Oilopoly

[hazard]

Problem je što ti se sve gledaš iz ugla ekonomiste ili knjigovođe. Kada nešto spušta cenu nafte u današnjem svetu, to je loše. Loše je jer ohrabruje dalje i veće korišćenje nafte, što je loše. Sve ostalo što si naveo može da se radi i na druge načine, bez frakinga.

[hazard]

I čuj ,,jedino" gde su Evropljani ispred SAD su obnovljivi izvori! [emoji38] pa o tome pričam.

[Ravanelli]

najvažnija vest danas je da su iranci dogovorili nuklearni program. 

 

faktori koji trenutno deluju i povećavaju cenu nafte:

+ jemenska kriza (daleko značajnija od ove ispod zbog Bab-el-mandeb moreuza)

+ libijska kriza

 

faktori koji trenutno deluju i smanjuju cenu nafte:

- overcapacity američkih skladišta jer su rafinerije na redovnom remontu pred letnju sezonu

- izgledno skidanje sankcija iranu

- izbori u nigeriji su prošli ok

 

 

===

 

horizont od par meseci:

+ rafinerije će završiti maintenance uskoro

+ rollover terminskih ugovora po kojima frekeri prodaju naftu po 70-80 $/bbl će se desiti negde maj, jun, jul i onda će morati da ugase neka neprofitabilna proizvodna polja

Edited April 3, 2015 by Ravanelli

[bigvlada]

BP dropped green energy projects worth billions to focus on fossil fuels

Oil firm invested billions of pounds in clean and low-carbon energy in the 80s and 90s but later abandoned meaningful efforts to move away from fossil fuels and locked away the research
BP’s oil refinery complex at Grangemouth in central Scotland Photograph: Christopher Furlong/Getty Images

Terry Macalister

Thursday 16 April 2015 06.00 BST

BP pumped billions of pounds into low-carbon technology and green energy over a number of decades but gradually retired the programme to focus almost exclusively on its fossil fuel business, the Guardian has established.

At one stage the company, whose annual general meeting is in London on Thursday, was spending in-house around $450m (£300m) a year on research alone - the equivalent of $830m today.

The energy efficiency programme employed 4,400 research scientists and R&D support staff at bases in Sunbury, Berkshire, and Cleveland, Ohio, among other locations, while $8bn was directly invested over five years in zero- or low-carbon energy.

But almost all of the technology was sold off and much of the research locked away in a private corporate archive.

 

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/apr/16/bp-dropped-green-energy-projects-worth-billions-to-focus-on-fossil-fuels

[hazard]

Ha ha, "beyond petroleum", my ass.

[bigvlada]

Contaminated Oil That No One Wants Is Heading to Asia

 

 

One million barrels of oil. Enough to fill more than 60 Olympic-sized swimming pools. And there it sat in tanks outside San Francisco -- for three years -- despite crude prices that topped $100 a barrel.

This isn’t the prized “light, sweet” kind of crude that is pumped out of the ground in Texas, or even the thick, sticky stuff from Alberta’s tar sands. Rather, it’s what’s known as “orphaned oil” that is so contaminated with organic chlorides that it can corrode the insides of even the biggest refineries.

Now, it’s on the move -- and guessing exactly where is turning into a sort of parlor game for some in the oil market. All that is known is that Chevron Corp., which flushed the oil from a pipeline in September 2012 and has seen its value drop by $50 million since then, is loading it onto two tankers bound for Asia.

“It’s really kind of a bizarre incident,” said Gordon Schremp, a senior fuels specialist at the California Energy Commission who was notified by industry representatives of the planned exports.

It’s a rare shipment, considering most crude is barred from leaving U.S. borders. It just so happens that an exemption has been in place since 1992 allowing limited amounts of California oil to leave the country.
Export Exemption

The only reason exports don’t happen very often is because California’s refiners keep almost all the state’s oil for themselves.

The saga began on Sept. 17, 2012, when Chevron told shippers that its pipeline delivering California crude to San Francisco-area refiners was contaminated. Chevron ended up pushing an estimated 1 million barrels through the pipe to get rid of the chlorides.

