Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[Prospero]

Slažem se, generalno.

 

Ja bih možda rekao da je poštenije (ne nužno i bolje, objasniću zašto) da izađu iz EZ, a pritom bi bilo i najbolje da ne moraju da izlaze iz EU, tj da postoji volja da se prerade ugovori tako da postoji jasna opt-out funkcija (koja ne bi trebala biti laka jer obesmišljava EMU). 

Dakle, da naštampaju nove drahme, u prvom talasu progutaju inflaciju, stabilizuju je u nekom trenutku i krenu da rade kako sami misle da je najbolje. O dugu će morati da pregovaraju na neki način, od ukupnog otpisa naravno da nema ništa. U tom scenariju bi grčki političari mogli biti jedini odgovorni za stanje u Grčkoj. E sad, u tome je caka, ja bih se bez dvoumljenja pre držao briselske nego grčke birokratije, tj. imam 0 poverenja da će ta i takva elita uraditi bilo šta smisleno od zemlje. Oni bre ne mogu pola poreza da naplate.

 

Na neki srednji rok, oni mogu štampati drahme, nalaziti špekulativni kapital, privatizovati neke firme, osloniti se na jeftini turizam zarad deviznog priliva itd, ali će dug morati da vraćaju u nekom iznosu i nekom obliku.

 

 

Glavni problem zadnjih godina nije bio osteriti paket nego manjak smislenih reformi, a tu politiku je nastavila i Siriza. Jeste, na vlasti su samo 5 meseci ali deluju kao potrošena priča koja je, IMHO, potpuno omašila u svom izboru bitke koju treba da bije (a zbog svoje prevelike populističke prirode). Ja ne znam ko će kod njih te reforme da izgurava do kraja ako resuverenizuju monetarni sistem, a to traljavljenje će pojesti bilo kakav eventualni rast, tj onemogućiti ga.

[vememah]

Nine things to know about Greece’s IMF debt default

June 30, 2015 1.55pm BST

André Broome

Associate Professor of International Political Economy at University of Warwick

Greece is set to miss the deadline on its €1.6 billion loan repayment due to the IMF. The country’s stalemate with its international creditors and the decision to hold a referendum on its bailout offer means Greece will become the first advanced economy to default to the fund in its 71-year history.

 

Here are nine essential things to know about the default:

 

1. The long-term damage may yet be minimal. If Greece is only in arrears to the IMF for a short period of time, it may be shown leniency down the line. The IMF’s policy on overdue payments does distinguish between short-term and protracted arrears.

 

2. This is not yet a full-blown sovereign debt default by Greece. This is still a first for an EU member state, but the IMF is keen to maintain a distinction between a country being “in arrears” and a “default”. This important semantic distinction is also made by major credit rating agencies. It means the consequences for Greece may be temporary and small, if they are able to find a speedy resolution and make the payment.

 

3. Being in arrears to the IMF is not a new phenomenon. Since 1997, arrears owed to the IMF that were at least six months overdue have ranged from €1.5 billion to €3 billion in any given month. This is not a position any country wants to be in, however. It places Greece in the company of countries whose governments are widely seen as dysfunctional, or even “failed states”. The only countries with IMF repayments at least six months overdue in the past decade have been Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Liberia.

 

4. The IMF will not allow any country to access its resources while it remains in arrears. For the IMF to be involved in any future new support package, arrears payments will first need to be settled, without the possibility of rescheduling payments. This makes Greece even more dependent on EU funding to bring liquidity back to its banks – making the outcome of the July 5 referendum even more important.

 

5. The IMF may now treat Greece even more harshly. It is hard to overstate how seriously the IMF takes the issue of prompt repayment of loans. In the past, countries that have deliberately missed payments have had to make significant moves towards adopting IMF policy preferences in order to regain access to its financial resources. This could include things like meeting stricter spending targets and enacting fundamental tax and pension reforms to gain future access to funds.

 

6. Greece is the IMF’s biggest-ever debtor. This means the stakes for the IMF are higher here than in other countries. Greece’s €1.6 billion payment would be the largest payment ever missed to the IMF.

