Svet

[hazard]

Kakav je to mentalni sklop koji može da na isto mesto smesti Če Gevaru i Dražu? 

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYSauqQODoo

[Budja]

a sto navijate da padne maduro,a mali desnicari?zabrinjavajuci trend mladih napaljenih desnicara fasciniranih politikom iz americkih serija.japi politicari..

nema demokratije za venecuelu zato sto ce ovi prodati sve resurse americkim kompanijama.to se nekad zvalo izdaja zemlje i predlazem ukidanje visepartizma i uvodjenje vannrednog stanja.nema uslova za visepartijsko drustvo.to je rezervisano samo za bogate.ovako samo nestabilnost i rasprodaja resursa.

 

Cekaj, nesto sada ne kapiram, ako je demokratija recept za korupciju, kako to da je Milo autokrata korumpiran? 

Nesto tu ne stima.

[vememah]

Grčka pala za 10 mesta, Venecuela za 16.

http://www.prosperity.com/#!/country/VEN

Edited December 9, 2015 by vememah

[bradilko]

Cekaj, nesto sada ne kapiram, ako je demokratija recept za korupciju, kako to da je Milo autokrata korumpiran?

Nesto tu ne stima.

stima.morao sam da se budim u 5 sabajle da popijem antibiotik a i nerviraju me ovi sto su uvek za usa politiku. i europa je nesto drugo..

[vememah]

predlazem ukidanje visepartizma i uvodjenje vannrednog stanja.

 

Nego šta, obavezno vanredno stanje kako bi ove velike patriote i levičari što su od silne brige za narod sjebali minimalac 14x za jedva nešto više od 3 godine mogli da nastave svoj uspešan pohod.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-16/venezuela-raises-minimum-wage-30-it-s-still-only-13-a-month

 

 

Price controls and scarcity force Venezuelans to turn to the black market for milk and toilet paper

 

From thosstrggling to meet inflated prices for everyday goods, to lawyers turned pasta smugglers, the street economy flourishes under President Maduro

 

 

In Petare, a giant slum overlooking Caracas from the east, hustlers known asbuhoneros sell their goods at a busy intersection. “I’ve got milk, toilet paper, coffee, soap…” said 30-year-old Carmen Rodríguez, pointing to her wares by the side of a road busy with honking motorbikes, cars and buses. “Of course they cost more than the government say they should. We have to queue up to get them or buy them from someone who has done. We’re helping people get the basics.”

 

Yet, many of the poor simply can’t afford Rodríguez’s basics. In a raw and arguably necessary display of capitalism, she sells them for far more than the government’s legally required “fair prices”. It is ironically because of those government-imposed fair prices that the goods often aren’t available at supermarkets at fair prices as it’s simply not profitable to import them. This is thanks to economic policies dating back more than a decade.

 

Rodríguez sells each of her products for around 100 bolívares. At the black market currency exchange rate, that’s just 30 pence or so. But at that same exchange rate, the minimum wage in Venezuela is around £15 a month.

 

“I can’t live like this, earning the minimum wage. It’s not enough at all,” said Araceli Belaez, 40, lining up for groceries at a supermarket in the Caracas slum of Catia.

Johan Elizandre is a fruit-seller in 23 de enero, a slum on the other side of Caracas. It overlooks the presidential palace and its walls are adorned with murals of leftist heroes such as Che Guevara, Karl Marx and former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. “A kilo of meat costs me 600 bolívares” said Elizandre, who earns 7,000 bolívares a month, around £20 when measured at the black market exchange rate – far more than the minimum wage. “I have sons, aged five and seven. I’d rather give them the food and not eat so much myself.”

 

 

The scenes at Petare’s intersection, 23 de enero’s streets and Catia’s supermarkets are manifestations of an economy in tatters: one in which people buy milk, toilet paper and shampoo at inflated prices because supermarkets, with long queues outside, are near empty; in which engineers and lawyers smuggle pasta and petrol across borders to earn many times more than they would carrying out their profession; and in which surgeons complain that people are dying on the operating table because they cannot import medicines and equipment. 

