NATO

[namenski]

Tesko da ce da pomogne, andurilovstina je debelo zasela u glave, muku cemo mi tu da vidimo...

Toliki stepen zatucanosti je neverovatan, danas citam na brzinu one Lend Lease bljuvotine koje su ovde pisane 

Nema tu pomoci.

 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation accepted the debts of all previous states that ever existed on its territory before. The Soviet Lend-Lease debt to the USA was among them. In 1975 it was 674 million dollars......

The debt was not canceled even after the USSR ceased to exist, and the general political climate had warmed up.

At the end of October 1999, the United States Government suggested the Russian side grant them ownership of five buildings in Moscow, including the Spaso House mansion (the residence of the American Ambassador to Russia) to pay off of the lend-lease debt balance. This suggestion was not accepted. The Russian Finance Ministry’s letter № 01-02-03/26-65, signed by Deputy Minister Kolotukhin on February 12, 2003, said: “…the lend-lease payments are included in the Russian–American agreements on the restructuring of foreign debt of the former USSR signed with the Paris Club of Creditors on 29 April, 1996, and as of 1 August, 1999, … all the lend-lease payments to the American party are being paid according to the schedules of the above mentioned Agreements.”

In April 2006, the president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin declared that all the debts to the Paris Club of Creditors would be paid off ahead of the schedule by the end of the year. It meant that the lend-lease debt would be paid, too. In July, at the summit in St. Petersburg, it was declared that the payments would be completed in August 2006.
The lend-lease debt was paid off without acknowledgement of the fact that almost half of the losses of the Soviet transport fleet were caused by the activity of American submarines in the North Pacific.

 

 

[Dagmar]

huh? Kakvi sad gubitci flote od strane Amerikanaca?

[namenski]

Whether or not 10,000 Russian women collapse from exhaustion while digging a tank ditch interests me only in so far as the tank ditch is completed for Germany.

Govor Rajhsfirera SS po imenu Heinrich Himmler, koga zanima moze da cuje i u originalu.

Odrzan u gradu koji se zvao Posen, Poljaci koji ga danas zovu Poznan - i koji bi ga malo sutra tako zvali da je bilo do nesebicnih saveznika - oktobra 1943.

[Anonymous]

ne prizivaj majku.to je ta razina.ide jedno na drugo..

 

Tema bi trebalo da je NATO. Za ostalo postoji, na žalost, zapostavljen topik fajt klub.

[MancMellow]

Možda mu ovo pomogne:

 

национальный состав военнопленных в ссср в период с 1941 года и по 1945 год

 

 

Nema Engleza i Amerikanaca 

[namenski]

Nema Engleza i Amerikanaca 

Nisu ih se dokopali 

Pogledaj, na primer, pod Robert Henry Best, Herbert John Burgman...

 

Edit: Ipak, jednog jesu  :0.6:

Zamalo da zaboravim starog Freda Kaltenbach-a, jadnika 

Edited May 15, 2016 by namenski

[Sestre Bronte]

Sva sreca pa smo pred klimatskom apokalipsom i sto nas nece jos dugo muciti problemi ko je kome postavio blize bazu. Nemaju pametnija posla ovi sa razvijenog zapada, umesto da pokusaju da spasu sta se spasti moze, teraju svoju pricu kao da je 1960. Dobro je pa zemlja moze sasvim fino i bez ljudi.

Edited May 15, 2016 by Braća Strugacki

[Hella]

Nema Engleza i Amerikanaca 

 

otkud ovih 22k iz nogoslavije

[Dagmar]

Sva sreca pa smo pred klimatskom apokalipsom i sto nas nece jos dugo muciti problemi ko je kome postavio blize bazu. Nemaju pametnija posla ovi sa razvijenog zapada, umesto da pokusaju da spasu sta se spasti moze, teraju svoju pricu kao da je 1960. Dobro je pa zemlja moze sasvim fino i bez ljudi.

 

To. Ne znam samo da li će zemlja uspeti da obnovi neki ekosistem dok se ljudi ispotrebljuju.

[Dagmar]

otkud ovih 22k iz nogoslavije

 

Neki vonabi zapadnjaci verovatno.

[Anduril]

Isporuke po lend-lizu ostvarene su na osnovu 4 protokola:

....

