BrExit?

[Roger Sanchez]

[bigvlada]

Oni ovo i dalje drže. :D

 

David Davis: Trade deals. Tax cuts. And taking time before triggering Article 50. A Brexit economic strategy for Britain

 

Published: 

July 14, 2016

 

http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/07/david-davis-trade-deals-tax-cuts-and-taking-time-before-triggering-article-50-a-brexit-economic-strategy-for-britain.html

 

David Davis: Britain would be better off out of the EU – and here’s why

Published: 

February 4, 2016

 

https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/02/david-davis-britain-would-be-better-off-out-of-the-eu-and-heres-why.html

 

 

[Roger Sanchez]

 

 

[MancMellow]

I odgovor

 

 

Theresa May has signalled there will be no transitional period to prevent a “cliff-edge” Brexit unless the UK manages to agree a deal with the EU on their future relationship.

The prime minister has been under pressure to help businesses plan for the future by agreeing a time-limited transitional period by Christmas, but she told MPs that this “implementation phase” could only be agreed when a trade deal had been struck.

“The point of the implementation period is to put in place the practical changes necessary to move to the future partnership, and in order to have that you need to know what that future partnership is going to be,” she said.

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

Aaaa hahahahahaaaa-hahahahahhaha

 

 

Academics are accusing a Tory MP and government whip of “McCarthyite” behaviour, after he wrote to all universities asking them to declare what they are teaching their students about Brexit and to provide a list of teachers’ names.

[MancMellow]

[bigvlada]

[Roger Sanchez]

Aaaa hahahahahaaaa-hahahahahhaha

Daily Heil follows up, dissuades a .

 

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

UK Could Lose Free Trade Deals With 65 Countries After Brexit, Admits UK's Top Negotiator

 

 

 

Liam Fox admitted today the UK has not signed deals to continue free trade with countries who already have agreements with EU - meaning even more tariffs could go up after Brexit. Appearing before the International Trade Select Committee this morning, Fox said the UK had conducted “initial discussions” with the 65 countries to continue trading on the same terms after Brexit.

 

Yet despite a tweet from former Trade Minister Lord Price claiming deals had already been struck, Fox was forced to admit nothing had been signed, and was merely “hopeful” agreements would be reached by March 2019.

 

Fox’s chief negotiator Crawford Falconer warned MPs that even agreements struck in principle could be tossed aside as countries seek to improve trade deals.

Under a grilling from Labour MP Chris Leslie, Fox said he has “not had any indication from any of trading partners in those countries” that they did not want to continue trading with the UK on the same terms as they do currently.

 

When pushed on whether anything had been signed to guarantee that, Fox said: “Well we haven’t got agreement with them but they’ve agreed with the process.”

Fox said the text of the current EU trade deals would be used as the basis for any agreement, adding: “We have had initial discussions with them and we are now beginning to get more granular with the most important ones of them and as we go through the process we will get closer to agreements.

 

“When we’ve got the agreements with the biggest we will work our way through the others. Hopefully finishing them all by the time we leave the EU.”

Falconer, who was appearing alongside Fox, added: “They have agreed that that’s what they intend to do.

 

“All I would say is I’ve been around negotiations a lot and what people say today sometimes changes tomorrow.”

 

If the UK does not secure a carry-over of the EU’s deals after Brexit, it will find World Trade Organisation tariffs applied on trade with countries such as South Korea and Israel.

 

Fox also told MPs he believes it is “reasonable” for businesses to begin preparing for no deal. His comments came a day after it was reported the Bank of England is preparing itself for 75,000 job losses from the financial sector if the UK leaves the EU without a trade deal.

 

When asked if the believed the private sector should begin implementing contingency plans for a “no deal”, Fox replied: “No, because on balance at the present time I think we’re more likely to get a deal but I think it would be reasonable for them to develop such plans.

 

“Clearly, the longer we take to get into end state discussions with the European Union, the greater the likelihood that people would want to implement as well as a develop, which is why I think it’s in all our interest to get into those end state discussions as early as possible so business has greater certainty about what the potential end state looks like.”

 

He added he was “not afraid” of leaving the EU without a trade agreement.

 

 

 

Šokantno. Da su barem takozvani eksperti upozoravali javnost na ovo pre referenduma...

[jms_uk]

 

 

Sent from my iTelephone using Tapatalk

[hazard]

Meni je hit kako ova vlada na kraju uradi ono što insistira da nikako neće i onda ispadne slaba i smešna, umesto da su tako postavili stvari od početka kao najnormalnije. Zamisli, parlament da glasa o čl. 50, parlament da glasa o brexit deal-u, nečuveno. Nije traženo da Čarls stavi kapu zimbabveanskog vrača, mantra plemenske molitve planinskih Šerpi, pljune zatim u čaj s mlekom i na osnovu sličnosti fleke sa svojom frizurom kraljica odluči da li da prihvati sporazum ili ne. Dobro, Konzervativci bi na tu varijantu verovatno i pristali.

