NATO

[namenski]

Staljinom, Dzingis Kanom, Maom...

Umirem, javite mojima da sam bio dobar    :D

[Anduril]

Pričalo se naravno o tome kako Rusi treba da se civiliziraju, i kako zapad ima razlog da se plaši Rusa ali Rusi nemaju razloga da se plaše milih i naivnih zapadnjaka.

 

Pricalo se o tome da Rusija treba da podigne svoj GDP, obrazovanje, smanji korupciju, reformise politicki i pravni sistem, zdravstvo i ostale izmerive parametre gde i pored bogatstva kaska za razvijenim svetom.

Civilizovati ima sasvim drugu konotaciju...

[Dagmar]

Pricalo se o tome da Rusija treba da podigne svoj GDP, obrazovanje, smanji korupciju, reformise politicki i pravni sistem, zdravstvo i ostale izmerive parametre gde i pored bogatstva kaska za razvijenim svetom.

Civilizovati ima sasvim drugu konotaciju...

 

Mislim da će ona nova baza baš da ih pokrene da krenu ubrzano da menjaju kurikulum biologije.

[Anonymous]

Zapadnjaci su izvrsili najvece genocide u istoriji covecanstva, ali iz nekog razloga uzimaju sebi za pravo da drugima nesto kenjaju po tom pitanju.

 

Termin 'genocid' ne bi trebalo tako olako potezati. Moje površno poznavanje istorije govori da su zapadnjaci (Englezi) počinili genocid u Severnoj Americi i Južnoj Africi, a da su istočnjaci (Rusi) slično napravili u Sibiru. Rimljani (južnjaci) su potrebili nekoliko naroda sa juga Italije.

 

Ko je 'izvršio najveći genocid' je pomalo degutantno pitanje. Genocid je uvek genocid.

[iDemo]

Ko više voli šah i to... 

 

Ilustracija: strana 94, The Grand Chessboard (1997), 

Autor knjige Zbigniew Brzezinski, "a counselor to President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966–68 and was President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor from 1977–81".

[kobni zelaya]

Pricalo se o tome da Rusija treba da podigne svoj GDP, obrazovanje, smanji korupciju, reformise politicki i pravni sistem, zdravstvo i ostale izmerive parametre gde i pored bogatstva kaska za razvijenim svetom.

Civilizovati ima sasvim drugu konotaciju...

 

Čekaj, ozbiljan si za obrazovanje?

[Braća Strugacki]

Lolcina.

[iDemo]

Samo da vam napomenem - mada cenim da svi vec znate - ovaj bb ima jedan ozbiljan bag: ignore lista ne vredi nista ako se (drugi) ljudi masovno koriste quote opcijom. 

[Braća Strugacki]

Znaci - da ga kvotujemo!

[iDemo]

Znaci - da ga kvotujemo!

Jedino ako to doprinosi boljem razumevanju™... Sto otprilike nikad nije slucaj al' dobro - ko je baksuz nek kvotuje. Necu mu/joj to zaboraviti...

[Anduril]

Čekaj, ozbiljan si za obrazovanje?

Pa top univerziteti i nauka nisu u Rusiji. O obrazovanju u domenu administracije ili prava da i ne govorim.

Kao i kod nas, razlozi krize drzave su upravo i lose obrzovanje a time i losi kadrovi.

[namenski]

Pa top univerziteti i nauka nisu u Rusiji. O obrazovanju u domenu administracije ili prava da i ne govorim.

Kao i kod nas, razlozi krize drzave su upravo i lose obrzovanje a time i losi kadrovi.

Кадры решают все!  -_-

И. В. Сталин

[Braća Strugacki]

Lepo ti je rekao covek da ne kvotujes.

[Prospero]

Da su SAD bile toliko fiksirane istocnom Evropom i zauzdavanjem Rusije kako se tvrdi, mogla je i prema Ukrajini krenuti sasvim drugacija politika jos pocetkom devedesetih - recimo nesto kao sa Turskom.

