Opšti topik o EU (ex kriza Evrozone)

[Tribun_Populi]

Živi živi duh degolski živeće vekov'ma. Mislim da je red i pravi trenutak da se u Nemanjinoj 11 malo bolje prisete tradicionalnih saveznika.

 

via CZ-M53 TT

[Tribun_Populi]

 

 

NATO će biti koalicija dva partnera - SAD, UK&British Commonwealth-a i nekakve Evroarmije.

Don't forget the lads.

 

via CZ-M53 TT

[bigvlada]

Back to base: what does Brexit mean for UK sovereign bases in Cyprus?

 

Although they are often grouped with the other 13 British Overseas Territories, the sovereign bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus merit separate analysis in view of Brexit, especially since the east Bases – specifically the corridor that connects Dhekelia with Agios Nikolaos – today constitutes a de facto external border of the EU.

 

In view of Brexit, the relationship of the Bases with the Republic of Cyprus should be reviewed and clarified, in accordance with the European principles of proportionality and subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on the EU, which respectively provide that any action should not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve the pre-agreed objectives, and determine the most appropriate level of intervention in areas of shared competence. It should be noted that, in relation specifically to the principle of proportionality, that the “carrot” to the Annan Plan constituted the British promise to cede back to the Republic of Cyprus a significant part of the Bases, the rural or residential areas, which would not affect the military operation of the Bases, and which are strictly speaking not required in order to achieve the military objectives of the Bases. The principle of proportionality and the reasons for applying this principle should not be revocable depending on the passing of the Plan. Cyprus today is faced with a unique opportunity to leverage the strength of the EU and negotiate its position regarding the Bases to finally clarify the actual legal status of UK sovereignty over the Bases, and the conditions subject to which it will continue.

 

Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign EU state, with an obligation to protection the welfare of its residents. With the exit of the UK from the EU and the forthcoming negotiations, now is the time to bring back to the fore, clarify and assert ambiguous issues pertaining to the Bases that are of common interest to Cyprus and the EU (i) to clarify the legal status of the Bases; (ii) to safeguard the rights of the EU citizens residing and working within the Bases; and (iii) to amend the old texts which govern the relationship between the Bases and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus so as to clarify the rights and obligations of each party.

 

http://www.harneys.com/publications/articles/back-to-base-what-does-brexit-mean-for-uk-sovereign-bases-in-cyprus?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original

 

Stavljam ovde jer se više tiče EU. Zanimlivo je zbog najavljenog samita posvećenog Brexit-u. Kipar bi mogao da uz pomoć EU zahteva od VB predaju baza kao deo pregovora o budućim odnosima, slično kao što Španija želi Gibraltar. 

[CPP]

 

Stavljam ovde jer se više tiče EU. Zanimlivo je zbog najavljenog samita posvećenog Brexit-u. Kipar bi mogao da uz pomoć EU zahteva od VB predaju baza kao deo pregovora o budućim odnosima, slično kao što Španija želi Gibraltar. 

 

 

Baze na Kipru se znacajno razlikuju od Gibraltara. Prvo, same baze zauzimaju vrlo mali deo teritorije koja je formalno UK. Na karti dole, sama baza je u donjem cosku (RAF Akrotiri), dok je ostatak 'Britanije' prakticno deo Limassol metro zone. Druga kasarna u sklopu iste teritorije se nalazi levo gore (Episkopi). Tesko mi je da zamislim situaciju u kojoj se ova 'granica' (u navodnicima jer fizicki ne postoji) uspostavlja.

 

https://goo.gl/maps/vX1khbcSaKB2

 

Druga razlika je da ovde nije pitanje samo Britanaca i domorodaca kojima je 'oteta' teritorija, vec postoji i faktor Turaka. Ako s jedne strane Kiprani zele da se rese baza (a i to je pitanje u kojoj meri), s druge strane njihovo pristustvo im uliva koliku-toliku sigurnost u nekom potencijalnom zaostravanju s Turcima jer su svesni da u tom konfliktu nemaju apsolutno nikakve sanse.

[hazard]

Ja mislim da ce Kiprani traziti da se suverenitet nad teritorijama vrati Kipru, a zauzvrat ce dati Britancima zemlju u zakup za neki simbolican iznos na tipa 99 godina. Ne treba zaboraviti da dosta Kiprana radi u tim bazama

[CPP]

Kiprani, generalno, ne rade u bazama. Ono sto bi bio problem je da ih dosta zivi na teritoriji baza, as in cela sela su zvanicno u UK na Akrotiriju (Mazotos, Asomatos).

U svakom slucaju, Britanija je planirala da vrati tu teritoriju kada dodje do resenja tako da ne vidim sta konkretno Brexit menja - u svakom slucaju ce biti pokriveno bilateralnim ugovorom izmedju UK i Kipra.

[hazard]

Kako sta konkretno menja? Nemo' da zvucis ko Dejvis. Menja stvari utoliko sto je Kipar jedna od clanica koja moze da stavi veto na bilo kakav dil UK i EU, pa samim tim ima sada vecu ,,tezinu" i moze da trazi nekakve ustupke. Da li je Kipru to najbitnije pitanje vis-a-vis Britanije ili ne je vec druga stvar.

[CPP]

Cekaj, ti ozbiljno mislis da Kipar moze ili hoce da zateze sa Britanijom a zbog teritorije baza koja je vec sada prakticno njihova? Precenjujes znacaj tog pitanja a zbog nekog sireg narativa. Ako ipak dodje do nekog talasanja to ce biti jer ce Kipar igrati ulogu proksija nekog veceg igraca (i konsekventno popusiti kao i svaki put kad su se trtili medju velike).

