Jump to content



Recommended Posts

Opšta tema o najmoćnijem vojnom savezu na planeti. Za početak, isečak iz jedne skorašnje studije o problemu odbrane baltičkih republika od eventualne ruske invazije. 


Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics
David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson
Russia’s recent aggression against
Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace
and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors
and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the
perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the threat to the three Baltic Republics of Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania—former Soviet republics, now
member states that border Russian territory—may be the
most problematic.
In a series of wargames conducted between summer
2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined
the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Rus-
sian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings
are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot
successfully defend the territory of its most exposed mem-
bers. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert
participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the
longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts
of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and
Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. Such a rapid defeat would
leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad:
a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to
liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do
to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least
temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not
incidentally, the people of the Baltics.
Fortunately, avoiding such a swift and catastrophic failure does not appear to require a
Herculean effort. Further gaming indicates that a force of about seven brigades, including three
heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on
the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities—could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun
of the Baltic states. While not sufficient to mount a sustained defense of the region or to achieve
NATO’s ultimate end state of restoring its members’ territorial integrity, such a posture would
fundamentally change the strategic picture as seen from Moscow. Instead of being able to confront
NATO with a stunning coup de main that cornered it as described above, an attack on the Baltics
would instead trigger a prolonged and serious war between Russia and a materially far wealthier and
more powerful coalition, a war Moscow must fear it would be likely to lose.
Crafting this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive in absolute terms, with annual costs
perhaps running on the order of $2.7 billion. That is not a small number, but seen in the context of
an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product in excess of $35 trillion and combined yearly
defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it hardly appears unaffordable, especially in comparison
with the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—that is, of
potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.
Key findings
• Across multiple games using a wide range of expert
participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken
Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga
is 60 hours.
• Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited
number of options, all bad.
• Having a force of about seven brigades, including three
heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by
airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the
ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities—
might prevent such an outcome.
• While not sufficient for a sustained defense of the
region or to restore NATO members’ territorial integrity,
such a posture would fundamentally change the
strategic picture from Moscow.
• While this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive
in absolute terms, it is not unaffordable, especially in
comparison with the potential costs of failing to defend
NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies.


Link to comment

Moj mali doprinos temi :fantom:



NATO's Secret Armies - Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe Ganser Daniele

This fascinating new study shows how the CIA and the British secret service, in collaboration with the military alliance NATO and European military secret services, set up a network of clandestine anti-communist armies in Western Europe after World War II.

These secret soldiers were trained on remote islands in the Mediterranean and in unorthodox warfare centres in England and in the United States by the Green Berets and SAS Special Forces. The network was armed with explosives, machine guns and high-tech communication equipment hidden in underground bunkers and secret arms caches in forests and mountain meadows. In some countries the secret army linked up with right-wing terrorist who in a secret war engaged in political manipulation,

Codenamed 'Gladio' ('the sword'), the Italian secret army was exposed in 1990 by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to the Italian Senate, whereupon the press spoke of ''The best kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II'' (Observer, 18. November 1990) and observed that ''The story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller.'' (The Times, November 19, 1990). Ever since, so-called 'stay-behind' armies of NATO have also been discovered in France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Greece and Turkey. They were internationally coordinated by the Pentagon and NATO and had their last known meeting in the NATO-linked Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) in Brussels in October 1990.



Edited by slow
Link to comment

Moj mali doprinos temi :fantom:





Popularna knjiga, mada je ne bi trebalo uzimati baš zdravo za gotovo.




Falling Flat on the Stay-Behinds



Daniele Ganser: NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe, Frank Cass, London, 2005, 336 p., $135.00 hardcover, $40.95 paper.



In 1978, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Colby released Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, which included an account of his postwar paramilitary activities in Scandinavia, and thereafter the ‘‘stay-behind’’ phenomenon he described has puzzled scholars, research communities, and the media. The 1990 Italian Gladio incident made modern stay-behind operations public knowledge. Ever since then left-wing activists have had an easy time embroidering such information as existed, mainly because most Western European governments still retained staybehind forces under arms and were therefore very reluctant to comment comprehensively on the subject.


