Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Ravanelli]

Debt structure

 

Ne znam da li je bilo.

facility od 6 milijardi na 40god, veri seksi Edited July 1, 2015 by Ravanelli

[Budja]

NO VOTE IS A CHOICE FOR A BETTER DEAL ON MONDAY

IF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN EUROGROUP WE WILL RESPOND

 

Ipak sarlatan i pilicar koji referendum koristi kao sredstvo u pregovorima.

 

Samo, sto ce nakon danasnje ponude i ovog govora raskol u Sirizi samo narasti, kao i nepoverenje u Varufakisa i Ciprasa, a sto moze voditi manjem odzivu za OXI.

 

 

 

Stavise, mnogo je jasnije sta NAI znaci nego sta OXI znaci jer NAI kampanja mnogo cistije i jasnije predstavlja situaciju. OXI da bi se jacala pregovaracka pozicija za sta? Do jaja motivisuce.

Edited July 1, 2015 by Budja

[Prospero]

The PM has taken to Greek television. We're relying on translations but he is remainng defiant. Some flashes:

TSIPRAS SAYS CREDITORS SHIFTED BLACKMAIL FROM GOVT TO CITIZENS

TSIPRAS SAYS EUROPE SHOULD GIVE TIME AND SPACE TO GREEKS

TSIPRAS NOT BACKING DOWN, SAYS GREECE RECEIVED BETTER PROPOSALS FOR DEBT AFTER REFERENDUM CALL

CALLS FOR `NO' VOTE IN JULY 5 REFERENDUM

: 'NO' MEANS PRESSURE FOR A VIABLE DEAL W/DEBT RELIEF - MNI

''NO VOTE IS A CHOICE FOR A BETTER DEAL ON MONDAY

IF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN EUROGROUP WE WILL RESPOND

Edited July 1, 2015 by Prospero

[vememah]

Za one koji temu čitaju na preskok, već sam kačio ceo Tajmsov članak o tome da su Nemci otpisali Ciprasa, da se intenzivno radi na cepanju Sirize radi pravljenja nove parlamentarne većine koja će sklopiti dogovor, dok u slučaju OXI-ja sledi Grexit, evo još jednom linka.

http://www.parapsihopatologija.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=11906&page=281&do=findComment&comment=3118098

 

Varufakisovo ministarstvo danas:

 

Slovački minfin u klin:

 

Cipras u ploču:

 

 

Ovoga će narod vešati na ulici kad banke propadnu nakon OXI-ja.

Edited July 1, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Igra se nakon defaulta prema MMF-u sada može promeniti i po pitanju evropskih kredita, Evropljani sada imaju pravo da zatraže njihovo vraćanje odmah (tzv. nuklearna opcija) jer su takvi ugovori. Druge dve opcije su da čekaju ili da se odreknu prava na traženje ubrzanog plaćanja. Verovatno će se sada odlučiti za čekanje, ali nuklearna opcija će zasigurno ostati da visi u vazduhu.

 

EFSF takes note of Greece’s non-payment to IMF

 

Date: 01 July 2015

 

Luxembourg – The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) takes note of a public statement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that a Greek non-payment has occurred. It is the EFSF’s understanding that the IMF Managing Director has informed the IMF Executive Board. This will be confirmed by a meeting of the Executive Board, expected later today. For the EFSF, this would constitute an event of default for certain EFSF loans.

The EFSF also takes note of the fact that the IMF received a request yesterday from the Greek authorities for an extension of Greece’s repayment obligation that fell due yesterday. The IMF’s Executive Board intends to examine this request in due course.

In line with EFSF guidelines, EFSF CEO Klaus Regling must inform the chairman of the Eurogroup Working Group and the EFSF Board of Directors today of the non-payment and propose one of the following three options:

• - acceleration of the loan: this means that the EFSF cancels the loan contract and requests  immediate repayment of the principal and interest amounts;
• - waiver of rights: this means that the EFSF irrevocably waives its right and remedies under the loan for this specific non-payment;
• - reservation of rights: this means that the  EFSF neither accelerates the loan nor waives its right to do so, but instead reserves the right to act at a later stage.   

The EFSF will coordinate its next steps very closely with the Eurogroup Working Group, where its shareholders are represented, and with the European Commission and the IMF.