 

Nema sta da se spekulise kad postoje podaci:

 

 

By the late summer of 1941 the world watched, and waited, for what seemed like the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union. The Germans had penetrated deep into Russian territory and were on the doorsteps of the capital. The Red Army had lost millions of men, and tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft.

Recovery looked impossible. The Nazis occupied the primary agricultural regions of the country, and had also overrun a large portion of Russia’s industrial zones. What factories remained were in pieces, and in transit to their new locations far behind the front lines.

 

However, despite significant setbacks and incredible losses, the Russians did the impossible – they stopped the Germans. During the pivotal stage of the invasion, from October to December, the Red Army managed to recover enough to halt the German advance eastward. Not only was the defensive battle a resounding success, but the subsequent counter-attack that began in the first week of December around Moscow gave the Russians hope for the eventual defeat of the Nazis. The December offensive was eventually expanded to include the entire front, from Leningrad to Rostov, and ran into the late spring of 1942.

 

Up until the end of that year, the Russians worked feverishly to re-establish their industrial capacity and recover from the devastating losses experienced in the opening stages of the German invasion. By June 1942, American Lend-Lease shipments were starting to roll into the Soviet Union. These much-needed supplies would go a long way to propping up the Russian war machine, and its impact has been widely debated both on these forums and in the historiography of the issue itself.

 

One aspect of Lend-Lease that is quite often overlooked, and which gets very little attention here at TWC, is the First Moscow Protocol that technically ended in June 1942. Members here have often downplayed its role, if not ignored it altogether. Perhaps this is due to a lack of understanding, or an unwillingness to examine its impact on the early part of the war in the East. In any event, I will try to provide as objective an overview of it as possible.

 

During the First Protocol the British were the primary providers of aid to the Russians for the only reason that the American economy was just beginning to find itself on a war footing. These early shipments were quite significant for the Russians as they struggled to make good the losses of 1941. While the early LL aid certainly didn’t “save” the Soviets, it did play a much more significant role than has been acknowledged.

 

By the end of June 1941, the Russians had started requesting materiel from the British and Americans. They asked for 3000 fighter planes, 3000 bombers, anti-submarine sonar (ASDIC) as well as a massive quantity of raw material and other goods. Despite the requests, there was considerable resistance from within the US to the thought of supplying the Russians with any material at all – whether purchased through a cash and carry program, or via Lend Lease.

 

The difficulty facing the British was meeting their own needs, while at the same time being the primary provider to the Soviets until the Americans could formally include Russia in the Lend Lease Act. It wasn’t until late September that the big 3 Allies were able start negotiations for a more detailed itinerary for the First Protocol, and it wouldn’t be until November when Russia was formally included in the LL program. It was eventually agreed to supply 200 planes and 250 tanks on a monthly basis, along with other equipment/resources vital to the Soviet war effort.

 

According to Alexander Hill, the Russians were only able to produce 4649 “principle types (T34, KV series, and light tanks)” of tanks in the second half of 1941, and 11178 for the first six months of 1942. The British managed to deliver 1442 during this time. While the British vehicles were inferior to the T34, the Russians had been unable to produce the T34 in any appreciable numbers until after the end of the First Protocol, giving the British vehicles value that went beyond their technical characteristics.

 

The Russians only managed to produce 2819 medium/heavy tanks from June until December (while total med/heavy AFV losses during the same time amounted to 3200, and pre-war stocks being around 1400), and these were supplemented by 361 medium/heavy British vehicles (with 466 total AFVs delivered).

 

On December 1st, Red Army tank strength stood at 6347, with only about 1400 being medium or heavy. Thus, British Lend-Lease vehicles represented 25% of all available Russian medium/heavy tanks. The importance of Lend-Lease vehicles becomes even more evident when the situation in front of Moscow is examined in more detail. According to Soviet sources, the Red Army had a total of 670 tanks, of which 205 were medium or heavy. Of the integrated and Independent tanks units operating in the Battle for Moscow, Hill asserts that 30 – 40% of their medium/heavy tanks were of British origin!

During the spring and early summer of 1942, tanks from the UK continued to play a valuable role in Soviet formations. While the ratio of LL to domestic vehicles steadily declined as Russian production began to kick in, LL vehicles still amounted to 16% of total available strength.