 

There will not be much left in the supermarket for people at the back of this queue

Photograph: Girish Gupta

 

 

President Nicolás Maduro’s approval ratings are currently in the mid-20s. Annual inflation is at nearly 70% – which doesn’t include goods prices with the hefty premiums charged by the buhoneros like Rodríguez. The currency has fallen some 30% against the US dollar this year on the black market. And the murder rate is one of the world’s worst.

In 2003, Maduro’s predecessor Chávez enacted strict currency controls, pegging the bolívar to the US dollar. The aim was to reduce inflation and curb capital flight though neither has been achieved. Price controls, currency controls and the lack of dollars the government provides mean that importers no longer have the incentive to bring in goods. A thousand bolívares would have bought £30 on the black market when Maduro was elected to power in March 2013; it now buys less than £3. In the meantime, prices have risen rapidly while wages have not kept up.

On the country’s border with Colombia at San Antonio, engineer Jesús Arias, 33, has given up on his profession and smuggles petrol across the border. One of the country’s most costly price controls means that filling an entire tank costs just a couple of cents, converted at black market rates. Over the border, petrol sells for hundreds of times more. “Here petrol is practically a free gift,” Arias said. “A litre of mineral water costs more than a litre of gas.”

 

Children walk across the bridge to Colombia with Coca-Cola bottles filled with petrol

 

The subsidy costs the government around $12bn (£8bn) a year and Maduro is very clear that it needs to end – though that would be politically disastrous. Arias fills his 50-litre tank for just a few pence; a few hundred metres across the bridge in Cúcuta, Colombia, he can sell that for around £15. “Doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers we’re all doing it,” he said. “Here on the border, I can earn in three or four days what I earn as a professional in a month.” Children walk across the bridge with Coca-Cola bottles filled with petrol.

Maduro blames the problems on an “economic war” being waged against his government, with help from Washington. He blames smugglers, hoarders and street vendors for causing the problems rather than being a consequence of them.

 

Last year, the government tried to ban websites which publish the black market exchange rate, leading one blogger to liken the manoeuvre to banning the sale of thermometers to crack down on cold weather.

 

Yet, the black market, while imperfect, is offering an escape valve for the economy, a means for the poor by whatever means to obtain goods they would otherwise have to do without. “Repressing the black market rate, smuggling or trading is going to deteriorate the economic picture even further,” said Alberto Ramos, a senior analyst at Goldman Sachs in New York. “It will lead to even high inflation and higher levels of goods’ scarcity. The unofficial foreign exchange market and smuggling are to a large extent economic escape valves.”

 

For some government supporters, the rhetoric does work, however. “There’s nothing in the supermarkets because of the buhoneros,” said Ana Pérez, 60, walking past Rodríguez and the other vendors in Petare. “The government is doing it’s best but the opposition are getting in the way.”

 

Yet, Rodríguez, back on her stall, was clear. “The problem is the government. If there are shortages everywhere, what are people going to do. Every day it’s worse for people, but good for us. Someone always earns from all this.”

 

 

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/apr/16/venezuela-economy-black-market-milk-and-toilet-paper

Edited December 9, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Ovo mi promače:
 

Last year, the government tried to ban websites which publish the black market exchange rate, leading one blogger to liken the manoeuvre to banning the sale of thermometers to crack down on cold weather.

 
:0.6:
 
A evo i detaljnije - država ima tri zvanična kursa pri čemu se najmanji i najveći razlikuju 32x. Ubilo se za tamošnje Miškoviće koji imaju privilegiju da kupuju dolare po zvaničnom kursu.
 

Venezuela’s central bank sued to block a popular U.S.-based website from publishing allegedly misleading black-market exchange rates for dollars, claiming the move is part of a conspiracy to manipulate the South American country’s currency.

