Svet

[Prospero]

 

The hyper-globalisation era has been systematically stacked in favour of capital against labour

 

To možda protiv radnika na Zapadu ali ne i protiv radnika u Kini, J-I Aziji i raznim drugim delovima sveta u koja se kapital selio zadnjih decenija i koji su u jednoj do dve generacije iskusili izlazak iz sela, urbani i polu-urbani život, posao i zaradu s kojom mogu nešto da urade preko pukog biološkog preživljavanja.

 

 

@Anduril

 

Pa možda (oko alternative), no ako gledamo globalno ima još mnogo džepova gde tek treba da dođe prvi talas industrijalizacije i uglavnom nesputanog kapitalizma koji su, ako pratimo starije istorijske trendove, uglavnom prethodnica socijalnog normiranja i staranja.

 

Mnoga društva mogu da ponude samo jeftinu radnu snagu i neregulisano tržište i ne vidim da će se odricati toga da bi se bavili rešavanjem internih američkih ili evropskih tegoba.

 

Neka se američko i evropsko društvo prilagode pogoršanim uslovima poslovanja tj  pojačanoj konkurenciji. Imaju i dovoljno novca i političke svesti i internih mehanizama za to bez da eksportuju svoje probleme, da svoje specifične teme predstavljaju maltene univerzalnim/zajedničkim ili da - olako - krive zle globalne trendove.

 

caveat: Balkan/Srbija je u ovoj podeli naravno deo evropskog društva.

[Anduril]

Problem nejednakosti je vec prestao da bude samo problem SAD i Evrope - upravo Kina ima isti problem kako se rast smanjuje i kako milijarda ljudi shvata da je voz za srednjom klasom vec prosao pored njih. Slicno je sa Rusijom ili Brazilom koji u dogledno doba vise nece videti onakav rast srednje klase kao 2000-tih ali ce i dalje gledati superbogatase kako se bahate. To je eksplozivna smesa...

[Prospero]

Da, s tim da nejednakost prosto nije ista po raznim zemljama, od puke statističke predstave do svakodnevice i do njene političke i retoričke upotrebe, pogotovo u sklopu svih ostalih različitih društvenih tema.

[ObiW]

To možda protiv radnika na Zapadu ali ne i protiv radnika u Kini, J-I Aziji i raznim drugim delovima sveta u koja se kapital selio zadnjih decenija i koji su u jednoj do dve generacije iskusili izlazak iz sela, urbani i polu-urbani život, posao i zaradu s kojom mogu nešto da urade preko pukog biološkog preživljavanja.

 

Pa to. "The more I suck, the less somebody in China blows".

 

Samo ne razumem kako nikome nije toplo oko srca sto je nama sve losije a njime sve bolje?.

[Prospero]

Ovo prvo nije nužno tačno jer dok se pita preraspodeljuje ona u suštini i raste tako da nemamo po sredi (samo) igru nulte sume.

 

 

Tramp i Brexit su lokalni fenomeni sa dominantno lokalnim uzrocima a ne nedvosmislena posledica nekakvih globalnih tokova tj globalizacije kao fenomena, osim u smislu "kako jedno društvo vari razne efekte globalizacije", što je opet lokalizam. To što je Amerika teškaš pa će se njena dinamika kako-tako odraziti na ostale je druga stvar.

[ObiW]

Ovo prvo nije nužno tačno jer dok se pita preraspodeljuje ona u suštini i raste tako da nemamo po sredi (samo) igru nulte sume.

Pita svakako raste, ali raste i broj stanovnistva na planeti. Sta raste brze u poslednjih 10-20-30 godina?

[Prospero]

Dow Jones i NASDAQ.
 

[braca]

Raste brže i parče pite koju "elita" otkida....  Nekih 70 najbogatijih poseduje POLOVINU pite...

[namenski]

Ma kakvi, burek je neogranicen, vazno je, najvaznije da indeksi rastu, sistem je sasvim OK, ima doduse po neku falinku, ali nista sto se finim podesavanjem ne moze da sredi, a takozvane elite, taj trijumf evolucije, dokaz da najuspesniji i najsposobniji uspevaju u najuspesnijem od najuspesnijih sistema, ekstrakt duha slobodnog preduzetnistva, san svakog ljudskog bica, narocito onog tranzicionog, zivog pecenog, nedopecenog...