 

 

 

...

“A transformed alliance,” march–august 1990

 

Having floated a non-expansion pledge in February 1990 and clarifying that this offer might include special status for the former East Germany, U.S. policymakers in the spring and summer of 1990 offered the Soviet Union additional

terms that reinforced the assurances against NATO enlargement. These included promises that the Soviet Union would not be strategically isolated in post–Cold War Europe, that NATO would not exploit Soviet weaknesses, and

that Europe’s post–ColdWar security architecture would be increasingly inclusive. The resulting bargaining thereby used discussions over the future of European security to underscore the non-expansion deal by implying limits on

NATO’s post–ColdWar role and the United States’ post–Cold War dominance. The Bush administration recognized that fear of NATO encroachment and loss of international prestige drove Soviet opposition to German reuniªcation

in NATO; as Baker commented in June 1990, “The Soviet Union doesn’t want to look like losers [sic].”109 The consequences of this situation became especially clear beginning in March of that year, when Soviet policymakers advanced

a set of demands to buttress Soviet power and limit NATO’s post–Cold War dominance in Europe as the price for German reuniªcation.110 As the Central Intelligence Agency reported, these demands included calls to disband the

Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as to slow reuniªcation until the two alliances  could be replaced with an “all-European security structure” centered on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).111 These demands

put pressure on the United States to advance an alternative “package” to convince the Soviet Union to agree to German reuniªcation without sacrifcing NATO.112

 

First presented by Baker during a mid-May 1990 visit to Moscow, the U.S. package—which became known as the “Nine Assurances”—combined points raised in earlier discussions into a single deal.113 For the purposes of this analysis, the three most important elements were promises (1) to gradually strengthen the CSCE by providing it with mechanisms designed to suggest that it might evolve into a pan-European security institution that would complement NATO and aid in the “development of a new Europe”; (2) to limit military forces in Europe via the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations; and (3) to transform NATO into an increasingly “political” organization.114 At a time when Soviet leaders were seeking “a new security structure” and “some guarantee of security” given changes in Europe,115 the United States designed these terms to “underscore our commitment to seek to meet Soviet concerns.” 116 After all, if the CSCE were to become a vibrant security institution, if NATO were to take on an increasingly political role, and if interlocking institutions were to ensure the United States and the Soviet Union a place in the “New Europe,” then NATO’s eastward expansion would be unlikely as NATO became less important to European security.117

 

Efforts to reassure the Soviet Union and downplay NATO’s dominance occupied a prominent place in discussions over Europe’s future throughout the spring of 1990. Even before revealing the Nine Assurances, Bush used a speech

in Stillwater, Oklahoma, on May 4, 1990, to highlight steps that the United States and NATO planned to take to build a more cooperative Europe.118 Meeting with Shevardnadze on May 5, Baker tied promises on the CSCE, military

reductions, and NATO transformation to Soviet concerns over NATO’s future and German reuniªcation, telling the Soviet foreign minister that U.S. proposals “would not yield winners and losers. Instead, [they] would produce a

new legitimate European structure—one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” 119

 

Baker was still more direct when presenting the Nine Assurances to Gorbachev on May 18. During their talks in Moscow, Baker explained that the United States did not want any “unilateral advantage” from the diplomatic negotiations, promised “a different kind of NATO,” and pledged that the United States was committed to building the pan-European security institutions desired by the Soviet Union.120 Bush reinforced these assurances when meeting the Soviet leadership in Washington on May 31–June 2, arguing (per his talking points) that NATO, the CSCE, and the European Commission (EC) made up “the cornerstone of a new, inclusive Europe,” while a Conventional Forces in Europe agreement represented “the gateway to developing a new political and security structure in Europe.” At a basic level, the United States claimed not to want—as Bush told Gorbachev on May 31—“winners and losers” but instead a Soviet Union “integrated [. . .] into the new Europe.”121