 

Banco Central De Venezuela accused a former Venezuelan army officer of using the dolartoday.com website to destabilize President Nicolas Maduro’s government and reap millions of dollars by falsifying exchange rates. The site promotes itself as the “authoritative source” of the daily exchange rate for the bolivar, the country’s currency, according to the lawsuit.
...
The government maintained official rates of 6.3, 13.5 and about 200 bolivars per dollar for authorized purchases of items deemed essential in September.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-23/venezuelan-central-bank-sues-to-block-exchange-rate-website

 

Na dolartoday.com današnji kurs je inače 886,36 bolivara za dolar.

Edited December 9, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Dosta detaljna analiza situacije u Venecueli.

 

Venezuela: Chavismo in Crisis
Phil Gunson

Graffiti depicting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas, April 17, 2015.
Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images

Venezuela is on the edge. In a stunning defeat of the country’s ruling party—the greatest setback in over ten years for the movement created by the late Hugo Chávez—voters overwhelmingly supported the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance in Sunday’s parliamentary elections. In the early hours of December 7, the election authority (CNE) said the MUD had won 99 of 167 seats, with 22 still to be determined. The MUD, however, claimed 112, which would just be enough to give it two-thirds “super-majority” needed, for example, to convene a constituent assembly.

The outcome, which exceeded the opposition’s most optimistic forecasts, gives the MUD sufficient control of parliament to precipitate a standoff with President Nicolás Maduro and his Chavista supporters. With the country already in economic crisis, this could set off serious political unrest; or it could force both sides into a negotiated transition. Given the ruling party’s tenacious hold on power and extensive efforts to shape the election, how did this remarkable result come about and what does it portend?

For anyone trying to understand the election, a good place to start is the government-run chain of Bicentenario supermarkets that can be found in Caracas and other cities. Take the one in Las Mercedes, a middle-class district of the capital: every day, by 7 in the morning, a line stretches around the block of people simply hoping to pick up some staples—rice, corn flour, cooking oil, and detergent—at government-controlled prices. The lines, which have been lengthening for the past eighteen months wherever price-controlled goods are on offer, are the most visible sign of the economic and social crisis that has spread across the country since Maduro took over as Chávez’s hand-picked successor in 2013.

As people headed to the polls on Sunday, some were still uncertain how to vote, especially public employees who had been told they would lose their jobs if they displayed “ingratitude” or “disloyalty” by voting the wrong way. Azucena, a twenty-four-year-old public-sector bank employee, asked her mother what she thought she should do. “Just vote the way your conscience dictates,” said her Colombian-born mother. “I’m not going to vote for the government,” the daughter replied. “We can’t keep living like this, there’s nothing to buy, something has to change.”

Even for a country that has gone through major upheavals in the recent past, the current situation is daunting. Although the government has stopped issuing statistics, GDP is expected to decline by 7 percent or more this year, having already dropped sharply in 2014. Driven by collapsing domestic production and rising demand as the government increased the money supply, prices are going up at an annual rate of nearly 200 percent (and food prices are rising even faster). Scarcity of basic goods is at record levels, with food, medicine, and other essentials even harder to find in the interior than in the big cities. The homicide rate is among the highest in the world. The situation is described as “bad” or “very bad” by nine out of ten Venezuelans. “In forty years of polling I’ve never seen a 90 percent negative evaluation,” says one leading pollster.

Nor does the government seem to have any idea how to tackle these challenges. Maduro, a one-time far-left labor union activist, was unexpectedly thrust into the top job in 2013, after his predecessor and mentor Chávez died of cancer. Since Maduro’s narrow—and bitterly disputed—election win in April that year, economic and social policies have floundered, thanks to factional differences that came to the surface in the absence of the former leader’s unrivalled authority. Meanwhile, accusations that the government is immensely corrupt and has ties to organized crime have acquired new substance with the revelation that two close relatives of the first lady have been jailed in New York for alleged drug-trafficking.