I, kada se jednog dana razvije svest elitnih masa Planete, kada one s nama podele svoje bogatstvo, uzivacemo svi koliko nas ima....

[MancMellow]

Neka se američko i evropsko društvo prilagode pogoršanim uslovima poslovanja tj  pojačanoj konkurenciji. Imaju i dovoljno novca i političke svesti i dovoljno oružja

 

^_^

 

No, seriously, ja sam pesimista. Ako neko misli da će se deo zemljine kugle tj društava koje ga čine i koji je u 1 diklajnu (a tu računam i Rusiju ako ozbiljno pričamo), a koji s druge strane poseduje verovatno 80% svetskog naoružanja (sofisticiraog svakako), obaveštajnih kapaciteta i tome slično se mirno "prilagoditi" novim uslovima koji za njih znače možda i do 30-40% gori život, a za njihovu političku elitu drastično opadanje globalnog uticaja...predlažem da se razmisli ponovo. 

Edited August 23, 2016 by MancMellow

[namenski]

Glavu gore, pomenuti su nebrojeno puta do sada dokazali da se moze i treba pouzdati narocito u njihovu visoko razvijenu politicku i svaku drugu svest i dalekovidost.

Mislim, ima i jacih^tm recepisa za propast.

[MancMellow]

Glavu gore, pomenuti su nebrojeno puta do sada dokazali da se moze i treba pouzdati narocito u njihovu visoko razvijenu politicku i svaku drugu svest i dalekovidost.

Mislim, ima i jacih^tm recepisa za propast.

 

Ma ok, ta tema zaslužuje detaljnu pažnju da ne bi ličila na kafansku raspravu, te je verovatno bolje zaustaviti se. Ono što hoću da kažem da amerika možda ima izbora da li da se konfrontira sa rusijom ili ne, u određenoj meri ima izbora i slobodu delovanja i na bliskom istoku. sa kinom nema izbora. samo je pitanje koji je najpametniji metod.

Edited August 23, 2016 by MancMellow

[namenski]

Ma ok, ta tema zaslužuje detaljnu pažnju da ne bi ličila na kafansku raspravu, te je verovatno bolje zaustaviti se. Ono što hoću da kažem da amerika možda ima izbora da li da se konfrontira sa rusijom ili ne, u određenoj meri ima izbora i slobodu delovanja i na bliskom istoku. sa kinom nema izbora. samo je pitanje koji je najpametniji metod.

Verovatno si u pravu sto se tice 'stop' znaka za dalju raspravu.

Ali pre bremzanja, porazmisli o, na primer, sledecem: Amerika i pridruzeni visokorazvijeni nemaju drugog izbora osim konflikta.

SIstemski.

Ne zbog ovestale i ofucane price o kraju imperije, trenutku kad ce Amerika koja je toliko zaduzila svet, konacno da propadne, nego zato sto je konflikt sastavni i nezamenljivi sastojak sistema onakvog kakvog poznajemo.

Rusija se trenutno namestila, ponajvise kao eho Hladnog rata, hladnoratovske terminologije i nacina razmisljanja; Kina jeste donekle novi kvalitet, ali ni izdaleka toliko nov i inovativan^tm da bi njen izlazak na takozvanu svetsku pozornicu promenio neke geostrateske aksiome i na njima zasnovane interese.

Pamet^tm tu nema sta da trazi, a bojim se da je izbor najpametnijeg metoda beznadezno ogranicen krizom moderne predstavnicke demokratije, liberalnog modela, itd, itd...: vremena su takva da se traze i ocekuju dugorocna, promisljena resenja, koja traze  poprilicno vizionarstva i hrabrosti da se preduzmu dugorocni nepopularni koraci, da se - na primer - ogranici rast indeksa^tm - dakle, sve bez izuzetka mere od kojih moderne zapadne vlade uljuljkane u ubedjenje o sigurnosti i potrebi da se razmislja u izbornim intervalima, nimalo nisu sklone, a bojim se ni sposobne.