Now Swiss author Dr. Daniele Ganser adds an additional chapter to the new wave of conspiracy literature that has hit the market after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks on New York City and Washington. His volume could be characterized as a journalistic work with a big spoonful of conspiracy theories. It is a mosaic of descriptions regarding each NATO country and its relationship with the stay-behind phenomena. No literature regarding Special Forces or unconventional warfare seem to have been used by Ganser. A larger portion of his material is drawn from newspaper articles and what could be termed political publications. In order to keep the disinformation apart from the serious research, a very deep look into the political landscape is necessary to make a lengthy study of each country mentioned. This, alas, Ganser fails to do, at least in respect of some important countries. Instead, he has come up with a thesis that is unsubstantiated by the content.




On the very first page of NATO’s Secret Armies Ganser asserts that ‘‘In each country, leading members of the executive, including Prime Ministers, Presidents, Interior Ministers, Defence Ministers, were involved in the conspiracy’’ and that ‘‘on a lower level in the hierarchy citizens and military officers in numerous countries of Western Europe shared this assessment [that a secret resistance network should be established in peacetime], joined the conspiracy and secretly trained for the emergency.’’


Ganser’s conclusion is that the United States, the CIA, Britain’s MI6, NATO, and the Western countries conspired together, but he fails to present any proof, or even an explanation, of the claimed conspiracy. Accordingly, concluding that there was no conspiracy might be in order, but Ganser quotes several high-ranking officers who have been part of a NATO stay-behind system, as such an organization definitely existed, but their recollections leave no reason for Ganser—or anyone else for that matter—to conclude that there was a conspiracy behind it all. On the contrary, the military officers paint a picture of a secret organization, classified because of the nature of its activities, but in which Ganser’s main conspirators, American and British intelligence officers, played no part in it, or at least not when any decisions were made. CIA personnel were present at meetings in NATO’s Coordination and Planning Committee, but ‘‘they had no voting right and were from the CIA headquarters of the capital in which the meeting took place.’’ Other American military representatives were also present, but again without the right to vote. Thus, Ganser alleges that the CIA was the leading force in the conspiracy, yet also states that the CIA had no voting rights within any of NATO’s stay-behind organizations. Therefore, his conclusion about a big conspiracy falls rather flat.


Accepted critical and methodical approaches used in historical research seem to have played a minor role in Ganser’s analysis. For a book on such a controversial subject to be taken seriously as a piece of scholarly research, it should contain a chapter on its sources, articles, and other bibliographic materials. The author’s research methods should be mentioned, but no opportunity is provided here to study the methods used by Ganser, so his claim of a big conspiracy seems even harder to believe.




Dr. Ganser’s uncritical approach becomes evident on several occasions. One of the important documents on which he bases his conspiracy claims is an American field manual, FM 30–31, but the full background of this document should have been explained as it has, in fact, been discussed for years, and was presented as evidence at a 1980 hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee of Oversight. There the manual was presented as an example of ‘‘Soviet covert action,’’ and CIA officials testified that the document was a singularly successful KGB forgery.


In Denmark, this purported field manual surfaced in several debates, together with other KGB forgeries, and an analysis undertaken by the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) in 1976 concluded that it was part of a KGB disinformation campaign, which was conducted across Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s. Although a considerable effort was made to expose the KGB operation, the field manual surfaced again in 1979, along with several other KGB forgeries, as part of the Soviet campaign against the renewal of the NATO nuclear forces in Europe. It then reappeared during the Gladio affair in 1990, but by then few had been persuaded of its authenticity. Even the Danish left-wing organization DEMOS questioned whether the field manual was genuine, but Ganser has overlooked these doubts, although he should have been under a duty to mention them.




One of the least convincing areas of Ganser’s thesis of a big conspiracy within NATO is in Scandinavia where stay-behind forces were established, led, and controlled by the local governments and their intelligence services. In fact, Social Democrats in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark concluded that the Scandinavian democracies were under a threat from the Soviet Union. Norway and Denmark had been occupied by the Nazis during World War II, having failed to make the necessary preparations for a resistance movement. The same mistake was not to be made twice, but Dr. Ganser fails to explain how NATO could have organized the Norwegian stay-behind network, which had been set up prior to 1948. Olav Riste’s account of the Norwegian military intelligence organizations and its stay-behind network offered quite different conclusions, yet Ganser relied upon Riste’s important work as his key source. In Sweden, the government took similar precautions in 1949, apparently on a strictly unilateral basis, but some erroneous information about Swedish stay-behinds was circulated by Ganser, first in his Ph.D. thesis and later on the PHP website. The Swedish stay-behind organization’s codename was alleged to be Sveaborg. That is not correct, as was emphasized by the two leading Swedish experts on the subject, Magnus Hjort and Ulf Eliasson, at an intelligence conference held in Oslo in late April 2005. Both have completed comprehensive studies of Sveaborg and its founder, Otto Hallberg.