And so the tainted oil sat in tanks at a Plains All American Pipeline LP terminal in Martinez until this month, when all the red tape, including getting an export license from the Commerce Department, was finally cut, Schremp said.

When the contamination was discovered, heavy crude from California’s San Joaquin Valley cost $97 a barrel. It’s now $46. The difference, multiplied by 1 million barrels, is more than $50 million. And that’s not counting the cost of storing the oil for more than two years, which could add millions more.
In Limbo

West Texas Intermediate futures, the benchmark for U.S. crude, rose 9 cents to $57.24 a barrel at 11:53 a.m. local time on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Prices dropped about 44 percent in the past year.

Kent Robertson, a spokesman for Chevron, declined to comment on the exports. Brad Leone and Meredith Hartley, spokesmen for Plains, didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Oil tanker Hellespont Protector, one of the two vessels chartered to carry the crude, was anchored in the San Francisco Bay on Friday, shipping data compiled by Bloomberg show. The other, Energy Champion, is headed for Qingdao, China, a place with no refineries. It may be a stopover, or it may not be headed to a refinery at all.

Schremp, who wasn’t told where the outcast barrels are headed, said they could be used as fuel for large ships or burned in a power plant.

If refiners know about the contamination ahead of time, they can blend in additives as a cure, but it’s an expensive solution that erodes the value of the crude, said David Hackett, president of energy consultant Stillwell Associates LLC in Irvine, California.

Wherever it lands, chances are it’ll be the first and last California oil that Asia sees for a while. California crude prices have been getting stronger and refiners across the Pacific have been flooded with supplies from much closer by.

Asked whether the rare cargoes are a bellwether for future exports of California oil, Schremp said, “It’s not like it makes perfect economic sense to move barrels that way into the world market -- this was an export of circumstance.”

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-26/orphaned-oil-rejected-by-u-s-refiners-takes-slow-boats-to-asia

[Hella]

na koji fazon je knez petrol ispušio za radnu dozvolu

[Prospero]

The Shale Industry Could Be Swallowed By Its Own Debt

by Asjylyn Loder

June 19, 2015 — 1:00 AM CEST

June 19, 2015 — 7:23 AM CEST

 

 

The debt that fueled the U.S. shale boom now threatens to be its undoing.

Drillers are devoting more revenue than ever to interest payments. In one example, Continental Resources Inc., the company credited with making North Dakota’s Bakken Shale one of the biggest oil-producing regions in the world, spent almost as much as Exxon Mobil Corp., a company 20 times its size.

The burden is becoming heavier after oil prices fell 43 percent in the past year. Interest payments are eating up more than 10 percent of revenue for 27 of the 62 drillers in the Bloomberg Intelligence North America Independent Exploration and Production Index, up from a dozen a year ago. Drillers’ debt ballooned to $235 billion at the end of the first quarter, a 16 percent increase in the past year, even as revenue shrank.

 

“The question is, how long do they have that they can get away with this,” said Thomas Watters, an oil and gas credit analyst at Standard & Poor’s in New York. The companies with the lowest credit ratings “are in survival mode,” he said.

The problem for shale drillers is that they’ve consistently spent money faster than they’ve made it, even when oil was $100 a barrel. The companies in the Bloomberg index spent $4.15 for every dollar earned selling oil and gas in the first quarter, up from $2.25 a year earlier, while pushing U.S. oil production to the highest in more than 30 years.

“There’s a liquidity issue, and you start looking at the cash burn,” Watters said.

 

Distressed Debt

Continental borrows at cheaper rates than many of its smaller peers because its debt is investment grade. S&P assigns speculative, or junk, ratings to 45 out of the 62 companies in the Bloomberg index.

“Our cash flow easily covers interest costs, and we expect to continue maintaining our investment-grade credit rating as commodity prices recover,” said Warren Henry, a spokesman for Oklahoma City-based Continental.

Almost $20 billion in bonds issued by the 62 companies are trading at distressed levels, with yields more than 10 percentage points above U.S. Treasuries, as investors demand much higher rates to compensate for the risk that obligations won’t be repaid, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

“Credit markets have played a big role in keeping the entire sector alive,” said Amrita Sen, chief oil analyst at Energy Aspects Ltd., a consulting firm in London.