 

7. Future relations are going to be tricky. It is difficult to see how the IMF could work with the Syriza-led coalition government after this default. There is an intense political dimension to the stalemate with the country’s creditors. The IMF does not like countries playing hardball over loan conditions. It likes populist appeals and inflammatory rhetoric even less. And it is fundamentally opposed to giving favourable deals to governments that violate their obligations to the organisation.

 

8. Greece’s default is a disaster for the IMF’s credibility. There is no positive spin that can be put on this. The IMF relies on countries making their payment obligations no matter what. This is why so few countries in recent years have gone into protracted arrears with the IMF. Greece’s credibility is already in dire straits, but the IMF has much to lose from its largest debtor “behaving badly”.

The IMF is already under fire from developing countries where Greece is seen as receiving special treatment. Unless the IMF brings the hammer down on Greece now, future borrowers outside of Europe will also delay IMF loan repayments when it is inconvenient.

 

9. Expect a severe response. If no quick resolution is found after Greece’s referendum on its bailout, the IMF must react strongly to preserve its credibility with other debtors. In the short term, the IMF is likely to step back sharply from seeking a compromise position with Greece. The IMF will insist the government makes key policy changes and meets its scheduled repayments before bailout negotiations can resume.

In the longer term, if Greece remains in arrears, the IMF could take the extreme step of suspending the country’s membership. Even if Greece didn’t need access to IMF resources, being suspended from the organisation would be another first for an advanced economy, and would see Greece’s reputation in the international financial community plummet further. Countries that remain in protracted arrears, such as Zimbabwe, have to complete an informal “staff-monitored programme” of policy conditions without funding as part of the process of normalising relations with the IMF.

 

Taken together, these nine points highlight the dangerous waters that Greece, the IMF, and the EU have now entered. Regardless of the referendum result, it is difficult to see the IMF cooperating with the government in Greece in the near future. Either fresh elections or a monumental change in policy direction will have to occur for that to happen.

 

https://theconversation.com/nine-things-to-know-about-greeces-imf-debt-default-44097

[SleeperSleep]

Jel mozes malo o tom dokazu? Nisam ubedjen.

+1

[Budja]

Slažem se, generalno.

 

Ja bih možda rekao da je poštenije (ne nužno i bolje, objasniću zašto) da izađu iz EZ, a pritom bi bilo i najbolje da ne moraju da izlaze iz EU, tj da postoji volja da se prerade ugovori tako da postoji jasna opt-out funkcija (koja ne bi trebala biti laka jer obesmišljava EMU). 

Dakle, da naštampaju nove drahme, u prvom talasu progutaju inflaciju, stabilizuju je u nekom trenutku i krenu da rade kako sami misle da je najbolje. O dugu će morati da pregovaraju na neki način, od ukupnog otpisa naravno da nema ništa. U tom scenariju bi grčki političari mogli biti jedini odgovorni za stanje u Grčkoj. E sad, u tome je caka, ja bih se bez dvoumljenja pre držao briselske nego grčke birokratije, tj. imam 0 poverenja da će ta i takva elita uraditi bilo šta smisleno od zemlje. Oni bre ne mogu pola poreza da naplate.

 

Na neki srednji rok, oni mogu štampati drahme, nalaziti špekulativni kapital, privatizovati neke firme, osloniti se na jeftini turizam zarad deviznog priliva itd, ali će dug morati da vraćaju u nekom iznosu i nekom obliku.

 

 

Glavni problem zadnjih godina nije bio osteriti paket nego manjak smislenih reformi, a tu politiku je nastavila i Siriza. Jeste, na vlasti su samo 5 meseci ali deluju kao potrošena priča koja je, IMHO, potpuno omašila u svom izboru bitke koju treba da bije (a zbog svoje prevelike populističke prirode). Ja ne znam ko će kod njih te reforme da izgurava do kraja ako resuverenizuju monetarni sistem, a to traljavljenje će pojesti bilo kakav eventualni rast, tj onemogućiti ga.

 

Zapravo, deluje da je trebalo da biju jos populistickije bitke na domacem frontu koje bi ujedno bile i reformske.

 

Mislim, Varufakis je pricao o trojstvu banaka, medija i zaobravih cega treceg. Posto za sest meseci nisu "uhapsili Miskovica" sad im ta tajkunska koalicija uz pomoc EU radi o glavi.