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

Uopšte nisu to rekli.

 

Mislim, u pravu si da je ova vlada cirkus jer ja mislim da do sada nisu doneli jednu jedinu odluku koja nije opozvana da li sudski, da li zbog pritiska parlamenta, da li su EU pregovarači rekli "on yer bike", ali ova "ponuda" od juče je blago rečeno smešna. Vlada predlaže da eto, u milosti njenoj, može parlament da glasa o konačnom sporazumu sa EU (koji jednostavno ne može da se utvrdi do marta 2019-te, nemoguće je logistički), ali taj glas u parlamentu otprilike kaže "Vi možete da aminujete taj sporazum sa EU glasajući za njega, ali ako izglasate da je Parlament protiv sporazuma, to samo znači da bi 3-4 dana posle Britanija napustila EU bez ikakvog sporazuma, haotično koliko to bude pa bude", što je otprilike nuklearna hard Brexit varijanta.

 

Dakle, bacili su im u krilo token Parliament vote koji znači baš ništa.

 

 

Fantastično je što je, gledajući širu sliku, jedan od osnovnih ideoloških motiva Leave-ovaca bio "Glasajte za Brexit jer nećemo da vrhovno zakonodavno telo bude u Briselu, moramo da branimo zakonodavni sistem UK, i vrhovno zakonodavno telo mora biti naš parlament", da bi od tada vlada uz svesrdnu pomoć svih brexitovaca pokušala da:

- progura da mogu da nazovu član 50 bez glasanja u parlamentu (opozvano u obe instance ustavnog suda)

- prigrabi za ministarstva "Henry VIII powers", tj, da ministarstva mogu bez glasanja parlamenta da donose i menjaju zakone (?!? missim jebo te)

- da se bori noktima i zubima da parlament uopšte nema glasanje o najvažnijoj tački verovatno od stupanja Britanije u WW2

 

Brexit FTW, sačuvajmo bitnost i suverenitet britanskog zakonodavnog sistema. Jbt, Guy Fawkes i Robert Catesby su imali veće poštovanje prema parlamentu nego Leaveri.

[hazard]

Vlada predlaže da eto, u milosti njenoj, može parlament da glasa o konačnom sporazumu sa EU (koji jednostavno ne može da se utvrdi do marta 2019-te, nemoguće je logistički), ali taj glas u parlamentu otprilike kaže "Vi možete da aminujete taj sporazum sa EU glasajući za njega, ali ako izglasate da je Parlament protiv sporazuma, to samo znači da bi 3-4 dana posle Britanija napustila EU bez ikakvog sporazuma, haotično koliko to bude pa bude", što je otprilike nuklearna hard Brexit varijanta.

 

 

To je tačno, ali to nije krivica britanske vlade, jednostavno tako funkcioniše izlazak iz EU po članu 50. Ako nema sporazuma do marta 2019., sledi the hardest of hard brexits, to je namerno tako upisano u Lisabonski sporazum. Naravno da neki sporazum mora biti odobren od obe strane (što valjda podrazumeva ratifikaciju u parlamentu, majkumustaru), ali ne može jedna strana jednostrano da odbije sporazum i da traži da se pregovori nastave. Parlament je suveren u UK ali ne van njega, bilo kakvo glasanje tamo o odbijanju brexit deal-a nije obavezujuće na bilo koji način za ostatak EU. I za to nije kriva Tereza Mej. Cela ideja da parlament tamo negde 6 meseci pred sam brexit može da odbije brexit deal i da to ne znači da se onda automatski ništa ne menja je deo britanske brexit fantazije o tome kako će oni da diktiraju sve i da se za sve samo oni pitaju. Britanija, onog trenutka kada je aktivirala čl. 50, više nema kontrolu nad procesom brexita (to je Mej i znala, i zato je toliko odugovlačeno sa aktiviranjem), njena sudbina zavisi od mogućnosti da se preostalih 27 članica jednoglasno slože da se rok produži. Ako se EU izlomata da sa UK nešto ispregovara, i onda UK parlament to odbije, vrlo je moguće da će iz Brisela da dođe jedno kratko ,,e pa onda jeb'te se".

[hazard]

https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-britain-is-in-denial-over-immigration/

 

 

Brexit Britain is in denial over immigration

Debate since Brexit referendum has failed to tackle immigration — the key motivator behind the Leave campaign.

 

LONDON — In the immediate aftermath of last year’s Brexit vote, there was much confusion about what pushed more than 17 million people to put a tick next to “Leave.”

 

The answer, we now know, boils down to one word: immigration. And yet, since the vote, the political debate has consistently failed to take this into account. If the U.K. continues to focus on trade and the future relationship at the expense of immigration reform, Brexit will only be the beginning of our political trouble.