So far this year, S&P lowered the outlook or downgraded the credit of almost half of the 105 U.S. exploration and production companies that it rates, according to a May report.

 

Financial Drain

Companies have reduced spending to cope with lower prices, but those cuts will eventually lead to production declines, further shrinking revenue, Watters said.

West Texas Intermediate, the U.S. benchmark grade, lost 11 cents $60.34 a barrel in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange at 1:04 p.m. Singapore time on Friday.

U.S. oil production will begin to fall this month and will continue to slide until early 2016 as shale drillers reduce spending, the Energy Information Administration said in a June 9 report.

Interest expense can drain a company’s finances. At this time last year, Quicksilver Resources Inc. was spending more than 20 percent of its revenue on interest. The company missed a debt payment in February and has since filed for bankruptcy. Sabine Oil & Gas LLC missed an interest payment in April and another this month.

Representatives of Fort Worth, Texas-based Quicksilver and Sabine, based in Denver, didn’t return calls or e-mails seeking comment. Sabine shares fell 96 percent in the past year to 8.5 cents, and its bonds are trading for less than 23 cents on the dollar.

 

Corporate Defaults

Oil and gas companies accounted for one-third of the 36 corporate-debt defaults worldwide this year, and missed interest payments are the leading cause of default, according to a May 14 S&P report. Companies including SandRidge Energy Inc., Breitburn Energy Partners LP and Halcon Resources Corp. have raised cash by taking on new debt or issuing new shares.

The new debt issued by Halcon and SandRidge is secured by oil and gas assets, making it less likely that unsecured bondholders will get repaid in a default. Both companies’ older, unsecured bonds are trading at distressed levels. Halcon’s are going for 72 cents on the dollar or less and SandRidge’s for 62 cents or less, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The new borrowing can be expensive. Oklahoma City-based SandRidge issued $1.25 billion of second-lien debt this month at 8.75 percent interest, more than all but one of their existing bonds, records show. The company paid $24 million in fees and will add $109 million a year to interest payments, which are already eating up 29 percent of its revenue.

“It provides us with liquidity we otherwise wouldn’t have had,” said Justin Lewellen, a SandRidge spokesman. “It bought us some significant time.”

SandRidge’s shares fell 84 percent in the last year to $1.08.

The financial troubles of the smaller players become amplified with lower oil prices, Sen said.

“We haven’t seen the worst,” she said.

 

[hazard]

Juzni tok je valjda u koliziji sa trecim energetskim paketom EU. To je ta razdvojenost proizvodnje i distribucije o kojoj govoris, cini mi se.

 

Evo kreni odavde

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Energy_Package

 

kljucna rec: ownership unbundling

 

Ukrajina je imala povlascene cene jer su je Rusi gledali kao "bratsku" drzavu i deo svoje interesne sfere. Problemi su krenuli sa narandzastom revolucijom 2004., kada je Ukrajina htela da se okrene ka Zapadu - ruski odgovor na to je bio da onda vise nema povlascenih cena. Onda su Ukrajinci ucenjivali Ruse tako sto su gas koji je trebalo da ide Evropi (Rusi su im ,,zavrnuli slavinu" nakon sto se nisu u prvom mahu dogovorili o daljim isporukama za Ukrajinu) uzimali za sebe. Stvari su ponovo legle na "svoje" kada su narandzasti skinuti s vlasti i kada je dosao Janukovic, a sada je opet isti problem iskrsao kada su dosli majdanovci ( = novi narandzasti). U sustini, ti problemi sa Ukrajinom nakon 2004. su i doprineli odluci Rusije da gradi i severni i juzni gasovod koji ce zaobici Ukrajinu i tako joj oduzeti ucenjivacki potencijal.

 

Belorusija kao zemlja jako politicki bliska Rusiji (u formalnoj uniji dve drzave od devedes' i neke i sada u EAU) i dalje ima povlascene cene. Ali Belorusija nije neka velika tranzitna zemlja.