The first steps for a Danish resistance movement were also taken well before the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. Three years earlier, a leader of the Danish resistance received a visit from an American diplomat who wanted to know how the Danish resistance would react to a Soviet invasion. Would the Danes be ready to fight the Russians? The answer was clear: They would! Another account reveals secret meetings held between foreign intelligence officers and Danish resistance leaders, influential citizens, and politicians, four of whom would later become Prime Minister of Denmark. One of the subjects discussed at these meetings was stay-behinds and, in 1948, Danish military leaders cooperated with their Swedish colleagues to arm the Danish stay-behind forces, described as the ‘‘sleeping’’ resistance. These details are omitted from Ganser’s book. Instead, he adheres to one of many unreliable stories that surfaced in Danish newspapers during October– December 1990. According to one, the organization Absalon was the Danish wing of Gladio. In fact, Absalon, as had been revealed in 1973–1974, was part of the political debate in the early 1970s and never engaged in stay-behind activities, since secrecy is the core necessity for such an organization in order for it to survive during an enemy occupation. Actually, there is much more to the Absalon story than Ganser suggests, and my knowledge is based on an interview with the only source, ‘‘Q,’’ a former officer who claimed that he was the leader of a Danish right-wing Gladio organization. In reality, there is no proof that such an organization ever existed in Denmark, so a faulty analysis on the basis of very limited source material and attempts to compare incomparable phenomena have led Ganser to the wrong conclusion.


Certainly, Western European countries took precautions because of the Soviet threat developing in the East. And the coup in Prague in February 1948, Soviet pressure on Finland, and rumors of Soviet invasion plans for Scandinavia all played their part. A study of the American and the British wartime experience, and an analysis of the East–West conflict and its impact on Western European countries, shows why these states reacted as they did, and would have established stay-behind networks on their own with or without American or=and British help.




The stay-behind phenomenon is a very important field for Cold War research, but also a very controversial one. As Daniele Ganser’s NATO’s Secret Armies demonstrates. It should be read with critical eyes and be seen as an example of how things can be blown out of proportion when there is no awareness of the character of the available documentary source material. The account concerning Denmark, and to some extent also Norway, is rather superficial, and devoid of the necessary critical approach to dubious sources. A thorough analysis of the material gives no reason to conclude that the stay-behind forces in Scandinavia were ever part of a big right-wing conspiracy, or had been used for terrorism. This raises an important question: Has Ganser’s analysis of stay-behinds in other countries followed the same pattern, and are there more errors? Certainly, the big U.S.–UK conspiracy theory does not hold water, so a more balanced account still remains to be written.




Peer Henrik Hansen, a doctoral scholar at Roskilde University, Denmark, specializes in intelligence and Cold War history and is currently working on a doctoral thesis about Stay Behind networks in Scandinavia. He was previously a researcher on Cold War issues at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen.



Edited by Prospero
Link to comment

Meni je najinteresantnije to da iako moderne armije imaju mnogo manje ljudi i tehnike u odnosu na one od pre 70-tak godina, logistički problemi su isti ili čak veći. 

Link to comment

NATO agrees on stronger eastern flank against Russia

A new plan agreed by NATO will see the alliance's military presence in Eastern Europe strengthened. The effort is meant to show solidarity and to reassure Eastern European members against perceived threats from Russia.




Defense ministers from NATO countries agreed on Wednesday to a plan that would see the military alliance strengthened in Eastern European countries feeling at risk of aggression from Russia.

The "enhanced forward presence in the eastern part of our Alliance," as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put it, is designed to "make clear that an attack against one ally is an attack against all allies, and that the alliance as a whole will respond."

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a 28-member military alliance made up of mostly Western European countries. In the past two years, relations between Russia and NATO have been at a level not seen since the Cold War, due in large part to Russia's suspected involvement in Ukraine's civil war and the annexation of Crimea.

Other Eastern European nations are concerned that Russia would carry out similar operations in their countries, and have increasingly looked to NATO for support.

Wednesday's agreement is a renewed pledge of solidarity among members.

The full details of the enhanced eastern presence have yet to be discussed but are likely to be complete by NATO's Warsaw Summit in July. The broad plan foresees multinational forces stationed in eastern NATO countries on a rotational basis while a larger, rapid-response contingent would be available upon short notice from elsewhere in Europe.