 

Concern about free movement, immigration and its impact on the country was clearly the main driver behind Brexit: Studies have shown that people who felt anxious about immigration were not only more likely to play down the risk of Brexit; they were more likely to turn out and vote — and to choose to Leave.

 

A word cloud reflecting the responses of thousands of self-identified Leavers who, in an open-ended question, were asked in July 2016 why they had voted to pull Britain out of the EU overwhelming answered “immigration.”

 

Clearly, these worries over identity were wrapped up with broader concerns: a strong sense that the power-brokers and media were not listening to the people; that Britain’s economy, politics and culture lean decisively toward London; and that the country’s political and media class have been too willing to attribute feelings of social and cultural loss to bigotry and ignorance.

 

Had leaders taken these concerns seriously, the social contract on immigration could have been renewed instead of broken.

 

Instead, worries were inflamed first by New Labour deciding not to impose transitional controls on EU nationals from 2004, and then by the Conservative Party’s undeliverable promise to reduce net migration from the “hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands.”

 

Political leaders consistently underestimated the potency of identity politics and thus Tony Blair and David Cameron were left as the unintended architects of Brexit. Immigration unified traditional and more affluent social conservatives on the right with blue-collar, left-behind workers on the left, and in 2016 this alliance — with a push from UKIP — found its full expression in the vote for Brexit.

 

Why does this matter now? The government’s management of Brexit — and its failure to tackle the issues that sparked it — tell us it hasn’t learned from its mistakes and is running the risk of replicating the entire cycle.

 

As journalist John Harris recently noted, “The only economic rebalancing that looks set to arise from Brexit will be London becoming a bit less rich thanks to the downsizing of the City.” Unsurprisingly, when Ipsos-MORI recently surveyed the population they found that 85 percent of Labour Leavers and around half of Conservative Leavers still feel as though the current system is rigged toward the rich and powerful.

 

Prime Minister Theresa May insisted in her January 2017 speech at Lancaster House that she would put an end to free movement, and thus take Britain out of the single market. But no one has talked seriously about how to rebuild public confidence on an issue that almost single-handedly sparked the most dramatic change to the political status quo in decades, if not longer.

 

The debate has focused on trade, economics and — because Britain relies so heavily on financial services — the fate of the City of London. Collectively, we have found sufficient time to debate every possible aspect of our future trading relationship with the EU — from the Norway model to the Canadian model, from the Swiss or Turkish model to a whole range of bespoke models.

 

We have debated every possible aspect of the economic repercussions; from passporting rights in the City to whether bankers really are leaving us for Frankfurt; from the estimated economic cost of a soft Brexit to the financial impact of Britain crashing out and falling back onto WTO rules.

 

Along the way, voters have been subjected to an almost daily avalanche of economic forecasts of the kind that appeared to make no real difference to public opinion, even when it actually mattered ahead of the vote itself.

 

And yet we have not had a comparable discussion about what a future immigration policy might look like and how this could be built around a public consensus.

 

We haven’t talked about why so many voters felt the country was moving in the wrong direction. Among those who felt that Britain “got a lot worse” in the past 10 years, 73 percent voted for Brexit. Only 40 percent of those who felt things were “a lot better” did the same.

 

We put this down to austerity and moved on, conveniently ignoring the fact that the British economy was enjoying its 48th consecutive quarter of growth when UKIP first broke through in 2004, years before the financial crisis hit. With the exception of irregular and largely politically motivated ramblings about creating a northern powerhouse, there is no clear plan for how Britain will rebalance its economy to address the concerns of the nearly 54 percent of voters in England who opted for Brexit.

 

Our leading parties appear incapable of having this debate. The Conservative Party is beholden to City donors, and Labour is terrified of saying anything about immigration and identity. A collective failure to ask these questions and trigger a more holistic debate over Brexit could easily come back to haunt us.

 

Imagine, for a moment, a long transition deal that retains the nuts and bolts of Britain’s current EU membership, followed by a slightly watered down settlement that sees the U.K. adopting a liberal immigration regime in return for access to specific areas of the single market. A majority of the British electorate would see it as one that prioritized economics over identity, or London over the nation.

 

We shouldn’t expect voters to shrug their shoulders if they feel let down by the government yet again. It’s far more likely they will mobilize and move into an even more radical political home that makes Nigel Farage and UKIP look like a fairly quirky brand of old school British conservatism.

