"I am allowed to cut off any and all trade… I can destroy the trade. I can destroy the country. I'm even allowed to impose a foreign country destroying embargo… I can do anything I want to do to them… I'm allowed to destroy the country, but I can't charge them a little fee." -- Donald Trump

Ne razumem šta je sporni u tome što je rekao. On ima ovlašćenja da otme (ili ubije) predsednika druge države, a nema ovlašćenja da im uvede 10% carine. I jeste smešno.

Pa da, blanko sankcije ne zahtevaju congressional approval, ali zato carinske tarife od +10%, e to mora da se odobri, polako!

Haha. Sad samo blokirati freedom.org i sve sto je linkovano na njemu.

17 hours ago, Rudolf Pingvinoglu said:

Kad smo već kod sankcija, tarifa i ostalog, najveća prodavnica muzičke i studijske opreme nasvijet, Reverb, više nije dostupna kupcima i prodavcima iz Srbije:

A što nas? Ušao sam na link koji su ostavili - https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information

Nas tu nema ili ja nisam dovoljno tražio.

1 hour ago, napadaj said:

A što nas? Ušao sam na link koji su ostavili - https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information

Nas tu nema ili ja nisam dovoljno tražio.

Obzirom da su na listi i Crna Gora i Bosna, mislim da ima neke veze sa onim zakonom za Zapadni Balkan što su skoro doneli, ali nisam siguran. I kakve veze imaju muzički instrumenti sa celom tom pričom, pojma nemam ..ko da se snađe u toj šumi birokratije.

edit: mislim da je to ovo: https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/balkans-related-sanctions

Edited February 21Feb 21 by Rudolf Pingvinoglu

Te su iz 2001. godine, otvorio sam taj dokument jutros 😃

5 hours ago, Verterdegete said:

Ne razumem šta je sporni u tome što je rekao. On ima ovlašćenja da otme (ili ubije) predsednika druge države, a nema ovlašćenja da im uvede 10% carine. I jeste smešno.

Pa sporno je što i dalje ne razume da te carine dobrim delom plaćaju američki biznisi i posredno poreski obveznici. Nije da se pravi da ne razume, nego stvarno ne razume. Odlika suda je jasna i eksplicitna- tarife su porez i vraćaj im pare.

A ne sme i da otima predsednike, Grenlande i slične stvari, što ga ne sprečava da to ipak radi. Samo što kod vrhovnog suda neće pasti zbog toga, nego zbog 💸 poreskim obveznicima.

Šta znam, uvek volim kad neko natera bulija da podvije rep, bilo da je to vrhovni sud, Carney ili ubuđali kongres.

53 minutes ago, napadaj said:

Te su iz 2001. godine, otvorio sam taj dokument jutros 😃

Apdejtovano Bajo moj, samo se po potrebi nešto doda i opet uvede:

Edited February 21Feb 21 by Rudolf Pingvinoglu

1 hour ago, bios said:

Pa sporno je što i dalje ne razume da te carine dobrim delom plaćaju američki biznisi i posredno poreski obveznici.

upravo. ono što svinja ne razume je da se "them" u "charge them a little fee" u stvari odnosi na Amerikance.

21 hours ago, Gandalf said:

upravo. ono što svinja ne razume je da se "them" u "charge them a little fee" u stvari odnosi na Amerikance.

Zavisi od sektora do sektora, te njihovih svojstvenosti: price elasticisty, nivo konkurencije, sofistikacija proizvoda, itd.

Posto sam ja poslom upucen na Japan mogu ti i iz prve ruke reci da je ogromna vecina japanskih izvoznika amortizovala carinski shok uzvodno (jedan dio na americki ogranak, jedan dio na centralu u Japanu, jedan dio na nabavljace u Aziji). To se posebno odnosi na japansku auto industriju.

Nema spora da je dio carinskog tereta prebacen i na americke firme i na potrosace, ali je nakon godinu dana jasno da to ta prica nije crno-bijela. Koliko god Trump bio u krivu kad kaze da ce "stranci sve to da plate", tako je i pogresno reci da ce "to americki potrosac sve da plati". Uostalom, to se i vidi iz reakcija drugih drzava, koja su sve do jedne morale da urade neke ustupke, pa cak i Kina.

Odlican opis nekohoretnosti Trumpove spoljne politike kroz dvorjansko-frakcijske borbe za uticja na Vodju:

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Summary

• Donald Trump prioritises headline-grabbing “wins” over the detail and substance of foreign policy.

• His administration has dismantled the interagency process that once filtered and vetted the policy options that reached the president, replacing it with a factional one.

• In the style of court politics, the factions in the White House compete to convince Trump their preferred option will serve him up the biggest win.

• The fierce competition means the administration’s defence and security policy is not informed by any previously defined strategy, but is in a continuous state of renegotiation.

• Influencing the Trump administration requires understanding that it does not make decisions like previous US administrations. Europeans can influence the factional process, but only if they can correctly perceive the factions.

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European Council on Foreign Relations

One battle after another: Factional struggles and the mak...

Trump’s foreign and security policy is the product of factional competition in the White House and a president fixated on short-term wins. Here’s how Europeans

Ne znam gde bih ovo, pa nek bude ovde...

Malo o Epštajnu, malo više o tome gde počinje zavera, a gde se završava teorija zavere, u svetlu trenutne situaciju USA, ali i u svetu...

Jos jedno gledanje na Trumpovu spoljnu politiku, koje smatra da je ovo vidjenje koje sam gore postavio prevazidjeno:

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Geo-kleptocracy and the rise of 'global mafia politics'

Expert Alex de Waal explains how the capture of Maduro, leaving his corrupt regime in place, is a 'crystalline example' of regime change in the new era

Di Caro: Do the familiar debates over foreign policy, such as restrainers vs. interventionists, fall short when it comes to making sense of the world today? Is your framework of global mafia politics closer to the mark? Or do they overlap?

De Waal: There is certainly overlap. If I were to put my thesis strongly, I would say geokleptocracy has swallowed geostrategy and geopolitics. They still exist, but the driving force, the logic that makes things tick at the moment, is geokleptocracy. Take the political bazaar in Sudan to a global scale, and what really counts is deploying political money backed up with coercion in order to create a system that will generate almost unlimited wealth for those at the top. That doesn’t mean countries. It means particular political-business enterprises, often attached to countries or sometimes owning countries, but are not identical to nation-states.

Di Caro: I want to return to Venezuela. Is there something more to this than the deal? Venezuela’s rulers get to stay without Maduro, the U.S. gets the oil. Is there also a theatrical nature to this? Use of overwhelming force to make a point?

De Waal: I think that’s absolutely correct. The economics of it don’t really add up. What’s interesting is that Trump, alone amongst the senior figures in his government, came out and gave [oil] as a rationale. This reflects two things. One is his own worldview, which is partly from the 1980s when oil was so important. But also to legitimize theft in this way, to legitimize kleptocracy. To say, yes, this is how we do it, just as the U.S. used to do it when it intervened in Central American countries in the past.

Di Caro: You’re painting a pretty bleak picture of how international affairs will be conducted.

De Waal: It is a bleak picture. And I think the first step toward coming to grips with it is to have pessimism of the intellect and recognize it for what it is. We need to see what the core drivers are. And there we can take some solace from places where there’ve been attempts to roll it back, where you’ve seen the business class often in coalition with civic groups say we can’t have our politics run on this basis. It’s not viable.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/global-mafia-politics/