 

The intended takeaway from these negotiations appears clear: given Bush’s February 1990 acknowledgment that German reuniªcation would accommodate the “legitimate interests” of all parties, Soviet acceptance of the U.S. terms

might result in a reuniªed Germany within NATO, but the Soviet Union’s broader concern with limiting NATO encroachment would be respected.122 Indeed, the State Department itself predicted on the eve of the May 31–June 2

Washington Summit that “Gorbachev will be open to using CSCE to guarantee pan-European security and diminish the need for military alliances or Germany’s membership in NATO, [but] is likely to insist on establishing parameters

for Germany itself,” including limits on the German military.123 Although the United States and the Soviet Union differed over speciªcs, U.S. calls to build the CSCE, limit military forces, and transform NATO thus played to Soviet interests by suggesting a post–Cold War Europe amenable to Soviet concerns. As Baker explained to his NATO colleagues in Brussels in early May 1990, “[A]daptation of NATO, the EC, and the CSCE to new European realities”

avoided “a loss to Moscow” and helped prevent “creating the image of winners and losers.”124 He was even clearer when suggesting the possibility of institutionalizing the CSCE, telling Shevardnadze in Moscow on May 18, that “it can create a sense of inclusion not exclusion in Europe [. . .] I see it as being a cornerstone over time in the development of a new Europe.”125 Nor was this just Baker’s personal effort: analysts from France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany were explicit in their calculated appeals to Soviet interests, concluding that the Soviet Union would accept reuniªcation in NATO “provided it is coated with sufªcient sweeteners” about cooperative security and included “appropriate assurances” about accommodating Soviet security concerns.126 These efforts also appear to have resonated to some degree with Soviet leaders, as Gorbachev “made clear” in a meeting with Baker in May that “he approved [Western proposals] very much.” In June Shevardnadze told Baker that a revamped CSCE was “laying the basis for substantive guarantees of stability” in Europe.”127

Even if Western proposals did not fully meet Soviet demands, the Soviets thus still had good reason to believe that the United States was, at minimum, suggesting a future in which NATO would be unlikely to expand further east. The point of U.S. proposals was not that NATO would disappear, but that Europe would become more cooperative and more integrated. By implication, NATO was unlikely to enlarge beyond Germany as it became less relevant to Europe’s security landscape.128

 

A deal with non-expansion elements, july–october 1990

 

The diplomatic discussions came to a head in July 1990. Early that month, Western leaders met in London to consider NATO’s future. Discussions over the preceding weeks suggested that the Soviet position on Germany might change

“depending on steps taken by NATO,” as Soviet leaders sought changes in NATO policy that would allow them “to tell our people that we face no threat—not from Germany, not from the US, not from NATO.”129 To reinforce

the narrative of an integrated Europe acceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States sponsored the “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” whereby NATO’s members pledged to “enhance the political component of our Alliance.”130 Equally important, the Declaration called for the CSCE to “become more prominent in Europe’s future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America,” while NATO governments

committed to “working with all in the countries in Europe [. . .] to create enduring peace on this continent.”131 The goal, as Bush explained, was to shape “Soviet attitudes on the vital questions Moscow must answer in the next

few months” and, as Baker expressed in a cable to Shevardnadze, to showcase NATO’s willingness to “work with the Soviet Union to build a new Europe characterized by peaceful cooperation.”132

 

Against this backdrop, Gorbachev and Kohl met in mid-July 1990 to discuss Germany’s future. At the time, neither the U.S. nor West German leadership expected a drastic shift in Soviet policy.133 To their surprise, however,

Gorbachev moved to settle the terms of German reuniªcation. During successive meetings with Kohl in Moscow and the Caucasus, Gorbachev agreed that a reuniªed Germany would remain within NATO, that NATO security guarantees

would cover the former East Germany, and that Soviet troops would withdraw quickly from East Germany.134 In return, Kohl offered loans to the Soviet Union and pledged that neither NATO nuclear weapons nor non-

German NATO troops would move into the former East Germany.135 Although subsequent U.S. pressure led to permission for non-German NATO forces to enter the former GDR in an emergency after the Soviets withdrew,

this basic deal—with NATO security guarantees extending to the former GDR and non-German forces banned from permanent stationing on former East German territory—became the core of the Final Settlement with

Respect to Germany, signed in September 1990.136 On October 3, 1990, East and West Germany ofªcially reuniªed.

