Oilopoly

[borris_]

U Baku-u su zaustavili projekat metroa (koji je vec daleko dogurao) radi pada cijene nafte.

[hazard]

jedan fejspalm članak u novostima, preneli b92 i правда. ovo je otprilike da vidite koji je nivo profesionalizma u pitanju.

 

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prvo, naftne rezerve srbije su državna/vojna tajna i nikada do sada nisam pročitao da je neko  davao cifru kolike su domaće rezerve :D

mislim da će autori teksta i ljubinko morati na jedan razgovor u ministarstvo odbrane

 

 

 

tu ide red nejasnoće

ovo ne znam šta mu znači. kakvo pretvaranje?

 

 

 

onda se nastavlja sa megalomanijom u brojevima bez dodadtnih objašnjenja.

 

 

ovo je original oil in place, što se onda množi sa sa koeficijentom koji je maksimalno moguće "izvući" iz zemlje. za gas je to oko 50%, za naftu, maksimalno 25%. naravno sve zavisi od geologije svakog nalazišta, ali recimo da su ovi brojevi koje sam dao prosek industrije. tako da ovo jesu možda ukupne rezerve, ali se njih nažalost nećemo nagledati.

 

 

onda jedna ofrlje cifra

 

saznaje sa da ima i vlasi i ekipa imaju nafte, što je čak mislim i teoretski nemoguće. nemam pojma ni za jedno nalazište ili proizvodnju tamo

 

To je taj visoki standard novinartsva sekcije b92 biz...

 

Ne znam sta se cudis, pitanje je da li u Srbiji postoje 2 ekonomski pismena novinara.

[borris_]

Jacque Sapir o nekovencialnom ulju i nafti

 

 

Shale rage

3 janvier 2015

Par Jacques Sapir

Note kindly translated by Anne-Marie de Grazia

The exploitation of shale oil (and gas) has opened up considerable possibilities as far as the size of available resources is concerned. It has permitted the United States to reach the goal of energetic independence for gaz (but still not for oil), albeit at an enormous cost to the environment, not yet entirely assessed. This translated on December 30^th , 2014 into a liberalisation of the American legislation relating to the export of oil products. The boom in shale oils and gas explains a large share (probably more than 50%) of American growth since 2011, as the exploitation of these reserves gave a tremendous boost to industry. The environmental cost has lead numerous states to introduce ever more constraining legislation[1].

The exploitation of shale fuels has also had important geopolitical consequences. It is often said that it might give back to the United States the upper-hand against the OPEC countries but also against Russia. This question is therefore of particular importance as it stands at the cross-roads of ecology, economy, finances and geopolitics. The financial dimension of this exploitation is certainly the one remaining the most ignored. And yet, as is the case with ALL emerging industries, the industry of shale fossil fuels has resorted significantly to the finance industry and has also blown a sizeable speculative bubble around itself. This results from a very small initial capitalization (a normal situation in the case of an emerging industry) but also of a financialisation which at present is holding sway over the American economy. So that this bubble results from the shift from a “pseudo-validation” of the values so committed, to a “pre-validation” according to the pattern described by Cedric Durand in his Le Capital Fictif.

Drillings seem to be cost-effective, if one considers the latest of them to date, only above a price of $80 per barrel. Older drillings have had initially a lower threshold of cost-effectiveness (around $50-$60) but the exhausting of these drillings forces companies to use technologies which have now become more costly. It is advisable therefore to examine closely the economic logic of shale oil.

A sane basis and a speculative drift.

The exploitation of shale oil rests on the boring of a well, at first vertical then horizontal, followed by the injection of chemical compounds destined to fracture the rock and to squeeze out the oil with the help of hydrogen-poor compounds.  Additionally, an external adduction of heat is needed[2]. These compounds are generally mixed with water, and one of the first problems of this industry has been its water consumption and the pollution of nearby aquifers.[3] The drilling’s yield decreases strongly during the first year already. One can consider that many drillings, taking into account exploitation costs, stop being cost-effective from the fourth year on. We must signal that the threshold of cost-effectiveness, which was initially foreseen at around $30 per barrel[4], is at present rather around $60/$70 per barrel, and this only as far as direct costs are considered.

