Толстый и тонкий

[Eraserhead]

8 hours ago, MancMellow said:

Ima veliki deo istine u ovome. Neka poslusaju, i to do kraja, cak i oni koji ga ne vole, jer on ovde kaze sustinski isto to.

 

 

Odlican.

[bradilko]

7 hours ago, Anduril said:

 

Kraj teskta - zaista strasno:

 

 

Deripaska kao Bil Gejts ili Steve Jobs. Svejetoisto.

Tako je i Srbija demokratija jer ima parlament i glasanje. Smesno kako se ne razume vaznost pravne drzave za ekonomiju bez obzira na politicare ili ekonomsku ideologiju, a to je kljucna razlik izmedju US i Rusije. Bez obzira na lobiranje u US ipak citava industrija (cigarete) moze da padne pred sudovima. U Rusiji tesko.

Ono sto je zajednicko za US i Rusiju jeste nacionalizam, militarizam i generalno desnicarski pogled na svet a u ekonomskom smislu skoro nista.

Rusija zivi od resursa dok je US ekonomija totalno divesifikovana i daleko najveci deo su usluge.

nije ni nacionalizam isti.ni ovo drugo.ni treće.ruski nacionalizam je bezumna osveta a kod ovih drugih je to izvedeno iz superiornosti i straha..

a nije to ni preovladavajuća tema u usa.pored svih mana možda najvažniji pokazatelj 'ispravnosti' jednog društva su želja drugih da postanu deo tog društva.nije tu samo faktor kinta kao jjedini način dolaska do sreće već mnogo toga čini neko društvo poželjno.

a najvažnije je da glavna linija ne može da bude extremizam u bilo kom slučaju..to je stabilno društvo.puno mana  ali uvek za korak ispred 

[namenski]

Kakva god da je post-CCCP Rusija, jedno je sigurno: transparetnija je, modernim jezikom receno, a i tamo gde nije da se uporedjivanjem iscackati po nesto podataka.

Sto se ruske vazduhoplovne industrije tice, vlast kaze jedno, neki drugi podaci drugo, pa je tako zamenik predsednika vlade Dmitri Rogozin u decembru 2017. godine obnarodovao da je Rusija prosle godine sve u svemu i za potrebe domaceg trzista i za izvoz isporucila 139 aviona i 214 helikoptera.

Brojke ukljucuju 31 avion i 64 helikoptera koji su otisli civilnom/nevojnom sektoru, a Rogozin je dodao da je 2017. godine proizvedeno 930 motora svih vrsta i namena.

Ali, prema nekim drugim sabiranjima, isporucen je 121 avion, pa se ceni da je Rogozin vlastodrzacko optimisticki u svoju brojku isporucenih aviona ubrojao avione koji su generalno remontovani.

2017. godine je rusko ministarstvo odbrane dobilo 3 doterana strateska bombardera, 2 Su-27M(3) lovca i nepoznat broj (ali ne vise od 10 – 12) MiG-31BM presretaca.

2014. godina se pamti kao najbericetnija poslednjih godina: Объединённая авиастроительная корпорация, ili United Aircraft Corporation, UAC, ako neko vise voli, isporucila je 158 aviona.

125 za vojne namene, od toga 103 za domacu upotrebu, 22 za izvoz i 33 civilnim/komercijalnim kupcima.

Sto se helikoptera tice, za udarnicku se uzima 2012. godina u kojoj je u Rusiji napravljeno 290 helikoptera.

U sektoru u kome se izistinski vidi ko koliko vredi u vazduhoplovnoj industriji, stvari – uz sav trud – ne stoje bas najbolje: jedina naprava koja je u serijskoj proizvodnji je regionalac Suhoj Superjet koji se proizvodi u fabrici u Komsomolsku na Amuru. Jedini iole znacajan dogadjaj u ovoj oblasti u 2017 godini je prvi let MC-21 Irkut.