Still, the scale of the MUD’s victory comes as a surprise, since the regime—the revolution, as it is known to its dwindling band of supporters—has devoted much of its energy to refining the system perfected by Chávez over the past sixteen years in which, while the votes cast are accurately counted, every other aspect of the process is monumentally stacked against its opponents. To begin with, it takes several times as many votes to elect an MP in the big cities—where the opposition vote is concentrated—as in the rural heartland that has long been the core constituency of Chávez’s and Maduro’s party.

Even with a heavily tilted playing field, however, the Maduro government long feared a major opposition victory and resorted to more aggressive tactics to manipulate the outcome. Already in mid-October Maduro spoke of the need to win the election “como sea,” which roughly translates as, “by whatever means necessary.” He warned the MUD’s secretary-general, Jesús Chuo Torrealba, that there was a “nice, modern prison” waiting for him if he questioned the results. This was not an idle threat. There are around seventy opposition figures currently in jail, and many more who have been driven into exile over the past dozen years. Already, the MUD’s most charismatic leader, Leopoldo López of the Voluntad Popular (VP or Popular Will) party, is beginning a fourteen-year jail sentence for inspiring the anti-government protests last year; while the opposition mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, is under house arrest for allegedly seeking to overthrow the government.

Ahead of the elections, several opposition leaders were also banned from standing for office on transparently trumped-up grounds, including for allegedly failing to mention food vouchers when declaring their income and assets. And López’s wife, Lilian Tintori, who in the weeks before the election toured the country to campaign for human rights and support opposition candidates, was the victim of a number of violent attacks at her campaign events on behalf of the MUD, culminating on November 25 with the murder of an opposition activist, hit by two bullets just feet from where she was standing. (Three people have been arrested for the murder, which the government insists was a settling of accounts between criminal gangs.)

The government also ensured that the MUD’s “Unidad” (Unity) ticket on the voting screen was surrounded by pro-government tickets using the same word and similar colors, in a clear bid to induce opposition supporters to vote for the wrong candidates. One prominent MUD candidate even faced a fake “Unidad” candidate with exactly the same name. Meanwhile, the government refused to invite qualified election observers from bodies like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union to the election.

Despite all this, Venezuelans woke up on December 7 to a commanding opposition majority in parliament—and a new political reality. So what will that look like? The MUD is a mishmash of over two dozen parties, most of them too small to register on the Richter scale. Even the biggest represent just a tiny fraction of the electorate. López’s VP, for instance, has 2.5 percent of voter allegiance according to a recent poll by Datanálisis; Primero Justicia (Justice First, or PJ), the party of two-time presidential candidate Henrique Capriles, little more. Both occupy the political center but are often at loggerheads over tactics. The one-time hegemon of Venezuelan politics, Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, AD) and its offshoot Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time, UNT) are social-democrat. Neither can claim as much as 3 percent support.

Indeed, though the opposition drew about two-thirds of the vote on December 6, only around 10 percent of the electorate identifies with the MUD as a whole, according to pre-election polling. The opposition, in other words, is much bigger than the MUD. That carries with it the danger that neither a disintegrating government nor an until-now fractured and unconvincing MUD will be able to handle the wave of popular discontent that threatens to overwhelm Venezuela’s fragile and compromised institutions.

For the moment, broader unrest seems to have been avoided, at least in part, by the prospect of an electoral solution to the country’s misery. But one possible consequence of the election is gridlock, with an opposition-dominated legislature stymied by the government’s control of all other branches of state—including, crucially, the Supreme Court. The MUD, for its part, could find itself once again divided between confrontationalists, led by the jailed López and his allies, who favor moving rapidly against Maduro, perhaps by organizing a mid-term recall referendum, and moderates like Henrique Capriles, who favor a negotiated transition. If the new MUD majority in parliament prioritizes the political struggle over social issues it could rapidly lose the support of the electorate. As opinion polls have clearly shown, voters are concerned above all with practical issues like food and public services and want peace and tranquility rather than conflict on the streets—such as the months-long demonstrations in 2014 that left over forty dead.