[Prospero]

Ovo je (IMHO) dovoljno ozbiljan a kratak rad o Gazpromovoj strategiji (tj promeni iste) i odustajanju od Južnog toka, uz par fudnamentalnih činjenica o lokalnom gasnom tržištu (da je malo, tj da ne može da isplati neka veća ulaganja):
 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Does-cancellation-of-South-Stream-signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-export-policy-GPC-5.pdf
 

Neke bitne crtice:

 

The rationale for South Stream The timing of South Stream discussions, following the first major interruption of Russian gas supplies through Ukraine, in January 2006, was not an accident.10 In retrospect, it could be argued that the major consequence of the (short-lived) January 2006 crisis was that president Putin decided that transit diversification capacity – which was already well advanced with the Yamal-Europe, Blue Stream and Nord Stream pipelines – needed to be expanded to the point where Russian gas exports to Europe could completely avoid Ukraine.11 In addition, at that time it was still possible to imagine that European gas demand might expand to the point where very substantial additional Russian delivery capacity could be required. A geopolitical explanation of that decision is that South Stream formed part of a strategy to isolate and exert political pressure on Ukraine using gas supplies and prices. 12 An alternative explanation was that South Stream was a “bluff” designed to prevent the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor (and specifically the Nabucco pipeline) from progressing. But such speculation was dwarfed by president Putin’s apparent conviction that it would never be possible to establish political and commercial relations with Kiev which would allow secure gas flows to Europe across Ukraine and, given the size and importance of export revenues for Gazprom and the Russian government, the only option was to eliminate this transit dependence. This conviction hardened following the more protracted January 2009 supply crisis and the financial losses and reputational damage to Russia as a gas supplier to Europe.13 Thus, from the Russian side, South Stream was part of a policy which began well before even the 2006 crisis.
 
Gazprom’s EU regulatory problems and South Stream The regulatory environment worsened dramatically for Gazprom, following the introduction in 2011 of the EU’s Third Energy Package (TEP).14 The TEP mandated regulated third party access (TPA) to pipeline capacity based on published tariffs (or their methodologies) approved by national regulatory authorities (NRAs) as well as unbundling of transmission assets and certification of transmission system operators (TSOs) – unless an exemption from these rules is granted by an NRA and approved by the European Commission (EC). Thus the TEP created major problems for Russian gas exports to EU countries in terms of compliance with the changing regulatory environment both in respect of existing and new pipeline capacity. Gazprom has been unable to utilise full capacity of the onshore extensions of the Nord Stream pipelines – OPAL and NEL. Although the German regulator granted an exemption allowing Gazprom to use 100% of OPAL, the EC Competition Authority capped it at 50%, following which Gazprom and the EC negotiated for more than a year, and reached a solution allowing Gazprom to utilise 100% of capacity unless access requests were received by third parties (to be determined through auctions). The EC was expected to approve the exemption by March 2014 but repeatedly postponed the decision citing technical issues and linking it to the worsening EU-Russia relationship over Ukraine. However, the EC terminated its OPAL exemption review procedure in December 2014 due to Gazprom’s failure to prolong the deadline under its settlement agreement on the exemption with the German regulator (thus rendering void the exemption’s substantive changes, which were being assessed by the EC). According to Russian energy minister Novak, Gazprom intends to apply for a new exemption instead and demand 100% capacity in OPAL. However in the current environment it seems unlikely this will be successful.15 Given its negative experience with OPAL, Gazprom did not apply for an exemption for South Stream but based the project solely on a set of intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) signed with host countries. The EC deemed these agreements in breach of the TEP and called for their re-negotiation or renunciation, otherwise threatening infringement procedures against member states concerned.16 The Russian government declared that the IGAs took precedence over the TEP and that the EC had failed to prove otherwise. 17 It also filed a request for consultations under the WTO, alleging the discriminatory nature of the TEP. 18 Meanwhile, the South Stream host countries faced a choice: renounce the IGAs thus making themselves liable to penalties imposed by Russia, or retain the IGAs intact thus making themselves liable to penalties imposed by the EC. Indeed, the EC started two infringement procedures against Bulgaria - one on the grounds of TEP incompatibility and another in respect of the legality of procurement for the pipeline – which led to the suspension of pipeline construction in Bulgaria in August 2014.19
...
 
