 1984 and a build-up to capacity use by 1986. According to their projections of 1979, the project would cost $363 million, including $180 million in foreign exchange for imported equipment and know-how. Because of the pioneering nature of the design, the project demanded a high order of organisational and managerial competence.

This was not forthcoming. Construction times could not be met. MKS blamed the site contractors, their lack of organisation, and the shortage of skilled craftsmen on site, though such complaints probably signify the difficulty of the contractors in procuring payment. By late 1981 construction was running six to seven months late, for want of materials.

MKS' perennial financial difficulties rendered it unable in 1981 to get imported equipment out of customs bond. This problem was still unsolved in 1983. In 1984 delay was also attributed to non-arrival of locally ordered equipment, particularly cranes and cable. As usual, MKS' inability to pay the contractors on time led to rows with them, and slowed the work down. MKS was reduced to 'begging the contractors to carry work out'. Cold rolling uses hotband as its input. This leaves the hot mill coated with scale so, on reaching the cold mill, the hotband is scrubbed through a tank of hydrochloric acid, the 'pickle line'. The East German cold mill had a line appropriate to its own capacity, but because of difficulties arising from a 'joint-venture' provision in the original contract, the phase 2 cold mill project went ahead without providing for a pickle line. Only in January 1984 was a contract signed (for $36 million) with Davy-McKee for supply of a second pickle line with 750 000 tons capacity.

Construction was then delayed until October 1985 (though completion had been scheduled for December that year). It immediately fell behind plan. Davy, against its better judgement, was pressured to sub-contract equipment such as conveyors with local firms in Serbia, to the value of $12 million. They were not really equal to the task, so they probably gave priority to other jobs. Therefore, despite the prompt delivery of most of Davy's own equipment, Yugoslav-made plant arrived very late, and under-payment of the construction teams caused further delays.

The cold mill equipment was still being tested in March 1986 when it sustained $50 million of damage through a fire. Repairs were carried out without much consultation with the supplier, and largely with Yugoslav-made components to save foreign exchange. After the fire, expected completion of the line was re-programmed to October 1987. However, by January that year, the local equipment suppliers were 20 months late, especially Ivo Lola Ribara of Zeleznik, even though as subcontractors for Davy, they were allowed to receive payment in foreign exchange. Much of the equipment that arrived from them suffered from defects which had to be rectified on site. There was uncertainty because of the (usual) lack of funds to pay for investment work. Construction was gripped by 'ultimate disorganisation'.

Despite all this MKS was to boast that 'the contractors have succeeded in doing the job in record time', and to blame 'momentary problems' on 'mistakes in the Davy-McKee project'. 

The line was completed in spring 1988. At last this entirely unnecessary bottleneck was broken, allowing the cold mill fully to resume work. (Indeed the cold mill was claimed—inaccurately—to have been complete in December 1985, but unable to work normally for lack of a pickle line.) This released a large amount of pent-up capacity. Even so, operation in 1988 was dogged by breakdowns in the Yugoslavmade equipment, especially the hydraulics. Some of it was so defective that it had to be replaced by imported machinery.

This was not the only problem. The Soviet-designed iron and steel plant consisted of 'simple long-life machinery of very good quality, at a low price'.  The blast furnace indeed gave 16 years of continuous service without any major refit. But the complex could not deliver top quality steel for rolling. Longer standing practice had been for shortcomings upstream to be rectified progressively on their way downstream, but Western 1970s rolling mill design assumed the input of top grade materials, which the Yugoslavs could not provide.

By the time the new cold mill was ready, the quality of the slabs arriving at the rolling complex was if anything deteriorating because of the unsatisfactory quality of the domestic ores and coke used in the blast furnace (see below). In 1984 the project for the second blast furnace was resurrected. It now needed to be built in a hurry. The existing blast furnace had been producing continuously since 1971 (a testimony to the solidity of its Soviet engineering). Despite claims that there w ould be a massive surge in production when both furnaces were running, the older furnace was worn out and the engineers feared it might overheat at any moment.