Vojska je 2017. zaduzila komada 16 Su-34 (po povampirenom NATO oznacavanju Fullback), proizvedenih takodje u Komsomolsku na Amuru, komada 17 Su-30SM Flanker iz pogona u Irkutsku iz koga se, inace, u decembru iskotrljao jubilarni, 100-ti primerak ovog aviona i 6 Jak-130 proizvedenih takodje u Irkutsku.

Dal’ pare, dal’ nesto drugo, tek u fabrici u Irkutsku ceka jos 8 zavrsenih ovih aviona.

Ceni se da ce ovogodisnja proizvodnja ostati na nivou prosle, 2017. godine ako se uzme zdravo za gotovo da se radi na 16 Su-30SM, 22 Su-34, 30 Su-35S i 14 Jak-130.

Medjutim, buducnost koja se ruskoj vazduhoplovnoj industriji smesi tamo negde oko 2020. je malo zajebanija: trose se idejne i svake druge mogucnosti masina zamisljenih i projektovanih jos u sovjetsko doba, a para za radikalan^tm razvoj novih jednostavno nema.

U iole znacajnom broju nastavice se, sto nije iznenadjenje buduci da se radi o jedinoj konstrukciji koja se iole moze da pohvali novoruskim pedigreom, isporuka Su-34M aj’ da kazemo taktickog bombardera, buduci da se ono frontovski izgubilo, dok se ocekuje da ce posle 2020. biti ugovarana isporuka 24, a mozda i svih 36 MiG-35, prve serije Su-57 i doterane varijante Tu-160M2 bombardera.

2017. Воздушно-космические силы zaduzile su 2 putnicka An-148-100E za potrebe komandnog/VIP prevoza i 3 Diamond DA32 laka skolska aviona, sklapane u Jekaterinburgu od delova iz Ausgtrije, inace prve iz serije od ukupno 35 ovih aviona koje ruski strategicari nametavaju da koriste za obuku pilota transportnih aviona.

Svim ocekivanjima uprkos, ni jedan novi Il-76MD-90A nije proizveden, tacnije zavrsen prosle godine: ugovor koji je predvidjao isporuku 39 aviona potpisan je jos 2012, preko 15 aviona je zavrseno do kraja 2017. ali je proizvodnja zaustavljena posle svega 2 isporucena primerka.

Boljka je po svoj prilici trzisna, kapitalisticka: Авиастар-СП iz Uljanovska, se vadi na enormno porasle troskove kako sopstvene, tako i podizvodjacke, poziva se na gubitak od oko 15 miliona dolara po svakom proizvedenom avionu i preti bankrotstvom ako se bude insistiralo na ispunjenu prvobitnog ugovora.

Sva je prilika, bar se cuju takvi glasovi, da ce na kraju krajeva ruskom ministarstvo odbrane da se pomiri sa manjim brojem isporucenih aviona za iste pare.

 

 

Kod tankera stvari stoje nesto bolje: iz fabrike u Uljanovsku se u novembru iskotrljao prototip novog Il-78M-90A: prvi put je poleteo januara ove godina, a vojska se nada isporuci 31 aviona.

 

Sto se izvoza tice, 2017. je iz Rusije izvezeno 36 borbenih aviona, ali se – sva je prilika – smese bolja vremena: MiG je poceo sa radovima na isporuci 46 komada MiG-29M/M2 za Egipat pa je tako 31. decembra 2017. godine isporuceno prvih 15 komada.

Kina je primila 10 Su-35 Flanker E kao deo ugovorenih komada 24: prvih 4 komada su isporuceni 2016, dok se isporuka preostalih 10 komada ocekuje ove godine.

Alzir je primio sledecih 6 Su-30MKI(A), 2 Su-30SM su otisla u Kazahstan, a 3 Jak-130 u Burmu: Rusija se nada povecanju izvoza, kao izvozne zvezde vide se pre svega MiG-35, Su-34 i Su-35, a nade se polazu pre svega u Alzir.