What makes it nevertheless interesting is that the initial production is strong and that the investment costs are relatively low. A small company can therefore acquire a concession (with a drilling permit for 5 to 10 years) and put it rapidly in operation. With high oil prices, the initial return is considerable. It allows either to reimburse the loans initially requested, or to resell the concession to another company, who has less know-how than the first one. In the case of a sizeable drop of production at the end of the first year already, this is equivalent to a rip-off pure and simple. The first company makes a large profit and the second one must deal with rapidly collapsing yields. In fact, this gives to the shale oil industry a “Ponzi scheme” dimension, from the term used in finance to describe financial pyramids where the first depositors are paid with the money from the depositors following. Indeed, investments are made largely on credit, sometimes at amounts of up to 100%. The first company must be able to resell its concession very fast if it doesn’t want to be penalized by the interest rates. Whence the necessity to produce as fast possible sizeable quantities of oil, at the expense of future yields, in order to be able to sell a concession with an appearance of high profitability. This also explains the rapid rise in the volume of oil produced, which contributed to unbalancing the market.

The financialisation of the production of shale oil.

We have alluded to loans. In reality, it is the whole production cycle which is broadly financialised. First of all, the concession and the initial capital are covered by a loan, the company committing in fact very little capital. This is easily understandable when one considers the high initial risks in this activity. These loans are taken out with small local American banks. The latter rapidly securitise these loans, which pop up all over the American financial sector. The costs of interests come to add themselves to the drilling and operating costs. It appears then, even if systematic studies are missing, that this brings the threshold of cost-effectiveness to above $80 (some authors even venture amounts in the order of $100) per barrel.

The companies also take insurances (this is called technically hedging) for the case of a drop in rates. Here again, it is not known in what proportions. But these insurance contracts rarely have a lifetime superior to six months to one year. There don’t seem to be any having been concluded after September 2014, as it appears that with oil prices beginning to go down brutally after September 2014, the cost of these insurance covers has become exorbitant. Most of the companies which are insured will therefore be so only until the month of June 2015. These insurance contracts have also been securitised on the model of the CDS (Credit-Default Swaps) which played a major role in the subprimes crisis. The securitising of loans as well as of insurances has been a major factor in the development of American finances. But this securitising has also lead to a spreading of the risk as soon as the shale oil industry stops being profitable, which is the case today.

With the very sharp drop in the price of the barrel, it is clear that the industry is losing money. One can say the same about the tar sands of Canada (Alberta). As soon as insurances will stop covering the losses (in the case of those companies which took up insurance) the closing of a great number of companies will become inevitable. The drop in the sales of concessions and the rapid decrease in the number of new operations being started, are a very clear sign that the whole of the shale industry has already reached a crisis. This will confront American (and Canadian) authorities with a double problem:

1. An industrial problem at first, because a large number of small companies exploiting these concessions will go bankrupt in the coming months. This will lead to a stop in production, and the volume of oil produced in the United States will drop spectacularly during the second semester of 2015. Moreover, the massive unemployment resulting will reverberate in the sector of services. The United States will therefore be faced with an “industrial crisis,” granted of a local dimension, but of a large amplitude beginning in the Summer of 2015.
2. Then a financial problem, because these bankruptcies will transform into « bad loans » a very large share of the « securitised » loans held by American banks. This could be the equivalent of a new « subprimes crisis » in the summer or early fall of 2015.

The geopolitics of the crisis of the « non-conventional oil » industry.