The new furnace was blown-in on 27 March 1987. It cost a reported $175 million. The older furnace was soon shut down, and largely dismantled.

...

We may estimate the overall magnitude of the losses incurred by MKS by mid-1987, when MKS convertible foreign exchange debt was estimated at $1400-1650 million. A further $290 million had been raised and invested from domestic (dinar) sources.

Yet the 1987 value of the fixed assets of the black metallurgy sector in 'narrow' Serbia was $418 million. The value of MKS inventories (if pro-rated to capital stock in 1970s proportions) would have amounted to around $140 million, against which MKS carried bank dinar debt equivalent to $76 million. This implies that its capital losses at this point had accumulated to upwards of $1300 million. Losses declared from late 1987 onward would raise this figure to around $1600 million at the end of 1990. However, enormous dinar losses on current trading had already been socialised via inflation and through subsidies.

To set MKS' losses in perspective, the (net) earnings of MKS' 11153 employees in 1987 (at an average $196 a month) amounted to 19.76 billion dinars, or $26.2 million at the (geometric) mean dollar exchange rate for 1987. So during that year the officially conceded loss amounted to nearly five times the pay-roll. Probably—as was already beginning to happen in the late 1970s—MKS was subtracting value in the 1980s, and heavily. By how much is unclear, because losses may have resulted from servicing debt in excess of enterprise assets, but for reasons discussed below, this appears unlikely.

Indirect costs and benefits

 

As the Yugoslav federation left most steel industry financing to the republics, Serbia had to pay dearly for its industrial totem. All its major blocks of investment were based on imported technology, and were financed mainly by raising foreign credits, which carried state repayment guarantees. From the point of view of the domestic banks which had to service MKS debt, lending to MKS was tantamount to giving money away. 

MKS' lien on the economy of Serbia was remarkable. In 1981 it was to receive 41% of the 'incentive funds of the Republic of Serbia', though it accounted for a puny 1.2% of its industrial output. In February that year it was announced that under Serbia's 'new medium-term plan for MKS development' to 1985, MKS would receive $1884 million in 'investment' and subsidies. As well as the fixed subsidy (raised through the tax system) of $457 million (dinar equivalent at end-1980), state credits of $167 million would be channelled to it, while the banks would advance $300 million in new money, and write off $116 million interest owned. Additionally, for its investments, MKS would receive 'foreign' credits of $809 million, which would include $249 million 'earmarked' from (hard currency) savings deposits at the banks and post offices. MKS would contribute a token $6 million from its depreciation fund.

These funds would in theory double blast furnace capacity, nearly quadruple that of raw steel, expand hot rolling by a quarter and complete the new cold mill. Productivity would rise from 46 tons of steel per employee in 1978 to 218 tons by 1985. None of these projects was fulfilled. Small wonder the press referred to MKS as 'the barrel without a bottom' 

 

 

... 

MKS generated substantial surpluses till the mid 1960s, which then gave way to losses. These deepened so much by the late 1970s that it was barely adding value at all; by the 1980s the enterprise was probably subtracting value. As a result an enormous debt burden was clamped onto Serbia's economy, diverting its investment capacity into an economically sterile project. Even disregarding the debt burden, the putative indirect benefit derived by the fabricators from access to the steel it supplied was probably negative, because of its many shortcomings.
 
I have identified three key areas that caused MKS' increasing loss-making propensities.
 
Firstly, the enterprise was handicapped by its unbalanced production structure up to 1988, and (a related problem) by its location and systemic lack of access to appropriate raw materials. Distance from the Bosnian orefields, coke shortages and foreign exchange policies restricted and distorted the structure of its supplies, lowering both the productivity of the MKS plant and the quality of its output. In defence of its location it enjoyed favourable access to energy. It also controlled a rather dispersed 'home' market represented by the Serbian metal fabricators, a market on which competition from other Yugoslav steelworks was discouraged.
 