Link to comment

združenim snagama demokratije u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala za bolje sutra :fantom:


Nato ships are being deployed to the Aegean sea to deter people-smugglers taking migrants from Turkey to Greece, Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg says.


The announcement followed a request from Turkey, Germany and Greece at a defence ministers' meeting in Brussels.

Mr Stoltenberg said the mission would not be about "stopping or pushing back refugee boats".

Nato, he said, will contribute "critical information and surveillance to help counter human trafficking".

US defence secretary Ashton Carter earlier said that targeting the "criminal syndicate that is exploiting these poor people" would have the greatest humanitarian impact.





Link to comment

Evo na primer :

Gledala sinoc docek rezultata iz NH i prve govore. Evo ukratko utisaka- Bernie Sandres dobar govor, pravicnost vise puta i ranije spominjana nego ljudska prava, ali i ona i to vrlo eksplicitno ( toliko o tom zlu koje Ameriknaci samo drugima namecu). Ocito da ima - sprema odgovor za Hilari tim pitanja tipa- OK je to sto pricas, ali kako to ostvaris? Tu je bio slab, samo je neki porez na spekulacije u WS spomenuo. Ne verujem da je to dovoljno za sve sto planira. O spoljnoj politici nacelno, sa naglaskom na obnovljive izvore energije u tom delu, i o klimatskim promenama. Eksplicitan o potrebi arapskih zemalja da se ukljuce vise i direktnije u resavanje problema na Bliskom Istoku. RETORIKA WHEN WE in WH, prilicno pobednicka, ali mi se ne svidja sto je fund rasing nastavka kampanje stavio na pocetak govora. Potencirao da ima najvise individulanih malih donacija istoriji americkih izbora, nekakao je zvucalo- jedna donacija jedan glas. Ali je imao vec sad eksplicitan stav o abortusu sto cenim. Najveci propust govora- da Amerika ne bude vise "svetski policajac". Bez konteksta i definicije, zvuci ko deo Putinovog a ne govora kandidata za predsednika SAD. Gde i kad tacno? OK protiv Iraka je bio, Vjetnama, i? Sta tacno jos nije OK, ne kazem da nema, nego je busno i suvise antiglobaisticki. Generalno, za democrats abroad:) suvise izolacionistcki. Odnos prema trgoinskim sporazumima- pa blizu Trampovog.... Mislim da nece da vidi njihove koristi i za svoju demografiju. Vidim I senatorka Varen ima takav stav.

Hilari Klinton- prvi utisak ( jace od mene) da je bila obucena ko kaludjerica i da vec u stvari radi kampanju za Juznu Karolinu i neoevangelsiticke drzave u koje se prajmariz sele. Drugi utisak-Bil je jako ostario, nisam sigurna da li deluje na bini. Rekla je da i dalje voli Nju Hempsajr iako je druga, sto je zvucalo nekako suvise I forma, a to su joj spocitali i na CNN da je vise ja cu ovo ono, a da je Sanders vise MI cemo ovo ono. HR je mnogo pre u govoru naglasila, nije ih delila po klasterima toliko kao Sanders. Naprvila je od sebe zrtvu Ustavnog suda i tih superpack struktura. Naglasavala kontinuitet sa Obamom, vs Sandersovi pozivi za radikalne promene. Vrlo ljubazni jedno prema drugom. Formalno. Recenica popravicu se prema mladima suvise paternalisticka. Vidi ih kao problem u kampanji ne kao bitnu demografiju, tako je ispalo. Upropastila su je Madlen Olbrajt i ona druga glupim izjavama. Ne bi me iznenadilo da se pojavi sad naknadno jos neko, iako se tvrdi da ona ima u suncanim zemljama vise sanse od Sandersa.

A oni! Majko moja. Wwwwwww NH! Veliki budget skandalozno- ALI ja cu da obnovim vojsku SAD jos vise, samo sto nije reako "dragi vojno industrijski kompleksu evo me". Vraticemo Ameriku da bude opet velika. U odnosi na koji period? WW2kad je bila najveca? Koliko ja kapiram propadose pod Obamom. Japan i Kina otese sve SAD. Nezaposlenost 4.5 posto nije tacna etc, etc.... Sagraditi zid na juznoj granici nije tesko. Razbucacemo ISIS. Parizani su krivi sto je na njih pucao ISIS da su imali slobodnije ala NRA zakone o nosenju oruzija, da je vise metaka islo u drugom pravcu, bilo bi manje zrtava.....

Link to comment
  • Create New...