[ObiW]

Neka se američko i evropsko društvo prilagode pogoršanim uslovima poslovanja tj  pojačanoj konkurenciji. Imaju i dovoljno novca i političke svesti i internih mehanizama za to bez da eksportuju svoje probleme, da svoje specifične teme predstavljaju maltene univerzalnim/zajedničkim ili da - olako - krive zle globalne trendove.

Hm, a da li je zastita zivotne sredine univerzalna ili partikularna tema? pravo na 40 radnih sati nedeljno? dve-tri-cetiri nedelje godisnjeg odmora? pravo na pauzu za topli obrok? pravo na par pauza po 5-10-15 minuta?

 

kako je trzisna utakmica ravnopravna ako neko na dalekom istoku mora da piski u pelene i radi 60-70 sati nedeljno sa par dana godisnjeg odmora, a neko u Americi/Evropi/Srbiji... radi 40 sati i ima 2-3-4 nedelje placenog godisnjeg odmora?

 

da ne pricam o tome sta se u toj Americi i Evropi mora da radi apropo zastite zivotne sredine od zagadjenja a na dalkom istoku - ne mora. Ili ste vec zaboravili kako su resavali problem zagadjenja vazduha u Pekingu tokom olimpijskih igara? 

 

Sutra da Berni Sanders postane predsednik i da kaze "udaramo porez 150% na sve proizvedeno u Kini dok se Kina po zakonima o zastiti zivotne sredine i radnika ne izjednaci sa Evropom i Amerikom, i dok se ne uverimo da se zakoni sprovodd u praksi", da li bi to opet bila bahata Amerika koja namece svoje interne probleme 1 suverenoj zemlji? 

 

Ili da preformulisem pitanje: umesto da se Amerikanci i Evropljani prisilno nauce da zive sa gorim uslovima proizvodnje, zasto se ne bi Kinezi prisilno naucili na bolje uslove proizvodnje? 

[Prospero]

Ma ok, ta tema zaslužuje detaljnu pažnju da ne bi ličila na kafansku raspravu, te je verovatno bolje zaustaviti se. Ono što hoću da kažem da amerika možda ima izbora da li da se konfrontira sa rusijom ili ne, u određenoj meri ima izbora i slobodu delovanja i na bliskom istoku. sa kinom nema izbora. samo je pitanje koji je najpametniji metod.

 

Nekakva rešenja su na 345317. strani od postojećih političkih debata.

 

----

 

 

Ono, ja nisam kao namenski da iskustveno prožimam sve pore društva nego sam osuđen da čitam druge, jbg :(

 

Milanović

 

1. What Forces Will Shape Global In equality in This Century?

 

The two forces that will shape global inequality are economic convergence

and Kuznets waves. The prospect for convergence, or the economic catch-up

of Asia with the West, seems strong. Even if China’s

growth were to sputter, the high economic growth rates of at least

some of the very populous Asian countries such as India, Indonesia,

Bangladesh, Thailand, and Vietnam will continue. It is unlikely that

they would all slow down together. Until the turn of the twenty- first

century, Chinese growth was largely responsible for the reduction of

global poverty and inequality, but in the future, more Asian countries

will be able to play that role, and consequently the chances that the process

will continue will be greater— the eggs won’t all be in one basket.

World economic power will shift much more toward Asia. In a

nice exercise he has conducted for several years, Danny Quah has

charted this gradual shift . In the 1980s, the center of gravity of world

output was in the mid- Atlantic, located between Eu rope and North

Amer i ca. In his latest calculations, Quah locates the center in the

middle of Iran, and notes that it has moved almost directly east over

the past thirty- fi ve years (Danny Quah, pers. comm.). By 2050, Quah

expects it to lie between India and China, which will have thus taken

on the roles previously played by Eu rope and North Amer i ca (Quah

2011).