Secondly, losses arose unavoidably from its inability to construct its highly capital-intensive plant efficiently, and its failure then to operate it close to design capacity. This problem was associated with its organisational incapacity to service, refit and retrofit its machinery efficiently, and to organise the management of its spare parts inventories with even minimal efficiency. The problem was worsened by a drive to minimise foreign exchange expenditure on spare parts and to source them domestically.
 
Thirdly, MKS' losses were swollen by its increasing export orientation. The Yugoslav financial crisis of the 1980s deprived MKS of access to official sources of foreign exchange. To survive, MKS tried to extort foreign exchange from its consumers, and when this failed, orientated output increasingly to exports. When domestic investment demand slumped in the later 1980s, it exported increasingly to keep the factory occupied. Finally, when currency reform caused domestic customers to default on their bills, exports became its only remaining source of cash. At no time were its exports profitable. For most of the period, MKS steel exports were offset by increased imports by the fabricators.
 
By 1987, even Serbia's communist politicians were questioning the wisdom of supporting the 'sick man of the Danube'. Funding and wages were squeezed, but Serbia's rejection of economic reform and restructuring under Milosevic resulted in the preservation of the status quo, with disastrous results.
 
The analysis of MKS' 'subjective' shortcomings stops short of explaining what underlay them. MKS had a well skilled workforce and abundant trained engineers. A potential source of this failure of management was the workers' self-management system, at least in the form into which it was remodelled in the 1970s. However, there are other potential factors, for example, the slavish adherence to 'the plan' which ran through all exhortations. Ultimately, MKS wallowed in inefficiency because nobody had both the responsibility and incentive to make things run better. It was managed with an indifference to its problems, as if their solution lay beyond the power of human agency. For example, in 1987 a long stoppage at the blast furnace was caused 'by the big absence of workers and the total demotivation of those who remained', but 'nobody cared about this stoppage'.
 
After the moribund years of war and sanctions, MKS is trying to rebuild its business. It claims 'we are capable of going out onto the world market braver and more aggressively than earlier'.   With the help of a $122 million credit, MKS (reincarnated as SARTID 1913) boosted blast furnace throughput, restarted the converter and the rolling mills in April 1996, and in the next six months rolled 280 000 tons of steel, exporting 180 000 tons. 

 
However, no convincing economic reform is in prospect, so the authorities will have to fund the resulting losses.

 
 
I šta da se radi s tom fabrikom? Verovatno je jeftinije da plaćamo plate radnicima iz budžeta a da ne dolaze na posao nego da je držimo ovako (ako nam je socijala bitna), te da se klijenti prosto preusmere na druge dobavljače. Neki problemi prevazilaze i epohe i sisteme, pa pošto pokriva decenije i decenije cenim da je za temu.

[Braća Strugacki]

 

Dobro si me podsetio   :)

 

Zaboravio sam ашчинице, 1 od osnovnih, u svakom slucaju 1 od glavnih oblika u kojima se manifestuje preduzetnistvo u Srbiji.

 

 

pa ne može preduzetništvo niotkuda, ostali smo sa premalo rasadnika firmi, nemaš gde ni da naučiš kako osim na jutubu

Edited March 1, 2016 by Braća Strugacki

[Braća Strugacki]

Evo par crtica i zaključka iz jedne klasične studije o našem gigantu (MKS - Sartid) iz '98, zadnja rečenica vredi i danas:

 

 

 

I šta da se radi s tom fabrikom? Verovatno je jeftinije da plaćamo plate radnicima iz budžeta a da ne dolaze na posao nego da je držimo ovako (ako nam je socijala bitna), te da se klijenti prosto preusmere na druge dobavljače. Neki problemi prevazilaze i epohe i sisteme, pa pošto pokriva decenije i decenije cenim da je za temu.

 

Sa tom fabrikom uglavnom ništa, cena gotovog proizvoda je jednostavno preniska, globalno se uništava pomenuto tržište i svega će par giganata opstati. Viši tehnološki nivo gotovog proizvoda je zahtevao investiciju koja nije bila moguća. Ima stručnijih za hevi metal ovde na forumu od mene, pa će me možda pobiti, to bih voleo da pročitam.