 

Tj. koje su strukturne reforme o kojima je Beowl pricao moguce sa novom Vladom ako je nova koaliciona Vlada plod tajkunske podrske NAI? Bice tu tapsanja po ramenu, gimme five i slicno sa Briselom, ali promena biti nece.

 

 

Nisu li upravo strukturne reforme bile bitka koju je Siriza trebalo da vodi od pocetka kako bi duplo legitimizovala svoju poziciju i spolja i iznutra, i na taj nacin dobila neki  bolji paket?

[MancMellow]

^^Rekao sam "vise-manje". Meaning - ako desetine svetski priznatih strucnjaka kazu da ce se upravo to desiti sa ovim merama u grckom slucaju, a nijedan (a pitao sam da mi se da link za nekog takvog) ko bar teorijski dokazuje da ce se u grckom slucaju sa ovim merama desiti suprotno, to je za ostatak populacije "vise-manje" dokazano. Ali to je teorija. Praksa od pet godina je mozda i mnogo bolji empirijski dokaz za takvu tvrdnju. Definicija ludila...znamo sta je. 

 

Dakle ostaje tvrdnja da je Grcka 1 unique case, pri tom je unique case zbog navodne rasturene administracije. Kako teramo zemlju da uredi administraciju? Ekonomskim merama koje nemaju podlogu u ekonomskoj teoriji, a ni u dosadasnjoj praksi IMF-a kada diluju sa najteze zaduzenim zemljama. 

Edited July 1, 2015 by MancMellow

[Budja]

^^Rekao sam "vise-manje". Meaning - ako desetine svetski priznatih strucnjaka kazu da ce se upravo to desiti sa ovim merama u grckom slucaju, a nijedan (a pitao sam da mi se da link za nekog takvog) ko bar teorijski dokazuje da ce se u grckom slucaju sa ovim merama desiti suprotno, to je za ostatak populacije "vise-manje" dokazano. Ali to je teorija. Praksa od pet godina je mozda i mnogo bolji empirijski dokaz za takvu tvrdnju. Definicija ludila...znamo sta je. 

 

Dakle ostaje tvrdnja da je Grcka 1 unique case, pri tom je unique case zbog navodne rasturene administracije. Kako teramo zemlju da uredi administraciju? Ekonomskim merama koje nemaju podlogu u ekonomskoj teoriji, a ni u dosadasnjoj praksi IMF-a kada diluju sa najteze zaduzenim zemljama. 

 

Ekonomska teorija nije jedinstvena.

Ako govoris o anecdotal evidence, ovde se vec pominjala Irska, Spanija, Protugalija na sta je tvoj odgovor a Francuska?

Tako se ne moze diskutovati.

 

Sto se IMFa tice, vec je vise puta receno da je Grcka unique case bas zato sto je u evrozoni pa standardni paket nije primenjiv.

[Hella]

da citiram indija koji je citirao stivija uondera 

 

Što reko Stevie Wonder, "when you believe in things that you don't understand, then you suffer."

 

ovi grčki dembelani su verovali u krađu para od nemačkih radnika a sad čekaju red za koru leba ispred etniki trapeze

 

 

 

ista sudbina čeka i belolistićare koji su verovali da je sve isto i da su svi isti i da je baš svejedno 

Edited July 1, 2015 by Hella

[Prospero]

Errr

 

 

 

 

 

Alexis Tsipras will accept all his bailout creditors' conditions that were on the table this weekend with only a handful of minor changes, according to a letter the Greek prime minister sent late Tuesday night and obtained by the Financial Times.

The two-page letter, sent to the heads of the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, elaborates on Tuesday's surprise request for an extension of Greece's now-expired bailout and for a new, third €29.1bn rescue, writes Peter Spiegel.

Although the bailout's expiry at midnight Tuesday night means the extension is no longer on the table, Mr Tsipras' new letter could serve as the basis of a new bailout in the coming days.

Mr Tsipras' letter says Athens will accept all the reforms of his country's value-added tax system with one change: a special 30 per cent discount for Greek islands, many of which are in remote and difficult-to-supply regions, be maintained.

On the contentious issue of pension reform, Mr Tsipras requests that changes to move the retirement age to 67 by 2022 begin in October, rather than immediately. He also requests that a special "solidarity grant" awarded to poorer pensioners, which he agrees to phase out by December 2019, be phased out more slowly than creditors request.