 

In sum, it was amid Western and, especially, U.S. suggestions of an integrated and mutually acceptable post–Cold War Europe that Gorbachev consented to German reuniªcation within NATO. The United States did not

formally commit to forgo NATO expansion, but its efforts throughout 1990 to engage the Soviet Union implied the existence of a non-expansion deal; as Gorbachev subsequently noted, assurances against NATO expansion were part of the “spirit” of the 1990 debates.137 Ultimately, if Europe was to be linked by a new set of security institutions while NATO was militarily constrained and had an increasingly political focus, then formal non-expansion guarantees were superºuous. The structure of the deal would sufªce: promises of new institutions, a transformed NATO, and an alliance with a circumscribed role in the former GDR suggested that NATO expansion was off the table.

 

 

Caveat Emptor: Private Signs of U.S. Ambitions

 

There is growing evidence that the United States was insincere when offering the Soviet Union informal assurances against NATO expansion. As Sarotte first observed, declassiªed materials from U.S. archives suggest that U.S.

policymakers used the diplomacy of German reuniªcation to strengthen the United States’ position in Europe after the Cold War.138 Yet, whereas Sarotte implies that the effort to expand the United States’ presence in Europe

began only in late February or March 1990, a review of the James Baker Papers, materials in the National Security Archive, and documents released by the George Bush Library since the late 2000s suggest that the impetus for an expanded U.S. footprint—especially into Eastern Europe—began closer to the turn of 1989–90.139

 

 

The false promise of accommodation

 

The United States’ effort to maximize its influence reflected the Bush administration’s general strategy for what it thought the United States should do in response to the collapse of Soviet power; it did not reflect a fully articulated plan of action.140 Nevertheless, U.S. policies were structured to block Soviet influence over German reuniªcation while still giving the appearance of accommodating Soviet concerns. Under these circumstances, Soviet troops would be gone from Central and Eastern Europe, Soviet inºuence would be reduced, and the Soviet Union would be in no position to challenge U.S. policies. The United States could then decide whether to support NATO enlargement while enjoying outsize inºuence within NATO itself.141 Put simply, U.S. policymakers intended that the results of German reuniªcation would give the United States a free hand by consolidating a reuniªed Germany—the great prize of Cold War Europe—within NATO, and blocking any deal that would foreclose American options in Europe’s new strategic landscape. As Bush observed when meeting the West German leadership at Camp David on February 24–25, 1990, “[T]he Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that! We prevailed and they didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.”142

 

Contrary to what U.S. ofªcials told their Soviet interlocutors, the Bush administration privately looked to use the collapse of Soviet power in Central-Eastern Europe to enhance U.S. preeminence on the continent.143 This policy, moreover, appeared to make strategic sense at a time when no one expected the Soviet Union to disintegrate and U.S. planners had to prepare for a world in which the Soviet Union might remain the largest military threat in Europe.144 Even before meeting the West German leadership at Camp David in late February 1990, Baker was ebullient over the prospect of reunifying Germany within NATO, noting in the margins of a brieªng paper that, relative to the concessions the United States and West Germany would have to offer, “you haven’t seen a leveraged buyout until you’ve seen this one!”145 The key to this end, as the paper elaborated, was structuring the diplomatic process to  create the appearance of U.S. attentiveness to Soviet interests, but actually avoiding a Soviet “veto” and giving Gorbachev “little real control” over the terms of German reuniªcation.146 The objective was to ensure Soviet acquiescence to a reuniªed Germany within NATO and thus maintain U.S. involvement in Europe through the alliance.147 Similarly, Scowcroft wrote to Bush before the May–June 1990 Washington Summit that the United States needed to underline to Gorbachev the “critical link” between “a forthcoming Soviet foreign policy—particularly regarding Germany—and further improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations.”148 The senior-most U.S. leaders, in other words, were focused on garnering the strategic advantages of moving a reuniªed Germany into a U.S.-dominated alliance, and were even willing to threaten the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations in support of this objective.