The catch-up of incomes in many Asian countries with incomes in

Western European and North American nations will also reduce

global inequality. However in this case, the role of China becomes

ambiguous. Although China has been a great force for the reduction

of global inequality over the past four decades, and until approximately

2000 was indeed the sole force because China alone made the

difference between rising and declining global inequality, in the near

future its fast growth will begin to add to global inequality. That effect

will be small at first, but then, depending on what happens in

Africa and whether the gap between China and populous poor countries

increases, the effect may become greater. The bottom line is that

for global inequality to go down, the world needs fast growth in other

places besides China. That growth seems most likely to occur in Asia;

it is doubtful that it will occur in Africa.

The role of the Kuznets waves is also not simple. Even if the waves

were to be “well behaved,” that is, if income in e qual ity began to move

along the downward portions of the Kuznets curves, fi rst in China

and later in the United States and the rest of the rich world, it still

might take a de cade for the reductions in national inequalities to

become established and have an impact on a global level. Moreover,

we cannot be sure if China and the United States are indeed at the

peaks of their respective first and second Kuznets waves. In China,

the main off setting forces— that is, those that may keep inequality

high— are the increased share of income coming from private capital,

corruption, and regional income gaps. In the United States, those

forces are the heavy concentration of capital in the hands of the rich,

the unifi cation of high capital and labor incomes in the same people

(the “new capitalism”), and the po liti cal power of the rich.

Income in e qual ity and po liti cal problems will remain closely

linked. While one cannot expect high or even rising inequality to

fundamentally alter the American political system other than by

pushing it even further toward plutocracy, high inequality may end

up undermining the Chinese political system and either transforming

the rule of the Communist Party into a more nationalistic

and autocratic regime or pushing it toward democracy. Either of

these po liti cal changes would likely be accompanied by huge economic

dislocation and a decline in the growth rate.

 

 

2. What Will Happen to Rich Countries’ Middle Classes?

 

Rich countries’ workers are squeezed between their own countries’

top earners, who will continue to make money out of globalization,

and emerging countries’ workers, whose relatively cheap labor makes

them more attractive for hiring. The great middle- class squeeze

(which I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2), driven by the forces of automation

and globalization, is not at an end. This squeeze will in

turn further polarize Western societies into two groups: a very

successful and rich class at the top, and a much larger group of

people whose jobs will entail servicing the rich class in occupations

where human labor cannot be replaced by robots. Education

may not have much influence on what happens because many rich

socie ties are already near the upper limit in terms of quantity of

education (mea sured by the number of years of schooling) and

possibly even in terms of quality of schooling that can be offered;

in addition, many of those employed in ser vice jobs are already

overqualified for what they do.

...

 

3. How Can In equality in Rich Welfare States Be Reduced?

 

The short twentieth century is the only sustained period in history

when rising mean incomes have been accompanied by decreasing income

inequality. This happened not only in rich countries but also

in many developmental states and in all communist countries. The

second Kuznets curve will have to repeat the behavior of the first if

inequality is to decline again. But it is doubtful whether this second

decline will be accomplished by the same mechanisms as those that

reduced inequality in the twentieth century: increased taxation and

social transfers, hyperinflation, nationalization of property, and wars.

Why not? Globalization makes increased taxation of the most signifi-

cant contributor to inequality— namely, capital income— very diffi-

cult, and without a fully concerted action from most countries, which

does not seem even remotely possble today, highly improbable.

Simply put, capital is hard to tax because it is so mobile, and the

countries that benefi t from this mobility have no incentive to help

those that lose out. Tax havens exist not only in microstates, but in

large countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.

Th ink, for example, about the recent unwillingness of the United

States to investigate and extradite Chinese citizens accused of embezzlement

by their government (66 out of 100 of the “most wanted”

people accused of economic crimes by the Chinese government are

thought to be hiding in the United States and Canada), or London

brokers all too eager to accept Rus sian money regardless of its origin.

Even high- income labor is becoming more difficult to tax because it

can easily move from one country to another: there are no obvious

reasons why a top executive may not be able to work in Singapore or

Hong Kong rather than in London or New York. Hyperinflation and

nationalization have fallen out of favor as a means of despoiling creditors

and big proprietors. No more land will be nationalized. The balance

of power has shift ed to the side of the capitalists, with owners of

assets and creditors holding political power. Finally, one hopes that

major wars will be avoided, although no sensible person can, unfortunately,

exclude that possibility.

...