"The Hellenic Republic is prepared to accept this staff-level agreement subject to the following amendments, additions or clarifications, as part of an extension of the expiring [bailout] program and the new [third] loan agreement for which a request was submitted today, Tuesday June 30th 2015," Mr Tsipras wrote. He added:

Eurozone finance ministers are due to discuss Mr Tsipras' new proposal in a conference call at 5:30pm, Brussels time.

As you will note, our amendments are concrete and they fully respect the robustness and credibility of the design of the overall program.

Edited July 1, 2015 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

Ekonomska teorija nije jedinstvena.

Ako govoris o anecdotal evidence, ovde se vec pominjala Irska, Spanija, Protugalija na sta je tvoj odgovor a Francuska?

Tako se ne moze diskutovati.

 

Sto se IMFa tice, vec je vise puta receno da je Grcka unique case bas zato sto je u evrozoni pa standardni paket nije primenjiv.

 

upravo (za to drugo)

 

A za ovo prvi - ekonomska teorija nije jedinstvena izmedju ostalog jer...case je case, zato sam i pitao za konkretan slucaj - dakle. kao sto postoje priznati ekonomski teoreticari (ne mali broj, vidimo) koji tvrde da ce ove mere u ovoj zemlji produbiti krizu, da li ima i koji su priznati (makro)ekonomski teoreticari koji tvrde da ce ove mere u ovoj zemlji postici proklamovani cilj. To je sve. Genuine question, posto dopustam, naravno, da prosto nisam naleteo. 

Edited July 1, 2015 by MancMellow

[Budja]

 ako je tacno.

 

Koji amaterizam.

 

 

Alexis Tsipras will accept all his bailout creditors’ conditions that were on the table this weekend with only a handful of minor changes, according to a letter the Greek prime minister sent late Tuesday night and obtained by the Financial Times.

The two-page letter, sent to the heads of the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank, elaborates on Tuesday’s surprise request for an extension of Greece’s now-expired bailout and for a new, third €29.1bn rescue, writes Peter Spiegel.

Although the bailout’s expiry at midnight Tuesday night means the extension is no longer on the table, Mr Tsipras’ new letter could serve as the basis of a new bailout in the coming days.

[MancMellow]

Errr

 

 

kao sto sam rekao VAT je glavna stvar. 30 VAT discount na 23% je...roughly 16% dakle vise od 13, ali daleko manje od 23. Doduse, ovim kapituliraju na 23% za vecinu prehrambene industrije, but jbg. Doduse ovo za penzionere (solidarity grant) i nije tako malo. Shall see

[Budja]

kao sto sam rekao VAT je glavna stvar. 30 VAT discount na 23% je...roughly 16% dakle vise od 13, ali daleko manje od 23. Doduse, ovim kapituliraju na 23% za vecinu prehrambene industrije, but jbg. Doduse ovo za penzionere (solidarity grant) i nije tako malo. Shall see

 

Da, i zbog toga se saziva referendum kao pregovaracka taktika. 

Ali, sada je kasno, nemci ce da ga dojebu i cekaju referendum.

[Prospero]

Mnijem da je ekonomski ovo uglavnom prihvatljivo za kreditore ali sumnjam da ima političke volje da se to radi pre referenduma. Ionako bi morali da smišljaju pravne kerefeke da produžavaju 2. bejlaut.

[Budja]

 

Mr Tsipras' letter says Athens will accept all the reforms of his country's value-added tax system with one change: a special 30 per cent discount for Greek islands, many of which are in remote and difficult-to-supply regions, be maintained.

On the contentious issue of pension reform, Mr Tsipras requests that changes to move the retirement age to 67 by 2022 begin in October, rather than immediately. He also requests that a special "solidarity grant" awarded to poorer pensioners, which he agrees to phase out by December 2019, be phased out more slowly than creditors request.

 

 Ovo boldovano mu dodje kao promena imena trojke u institucije.

[SleeperSleep]

Da, i zbog toga se saziva referendum kao pregovaracka taktika. 

Ali, sada je kasno, nemci ce da ga dojebu i cekaju referendum.

+1

 

cipras je ćao.