[Tribun_Populi]

Meni je, ljudi, mučno kad o ovome pišem, ali najiskrenije.

Prosto me uhvati tuga, ako ni zbog čega drugog onda zbog sebe i svojih drugara, što smo kao balavci onomad jurišali bez glave, da bi na kraju ispalo da smo od svega toga omogućili kurti i murti da profućkaju i ono malo što je posle zlobe ostalo od svega onog što su naši očevi i dedovi gradili.

 

Jebiga :(

 

Jesam Prospero, vidiš, ja sam baš imao očekivanja da će, kad mi dođemo na red, Srbija biti lepše mesto za život i posao nego 2000-te godine. Sad već razmišljam kako da odem, iako sam mislio da nikad neću. Ako misliš da je grdna razlika između 100 maraka onda i 300 eura sada, varaš se.

[Prospero]

 

Preteruješ sa potcenjivanjem ljudi iz tog perioda, cenim, jer se radi o veoma složenom sistemu koji je za današnje rezonovanje poprilično nepojmljiv - gde je sprega države i privrede bila dubinska ali je ipak postojala izvesna doza autonomnosti privrednika, za razliku od potpuno planske privrede zemalja istočnog bloka. Samoupravljanje dobrim delom i jeste bilo ono što mu ime kaže, bez obzira na niz negativnih pojava i procesa koji su bili imanentni tom sistemu.

 

I da budem jasan, ne prizivam ga ni najmanje, nije izdržao istorijsku proveru niti bi. Poentu ću podvući još jednom, iako je više puta ovde podvlačena, to je bila osnova nad kojom je trebalo graditi domaći kapitalizam.

 

Pomenuo si ono što sam izneo unazad vezano za samo tržište i efekte na celokupno društvo - rekao sam već i ponavljam ponovo, radi se o jedinoj i najsveobuhvatnijoj transformaciji društva, tu hteo-ne hteo moraš da sagledaš sa svih strana, i pros i cons.

 

Wtf, govorio sam o političkom sistemu koji indukuje ovakve ili onakve korake i ima svoje ciljne funkcije, a ne o moralnim i psihičkim karakteristikama ljudi. 

 

To je bila nekakva osnova 1990, do 2000. su se stvari kardinalno promenile. Društvena svojina je izgubila ekskluzivitet (ono što je imala), to je počelo i pre 1990. a o isteku novca iz sistema i tad i tokom 90ih ne mislim da moram da pričam.

[Tribun_Populi]

Wtf, govorio sam o političkom sistemu koji indukuje ovakve ili onakve korake i ima svoje ciljne funkcije, a ne o moralnim i psihičkim karakteristikama ljudi. 

 

Govorio si, da te podsetim, sledeće:

 

 

"Strpljivo čekanje" - opet, zna se ko je i kada odlučivao o stezanjima i otpuštanjima kaiša, da li će se graditi teška ili laka industrija, itd itd. Nema tu kontrole javnosti, nema korekcije stručne javnosti, nema neprijatnih pitanja koja danas imamo.

 

a ja ti rekao da nisu samo političari odlučivali o životu i smrti, pogotovo ne na nivou firme, i da je tu umnogome uspeh zavisio od kolektiva i menadžmenta.

 

 

 

edit: ovo ostalo ti je do sada deset puta prežvakana priča, nema svrhe tu išta dalje oponirati, opet će se sve svesti na isto, a to je besplodna diskusija. Ako ništa drugo, pokazuje koren gneva koga ćete se u godinama koje dolaze siti nagledati.

Edited March 1, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[namenski]

 

 

a ja ti rekao da nisu samo političari odlučivali o životu i smrti, pogotovo ne na nivou firme, i da je tu umnogome uspeh zavisio od kolektiva i menadžmenta.

Ne vredi Tribune, a steta, covek je ili tvrdoglav ili ideoloski zaslepljen za neverovati.