Sa helikopterima stvari stoje malo zakovrtnije: tesko je snaci se u masi varijanti i izvedenica Mi-8 proizvedenih u fabrikama u Ulan Ude i Kazanju.

Ceni se, na raznim stranama, da je od 214 helikoptera proizvedenih 2017. cirka 100 komada Mi-8 sto naravno ukljucuje Mi-17, Mi-171 i izvoznu verziju Mi-172.

Ceni se i da je proizvodnja helikoptera pala za oko 35% u odnosu na 2012: da bi se pomoglo najvise pogodjenim fabrikama, onoj u Ulan Ude i Kazanju, drzava je 2016. narucila seriju od 23 Mi-8 i 6 Ansat helikoptera za potrebe medicinskog zbrinjavanja i intervencija u elementarnim nepogodama.

Svih 29 narucenih je isporuceno 2017. godine, a rusko ministarstvo odbrane je narucilo dodatnih 10 Ansat-U za potrebe obuke.

Sto se borbenih helikoptera tice, Роствертол iz Rostova (Mi-28N i Mi-35M) i Прогрес iz Arsenjeva (Ka-52), stoje poprilicno dobro: Rostvertol ima upisano nekoliko desetina Mi-28 za rusko ministarstvo odbrane, ali i 42 Mi-28NE za Alzir, ugovor koji se, inace, sprovodi od 2016. kada su pocele i prve isporuke. 12 Mi-35M je otislo u Nigeriju, 4 u Pakistan, dok se broj ugovorenih za Mali ne zna.

Progres, Arsenjevo, radi na narudzbi za rusko ministarstvo odbrane, ukupno 146 Ka-52 helikoptera: do sada je isporuceno 100 komada, ukljucujuci komada 12 u 2017, ali i na prvoj izvoznoj narudzbi od 46 Ka52E za Egipat: isporuke su pocele krajem 2017, a zavrsetak posla se ocekuje do kraja ove godine.

[Redoran]

23 hours ago, Ivo Petović said:

 

Rekao si da zapad ima problem sa time kako Rusiji ide mnogo bolje nego što su oni očekivali (čak si iskoristio termin ljuti i nadrndani), a ja ti kažem da im ne ide tako dobro kako ti misliš da im ide.

 

 

Uopšte nisam to rekao nego sam rekao da je zapad ljut na Ruse jer su ovi, nakon što su se malo popravili u odnosu na period kada su se raspadali po svim šavovima, krenuli da preuređuju svoj komšiluk po nekom svom nahođenju. Nigde nisam napisao da im ide dobro niti da je zapad ljut na njih zbog toga što im ide dobro. Zapad je ljut jer mora ponovo politički da se nadigrava sa Rusijom umesto da raširenih ruku čeka njene novopečene milijardere u Londonu i Monaku.

 

Što se tiče Francuske i Nemačke, a u sklopu odnosa zapada i Rusije, primeniću drugačija merila na njih onog dana kada budem video da vode suštinski drugačiju politiku prema Rusiji u odnosu na SAD i njihovu Pistu 1. To što ih Fancuska i Nemačka prvo isprate uredno u svim sankcijama, proterivanjima diplomata i NATO manevrisanjima, pa posle toga šalju polutajne signale da su spremni na nekakav dogovor (koji pride nisu u stanju da izguraju), ja ne smatram za suštinski drugačiju politiku.

 

Deo o relativizovanju ne kapiram baš najbolje jer nisam poredio ruske oligarhe sa američkim nego sam se nadovezao na Tribunov post koji je kritikovao aktuelne trendove u SAD. Što čovek više ne sme da okrpi SAD jer će mu momentalno biti zalepljena etiketa putinoljupca i relativizatora koji ne razlikuje sunce od meseca, to je neki drugi fenomen i trend o kojem se možda da raspravljati ali ne na ovoj temi.