 

Of even more importance to the USSR during the First Moscow Protocol were the deliveries of aircraft. According to Mark Harrison, the Russians produced a total of 16468 planes between June 1941 and June 1942. During the same period, the UK supplied 1323 fighter planes. On the surface, this appears to be of only minor importance, but if we take into consideration combat losses by the Red Air Force, these LL planes take on greater significance. Including pre-war stocks, and deliveries in 1941, the Russians had cycled almost 30000 planes through frontline service, resulting in losses of 18000 planes! The December 31st stock of fighter planes was only 7900 aircraft, including an approximate number of 700 LL fighters.

 

Soviet Air Defence units (PVO) saw increasing numbers of LL supplied planes fill their orders of battle. The 6th Fighter Air Corps of Moscow had 15% of its compliment of aircraft supplied by LL for the defence of Moscow, and overall, by the end of 1942, LL planes made up 27.5% of PVO forces. Many air regiments in the far north had even higher proportions of LL planes, serving as the backbone for the aerial defence of Murmansk, Karelia and Archangel.

Aside from finished products – such as the tanks and planes mentioned above, the First Moscow Protocol provided a significant amount of raw materials to the Russians. The British managed to deliver a little over 14000 tons of aluminum during the protocol, while domestic production would have been approximately 60000 tons. Similarly, 35000 tons of rubber was supplied to the Soviets during this time, although I am unsure what domestic supplies were. I suspect they may have been limited, even more so after the Japanese entered the conflict. Evidence of the short supply of rubber lay in the fact that Russian factories had to stop the production of rubber tank wheels in late 1941 in order to meet demand elsewhere.

 

Communication equipment was also desperately requested by the Russians during the First Protocol. The German invasion inflicted massive losses of this type of equipment, and Russian industry was very slow to recover and make good the deficits. To that end, the British managed to supply 4000 telephones, 400 switchboards, and 30000 km of telephone cable. Russian production was quite limited to the manufacture of 1000 phones per month. During 1942 a total of 23000 phones, and 280000 km of cable were shipped via LL by the US and Britain – although much of this was shipped after the end of the First Protocol.

 

The British LL also played an important role in assisting Russian factories meet their expected output of tanks and planes. In total, 1210 machine tools were shipped via LL. Russian manufacture of similar parts totaled a mere 2994 in the first 3 months of 1942. However, total production eventually reached 22935 by the end of 1942. What should be noted is that although as a percentage the British contribution may seem minor, the Russians requested specific equipment that they were unable to get domestically. In some cases, equipment sent from the UK was vital in ensuring Soviet factories remained productive throughout late 1941 and early 1942.

 

I hope this post served its purpose by providing more detail on Lend Lease during the first year of the war in Russia. I have seen far too many posts stating the insignificance of LL aid during this period, and I’m fairly convinced that most people aren’t actually aware of how valuable this early assistance really was to the Soviet war effort. I’ll certainly be the first to admit that LL during this phase didn’t save Russia from defeat, but it gave them the breathing room they needed to recover from the crushing losses experienced during the opening stages of Barbarossa.

 

Here's a brief list of some of the sources I've used...

 

Mark Harrison. Accounting For war. Soviet Production, Employment and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945. (1996)

Mark Harrison. Soviet Planing in Peace and War. (1985)

Alexander Hill. The Allocation of Allied “Lend-Lease” Aid to the Soviet Union Arriving with PQ12…(2006)

Alexander Hill: British Lend Lease Tanks and the Battle for Moscow. (2006)

Alexander Hill: British Lend Lease and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941-June 1942. (2007)

Roger Munting. Lend Lease and the Soviet War Effort. (1984)

VF Vorsin. Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries Through Lend Lease. (1997)

 

 

Zapadnjaci su izvrsili najvece genocide u istoriji covecanstva, ali iz nekog razloga uzimaju sebi za pravo da drugima nesto kenjaju po tom pitanju.

 

Zapadnjaci? Gde su istocnjaci? Koje dno...

 

 

Kako može biti demantovana "nada u demokratsku Rusiju" nečim što se desilo 15-20 godina nakon što je učinjen korak koji je odmogao demokratizaciji Rusije?

 

Ukrajina sa nuklearnim naoružanjem nije trebala nikome. Zamisli Janukoviča koji 21. februara 2014. drži ruku na nuklearnom koferčetu (a da ga je stekao u međuvremenu)... <_<

 

 

 

 

 

Ukraine and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum

by Jeffrey Lewis | April 29, 2014 | 3 Comments

 

My friend and colleague at Monterey, Philipp Bleek, has been growing weary of the frequent mischaracterization of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, particularly as its relates to Ukraine’s renunciation of nuclear weapons.