Svi smo pomalo popustili, samo Prospero nece ni za dlaku :D

 

Inace, +1

Srpski/ex-Yu privredni kadrovi su imali itekakva iskustva sa delovanjem u trzisnim uslovima, i unutar zemlje i napolju.

Sve i da je na makroekonomskom nivou bilo onako kako Prospero tvrdi - a nije, na nivou preduzeca, grana, bilo je trzista i konkurencije koliko hoces.

Dovoljna je samo crtica da su reklame^tm na TV pocele da idu na kurac narodu jos tamo negde pocetkom 70-ih, a takozvana ekonomska propaganda, cuveni EPP se nije razvijao produciranja radi, nego zbog trzisne potrebe jer je trebalo svoj proizvod plasirati^tm u nimalo socijalisticki nastrojenom okruzenju.

Pa je, pored ostalog, i to trzisno iskustvo, koje u IE nije postojalo ni u tragovima bilo itekakav kapital, polazna osnova da se nesto uradi ili barem pokusa.

Umesto toga, stalno se insistira na pricama o komitetima koji komanduju direktorima sto je obicna zamena teza ili nepoznavanje problema.

Edited March 1, 2016 by namenski

[Prospero]

^^ Sklonio si Miloševića, kog su tvoji/moji očevi i dedovi listom doveli na vlast. Jbg.

 

 

Ja te generacije pamtim po tom i sličnom šenlučenju.

 

 

---

 

Govorio si, da te podsetim, sledeće:

 

 

a ja ti rekao da nisu samo političari odlučivali o životu i smrti, pogotovo ne na nivou firme, i da je tu umnogome uspeh zavisio od kolektiva i menadžmenta.

 

 

"Stezanje kaiša" je referenca na promene investicione politike tokom 1954/55. o kojoj se naravno nije odlučivalo na nivou fabrika (koje su zavisile od državnih investicija i bez tog novca su u suštini mogle da se uglavnom ugase) nego u širem Titovom okruženju, a koja je (investiciona politika) prebacila težište sa teške industrije na laku, na turizam i uopšte one stvari koje su brže obrtale devize pre svega, i u kojoj je došlo do smanjenja izdvajanja za investicije u odnosu na "popuštanje kaiša" u smislu povećanja potrošnje i širenja dostupnosti komercijalnih kredita naspram hard državne love od Opšteg investicionog fonda.

 

Trebalo je par godina da se to operacionalizuje. O dominantnom uticaju internih preduzećevih™ organa odlučivanja možemo govoriti u suštini tek posle 1965.

[namenski]

^^ Sklonio si Miloševića, kog su tvoji/moji očevi i dedovi listom doveli na vlast. Jbg.

 

 

Ja te generacije pamtim po tom i sličnom šenlučenju.

 

Nije to tako jednostavno Prospero, sinko.

Istom logikom^tm za koju godinu ce neko nama^tm moci da kaze da smo ove^tm doveli na vlast.

 

 

Edit: listom!

Edited March 1, 2016 by namenski

[Tribun_Populi]

^^ Sklonio si Miloševića, kog su tvoji/moji očevi i dedovi listom doveli na vlast. Jbg.

 

Nije dovoljno.

 

Sklonio sam Miloševića ali ne i njegove repove, koji su em mutirali em avanzovali, i to nauštrb nas.

 

Takoreći, podvalilo mi, i ekstrabonus - ogadilo kapitalizam. Jbg.

 

TT tj. CZ M57

[Prospero]

Opet nas neko zajebao :(

 

Kako stalno mi izvučemo ishod koji nismo zaslužili?

Edited March 1, 2016 by Prospero

[Tribun_Populi]

Pa ima mali problem tu, u ovoj priči vi i mi mislim da nismo isto.

 

TT tj. CZ M57

[Prospero]

Osim ako nisam privatnik-milioner™, fino kapitalizovan itd itd, a nisam, onda smo isto, believe you me.

[Braća Strugacki]

ne znam kako možemo da budemo isti, različite škole, države, iskustva, poslovi, kilometri, manometri, šta god

 

a i neki su bliže kraju, a neki i niste