The Greek non-payment has no influence on the EFSF’s capacity to repay its bondholders. Investors know that EFSF bonds benefit from a very strong guarantee structure.

http://www.esm.europa.eu/press/releases/efsf-takes-note-of-greeces-non-payment-to-imf.htm

Edited July 1, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Economist o pregovaračkoj taktici Sirize - ludilo bez metoda:
 
 

The Greek crisis
 
Madness without method

It is difficult to discern any logic or design in the negotiating gambits now being deployed

Jul 1st 2015 
 
WEDNESDAY July 1st began as a footnote in financial history textbooks: at midnight Greece became the first rich country to default on the IMF since the fund's inception in 1945. As the hours tick on, its entry on the tortuous timeline of the euro-area crisis grows longer; European leaders look determined to pack as much of the absurdity and tragedy that is so characteristic of the crisis into a 24-hour period as they possibly can.

The early hours were most notable for what didn’t happen. Greece's second bail-out programme officially ended on June 30th, leaving Greece without bail-out support for the first time since 2010, yet the Greek financial system is still standing—just. The IMF default did not trigger anything catastrophic. In theory, euro-zone finance ministers, as shareholders in the funds used to bail out Greece, could have clubbed together and declared it in default of those loans, by virtue of “cross-default” clauses in the IMF programme. To Greece's relief, they have not.

Few expected they would take such a step before Sunday’s referendum. Yet at times today it was unclear whether there would be one after all. By mid-morning, the Financial Timeswas reporting that Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, was suing for peace. A letter from Mr Tsipras to his Troika counterparts said Greece was willing to accept a proposal put out by the European Commission on Sunday (one based on, but ever-so-slightly different to, the one the Greeks will be asked to vote on). Mr Tsipras's offer included concessions on tricky subjects, including VAT and pensions. For a moment, a quick and (relatively) quiet resolution to the stalement seemed possible. European stocks bounced.

But the offer, predictably, was subject to “amendments, additions or clarifications”. These averred to be the same issues—around tax breaks on Greek islands and raising the retirement age—which have foiled attempts at agreement in recent weeks. It wasn’t long before Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s unbending finance minister, poured cold water on the offer, followed shortly by his boss, Angela Merkel. Both are extremely reluctant to negotiate anything before Sunday. By contrast, François Hollande, France’s president, is reportedly angling for a deal before then.

With the new offer tabled and tossed out, the news wires speculated that Mr Tsipras might finally reconsider holding his referendum. Yet in the Athens afternoon he addressed the Greek people and declared that the vote would go ahead, and that Greeks could have everything that they wanted—continued euro-zone membership and a better deal—by voting no to the Eurogroup's latest offer, despite euro-area leaders' best efforts to frame the vote as an effective in-out plebiscite. Meanwhile the leader of the Council of Europe (a European intergovernmental organisation which rather confusingly does not fall within the structure of the European Union) warned that the referendum might "fall short of international standards" thanks to insufficient monitoring and the lack of clarity in the proposed ballot language. 

Neither is the day over. The European Central Bank has yet to decide whether and how it will continue to provide emergency liquidity aid to Greece’s banks; some reckon it might increase the discount it applies to the value of the collateral it accepts in exchange for its emergency lending, tightening the screws on Greek banks that are already under intense pressure, despite the protection of capital controls. And late in the afternoon euro-zone finance ministers will have yet another teleconference to consider Greece’s latest gambit.

There may not be much to say while the referendum looms: a vote on which a great deal now rides. A "yes" vote would probably lead to a new government: Mr Tsipras and his fellow ministers would struggle to stay in office if voters reject their advice to spurn Greece’s creditors. That could lead either to the formation of a new government of national unity from the current parliament, or to fresh elections. A yes vote would unleash a torrent of political goodwill from Greece’s creditors, who will have in effect forged a successful alliance with Greek voters over the heads of their government. Once Greece forms a government, assuming it is no longer led by Syriza, negotiations could begin immediately on a third bail-out, including at least the promise of a restructuring of Greece’s vast debts, worth nearly 180% of GDP. The terms of such a deal may not differ drastically from the creditors’ last offer to Greece, but if they find themselves working with a more cooperative government that should not be too drastic a difficulty: after all, it is precisely that offer that Greeks will have just approved.

A "no" vote, on the other hand, would put Greece on the fast track to exit. The drop dead date is now July 20th, when €3.5-billion worth of ECB bonds must be repaid. Greece could not make the payment without a new bail-out programme. Defaulting on the ECB would almost certainly push the central bank to pull its support for Greek banks entirely. That, in turn, would force the Greek government to either tolerate the complete collapse of its banking system or to make good on its guarantee of Greek deposits by printing a new currency. But even a "yes" vote would leave precious little time to conclude a new bail-out deal. Neither is it clear whether Greece's banks can survive until July 20th. 