[Eraserhead]

ICARUS - Jednostavno mafijaska drzava 

[assignment]

8 hours ago, Eraserhead said:

ICARUS - Jednostavno mafijaska drzava 

 

SNOWDEN - jednostavno mafijaska drzava

[Eraserhead]

2 minutes ago, assignment said:

 

SNOWDEN - jednostavno mafijaska drzava

 

Nidje veze. Bar ga nisu otrovali

Edited April 6, 2018 by Eraserhead

[Кристофер Лумумбо]

8 hours ago, Eraserhead said:

ICARUS - Jednostavno mafijaska drzava 

 

fenomenalan dokumentarac

[Eraserhead]

 

Interesantni dani su pred nama.

 

Edited April 9, 2018 by Eraserhead

[bradilko]

22 minutes ago, Eraserhead said:

 

Interesantni dani su pred nama.

 

u kom smislu?

neke nebulozna opravdanja na račun rusije?

to ti je paranoja kao dijagnoza ili što bi reko milosloba snage haosa i bezumlja nam ne daju da raširimo krila za opći boljitak..

[Eraserhead]

 

[Roger Sanchez]

Opet taj misteriozni mortalitet prenjuškavih novinara u super sređenoj državi

 

 

Možda bi bilo najbolje da žive u stanovima bez prozora i vrata?

[MancMellow]

Isto se dešava i u Slovačkoj 

 

Nego, podstaklo me ovo sa Telegramom. 

 

Friday, April 13, 2018
When autarky becomes the only solution

 

Putin has thus, through a series of tactical successes, brought to Russia a comprehensive strategic defeat from which neither him, nor the governments that succeed him, will be able to extricate the country. There is moreover no ideology, short of extreme nationalism, on which the autarkic system can be built. Bolsheviks in the 1920s had an ideology which led them ultimately to accept autarky and to work within it. Such an ideology does not exist in today’s capitalist Russia. Yet the industrialization debate of the 1920 may again become indispensable literature for economic policy-making.

 

The latest, and by far the most serious, round of US sanctions against Russia has shown two things very clearly—neither of which has received much publicity in the comments so far. The first is the extraordinary power of the modern state. The second is that when powerful states impose sanctions that limit one’s access to markets, technology and capital, the only remaining option turns out to be autarky.

I will discuss the two points in turn.

 

Despite all the talk about the waning power of the state and the rising power of ”foot-loose” large corporations what the sanctions do show is that the state is still the most powerful actor in contemporary global capitalism. Apple or Amazon could not impose sanctions and destroy Rusal. Actually, no company in the world —even those who are Rusal’s major customers—could not destroy it. But a state can. Putin showed the power of the Russian state, at the time when it seemed weak and insignificant, when he overnight imprisoned Khodorkovsky, the richest man in Russia, and despoiled him of Yukos. Trump, or rather US treasury, shows the power of US state in destroying overnight the largest aluminum producer in the world

 

The second lesson is, to a large degree, for Russia the replay of the 1920s. It is today often wrongly asserted that the USSR chose a policy of economic autarky. On the contrary, all the 1920s, as soon as War Communism and foreign intervention ended, was spent by Russia in pursuit of foreign capital with which to rebuild its destroyed industry, and optimistically, to catch up with the West. But that capital was not forthcoming. The Western powers refused to recognize the Soviet government, and since the Soviets repudiated previous debt of the Tsarist Russia, their access to capital markets was shut both because of default on the debt and because of ideological reasons.

 

This created the situation in which Soviet development had to be conducted entirely based on domestic accumulation and technology. As is well known, the implications of that was first seized by Trotsky and Preobrazhensky:  it meant comprehensive planning  of the economy and extraction of the surplus from the only segment of the population that could generate it: the Soviet peasantry. Soviet industrialization thus took place on the “blood and toil” of Soviet (which essentially meant Ukrainian) peasantry. This policy, which by definition included collectivization, was then, beginning with the First Five-Year plan in 1928 conducted with characteristic brutality by Stalin. 

