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Izrael, Palestina i arapske zemlje


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Krošek
Message added by Krošek,

Na ovoj temi postoje stroža pravila oko kačenja raznoraznih sadržaja: Zabranjeno je repostovanje, kačenje tvitova ili bilo kakvih materijala (slika, klipova...), kao i goli linkovi. Postovi moraju biti napisani sopstvenim rečima, i dozvoljen je hipertekst (dugme Link). Izuzetno, kao propratni sadržaj uz sopstveni post, prihvatljivi su kratki isečci nekog dužeg teksta (ne i kraćeg kao što je obična vest).

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22 hours ago, Zaboravan said:

Hm... Koliko je meni poznato niti su tražili niti dobili diplomatsku podršku, šta više usa je smatrala svojim diplomatskim porazom to što nisu uspeli ubediti Izrael da ne kreće u napad.

deklasifikovani izveštaji i zapisnici sa sastanaka izraelskog kabineta kazuju drugačije.

 

According to Israel Lior, the decision to go to war was made on Friday, June 2. The minutes, however, do not confirm Lior’s impression. The generals repeated their demand to go to war immediately and a few spoke disrespectfully to the prime minister, but Eshkol, though downcast and dejected, unflinchingly refused to promise war. He was waiting for the green light from the United States.

...

When the exchange concluded, Eshkol convened Dayan, Eban, and Allon and a few of their staffers. The next evening, they would hear from Amit, who was about to return from Washington. At that point, they would have their “final discussion.”

...

Amit arrived tomorrow night, bringing Ambassador Harman with him. They drove straight from the airport to Eshkol’s house in Jerusalem, where they found the ministers showing signs of the recent stress. 

...

In all his meetings, including the one with McNamara, Amit emphasized the economic burden of the general mobilization. He repeated that Israel was not asking the United States for anything but freedom of action. He heard no objections from McNamara, who asked how long the operation would take (Amit said one week) and how many casualties Israel would sustain (Amit said fewer than in the War of Independence—less than six thousand).

...

McNamara found Amit’s arguments persuasive, and he conveyed them to Johnson the same evening. The president understood that Israel was going to act; he set up a special task force to handle the situation, headed by McGeorge Bundy. Jim Angleton was enthusiastic: for the first time in the history of the Middle East, there was the possibility of solving the region’s problems, making it less vulnerable to intrigue and extortion, safer for capital investment and development. The new situation must be quickly exploited. Helms had made sure Israel’s positions were reflected in the CIA’s recommendations to the president. Angleton stressed the issue’s delicacy and asked to preserve complete secrecy.

...

Eshkol was now convinced. He wanted to know the soonest possible date for the operation. Dayan said he had given orders to prepare for Monday. “Can we do it this morning?” Eshkol asked, and Dayan said it would be difficult: there were some constraints.

...

The formal decision was made the next day, Sunday, June 4. Eban gave his colleagues additional information that left no room for doubt: the United States had given its consent for Israel to go to war.

 

1967, by Tom Segev

Edited by Gandalf
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1 hour ago, Gandalf said:

deklasifikovani izveštaji i zapisnici sa sastanaka izraelskog kabineta kazuju drugačije.

 

According to Israel Lior, the decision to go to war was made on Friday, June 2. The minutes, however, do not confirm Lior’s impression. The generals repeated their demand to go to war immediately and a few spoke disrespectfully to the prime minister, but Eshkol, though downcast and dejected, unflinchingly refused to promise war. He was waiting for the green light from the United States.

...

When the exchange concluded, Eshkol convened Dayan, Eban, and Allon and a few of their staffers. The next evening, they would hear from Amit, who was about to return from Washington. At that point, they would have their “final discussion.”

...

Amit arrived tomorrow night, bringing Ambassador Harman with him. They drove straight from the airport to Eshkol’s house in Jerusalem, where they found the ministers showing signs of the recent stress. 

...

In all his meetings, including the one with McNamara, Amit emphasized the economic burden of the general mobilization. He repeated that Israel was not asking the United States for anything but freedom of action. He heard no objections from McNamara, who asked how long the operation would take (Amit said one week) and how many casualties Israel would sustain (Amit said fewer than in the War of Independence—less than six thousand).

...

McNamara found Amit’s arguments persuasive, and he conveyed them to Johnson the same evening. The president understood that Israel was going to act; he set up a special task force to handle the situation, headed by McGeorge Bundy. Jim Angleton was enthusiastic: for the first time in the history of the Middle East, there was the possibility of solving the region’s problems, making it less vulnerable to intrigue and extortion, safer for capital investment and development. The new situation must be quickly exploited. Helms had made sure Israel’s positions were reflected in the CIA’s recommendations to the president. Angleton stressed the issue’s delicacy and asked to preserve complete secrecy.

...

Eshkol was now convinced. He wanted to know the soonest possible date for the operation. Dayan said he had given orders to prepare for Monday. “Can we do it this morning?” Eshkol asked, and Dayan said it would be difficult: there were some constraints.

...

The formal decision was made the next day, Sunday, June 4. Eban gave his colleagues additional information that left no room for doubt: the United States had given its consent for Israel to go to war.

 

1967, by Tom Segev

Ne bih dalje ovde.