 

Reºecting this thinking, a State Department ofªcial could quip in March 1990 that the Two-Plus-Four negotiations represented a “two by four,” because they offered “a lever to insert a uniªed Germany in NATO whether the Soviets like it or not.” Assuming that the United States began reaching out to other former Soviet clients in Eastern Europe while Soviet military retrenchment continued, the United States could then see “the outlines of the new Europe, with Germany inside NATO [. . .] and a revived ‘active buffer’ between the Germans and the Russians.”149 The United States was therefore not going to accommodate the Soviet Union so much as take advantage of the opportunity to position itself for achieving maximum leverage in post–Cold War Europe. Already in late December 1989, Scowcroft was advising Bush that the United States was at a “strategic crossroads” and would either “ªnd a way to keep up with the intensifying pace of diplomatic interaction” in Europe or find itself excluded from continental politics. Central to resolving this dilemma was ensuring that a reuniªed Germany maintained its ties to NATO while moving into Eastern Europe’s “power vacuum” to facilitate “a much more robust and a constructive U.S. role in the center of Europe.”150 NSC staffers Robert Hutchings and Robert Blackwill elaborated on this perspective in mid-January 1990, writing to Scowcroft that German reuniªcation and an expanded U.S. presence in Europe were mutually reinforcing.

 

The United States needs to stand between Germany and Russia in central Europe. If and as our military presence recedes, we will need to find ways of replacing it with a much greater political, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial presence.  A strong U.S. presence in Eastern Europe will also be an important means of shaping the process, now seemingly irreversible, of German reuniªcation. By increasing our own inºuence in Eastern Europe, we can better manage an eastward drift in FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] policy and better position ourselves to affect the future of a reuniªed Germany. Finally, Eastern Europe is a key to strengthening our future position in Europe as a whole. Our ability to maintain a strong political consensus in the Alliance and to develop a partnership with the EC [European Community] will depend importantly on our playing a major role in Eastern Europe.151

 

 

Reinforcing nato and debating enlargement

 

Against this backdrop, calls from East European leaders starting in the winter of 1990 for a NATO presence in the region intersected with the United States’ interest in deepening its involvement in post–Cold War Europe. In a late

February 1990 meeting in Budapest, for example, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger heard from Hungary’s foreign minister “that a new NATO could provide a political umbrella for Central Europe”; similar calls from Poland followed shortly thereafter.152 By mid-March, the United States’ interest in Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe’s interest in NATO started to overlap, as the United States began thinking of NATO as the vehicle through which it might “organize” Eastern Europe.153 In July, Baker himself acknowledged the possibility of NATO’s eastward expansion, arguing that a revamped CSCE would provide a “‘half-way house’ for governments who want out of the Warsaw Pact [. . .] but can’t join NATO and EC (yet).”154 Given that U.S. policymakers were simultaneously promising to emphasize NATO’s political nature so as to render NATO acceptable to the Soviet Union, Baker’s comment suggests the dual nature of U.S. strategy.155

 