 

What current sanctions, and those that may yet come (as for example on Gazprom), show is that Russia is now at the same crossroads at which it was in the early 1920s. Its access to Western markets, technology and capital is all but cut off.  It is true that there are nowadays other sources for all three, including in China. But the breadth of sanctions is such that Chinese actors, if they themselves plan to do business or raise money in the United States, will too avoid doing business with Russian entities. So Russian industry will be left to grow, if it can, using only domestic resources, which compared to global resources, are small and inadequate (given how Russia’s relative economic and population role in the world has declined). Autarky is thus preordained.

 

The questions is then whether such an economic choice will also entail, as it did in the 1920s, dictatorial domestic politics. This is quite possible because autarkic developments are hard to implement if there is no corresponding political pressure. Moreover, there would be for sure attempts from those who are affected by sanctions and all those who need access to global markets to reverse the policies that have led to the sanctions. Such attempts make them become direct political foes of the current government. The logic of political repression then becomes inescapable.

 

It would be wrong however to believe that the current impasse in which Russia finds itself can be overcome through different policies. It could have been done several years ago, but no longer. The reasons listed in the imposition of sanctions that cover everything from the annexation of Crimea to fake news are so comprehensive that no new post-Putin government of any conceivable kind can accept them all. They can be accepted only by a totally defeated country. In addition, US sanctions are notoriously difficult to overturn. The US sanctions against the Soviet Union started in 1948 and were practically never discontinued. The Jackson-Vanik amendment that linked trade to the freedom of Jewish emigration was on the books from 1974 until 2012, i.e. lasted more than a quarter century after the ostensible reason for its imposition ended. And it was repealed only to be replaced by another set of sanctions contained in the Magnitsky Act. The sanctions against Iran have been on, and despite the recent talk of their loosening, for almost 40 years. The sanctions on Cuba have lasted, and many still do, for more than half-century.  

 

Putin has thus, through a series of tactical successes, brought to Russia a comprehensive strategic defeat from which neither him, nor the governments that succeed him, will be able to extricate the country. There is moreover no ideology, short of extreme nationalism, on which the autarkic system can be built. Bolsheviks in the 1920s had an ideology which led them ultimately to accept autarky and to work within it. Such an ideology does not exist in today’s capitalist Russia. Yet the industrialization debate of the 1920 may again become indispensable literature for economic policy-making.

http://glineq.blogspot.rs/

 

Malo je predramaticno, ima delova u kojima je pitanje da li analogije rade (ali nemam sad vremena da ulazim dublje u to...mada bih mogao jednom), ali - bazicna premisa (poslednji pasus) je u samoj sustini tacna.

 

[Tribun_Populi]

U suštini to je to.

Meni opet pokazatelj da suštinski dobrih, partnerskih odnosa između Zapada i Rusije nije bilo niti može biti.

Kako će se Rusi iz toga izvući i po koju cenu, videćemo, ali u svakom slučaju zategnutost je here to stay for a long time to come.

[Eraserhead]

Odlican Branko Milanovic.

 

Putin has thus, through a series of tactical successes, brought to Russia a comprehensive strategic defeat from which neither him, nor the governments that succeed him, will be able to extricate the country. There is moreover no ideology, short of extreme nationalism, on which the autarkic system can be built. 

 

Quote

 

When autarky becomes the only solution

 

The latest, and by far the most serious, round of US sanctions against Russia has shown two things very clearly—neither of which has received much publicity in the comments so far. The first is the extraordinary power of the modern state. The second is that when powerful states impose sanctions that limit one’s access to markets, technology and capital, the only remaining option turns out to be autarky.

 

I will discuss the two points in turn.