And in Athens, a large banner declaring “No to blackmail and austerity” now hangs outside the finance ministry (the work of trade unionists rather than the government, its finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, later clarified). But the day is not yet over.

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21656605-it-difficult-discern-any-logic-or-design-negotiating-gambits-now-being-deployed-madness

Edited July 1, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Evrogrupa gotova, odgovor Ciprasu: čujemo se posle referenduma

Edited July 1, 2015 by vememah

[Tribun_Populi]

Game over?

[akibono]

Ovako te malo prođe nostalgija za Zaz_Pijom, zatrpavanje teme lopatom & samodovoljština... nedostajalo je 

[MancMellow]

 

Europe Wants to Punish Greece With Exit 276  JUL 1, 2015 12:01 AM EDT

By Clive Crook

 

In my more than 30 years writing about politics and economics, I have never before witnessed such an episode of sustained, self-righteous, ruinous and dissembling incompetence -- and I'm not talking about Alexis Tsipras and Syriza. As the damage mounts, the effort to rewrite the history of the European Union's abject failure over Greece is already underway. Pending a fuller postmortem, a little clarity on the immediate issues is in order.

On Monday, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said at a news conference that he'd been betrayed by the Greek government.

The creditor institutions, he said, had shown flexibility and sought compromise. Their most recent offer involved no wage cuts, he emphasized, and no pension cuts; it was a package that created "more social fairness." Tsipras had misled Greeks about what the creditors were asking. The talks were getting somewhere. Agreement on this package could have been reached "easily" if Tsipras hadn't collapsed the process early Saturday by calling a referendum.

 

What an outrageous passel of distortion. Since these talks began five months ago, both sides have budged, but Tsipras has given vastly more ground than the creditors. In particular, he was ready to accede to more fiscal austerity -- a huge climbdown on his part. True, the last offer requires a slightly milder profile of primary budget surpluses than the creditors initially demanded; nonetheless, it still calls for severely (and irrationally) tight fiscal policy.

In contrast, the creditors have refused to climb down on the question of including debt relief in the current talks, absurdly insisting that this is an issue for later. On Tuesday, Tsipras made his most desperate attempt yet to bring the issue forward.

Far from expressing any desire to compromise, dominant voices among the creditors -- notably German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who often seemed to be calling the shots -- have maintained throughout that there is nothing to discuss. The program already in place had to be completed, and that was that.

Yes, the program had failed. No, it wouldn't achieve debt sustainability. Absolutely, it was pointlessly grinding down Greek living standards even further. What did that have to do with it?

Juncker says the last offer made no demand for wage cuts. Really? The offer says the "wage grid" should be modernized, including "decompressing the [public sector] wage distribution." On the face of it, decompressing involves cuts. If the creditors were calling for public-sector wages to be decompressed upward perhaps they should have made this clear. Regardless, the increases in value-added taxes demanded by the creditors mean lower real wages, public and private alike. As for no pension cuts, the creditors called for phasing out new early-retirement penalties and the so-called social solidarity payment for the poorest pensioners. Those are cuts.

The creditors called for a lot else, too. Remember that the Greek economy is on its knees. Living standards have collapsed and the unemployment rate is 25 percent. Now read the offer document, and see if you think the advance in "social fairness" that Juncker stressed at his news conference shines through.

But I haven’t mentioned the biggest distortion of all. Noticing for the first time that Greece has EU citizens within its borders, Juncker addressed them directly on the subject of the July 5 referendum. Greeks will be asked whether they accept the offer presented by the creditors -- an offer, by the way, that the creditors say no longer stands. "No [to the offer that no longer exists] would mean that Greece is saying no to Europe," Juncker explained. President Francois Hollande of France clarified: The vote would determine "whether the Greeks want to stay in the euro zone."

Nonsense. There's no doubt that Greeks want to stay in the euro system -- though I find it increasingly difficult to see why. If Greece leaves the system, it won't be because Greeks decide to leave; it will be because Europe decides to kick them out.

This isn't just semantics. There's no reason, in law or logic, why a Greek default necessitates an exit from the euro. The European Central Bank pulls this trigger by choosing -- choosing, please note -- to withhold its services as lender of last resort to the Greek banking system. That is what it did this week. That is what shut the banks and, in short order, will force the Greek authorities to start issuing a parallel currency in the form of IOUs.