He was kind enough to share his weary reflections based on a new article he’s published, the work of our mutual colleague Jeffrey Knopf, and the very strange notion of actually reading the text of the Memorandum.

 

Reading the (not so) fine print

or

Why Ukraine wasn’t a nuclear power in the early 1990s and the West has no legal obligation to come to its aid now

Philipp Bleek

 

Following Putin’s Crimean land grab and ongoing mischief in eastern Ukraine, Kiev’s mid-1990s decision to give up the nuclear weapons on its soil after the collapse of the Soviet Union has suddenly gotten a lot more attention. But armchair pundits have been mischaracterizing both Ukraine’s early-1990s nuclear capabilities and the commitments it received in exchange for giving them up.

The fact that Ukraine never had operational control over the weapons in its possession is often ignored. While it had physical control, it’s not clear former Soviet military personnel would have executed Ukrainian launch orders, and regardless Kiev lacked the codes to overcome the permissive action links, electronically encrypted locks to prevent unauthorized use. (Conversely, Ukraine might have been capable of impeding a Russian attempt to launch nuclear weapons on its soil.) As negotiations over the weapons’ status dragged on into the mid-1990s, Western intelligence agencies were reportedly concerned that Ukraine was making efforts to gain operational control over the weapons, but no reports have emerged that it was successful in doing so. And when Ukraine publicly suggested it might seek operational control, Russia made clear this would constitute an act of war.

It’s possible Ukraine might eventually have managed to obtain control over the weapons. But at a minimum the frequent characterization of Ukraine (as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan) as nuclear-armed states that chose to disarm misses some key nuances. (Relatedly, a fellow policy wonk in Kiev reports that rumors are circulating that Ukraine covertly retained some tactical nuclear weapons that might come into play now. That seems highly implausible, if admittedly difficult to conclusively rule out.) And even if Ukraine had somehow managed to hold onto nuclear weapons, it’s far from clear they would have helped rather than hurt in the current situation. During the political instability after President Yanukovych fled to Russia in February, command and control of those weapons would presumably have been uncertain—much as it was in the Soviet Union during the 1991 coup against Gorbachev—and Moscow would have had substantial motivation to intervene aggressively to ensure the weapons were secure. (Founding publisher Jeffrey Lewis has a lengthier discussion here.)

As for the purported treaty commitment to come to Ukraine’s aid, that appears to be based on a misreading (or non-reading) of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that extended guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for its joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. Signed by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (with France and China, the other two NPT nuclear weapons states, separately making similar commitments), the document was part of the price Ukraine demanded in order to join Belarus and Kazakhstan in transferring nuclear weapons on their soil after the collapse of the Soviet Union to Russia, a diplomatic coup for the Clinton administration, eager to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states.

A lot of folks, including apparently a former British ambassador to Moscow, now seem convinced that NATO’s failure to respond more robustly to Russia’s crass annexation of Crimea, and perhaps more of Ukraine in the coming weeks, violates commitments the United States and United Kingdom made under the agreement. One gets the impression that many of those opining about the Budapest Memorandum haven’t read it, despite the fact that it’s readily accessible online, only a few hundred words long, and written in what passes as exceptionally clear language in the often arcane world of international law. At the risk of being snarky (and what fun is an Arms Control Wonk blog post without a little snark?), it’s tempting to cite Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s famous query after the Clinton administration failed to foresee the 1998 nuclear tests India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) conducted shortly after winning election and consistent with their published election manifesto: “Why don’t we learn to read?”

In that spirit, let’s review the key points of the Budapest Memorandum (there are only six, condensed a little here, available in their full glory at the various links above). Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom all committed to:

1) Respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine;

2) Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and pledged that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter;

3) Refrain from economic coercion;

4) Seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to assist Ukraine, should it be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons;

5) Not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine unless attacked by Ukraine in association or alliance with a nuclear-armed state;

6) Consult if a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments.

That’s it. Russia is pretty clearly in violation of its end of the bargain (though Moscow argues the West is the violator for having “indulged a coup d’etat” that ousted President Victor Yanukovich). Washington and London have obligations to consult with Moscow—of which they’ve been doing plenty—but it’s hard to read any further obligations into the agreement.