For its part, the executive could also try to precipitate open conflict with parliament. Before the election, Maduro had threatened to “take to the streets” in the event of an opposition victory and to govern, “with the people and the civilian-military union.” The nature of the revolution, he declared, would change if the opposition were to control parliament—a hint that the government would seek to press ahead with the creation of a so-called “communal state,” for which legislation already exists: this would replace “bourgeois democracy” with popular assemblies dominated by the ruling party. But there is considerable doubt that a president who has just suffered such a blow to his prestige and political authority can really carry out the threat, despite the fact that millions of people (especially among the urban and rural poor) still support the revolution. To “radicalize the revolution” against the wishes of the majority might well require the use of armed force, and there is no guarantee that the military could be counted on if asked to fire on demonstrators.

In televised comments Monday morning, Maduro accepted the results and appeared subdued. But he also alleged that an “economic war” waged by the opposition and its foreign allies was to blame; and he has the ability to obstruct parliament in serious ways if he chooses. As president, Maduro can veto any law coming from the National Assembly. Should that veto be over-ridden, his Supreme Court can declare any of parliament’s actions unconstitutional, while the president’s control of the state oil corporation, PDVSA, the source of 96 percent of the country’s foreign earnings, means he may lose little sleep over the prospect of the MUD vetoing his budget—even with oil at just a third of its average 2014 price. Erick Malpica Flores, a nephew of Cilia Flores, the first lady (“first combatant” in revolutionary jargon), is treasurer of PDVSA and national treasurer to boot. But Maduro’s hold on power may not be so firm in reality as it is on paper.

The biggest challenge could come from within the ranks of the revolution itself. Not only has Maduro squandered the enormous political capital he inherited from his charismatic mentor and plunged Venezuela into its worst economic crisis in modern times, his own immediate family is under suspicion of involvement in drug trafficking. Two other nephews—one reportedly brought up in the Maduro household—are in a New York jail charged with conspiring to import 800 kilograms of cocaine into the United States. Neither Maduro nor Flores have commented, and the government has tried to keep the matter under wraps. But the scandal, which is a hot topic on social media, although newspapers, radio and television barely mention it, is sapping the enthusiasm of even hard-core supporters. The large volume of evidence reportedly accumulated by US authorities relating to links between senior regime figures and organized crime complicates prospects for a peaceful transition, since some important members of the ruling party may have too much to lose by ceding power.

It is not just the opposition that wants Maduro out; rumors suggest that many within the government itself would like to see him go. Their problem is that there is no obvious successor—at least, not one that could win a presidential election. If Maduro can hang on at until late 2016, the constitution mandates his replacement by the vice-president (an appointed figure who can be replaced at any time) for the remainder of his term. That might prove a more palatable option for critics within his own party.

Meanwhile, with a shrinking economy, reserves running out, and multi-billion-dollar debt repayments pending, the prospect of a chaotic default cannot be ruled out. Pressures at home and abroad will mount. Until now, for example, though it is unpopular in the US and elsewhere, the Maduro government could count on the support of a majority of countries in the region, thanks not only to political ties but to the distribution of cheap oil. But this may be changing. Argentina’s presidential election, for example, has brought to power a politician, Mauricio Macri, who had called for Venezuela’s suspension from regional organizations on human rights grounds (though he withdrew the threat following Maduro’s election concession). For Maduro, it seems likely that hanging on to power “como sea” is likely to become much harder.