 

 

A truly independent ECB, willing to do whatever it takes to defend the euro system, could have announced that it would keep supplying Greek banks with liquidity. If the Greek banks are deemed in due course to be insolvent (which hasn’t happened yet), that doesn't have to trigger an exit, either. Europe has the wherewithal and a bank-rescue mechanism that would allow the banks to be taken over and recapitalized. These options are foreclosed because the supposedly apolitical ECB has let Europe's finance ministers use it as a hammer to extract fiscal concessions from Greece.

Nobody ever imagined that a government default in Europe would dictate ejection from the euro zone. The very possibility would have been correctly recognized as a fatal defect in the design of the system.

If the Greeks vote no, a Greek exit is a possible and even likely consequence. But if it happens, the reason won't be that Greece chose to go. The reason will be that the European Union and its politicized central bank chose to inflict exit as punishment. 

Clive Crook is a Bloomberg View columnist and a member of the Bloomberg View editorial board. A former chief Washington commentator of the Financial Times, he previously worked at the Economist and as a senior editor at the Atlantic. 

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-07-01/europe-wants-to-punish-greece-with-exit

Edited July 1, 2015 by MancMellow

[reginald]

O tome je i Krugman pisao kada je razradjivao jedan scenarij prilikom pregovora prije sest mjeseci.

 

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/thinking-about-the-new-greek-crisis/?smid=tw-NytimesKrugman&seid=auto

 

 

4. Instead, the power of the creditors over Greece comes via the ability to crash the Greek banking system, which is heavily dependent on the ability to borrow at need from the ECB. Cut off that support, and Greece suffers banking collapse. So yes, the creditors have a large club they can use on a recalcitrant Greece. But do they really want to do that? Within a European Union supposedly dedicated to democratic ideals? Actually, you have to wonder whether the ECB, which surely understands the stakes, would even be willing to go along. If the situation continues to look like unraveling, I would expect Draghi to say something to reassure the markets that a Greek bank cutoff is not on the table.

 

U daljnjoj razradi scenarija postoje i tocke u kojima se spominje i izdaja europskih principa. Apropo, Nijemci vec otvoreno govore da nece pregovarati sa demokratski izabranom vladom.

[Prospero]

Sad ja kao polemišem sa njima dvojicom ali smo i na ovom topiku o tome raspravljali - kolaps grčke ne povlači sa sobom i EZ; tome je služio i plan Z ali i ceo paket pumpanja novca od početka godine (naći tekst Anatola Kaleckog na temi). Grčka je u zadnje dve godine ograđena od EZ iz straha od ove situacije - "Greek cutoff" nije isto što i kolaps EZ.

 

Drugo, Crook ironiše da je ECB zapravo politički aktivna (sa Briselom protiv Atine) a zaboravlja da je cap na 89 milijardi evra (i koji je trenutno na snazi i sprečava veće ELA pozajmice) zapravo ekonomska i daleko ranije ugovorena mera. Zar ne bi ECB bila takođe "politična" kada bi udovoljila Atini i povećala ELA preko dogovorenog, imajuči na umu da nestabilnost grčkih banaka nije isto što i nestabilnost EZ?

[Prospero]

Neki poll-ovi:
 

 
 
I Dijselblomov formalni odgovor Ciprasu:
http://t.co/ytJRddhmkl
 

...

Your letters were shared with Eurogroup Finance Ministers and we discussed them at extraordinary Eurogroup conference calls on 30 June and 1 July.

Firstly, as regards the further request to extend the current EFSF financial assistance arrangement, the Eurogroup reconfirmed on 30 June the decision of the 27 June Eurogroup not to support an extension, given that the considerations that led to that decision remained unchanged. The current EFSF financial assistance arrangement with Greece has expired on 30 June 2015, as well as all agreements related to the current Greek programme including the transfer by euro area Member States of SMP and ANFA equivalent profits. In view of your letter, we would like to recall that on February 20 the Greek authorities agreed to reiterate their unequivocal commitment to honour their financial obligations to all their creditors fully and timely.

Secondly, we will come back to your request for financial stability support from the ESM only after and on the basis of the outcome of the referendum.

Edited July 1, 2015 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

to je efektivno 52:48 za NAI. Tesno

[Prospero]

Ja se ne bih iznenadio da bude nešto tipa 65:35 za neku od opcija, realno ko zna kakva je pouzdanost ovih anketa, a ionako se svaki dan dešavaju neki obrti i neočekivane vesti, verujem da je narod poprilično sluđen :(