The consequences of this will most probably not be merely economic (and financial) but also geopolitical. It is clear that the American government has leaned on the shale industry in the hope to reduce its dependence on oil imports. It is clear that it has, at the beginning, instrumentalised the decrease in oil prices in order to weaken the position of Russia, but also of Venezuela. Yet should the prices remain low beyond the Summer of 2015, the United States themselves will be hit very hard by the double crisis, industrial as well as financial. The bright shale oil “baby,” on which so many hopes were resting, will turn into a cumbersome, fouled-up baby.

It would therefore be logical for the price to rise again by March 2015. But one cannot steer the markets like combat airplanes. If it is clear that prices will go up in the second semester of this year, nobody can say if this will be enough to ward off the crisis, or at what level. In fact, the best strategy for Russia would be to delaythis rise. If the movement of prices should lead to the double crisis indicated above, we would end up having:

• (1) A brutal drop in production which could push the prices up to $90, even $100 per barrel (whereas if they rise at the end of the 1st quarter 2015 already, the prices will stabilize around $75 per barrel).
• (2) A weakening of the American position as an effect of the industrial and financial crisis, which will be noticeable in autumn 2015.
• (3) This weakening of the United States will translate into a relative weakening of the dollar and a correlating rise in the Euro which – combined with the rise in oil prices – will put in jeopardy the tiny growth hoped for in Europe (and particularly in France).

The question therefore is to know if Russia and the OPEC countries can wait out the autumn of 2015. As far as Russia is concerned, this seems assured. But it is much less so in the case of the OPEC countries. Moreover, the big American companies themselves can have an interest in the crisis, which would allow them to buy up at a small price hundreds of concessions. The hopes raised by shale oil therefore run the risk of turning into a nightmare in the coming six months, in particular for the American authorities.

[1] "Chapter 4. Effects of Oil Shale Technologies". Proposed Oil Shale and Tar Sands Resource Management PlanAmendments to Address Land Use Allocations in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (http://ostseis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/vol1/OSTS_FPEIS_Vol1_Ch4.pdf )

Bureau of Land Management. Septembre 2008. pp. 4-3.

[2] Burnham, Alan K.; McConaghy, James R. (2006-10-16). "Comparison of the acceptability of

various oil shale processes" (https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341283.pdf ). 26th Oil shale symposium. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Golden, Colorado): 2; 17. UCRL-CONF-226717. Smith, M.W.; Shadle, L.J.; Hill, D. (2007). "Oil Shale Development from the Perspective of NETL's

Unconventional Oil Resource Repository" (http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/915351 ). United States Department of Energy. DOE/NETL-IR-2007-022

[3] World Energy Outlook 2010. Paris: OECD. pp. 165–169. Tuvikene, Arvo; Huuskonen, Sirpa; Koponen, Kari; Ritola, Ossi; Mauer, Ülle; Lindström-Seppä, Pirjo (1999). "Oil

Shale Processing as a Source of Aquatic Pollution: Monitoring of the Biologic Effects in Caged and Feral Freshwater Fish" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1566439 ). Environmental Health Perspectives (National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences) 107 (9): 745–752.

[4] "Fact Sheet: U.S. Oil Shale Economics"

(http://web.archive.org/web/20120108161835/http://www.evi.ee/lib/Security.pdf ). DOE. Office of Petroleum Reserves.

 

 

[Кровавый Пастор]

...

 

 

Ravaneli, Banka Amerike je procenila da ce Brent u aprilu pasti na 31 za barel, a da prosecna cena u 2015. nece biti mnogo veca od 50 usd za barel, negde oko 53 se predvidja.

 

Koliko ti to deluje realno?

[Ravanelli]

iskreno, da znam pravio bih pare na tome, a ne se zajebavao na forumu :)

direktor lukoila je juce pricao o 25$.

 

brent se ove nedelje popravio sa 47 na 50 i nadam se da ce se taj trend nastaviti.

meni je ovo i sada previse i nije prirodno za industriju. sa ovim cenama ce mnogo projekata vezanih za tradicionalnu naftu i gas biti stopirano, a kamoli za shale i bitumen, ali ce i naftne kompanije poceti sa otpustanjem ljudi naveliko.