Russia’s cavalier disregard for Ukraine’s sovereignty is doubly troubling because it sets a rather unhelpful nonproliferation precedent. There is something close to consensus among scholars and policymakers that security guarantees—the more robust sort, anyway—do play a key role in dissuading countries from pursuing their own nuclear arsenals (shameless plug, I have a just-published article that seeks to bolster that consensus). Whether and to what degree lesser guarantees, of the sort Ukraine received and the nuclear weapons states have extended to non-nuclear weapons states in the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, aid nonproliferation efforts is more contentious.

To the extent that such lesser assurances matter, the precedent of Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and perhaps more of Ukraine in the coming weeks, in blatant violation of its commitments in Budapest, seems unlikely to encourage future countries mulling giving up nuclear or other potential deterrent capabilities. But arguably neither did NATO’s military support to the effort to topple Gaddhafi not long after he agreed to renounce his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs (though it’s worth emphasizing that in Gaddhafi’s case those capabilities weren’t very robust).

Ukraine’s leaders in the mid-1990s, and for that matter Gaddhafi’s regime more recently, were presumably under no illusions about how binding commitments they received were. But leaders in Kiev, and perhaps also Tripoli, appear to have calculated that even less-binding commitments would have some political effect. As my colleague Jeffrey Knopf, who has published some of the most thoughtful scholarship on security assurances, pointed out in response to an earlier draft, future nonproliferators may not be willing to settle for so little.

 

 

Abhazija, Pridnjestrovlje, Osetija i Cecenija su bile ranije. Krim i Donbas su samo nesto veci zalogaji shodno trenutnim mogucnostima.

Da su SAD bile toliko fiksirane istocnom Evropom i zauzdavanjem Rusije kako se tvrdi, mogla je i prema Ukrajini krenuti sasvim drugacija politika jos pocetkom devedesetih - recimo nesto kao sa Turskom.

 

Naravno, ali, čini mi se da je napad na Dagmar pogrešan, to sa Zapadnjacima i Zapadom je uveo u priču neko drugi... Dagmar je, činimi se, bar u početku, pokušala da ukaže ne glupost takvog stava... I zato je i uvela naciste-zapadnjake... Posle joj se izgubila nit...

Bar sam ja tako razumeo...

 

Kvotuj gde sam uveo pricu sa Zapadnjacima. Do tog momenta kad je Dagmar odgovorila Erazeru se pricalo o Zapadu u kontekstu EU/NATO-a/saveznika dok nije pocelo ovo seseljisanje po topiku.

Edited May 15, 2016 by Anduril

[iDemo]

Zapadnjaci su izvrsili najvece genocide u istoriji covecanstva, ali iz nekog razloga uzimaju sebi za pravo da drugima nesto kenjaju po tom pitanju.

Oni su to na vreme™ odradili, dok je ostatak sveta pishao u pesak... Sad osecaju moralnu obavezu i potrebu da ukazu ostatku sveta na koju stranu treba da se ide... Da se ne zaluta i to. 

[Anonymous]

Zapadnjaci? Gde su istocnjaci? Koje dno...

 

Moguće je da Rimljane svrstava pod zapadnjake.

[Dagmar]

Kvotuj gde sam uveo pricu sa Zapadnjacima. Do tog momenta kad je Dagmar odgovorila Erazeru se pricalo o Zapadu u kontekstu EU/NATO-a/saveznika dok nije pocelo ovo seseljisanje po topiku.

 

Pričalo se naravno o tome kako Rusi treba da se civiliziraju, i kako zapad ima razlog da se plaši Rusa ali Rusi nemaju razloga da se plaše milih i naivnih zapadnjaka.

[Anduril]

Oni su to na vreme™ odradili, dok je ostatak sveta pishao u pesak... Sad osecaju moralnu obavezu i potrebu da ukazu ostatku sveta na koju stranu treba da se ide... Da se ne zaluta i to. 

 

Pa objasni nam sta su to posebno odradili u poredjenju sa Staljinom, Dzingis Kanom, Maom, Pol Potom, raznim dzihadistima, Mogulima, Ruandom, Osmanlijama, dopisati prema potrebi.

Bice vise da ovde rade po obicaju neki cudni kompleksi nize vrednosti...