 

Despite all the talk about the waning power of the state and the rising power of ”foot-loose” large corporations what the sanctions do show is that the state is still the most powerful actor in contemporary global capitalism. Apple or Amazon could not impose sanctions and destroy Rusal. Actually, no company in the world —even those who are Rusal’s major customers—could not destroy it. But a state can. Putin showed the power of the Russian state, at the time when it seemed weak and insignificant, when he overnight imprisoned Khodorkovsky, the richest man in Russia, and despoiled him of Yukos. Trump, or rather US treasury, shows the power of US state in destroying overnight the largest aluminum producer in the world

 

The second lesson is, to a large degree, for Russia the replay of the 1920s. It is today often wrongly asserted that the USSR chose a policy of economic autarky. On the contrary, all the 1920s, as soon as War Communism and foreign intervention ended, was spent by Russia in pursuit of foreign capital with which to rebuild its destroyed industry, and optimistically, to catch up with the West. But that capital was not forthcoming. The Western powers refused to recognize the Soviet government, and since the Soviets repudiated previous debt of the Tsarist Russia, their access to capital markets was shut both because of default on the debt and because of ideological reasons.

 

This created the situation in which Soviet development had to be conducted entirely based on domestic accumulation and technology. As is well known, the implications of that was first seized by Trotsky and Preobrazhensky:  it meant comprehensive planning  of the economy and extraction of the surplus from the only segment of the population that could generate it: the Soviet peasantry. Soviet industrialization thus took place on the “blood and toil” of Soviet (which essentially meant Ukrainian) peasantry. This policy, which by definition included collectivization, was then, beginning with the First Five-Year plan in 1928 conducted with characteristic brutality by Stalin. 

 

What current sanctions, and those that may yet come (as for example on Gazprom), show is that Russia is now at the same crossroads at which it was in the early 1920s. Its access to Western markets, technology and capital is all but cut off.  It is true that there are nowadays other sources for all three, including in China. But the breadth of sanctions is such that Chinese actors, if they themselves plan to do business or raise money in the United States, will too avoid doing business with Russian entities. So Russian industry will be left to grow, if it can, using only domestic resources, which compared to global resources, are small and inadequate (given how Russia’s relative economic and population role in the world has declined). Autarky is thus preordained.

 

The questions is then whether such an economic choice will also entail, as it did in the 1920s, dictatorial domestic politics. This is quite possible because autarkic developments are hard to implement if there is no corresponding political pressure. Moreover, there would be for sure attempts from those who are affected by sanctions and all those who need access to global markets to reverse the policies that have led to the sanctions. Such attempts make them become direct political foes of the current government. The logic of political repression then becomes inescapable.

 

It would be wrong however to believe that the current impasse in which Russia finds itself can be overcome through different policies. It could have been done several years ago, but no longer. The reasons listed in the imposition of sanctions that cover everything from the annexation of Crimea to fake news are so comprehensive that no new post-Putin government of any conceivable kind can accept them all. They can be accepted only by a totally defeated country. In addition, US sanctions are notoriously difficult to overturn. The US sanctions against the Soviet Union started in 1948 and were practically never discontinued. The Jackson-Vanik amendment that linked trade to the freedom of Jewish emigration was on the books from 1974 until 2012, i.e. lasted more than a quarter century after the ostensible reason for its imposition ended. And it was repealed only to be replaced by another set of sanctions contained in the Magnitsky Act. The sanctions against Iran have been on, and despite the recent talk of their loosening, for almost 40 years. The sanctions on Cuba have lasted, and many still do, for more than half-century.  

 

Putin has thus, through a series of tactical successes, brought to Russia a comprehensive strategic defeat from which neither him, nor the governments that succeed him, will be able to extricate the country. There is moreover no ideology, short of extreme nationalism, on which the autarkic system can be built. Bolsheviks in the 1920s had an ideology which led them ultimately to accept autarky and to work within it. Such an ideology does not exist in today’s capitalist Russia. Yet the industrialization debate of the 1920 may again become indispensable literature for economic policy-making.

 

 

Edited April 16, 2018 by Eraserhead