Interventions done before taxes and transfers kick in are a much

more promising approach for the twenty- fi rst century. These include

a reduction in the inequality of endowments, especially inequality in

the owner ship of assets and in education. If endowments (private

wealth and skills) became less unequal, and assuming that the rates

of return on wealth do not diff er markedly between big and small

fortunes, market incomes (that is, incomes before taxes and transfers)

would be distributed much more equally than they are today.

...

The distribution of endowments

is almost taken as a given. But as we see in the case of the rich Asian

countries, this is not the case: endowments can be made more equal.

So, the same level of in e qual ity in disposable income can be achieved

either through large taxes and transfers or through much more

modest interventions by the government superimposed on a relatively

equal structure of endowments.

How can the equalization of endowments be achieved? Here again,

as in the past, the role of the government is crucial, although the government

does not in this case work on current incomes (taxing and

redistributing them) but rather works toward longer- term equalization

of capital owner ship and education. Policies that would work

toward this long- term equalization include (1) high inheritance taxes

(as Piketty calls for), which would keep parents from being able to

transfer large assets to their children, (2) corporate tax policies that

would stimulate companies to distribute shares to workers (moving

toward a system of limited workers’ capitalism), and (3) tax and administrative

policies that would enable the poor and the middle

classes to have and hold fi nancial assets.

...

But even if such policies are theoretically possible, and even if we

have examples of countries that have used them, that does not mean

they will be implemented. European welfare states, and to a lesser

extent the United States, have been managed for almost a century on

entirely diff er ent premises, and changing them now will not be easy.

Th e anti- equality headwinds of globalization will make it even

harder, as will the unevenness in returns to labor that oft en goes with

globalization

 

 

6. Will Labor Remain Different from Other Factors

of Production?

 

When it comes to labor and migration, global governance of almost

any kind is missing. By contrast, global institutions exist that deal

with economic development (the World Bank), balance of payments

and international debt (the International Monetary Fund), health

(the World Health Organ ization), trade, including in intellectual

property rights (the World Trade Organ ization), central banks (the

Bank for International Settlements), and now regional trade (the

Atlantic and Pacifi c trade agreements). When it comes to labor,

the International Labor Organ ization, which is the oldest among the

institutions mentioned here, has little power and deals mostly with

national labor rules. Th e International Organ ization for Migration is

a keeper of accounts and statistics, duly following all catastrophes,

rather than a policy- setter. Th e reason for this lack of multilateral institutions

regarding labor and migration is obvious: the rich and

power ful countries have no interest in raising the issue. But ignoring

the prob lem by following an ostrich policy is becoming more diffi -

cult as globalization makes people more aware of the glaring diff erences

in national standards of living, and physical distance is much

less of an obstacle than ever before. Eu rope, faced by an exodus from

Africa, and more recently from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent,

will be perhaps the fi rst to begin defi ning a multilateral

policy on the movement of people. However, unlike what is envisaged

now (multilateralism among EU members only), such a policy needs

to include the sending countries as well. A world of more orderly migration,

and of quotas at the level of both the sending and the recipient

countries, should be the goal.

In order for such a change to become feasible, we need to change

the binary character of the current rules for national citizenship (as

argued in Chapter 3). With some exceptions, citizenship today confers

on the person who obtains it the same rights and duties as are

enjoyed by all other citizens. It is that binary nature of citizenship

that makes current citizens reluctant to share their “citizenship rent”

with migrants: in monetary terms, the citizenships of rich countries

are very valuable. Physical walls between jurisdictions are being built,

in part, because there is a huge fi nancial wall between being and not

being a citizen of a rich country. But citizens of rich countries might

be more open to foreign migration if this fi nancial wall could be lowered

through the introduction of an intermediate level of citizenship

that would be less valuable ( because, for example, it might involve

higher taxation, lower access to social ser vices, or an obligation to

return to work in one’s country of origin at periodic intervals). A

policy such as this would bring globalization to the forgotten factor

of production, labor, and through migration would lower global poverty

and in e qual ity. For this to happen, two changes are essential: (1)

the redefi nition of citizenship, and (2) multilateralism involving

sending and recipient countries.