December 7, 2015, 5:43 pm
 
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/12/07/venezuela-chavismo-in-crisis/

 
Što se tiče Madurove pretnje da neće prihvatiti amnestiju, moguće je da ona nema mnogo veze s realnošću, ali je zato Kabeljo najavio da će odlazeći parlament (ima još 3 nedelje do raspuštanja) imenovati sudije vrhovnog suda i da će vlast onemogućiti da opozicija stekne kontrolu nad parlamentarnim kanalom i tako probije značajnu medijsku blokadu.
 

Venezuela's Maduro visits President Chavez's mausoleum, vows to fight opposition

Published December 09, 2015
Fox News Latino
 
CARACAS (AP) –  Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro is promising to protect the country's socialist revolution from what he says are "bad guy" opposition leaders who will take control of Congress next month.

Speaking from the mausoleum of the late President Hugo Chavez Tuesday night, Maduro said he would fight the agenda of opposition leaders who won a landslide victory in Sunday's legislative election.

The embattled socialist president stood directly over the marble sarcophagus where his mentor's body rests, and appealed to Chavez for guidance.

"Oh how we miss you, Commander; your advice and your fighting spirit," he said. "I hope that the historic project you left to Venezuela and the world can continue."

Maduro promised to reject a law backed by opposition leaders that would free imprisoned anti-government activists.

That rejection would be mostly symbolic, because in Venezuela bills can become law even if the president does not approve, so long as the Supreme Court does not find the legislation unconstitutional.

Maduro also pledged to shake up his cabinet in the wake of the opposition's first national victory since Chavez initiated the socialist movement in 1998, and to hold a summit to examine what went wrong in the election in which, he said, "the bad guys won."

A group of justices requested early retirement in the run up to the vote, raising fears that the socialist party would try to pack the court if the election went against them. Those justices could in theory reverse any legislation the new National Assembly approves.

On Tuesday, National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello announced that the government would appoint 12 new Supreme Court judges before the opposition leaders are sworn in on Jan. 5.

Cabello also said the National Assembly's television channel would remain in the hands of the station's government workers.

The tiny channel has become a point of contention because the opposition has been almost completely frozen out of the mainstream media here. State television stations, including this one, have become organs of propaganda for the socialist party.

Opposition members now use a YouTube channel to get their announcements out, and have already been eagerly planning what they will do with the National Assembly channel.

Venezuela has not seen a divided government since Chavez came to power in 1998, and Maduro's remarks Tuesday added fuel to fears that the two camps will be unable to share power.

The opposition has said it will use its new legislative power to remove Maduro from office if he refuses to work together to rescue the country's sinking economy, and even some socialists have called for his resignation in the wake of Sunday's loss.
 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2015/12/09/venezuela-maduro-visits-president-chavez-mausoleum-vows-to-fight-opposition/?

[iDemo]

K'o da su radili nacrt za voshtanu figuru za muzej u Jagodinu (Jagodina, ne?)...

[vememah]

Režim gura opoziciji prst u oko:

On Thursday, the National Assembly designated 28th trial Judge Susana Virginia Barreiros Rodriguez as General Public Defender. Opposition parliamentarians rejected her appointment, as she was the judge who convicted dissenter leader Leopoldo López to 14 years of imprisonment.

http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/151210/parliament-designates-judge-susana-barreiros-as-general-public-defende
 
Evo na šta je ličilo suđenje Lopesu:

Venezuela’s Most Famous Dissident Gets 13 Years

The trial against Leopoldo López, the jailed leader of Venezuela’s opposition, was never expected to be fair. Yet when Judge Susana Barreiros handed down her ruling late last night, sentencing López to 13 years in military prison for inciting violence and other bogus charges, it was a hard blow for his supporters. Many had harbored hopes that he would be freed, or at most be given house arrest.
 