With the exception of countries (particularly Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary) which stood to gain from their transit role, the European view of South Stream had been generally negative either because of the belief that the project would undermine diversification of gas supplies, and reinforce Gazprom’s market dominance, or because of general political antipathy towards Russia and Gazprom. European investors in South Stream (ENI, EdF and Wintershall) maintained a relatively low profile, largely refraining from public comment either before or after the project’s cancellation; indeed there were suggestions that the investors did not know about the cancellation until they read about it in the press. Within a month, Gazprom bought the 50% of South Stream Transport (the offshore pipeline company) owned by the European partners which appeared the final declaration that the project was indeed dead.24 While one strand of opinion was that the real reason for the cancellation was a recognition from the Russian side that, due to economic problems stemming from sanctions and a falling oil price, the project could no longer be afforded, this seems unlikely for the following reasons: • The pipe for the first offshore line was already on the dock at Varna and the pipe for the second line had been ordered; • The barges for laying the first two lines had been chartered and the first had already arrived at Varna; • The western route of the (Russian) Southern Corridor and the Russkaya compressor station (close to Anapa at the start of the offshore lines) were under construction; • A small amount of construction had taken place in Bulgaria and Serbia. By the time the project was cancelled, Gazprom had already spent $4.7 billion on the offshore and European sections, most of which would have been for the offshore pipe and the charter of the barge.
...
Turkey is the second largest European regional export market for Gazprom and imported 26.7 Bcm in 2013; by comparison the whole of south-east Europe imported less than 10 Bcm of Russian gas in that year, and even adding Hungary and Austria the total was only 21 Bcm (see Appendix). 28 Equally important in the current gas environment in Europe, is that Turkey is the only major expansion market for Russian gas in the 2020s.29 New pipelines would ensure Gazprom’s ability not just to deliver to Turkey without fear of transit interruption, but also to supply “reverse-flow” gas to its south-east European customers quickly at relatively low incremental cost. But even if this proves not to be possible – for logistical or EU regulatory reasons – it would have protected its most important market in the region from (what it perceives as) unreliable transit through Ukraine. The new pipelines would also place Gazprom in a powerful position to compete with gas from Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan and any other potential source passing through Turkey en route to Europe. Gazprom’s sales figures give a clue as to how much additional capacity it makes sense to create – at least initially – in the Turkish Stream system. Replacing the 14 Bcm/year which reaches Turkey through the trans-Balkan line, and adding 10 Bcm/year for South East Europe, it is clear that two new lines with a capacity of 30 Bcm/year would be quite sufficient to supply these markets and allow for some expansion of deliveries to the Turkish market (although certainly not sufficient to eliminate dependence on Ukrainian transit – see below).30 This would still require negotiations on whether it will be compatible with Third Package regulations for Gazprom to “reverse flow” gas from the new pipelines through the trans-Balkan pipeline to Bulgaria, Romania and other Balkan countries.
...
The Ukrainian government led by Arseny Yatseniuk has expressed a determination to phase out Russian gas imports (replacing them with LNG and pipeline gas from other sources), but a willingness to continue transit.38 On the Russian side, when announcing the South Stream cancellation, Alexey Miller reiterated the claim that transit of Russian gas across Ukraine would be phased out, but a willingness to continue supplying the country.39 The positions of the two countries on supply and transit are fundamentally in conflict, and appear equally unrealistic. Our calculations suggest that given:  the available capacity in, and configuration of, existing delivery networks;  the EU-imposed rules about the share of capacity which Gazprom can utilise;  and the specifics of market requirements in different European countries; even with two new Black Sea pipelines to Turkey, Gazprom will not be able to meet all of its contractual commitments unless it continues to utilise some part of the Ukrainian system until at least 2020 and probably much longer. Assuming the aim is to phase out Ukraine transit entirely then, taking 2013 deliveries as a guideline (see Appendix), a combination of the Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream pipelines would have been sufficient to meet the requirements of German, Polish and French, and a part of Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Austrian requirements.
...