But even if migration were to become more common than it is

today, it is still extremely unlikely that the change would be so

momentous as to lead to fully open borders and a situation whereby

GDP growth rates of poor countries would become unimportant

because people could just leave whenever they wanted to. Th us, the

growth of poor nations will remain of crucial importance. We turn

to this next.

 

 

7. Will Economic Growth Still Matter?

 

Economic growth will still matter a great deal in the coming century:

it is the most power ful tool for reducing global poverty and in e qual ity

(as it is, also, for reducing national poverties). One can hardly overestimate

its importance in poorer countries as a means of making the

lives of ordinary people better. Th e disparagement of growth that

surfaces from time to time comes mostly from rich people in rich

countries who believe that they can dispense with more economic

growth. But these people either are deluding themselves or are hypocritical:

their own be hav ior— for example, when they negotiate their

salaries and fees— shows that they do care about material incentives.

Moreover, if growth were unnecessary, why wouldn’t we celebrate the

recession instead of trying to get rid of it? If growth did not matter, why

would the referendum on Scotland’s in de pen dence, or the pos si ble

future referendums on the United Kingdom staying in the Eu ro pean

Union or Catalonia seceding from Spain, revolve around economic issues

and oft en be deci ded by them? If rich people care about income

and economic growth, why shouldn’t poor people care even more?

Th ose who are calling for a slowdown in growth because of environmental

concerns are themselves oft en the biggest contributors to

environmental degradation and global warming. One need only

think of the hy poc risy of conferences on carbon- neutrality where the

organizers try to convince the well- heeled participants not to feel bad

about fl ying for fi fteen hours to get to the conference by paying the

so- called carbon emission off sets— a practice similar to the erstwhile

practice of buying indulgences for the expiation of sins in the Catholic Church.

 It suffi ces to look at the amounts of air conditioning,

driving, and meat consumption that is being done by the global top

1 percent or global top 10 percent to realize that the rich are the main

contributors to climate change. But they are oft en the ones calling for

a reduction in growth (implicitly, in poor countries as well as rich

countries) on the basis of the eventual ecological unsustainability

of a world where today’s poor would enjoy the standard of living of

today’s rich.

Th ere is an unevenness in carbon emissions that is seldom recognized

and on which empirical research is lacking, despite the availability

of data. One could easily estimate the distribution of CO2

emissions across the world population by income group and not, as

is done today, by country. If income elasticity of carbon emissions is

unitary (i.e., a 10 percent increase in real income entails a 10 percent

increase in carbon emissions), then the Gini coeffi cient of global

carbon emissions is around 70 points, which would mean that more

than one- half of all emissions are made by the global top 10 percent.

Almost all the people in the top world decile come, as we know, from

rich countries. Not from Africa.

High rates of economic growth will remain crucial, especially for

poor countries in Africa, and a few in Asia and Central Amer i ca. Our

main concern therefore should not be how to manage a slowdown in

growth but how to raise the growth rates of the very poor countries.

Th ere is also a direct connection between the growth rates of poor

countries and the migration pressure that was discussed previously.

If the growth of poor countries picks up, we shall also more easily

solve the prob lem of pent-up demand for migration as well as other

po liti cal problems associated with migration in the recipient countries.

Th at would mean less populist and oft en xenophobic politics in

Eu rope, and less use of migration as a political football in the United

States.

It is important to realize that a fine balancing act must be done between

three variables: growth rates of poor (and populous) countries, migration,

and environmental sustainability. Migration and the development

of poor countries are, from the point of view of global

poverty and in e qual ity reduction, equivalent: poor people would become

richer, either in their own countries or somewhere else. Politically,

of course, they are not equivalent. But this worthwhile objective

of increasing people’s incomes has to be balanced by making

sure that it is ecologically sustainable. That would, in principle, require

the largest sacrifices from the rich. In other words, if, because

of improvements in the standard of living of today’s poor ( whether

through migration or faster growth in Africa and Asia), the ecological

balance is upset, restraints on growth should be imposed on the

rich. I know that this is an especially unpopular proposition to make

while the Great Recession either still goes on or has barely ended, but

the reasoning behind it seems to me incontrovertible.