The ruling is a travesty. Instead of closing a chapter, it marks a deepening of Venezuela’s political and economic collapse. It is also a strategic error on the part of the government of President Nicolás Maduro.
López was imprisoned after calling for peaceful protests against the government in February 2014. His message was for Venezuelans to take the streets with the cry of “La Salida” (“The Exit”) and to press for the ouster of the unpopular Maduro using constitutional means, such as a recall referendum. After López was jailed, the protests became violent, leaving 43 people dead — most from the opposition, but also including a few government supporters and soldiers. The hazy narrative surrounding these events is part of the reason why López remains a controversial figure both inside the opposition and in Venezuela at large.

The government blamed López for all these deaths, even though he was being held in prison, incommunicado, when they took place. The prosecution’s main argument was that, by calling on people to take to the streets, he was encouraging violence and “terrorism.” He was also charged with conspiracy, incitement to commit crimes, and damaging public property.

The star witness for the government was a linguistics professor named Rosa Amelia Asuaje, who claimed López had used “subliminal” messages in his speeches and writings which called for violence. But when cross-examined by the defense, Asuaje recanted, stating that “López’s messages are not subliminal; they are clear, direct, and specific. They call for non-violence. There was never a call to violence by López.” (A white paper prepared by López’s defense team lays out the details — no official transcripts or records of the trial have been made available.)
 
This apparent collapse of the government’s case meant nothing, since it was never about the law. The proceedings, marred by irregularities and violence, were part of a political circus from start to finish.
That said, circuses are usually meant for public spectacle, while these proceedings were held in conditions of absolute secrecy. No international observers were allowed inside the courtroom, even though Venezuelan law allows for access to trials. Secret videos leaked from the fortified courtroom have made their way to the public, and in them, López comes across as defiant despite the lack of due process.
The unfairness of the trial was obvious. Take, for example, the imbalance in the evidence allowed by each side. The prosecution was allowed 82 witnesses, mostly police or public prosecutors on the government’s payroll. The defense was allowed only two. Numerous exhibits submitted by the defense were declared inadmissible.

The judge did not take into consideration López’s many calls for peaceful protests. She rebuffed calls from the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the U.N. Committee Against Torture for Venezuelan authorities to allow López a fair trial and improve the conditions of his detention. For much of his trial, López was held in isolation in a military jail. Even his reading material was taken away.

The government has been heavily invested in the López case from day one. National Assembly President (and Venezuela’s No. 2 leader) Diosdado Cabello personally drove López to jail when he turned himself in. Maduro himself has publicly condemned López on numerous occasions, labeling him “the monster of Ramo Verde” after the military prison that houses him. He even offered to free López if the U.S. government would release a Puerto Rican “political prisoner.”

Judge Barreiros, like most Venezuelan judges, is a temporary judge. This means she can be replaced at will by judicial authorities closely linked to the government. In a curious twist, she was initially named a judge as a substitute for Maria Lourdes Afiuni, a famous former judge who was imprisoned, tortured, and raped after ruling against the government in 2009. Few would be as aware of Afiuni’s sad fate as her replacement — so it’s no surprise that Barreiros has historically towed the party line. A few years ago, Judge Barreiros freed the brother of a minister in Maduro’s cabinet who had been jailed for embezzlement.

The López verdict is a sign of the government’s clumsiness. Making him a martyr unifies the opposition and reinforces its main message: Basic freedoms are at stake, and only a complete change can bring about democracy in Venezuela. With legislative elections coming up in December (a date that was set only as a response to a hunger strike by López and other political prisoners) and the government looking increasingly likely to do poorly, energizing the opposition further is not likely to help.

Internationally, the ruling is expected to hurt Venezuela’s chances of reaching a rapprochement with the United States. Both the Maduro and Obama administrations have been inching toward some form of coexistence as of late, but the ruling is likely to poison the well for the near term. Both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have expressed support for López. Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden have both met with his wife. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have already condemned the ruling.