I ovaj tekst ima par nelogičnosti npr: The president understood that Israel was going to act.

 

Ali ajde ako nas prebace negde drugo nastavimo, svakako uvažavam tvoje argumente i lako moguće da grešim. 

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On 6. 4. 2024. at 11:46, namenski said:

Jeftino ti je ovo, podmeces... :(

nope. ti bi da se baviš opštim mestima, tipa odakle maskultura, sviranje qrcu.

 

ja bih malo konkretnije. da su američke administracije, akademija, Holivud... želeli da Sovjete/Ruse/komuniste predstave u najgorem mogućem svetlu, ne bi se zahebavali karikaturama tipa nekakvog sovjetskog kapetana u Rambo 3. uz izuzetak Dr. Živaga i animirane Životinjske Farme, svi iole vredni anti-komunistički filmovi i književna dela su snimani/pisani van SAD. ako se uzme kao nekakva datost da su hladnoratovske američke administracije želele da Sovjete nabede koliko je god moguće, zašto nije bilo blokbastera o Gulagu ili Holodomoru?

 

odgovor je u onome što je očito bilo kome ko živi ovde i ima tri čiste u glavi - američki predsednik i državna administracija imaju ograničenu moć da usmeravaju dešavanja u SAD, i ograničenu moć da utiču na javno mnjenje. visok stepen decentralizacije, razuđeni centri moći, liberalna ekonomija, itd.


e sad... kakve to veze ima sa Izraelom!? izraelski mit je vanredno moćna priča o ljudima koji su se izdigli iz (bukvalno) pepela Aušvica i stvorili čudo u obećanoj zemlji. paralela sa biblijskim begom iz Egipta se sama nameće. npr. to je paralela koju je uspešno iskoristio Leon Uris i otelotvorio Pol Njumen. time čak i Aušvic ima nekakav optimističan epilog. a Amerikanci vole sretan kraj i optimistične priče. dodaj tome mitski subob dobra i zla (WWII).

 

narativi, državne potrebe, hladnoratovska propaganda, qracpalac... nije bio potreban marketinški genije da shvati da je u pitanju i moćna priča i prilika za masnu zaradu.

Edited by Gandalf
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18 hours ago, Gandalf said:

zašto nije bilo blokbastera o Gulagu ili Holodomoru?

 

Jer je opštepoznato šta je gulag, a i mišićavi machine gun-wielding heroji se bolje prodaju.

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Hm... tokom istorije je bilo puno reportera koji nisu psihicki izdrzali izvestavanje iz ratnih zona. Super je sto imamo pristup informacijama ali mozda nije bas zdravo da gledamo i citamo o svakom sranju koje se desava kod nas i u svetu. Skrenucemo. Ne mislim samo na Gazu nego generalno. Nije covek napravljen da toliko sranja podnese. Izvinite na off-u :) 

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Evo nešto pozitivnije, Britanci šalju 20,000 paketića dostojanstva ženama i devojčicama Gaze. Ulošci, četkice za zube, šamponi, gelovi za tuširanje, plus pištaljka za zaštitu.

 

Sve je sustainable, jer planeta! Hrana nije uključena, ali šta sad.

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13 minutes ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Evo nešto pozitivnije, Britanci šalju 20,000 paketića dostojanstva ženama i devojčicama Gaze. Ulošci, četkice za zube, šamponi, gelovi za tuširanje, plus pištaljka za zaštitu.

 

Sve je sustainable, jer planeta! Hrana nije uključena, ali šta sad.

IDF ih poziva da im pištaljkama lakše otkriju gde su se sakrili.

Kakvo jebanje u mozak. Gadovi. 

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Prosto ne znaš šta je bolje, da li ideja da će se u Gazi spasiti silovanja duvanjem u pištaljku, ili ideja da ako ogladne treba lepo da operu kosu.

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11 minutes ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Prosto ne znaš šta je bolje, da li ideja da će se u Gazi spasiti silovanja duvanjem u pištaljku, ili ideja da ako ogladne treba lepo da operu kosu.

Pravi Neka jedu kolače momenat...

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38 minutes ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Evo nešto pozitivnije, Britanci šalju 20,000 paketića dostojanstva ženama i devojčicama Gaze. Ulošci, četkice za zube, šamponi, gelovi za tuširanje, plus pištaljka za zaštitu.

 

Sve je sustainable, jer planeta! Hrana nije uključena, ali šta sad.

Znači u ratu prestaje potreba za tuširanjem, ulošcima i sl? Mogli su malo veći broj obezbediti, ali jadni ste ako vam smeta bilo kakva humanitarna pomoć...

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3 minutes ago, Spooky said:

Znači u ratu prestaje potreba za tuširanjem, ulošcima i sl? Mogli su malo veći broj obezbediti, ali jadni ste ako vam smeta bilo kakva humanitarna pomoć...

Jadan je onaj koji je došao na ideju da pištaljke su super stvar, kao i oni koji aplaudiraju takvoj ideji. 

Inače sve drugo se vodi kao pomoć za ličnu higijenu, i važan je odmah posle vode, hrane, lekova. 

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Gledam video, naterali Palestinca da trci sa vezanim ocima prema svojima a onda mu ladno pucali u glavu...

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