 
Ovde imaš linkove za niz EU projekata oko gasovoda na ovom području:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/transparency_platform/map-viewer/
http://www.euractiv.com/files/southern_gas_corridor_investors.pdf
http://www.euractiv.com/files/next_phases_of_southern_gas_corridor_0.pdf
http://www.euractiv.com/files/eastring_gas_pipeline_basics_and_route_a_and_route_b.pdf
 

Euractiv generalno dobro prati te gasne priče.

 

Imaj na umu da je po novom Zakonu o energetici iz decembra 2014. Srbija praktično unela odredbe 3. energetskog paketa i da se formalno primenjuju od 1.1.2015.

 

Još jedna stvar oko JT - projekat je, iz perspektive EU bio preskup, što je dovelo do toga da se sumnja da će novcem odvojenim za taj projekat Gazprom/Rusija takođe kupovati politički uticaj u regionu (plaćati stranke, lobiste itd). Međutim, izvesnije je da je korupcija bila interna, tj. da su privilegovani™ izvođači radova naduvavali cene i isisavali pare iz Gazproma, u dilu sa vrhom, naravno.

 

Srž spora je zapravo u Ukrajini - Rusija neće više da koristi Ukrajinu za tranzit, a EU i Kijev hoće da Ukrajina ostane tranzitna zemlja, delom kako bi Kijevu ostajao novac od tranzitnih taksi a delom kako bi Rusija morala na neki način ostati privezana za (prozapadnu) Ukrajinu. Severni tok je poslužio i tome da se smanji protok tranzitnog gasa preko Ukrajine, Južni tok je trebao da bude drugi deo "isključivanja" Ukrajine iz igre kao tranzitne zemlje. Nama je to problem (u perspektivi) jer mi gas dobijamo preko Ukrajine i Mađarske. Turski tok je još uvek na dugom štapu mada verovatno bliži tome da će biti izgrađen nego da će propasti. Azerbejdžanski gas je prosto nedovoljan količinski (4x manje od JT) da podmiri potrebe i Turske i Balkana.

Edited June 23, 2015 by Prospero

[Prospero]

 

 

Shale prospects flail after UK vote

A few years ago there were heady predictions of a shale gas boom from Poland to the U.K. — the reality is a lot more disappointing.

By SARA STEFANINI AND HELENA O'ROURKE-POTOCKI

 

29/6/15, 5:19 PM CET

 

Updated

29/6/15, 5:38 PM CET

Lancashire County Council manages just a small patch of northwest England, but its negative vote on a shale gas application Monday has made the already troubled development of the unconventional fuel in Europe even less likely.

The U.K. has become one of the last EU countries where shale gas development remains a viable prospect, as it has strong national government backing on the grounds that it provides cheaper, home-grown energy sources for the future.

 

But people in Lancashire were not convinced, and they made their voices heard over the last week, as the council considered whether to approve two applications for fracking from oil and gas explorer Cuadrilla.

The first decision, last week, was somewhat expected. The council voted in line with recommendations from the planning commission, and rejected Cuadrilla’s application to drill at a site called Roseacre Wood. Monday’s vote on the Preston New Road site was less certain, as the planning commission had recommended approving it.

Instead, it voted 9 to 3 against, with three Conservative members joining the majority and another two abstaining.

“This decision is a Waterloo for the fracking industry and a triumph for local democracy,” said Daisy Sands, from Greenpeace U.K.

For Tory Prime Minister David Cameron, shale gas offered a potential way to ensure the country would still have domestic oil and gas as its aging fields in the North Sea start to run out. But while he has famously said the U.K. would go “all out” for shale gas, Cameron cautioned earlier this year that it would not be done without safeguards in place.

Hydraulic fracturing, a drilling technique that injects chemicals and water into deep shale rocks to crack them and release oil and gas, has turned the United States from an importer into a self-sufficient producer and exporter in less than a decade.

But while oil and gas companies saw potential of replicating the boom in Europe, strong public opposition has gradually turned governments against it, causing companies to step away in recent years. The geology of shale deposits in Europe is also different and more complicated than in the U.S.

“Shale in Europe isn’t going to be a game changer on the energy side,” Karl Falkenberg, the European Commission’s director-general for environment, said at a shale event in Brussels earlier this month. He added that the U.K. and Poland were the last enthusiasts.

But this year has been a particularly bad one for shale gas hopes.