[Marvin (Paranoid Android)]

To je tačno, ali to nije krivica britanske vlade, jednostavno tako funkcioniše izlazak iz EU po članu 50. Ako nema sporazuma do marta 2019., sledi the hardest of hard brexits, to je namerno tako upisano u Lisabonski sporazum. Naravno da neki sporazum mora biti odobren od obe strane (što valjda podrazumeva ratifikaciju u parlamentu, majkumustaru), ali ne može jedna strana jednostrano da odbije sporazum i da traži da se pregovori nastave. Parlament je suveren u UK ali ne van njega, bilo kakvo glasanje tamo o odbijanju brexit deal-a nije obavezujuće na bilo koji način za ostatak EU. I za to nije kriva Tereza Mej. Cela ideja da parlament tamo negde 6 meseci pred sam brexit može da odbije brexit deal i da to ne znači da se onda automatski ništa ne menja je deo britanske brexit fantazije o tome kako će oni da diktiraju sve i da se za sve samo oni pitaju. Britanija, onog trenutka kada je aktivirala čl. 50, više nema kontrolu nad procesom brexita (to je Mej i znala, i zato je toliko odugovlačeno sa aktiviranjem), njena sudbina zavisi od mogućnosti da se preostalih 27 članica jednoglasno slože da se rok produži. Ako se EU izlomata da sa UK nešto ispregovara, i onda UK parlament to odbije, vrlo je moguće da će iz Brisela da dođe jedno kratko ,,e pa onda jeb'te se".

 

I da i ne, suviše stvari je trenutno fluidno, i sama činjenica da je ovo presedan i da se piše istorija svakim danom znači da ništa nije u kamenu upisano. Vlada je htela da zacrta u slovu zakona, da bude zakonski akt kojim UK napušta EU 29-tog marta 2019-te, to je deo ovih novih zakona koje sada guraju. Samim tim da žele time da se obezbede znači da nije nemoguće, ni nezakonito, da u narednih 18 meseci ako se nekim čudom nešto dogodi, da UK može da zatraži ili u najboljem slučaju potpunu obustavu izlaska, ili odgađanje ako se naravno sa tim slože ostale EU države članice (verovatno ne bi, ali da ne ulazimo u ŠBBKBB). Pre samo 5 dana, Lord Kerr, čovek koji je pisao član 50 je sam dao veliki intervju gde kaže da ništa nije nemoguće do samog definitivnog izlaska i da u samoj proceduri ne piše da je član 50 upisan u kamenu.

 

Vlada je mogla da ponudi gomilu stvari - već je prošlo 18 meseci od referenduma, vlada je mogla da ponudi javnu debatu i parlamentarnu debatu da li treba ostati u zajedničkom tržištu, da li treba izaći iz carinske unije, kako se treba poneti prema EU državljanima koji žive u UK (za ovo poslednje je potrebno otprilike nedelju dana, a pitanje se povlači godinu i po, da bi na kraju Mejova posisala veliki evropski ne dobivši baš ništa zauzvrat). Što se ovog samog predloga zakona tiče, sumanuto je stavljati da UK napušta EU određenog datuma no matter what, i cinično je, da ne kažem pičkasto, stavljati na glasanje odluku "Evo vam dil, ako izglasate protiv, nema dila uopšte". Krivica vlade Tereze Mej je što je sprcala 18 meseci bez ikakvog koherentnog dogovora u samoj vladi, da ne kažem u samoj konzervativnoj partiji ili široj javnoj debati koja bi, ne dao bog, uzeo u obzir i ono što javna služba kaže, tj, ljudi koji su zapravo motor državne uprave. Do sada smo imali mudru pregovaračku taktiku koja je od EU dobila 0, a koja je klekla pred svime što je EU zatražila, pa nekako mislim da je to vreme moglo biti pametnije iskorišćeno. Da se sada, u novembru 2017-te stavljaju na glasanje stvari poput (1) da li se ostaje u carinskoj uniji (2) da li će biti tranzicionog perioda i koliko dugog (3) da li se garantuje bezbednost finansijskih usluga u budućem dilu. S obzirom da bi UK izgleda bolje stajala da je outsorsovala njenu pregovaračku poziciju Momiru Bulatoviću, itekako držim vladu odgovornom za to da smo u ovom času pred situacijom gde em neće da daju parlamentu glas, a onda pojedu govno i priznaju da mu daju glas koji faktički ne znači ništa.

 

Mislim, nije samo stvar u pregovaračkom umeću, jer je taktička pozicija Britanije takva da u ruci drži praznu plastičnu pušku, najveća tragedija je što u samoj vladi postoje tri različite struje, u konzervativnoj partiji ima struja onoliko koliko ima bolesno ambicioznih skotova, laburisti su isto negde rascepljeni na pola pola, a koliko se meni čini, mali čoek na ulici™ je sve besniji. Ima onih besnih što se sve ovo uopšte dešava, ima onih besnih što nismo završili pregovaranje u nedelju dana, i ima onih što će tek da budu besni kad se ispostavi da je Brexit ogromno govno, dok su oni očekivali verovatno all-white-England valhalu sa besplatnim pivom za sve i jednorozima po engleskoj zelenoj travi.