In the secret video of López on trial, he claimed defiantly that he was a political prisoner. By throwing the book at him on trumped-up charges, the Venezuelan government and its lackeys in the courts have made certain the world knows he is right.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/11/venezuelas-most-famous-dissident-gets-13-years-leopoldo-lopez-maduro/

 
A evo i stvarnog razloga za hapšenje - bio je osetno popularniji od Madura:
 

He now consistently polls among the most popular politicians in the country, with his favorability approaching 50 percent, while Maduro's has slid below 30 percent, according to surveys released in recent months by a leading national pollster, Datanalisis.
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2014/12/15/jailed-venezuelan-opposition-leader-leopoldo-lopez-calls-for-more-protests/

 
MUD-ovu parlamentarnu većinu čini čak 13 stranaka:

ELECTION 2015

Supermajority at Parliament comprises 13 political organizations

Within opposition coalition Unified Democratic Panel (MUD), Justice First (PJ) party holds the largest representation with 33 deputies; followed by Democratic Action (AD), with 25 parliamentarians
 

United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) is the first political organization at the Venezuelan Congress (Infography)

United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) continues to be the leading political organization at the National Assembly. Even though it did not manage to win the majority in the parliament vote held on December 6, the party got the highest number of deputies elected.

Out of the 55 seats amassed by the Great Patriotic Pole, 52 were earned by ruling PSUV, while two seats belong to the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), and one deputy is from Republican Vanguard, confirmed secretary general of (Motherland for Everyone (PPT) party, Rafael Uzcátegui. He explained that 19 elected alternate deputies were elected from other pro-government parties.

Out of the 5,462,886 votes the pro-government group got in the vote, according to the National Electoral Council (CNE), 5,057,131 came from PSUV (92.57%).

http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/151210/supermajority-at-parliament-comprises-13-political-organizations

Edited December 11, 2015 by vememah

[Budja]

Sledece nedelje spanski izbori.

 

PP sigurno pobedjuje (oko 28% po poslednjim ispitivanjima), dok se PSOE, Ciudadanos i nesto oporavljeni Podemos kolju za drugo mesto (oko 20%).

 

Ne znam tacno kakav je izborni sistem, ali socijalisti su prilicno slabi i cini se da koalicija PSOE/Ciudadanos ne bi imala vecinu.

Edited December 12, 2015 by Budja

[vememah]

 

Na prvom referendumu (glasalo skoro 50% biračkog tela) izabrana zastava koja će biti protivkandidat postojećoj zastavi Novog Zelanda na drugom referendumu zakazanom za mart 2016.

Rezultati i ostale zastave koje su bile u užoj konkurenciji:

http://www.electionresults.govt.nz/2015_flag_referendum1/results-by-count-report.html

 

 

Postojeća zastava:

Edited December 12, 2015 by vememah

[Eraserhead]

Ovi izgleda igraju ozbiljno.

 

@kenroth: New Argentine gov't abandons deal to let Iran investigate itself for Jewish center bombing.

Edited December 13, 2015 by Eraserhead

[hazard]

Sledece nedelje spanski izbori.

 

PP sigurno pobedjuje (oko 28% po poslednjim ispitivanjima), dok se PSOE, Ciudadanos i nesto oporavljeni Podemos kolju za drugo mesto (oko 20%).

 

Ne znam tacno kakav je izborni sistem, ali socijalisti su prilicno slabi i cini se da koalicija PSOE/Ciudadanos ne bi imala vecinu.

Zašto bi ,,građani" išli u koaliciju sa PSOE, zar oni nisu desno od centra?

[Budja]

Zašto bi ,,građani" išli u koaliciju sa PSOE, zar oni nisu desno od centra?

 

Jesu, ali PP je kompromitovan, pa je lakse ici u koaliciju sa umerenom opozicijom nego sa komrpomitovanom strankom na vlasti protiv koje uglavnom vodis kampanju,

 

No, dilema je "most"ovska da se izrazim hrvatskim politickim recnikom.

[iDemo]

 

Lepa zastava.