Scotland and the Welsh parliament imposed moratoriums on fracking in January and February, and the German government announced stricter regulations in April. The U.S.’s Chevron and Italy’s Eni dropped their shale gas projects in Poland, and Chevron did the same in Romania a month later. The U.S.’s ConocoPhillips then became the last global company to ditch Poland this month, after hitting adry well.

In a county of roughly 1.5 million, concern over Cuadrilla’s fracking plans was decidedly local. More than 40,000 people signed a petition circulated by Friends of the Earth, and hundreds showed up to protest at the council.

They worry about the safety of fracking, and whether it can contaminate water supplies and cause earthquakes. “Are our residents being used as guinea pigs? If so, this is unacceptable,” one woman said during the council’s discussions.

Kalina Oroschakoff contributed to this article.

[hazard]

Evropa je mnogo gusce naseljena i logicno je da postoji mnogo veci otpor prema frakingu nego u SAD. U Americi moze da se busi po nekim vukojebinama gde niko ne zivi, ili po nekim gradicima koje je lako ucutkati ili gde ljudi na kraju uvek mogu da se odsele negde slicno par stotina km dalje, a ako im je fraking zaista sjebo vodu ili tako nesto, tuzice kompaniju koja je to uradila pa dobiti milionsku odstetu, ili tako nesto. U Evropi to teze ide (gde ces da preselis 1,5 miliona ljudi iz Lankasira ako im se sjebu podzemne vode npr.?).

[Ravanelli]

napraviše deal sa irancima. kapiram naftu na ispod 50 ponovo.

[Prospero]

Eni announces discovery of huge gas field off Egypt’s coast

EurActiv.com with agencies, by Georgi Gotev,

 

Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa and the second-largest dry natural gas producer on the continent.. An

American rig, in Alexandria, circa 1982.  [Thintruman/Flick]

 

Italian energy group Eni says it has found one of the world's largest natural gas fields off Egypt's coast.

 

The company said the area was 1,450m (4,757 feet) beneath the surface and covered 100 sq km (39 sq miles).

It could hold as much as 30 trillion cubic feet of gas, or 5.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, Eni said. 30 trillion cubic feet is the equivalent of 850 billion cubic metres.

 

In comparison, the two countries with the larges proven gas reserves, Iran and Russia, are believed to have 34 and 32 trillion of cubic meters of gas respectively.

 

>>Read: Consortium declares Cyprus gas find commercially viable

 

The company says that the Zohr field "could become one of the world's largest natural-gas finds" and help meet Egypt's gas needs for decades.

 

 

 

"This historic discovery will be able to transform the energy scenario of Egypt," said Claudio Descalzi, chief executive of Eni, as quoted by the BBC.

Most of the gas is expected to be used by Egypt, with any excess exported, perhaps using an existing LNG plant that Eni has not far from the field.

Eni, which has full concession rights to the area, is the biggest foreign energy firm in Africa.

 

>>Read: Greece, Cyprus and Israel table plan for pipeline to EU

 

In June, it signed an energy exploration deal with Egypt's oil ministry worth $2bn (£1.5bn) allowing the company to explore in Sinai, the Gulf of Suez, the Mediterranean and areas in the Nile Delta.

 

Eni's find follows other significant gas discoveries in the Mediterranean in recent years, including by Egypt's neighbour Israel.

 

 

 

But the discovery caused disappointment in Israel, who had invested a lot to develop its own Leviathan offshore gas field precisely with the purpose of supplying Egypt. The main reason is that Israel wants to prevent Egypt from becoming a client for Iranian gas. ​

 

[Ravanelli]

došao baš da okačim. imaju još upside potential u sloju ispod.

 

koliko sam pogledao koncesione ugovore u egiptu imaju production sharing agreement. eni bi trebao dobijati oko 20-40% revenue (ima više varijanti koje su mogli dogovoriti sa enijem), plus 35% cost recovery. plus profit tax. ali ovde će biti silnih production bonusa (eni će plaćati bonuse tipa na svakih pola milijarde kubika i sl).

 

sve u svemu, government take u egiptu je prevelik.

Edited August 31, 2015 by Ravanelli