[Prospero]

First, American guarantees are no longer reliable. Trump has questioned whether he would defend Eastern European NATO members if they do not do more to defend themselves. He has said that Saudi Arabia should pay for American security. He has encouraged Japan and South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons. In Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Trump has made it clear that America will no longer play the role of policeman; instead, it will be a private security company open for hire.

Second, global institutions will come under attack. Trump fundamentally rejects the view that the liberal world order that the US built after WWII (and expanded after the Cold War) is the cheapest way of defending American values and interests. Like George W. Bush after September 11, 2001, he views global institutions as placing intolerable constraints on US freedom of action. He has a revisionist agenda for almost all of these bodies, from the World Trade Organization to NATO and the United Nations. The fact that he wants to put the “Art of the Deal” into practice in all international relationships – renegotiating the terms of every agreement – is likely to provoke a similar backlash among America’s partners.

Third, Trump will turn all US relationships on their head. The crude fear is that he will be kinder to America’s foes than to its allies. Most challenging for Europeans is his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Should Trump, cozying up to Putin in search of a grand bargain, recognize Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the EU would be placed in a near-impossible role.
Fourth, there is Trump’s unpredictability. Even during the 18 months of the presidential campaign, Trump has been on both sides of almost every issue. The fact that he will say the opposite today of what he said yesterday, without admitting that he has changed his mind, shows the extent to which capriciousness is his method.

 

One of the benefits the US political system is that it provides a two-month grace period to prepare for Trump’s world. So what should Europeans do about it?

 

First, we need to try to increase leverage over the US. We know from Trump’s writings and behavior that he is likely to resemble other strongmen presidents and treat weakness as an invitation to aggression. We saw from the Iraq experience that a divided Europe has little ability to influence the US. But where Europe has worked together – on privacy, competition policy, and taxation – it has dealt with the US from a position of strength.

The same was true with the so-called E3+3 policy on Iran – when the big EU member states shifted the US stance by standing together. To get on the front foot, the EU now needs to launch a process to agree on common policies on security, foreign policy, migration, and the economy. This will be difficult, as Europe is deeply divided, with France fearing terrorism, Poland dreading Russia, Germany inflamed by the refugee issue, and the United Kingdom determined to go it alone.

Second, Europeans should show that they are able to hedge their bets and build alliances with others. The EU must reach out to other powers to help shore up global institutions against Trumpian revisionism. And it also needs to diversify its foreign-policy relationships. Rather than waiting for Trump to marginalize the EU over Russia and China, Europeans should fly some kites of their own. Should they, for example, begin consulting with the Chinese on the EU arms embargo to remind the US of the value of the transatlantic alliance? Could the EU develop a different relationship with Japan? And if Trump wants to cozy up to Russia, maybe he should take over the Normandy process on Ukraine?

Third, Europeans need to start to invest in their own security. From Ukraine to Syria, from cyber attacks to terror attacks, Europe’s security is being probed in different ways. Despite an intellectual understanding that 500 million Europeans can no longer contract out their security to 300 million Americans, the EU has done little to close the gap between its security needs and its capabilities. It is time to put meat on the bones of the Franco-German plan for European defense. And it will be important to find institutionalized ways of binding the UK into Europe’s new security architecture.

 

 

 

 

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-faces-trump-transatlantic-breakdown-by-mark-leonard-2016-11

Edited November 10, 2016 by Prospero

[Dr Arslanagić]

sve +1000

[hazard]

 

Third, Europeans need to start to invest in their own security. From Ukraine to Syria, from cyber attacks to terror attacks, Europe’s security is being probed in different ways. Despite an intellectual understanding that 500 million Europeans can no longer contract out their security to 300 million Americans, the EU has done little to close the gap between its security needs and its capabilities. It is time to put meat on the bones of the Franco-German plan for European defense. And it will be important to find institutionalized ways of binding the UK into Europe’s new security architecture.

 

A za to ti treba evropska vojska inace ce sve biti preskupo...dakle, khm, draft speech for Messrs. Tusk and Juncker:

 

"We must remember that first of all, the European Union began as a project of peace. The countries which so savagely waged war on one another set out to entangle their economies to such a scale as to make any future war impractical - infeasible. Now, we must complete the process by the final step - by making our armies so interlocked and interdependent as to make it almost impossible for them to fight another. Right after the Second World War, this was not possible - but today, it is. We must pay more for our security - we must take care of ourselves. We must take back control ( ) of our own shared destiny. If we do it as it is done today, with each country paying its own way alone - this means more defense spending, and more austerity on other fronts to pay for it. Europe can afford no more austerity - so together, we can improve the security of the European people - make them safer, sounder, and more protected - while not increasing costs, and not imposing any new taxes or austerity. This is the way we must move forward - decisively."

 

itd.

[Prospero]

pa armijsko ujedinjenje je bio jedan od prvih zamišljenih koraka uopšte ali su francuski tupsoni uspeli da propuste priliku.

[hazard]

Francuska se tada jos uvek nije suocila sa svojim post-kolonijalnim/post-imperijalnim statusom (jer ipak tada ti procesi jos nisu svi ni zavrseni bili), pa me to i ne cudi.

 

Ima btw ovaj izvestaj, sa dosta interesantnih cifara, naravno pitanje je koliko je objektivan s obzirom na to ko ga je pisao

[Prospero]

lepo jednom napisa mišel barnije - za pola američkog vojnog budžeta (kad sabereš EU28) dobiješ 10% mogućnosti.

[Dagmar]

lepo jednom napisa mišel barnije - za pola američkog vojnog budžeta (kad sabereš EU28) dobiješ 10% mogućnosti.

 

Huh? Evropa troši ekivalent pola američkog vojnog budžeta na vojsku?