Other U.S. positions support this assessment of the administration’s twopronged approach. For example, even as Bush and Baker suggested in the spring of 1990 that the CSCE would provide a way of overcoming Cold War divisions,156 State Department officials maintained in June that “CSCE must complement NATO, not replace it.”157 Likewise, Baker privately cautioned Bush, Scowcroft, and other senior policymakers in July that the “real risk to NATO is CSCE”;158 U.S. support for transforming CSCE into a powerful institution was correspondingly lukewarm.159 By the time Germany ofªcially reuni ªed in October 1990, U.S. efforts to reinforce NATO dominance and limit the CSCE’s inºuence had crystallized. On October 5, an interagency review concluded that “the key U.S. interest is to ensure that NATO remains the central pillar of Europe’s security architecture.”160 And on October 9, senior NSC officials argued that NATO needed to be strengthened to prevent European attention from shifting to the CSCE while ensuring that NATO remained the “central institution in providing for Europe’s defense” and managing “East-West security policy.”161

 

Meanwhile, NATO’s eastward expansion increasingly became part of discussions of U.S. options in Europe. By late October 1990, ofªcials from the NSC, State Department, intelligence community, and Defense Department

were asking: “Should the United States and NATO now signal to the new democracies of Eastern Europe NATO’s readiness to contemplate their future membership?”162 Although U.S. policymakers at the time decided against expanding NATO, the State Department Policy Planning Staff and the Ofªce of the Secretary of Defense still sought to keep NATO’s “door ajar and not give the East Europeans the impression that NATO is forever a closed club.”163 Even those opposed to NATO expansion at that moment acknowledged that U.S. policy might change, and they agreed to reserve all American options “as the political situation in Europe evolves.”164 Considering that the ofªcials most interested in exploring NATO expansion were among the closest advisers to decisionmakers such as Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, these discussions are particularly revealing:165 not only was NATO expansion under consideration, but policymakers with access to the highest levels of U.S. strategic decisionmakers were seeking to examine the issue further. Thus, whereas U.S.-Soviet bargaining throughout 1990 was meant to convince the Soviets that the United States would not expand NATO en route to creating a cooperative Europe, the October 1990 discussions show that the United States was already loosening the non-expansion pledge by holding NATO expansion hostage to (1) Soviet behavior, and (2) debates within the U.S. government over U.S. interests. Distinct from what the United States told the

Soviet Union, non-expansion was not sacrosanct; under certain circumstances, the United States would consider enlarging NATO.

 

 

u.s. dominance and the diplomacy of 1990

 

To be clear, there is no evidence that the United States was actively planning to expand NATO into Eastern Europe in 1990, and it is debatable whether policymakers in Washington would have reinforced the preeminence of the United States at unlimited cost to U.S.-Soviet relations.166 Still, the available evidence suggests a sharp disjuncture between what the United States told the Soviet Union and what U.S. policymakers privately intended. For Soviet and other external audiences, U.S. policymakers depicted a world in which the United States would forgo NATO expansion and craft a mutually acceptable European order. Privately, however, U.S. policymakers sought to expand the United States’ presence in Central-Eastern Europe; they discounted the importance of the cooperative and pan-European security structures presented to the Soviet Union; and they opposed arrangements that would foreclose future U.S. op- tions in Europe. As part of this effort, the United States was also actively considering expanding NATO despite assurances to the contrary.

 

Overall, and as State Department Counselor Robert Zoellick described in June 1990, U.S. policy was designed to “give an impression of movement” on European security and to offer Gorbachev “some things to make him more

comfortable w[ith] the process” of German reuniªcation.167 Meaningfully limiting NATO’s future, however, was not the real goal. Rhetoric and substance diverged as the United States suggested that it would respond to Soviet concerns,

yet took practical steps to reinforce U.S. dominance in Europe. Appropriately, Bush had previewed this dual approach early on, telling Kohl at Camp David: “We are going to win the game, but we must be clever while we

are doing it.”168 Even as diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union proceeded, the United States was moving to circumvent many of the promises made during the 1990 negotiations.

...

 

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Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

 

Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the George Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University.

 

International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 7–44, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00236

 

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/617460

Edited May 15, 2016 by Prospero

[iDemo]

Lepo ti je rekao covek da ne kvotujes.

Neka, neka... :)