 

zasto treba skuplja nafta? - dosta njih je izvuklo tu naftu za koju nisi morao da kopas duboko ili koristis skuplje tehnologije, sada nam treba veca cena da bismo izvlacili ovu nepristupacniju. jeftino mogu da rade jos dosta njih, pogotovo arapi, ali to nije dosta da se zadovolje trenutne potrebe trzista. i onda se tu trazi neki balans u ceni, obo zrenutmo je sigurno ispod balansa.

otislo je ispod jer smo prvo imali manjak proizvodnje i vislje cene, a onda su ameri suvise ulozili u shale po cenama 100$/bbl i preplavili trziste. sa ovako niskim cenama ce i to preplavljivanje da oslabi.

 

dakle sada idemo ka balansiranju trzidta u smislu ponude i cena.

 

sada me najvise brine sto gledam kako cela industrija staje i svi se spremaju za bitku za opstanak, pogotovo manje kompanije koje najcesce zavise od investitora, koji opet ne zele da ulazu po ovim cenama.

ako ovako ostane cele godine ili duze sledi nam dosta bankrota i blagi reset sistema gde se licence bankrotiranih vracaju na trziste i stvara se prilika za za jeftinu kupovinu tih licenci/asseta, za neka bolja vremena. pitanje je da li ce neko biti sklon tolikom riziku i ko ce imati para. svakako mislim da ta jeftina kupovina ima smisla na duge staze jer rebound cena mora da se desi.

 

ne bih cak ni da nagadjam kada ce da bude rebound cena. logicno je da ameri zaustave investicije u shale i da im za 2 god padne proizvodnja (proizvodni profil nekonvencionalnih mnogo brze opada od konvencionalnih), ali videli smo koliko je trziste ludo i da na manje promene u kolicinama i po vestima cene skacu ludacki. drugo, pokazalo se da su haliburton i ostale ofs kompanije preplacivale svoje usluge i da troskovi opexa/capexa mogu da idu i do 30% dole, sto opet totalno menja logiku shalea i onda je jos vece pitanje kada cemo i do do koliko $/bbl imati rebound cena

Edited January 17, 2015 by Ravanelli

[Ravanelli]

mmmm da. počelo je od ofs-ovaca. šlamberže je otpustio 9,000 radnika (7% radne snage)

[Zaz_pi]

Trziste nije preplavljeno da bi cena pala 60%. Koliko znam EIA kaze da se visak krece 0.5-1 mb/d, sto je u rangu onoga smo imali u prvom kvartalu 2014, kada je cena bila iznad $100(inace u ovo doba godine se cesto to desava, sezonski). Cena je mogla da napravi korekciju ka $70-80, u najboljem slucaju, i da nije bilo OPECa, tu bi ostala. Medjutim, iz nekog razloga, necu ulaziti kojeg, kraljevine iz Persijskog zaliva pocinju sa pritiskom na cenu samo pricom, poput: necemo smanjiti proizvodnju dok ne dodje na $60; kada je dosla na $60-nije nas briga ako nafta dodje i na $20, $40; manjak potraznje(sustinski nije tacno, Kinezi kupuju kao ludi, a vidim da i u SAD potraznja skace); visak ponude 2mb/d(laz)...i tako je nafta spustena za 60%.

[Кровавый Пастор]

Hvala Ravaneli.

[Eraserhead]

Bice nekome zanimljivo kako su se kretali troslovi proizvodje shale gasa:

 

[Ravanelli]

izgleda da će ekson sada uleteti u shale, dok je jeftino i dok se male kompanije dave u dugovima koje su napravile da bi bušile.

 

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-02/exxon-could-be-the-big-winner-of-the-oil-crash

 

Exxon is sitting on nearly $5 billion in cash and equivalents, and while there aren't many holes in the company's portfolio, there is room to upgrade. The company could try to expand its footprint in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico or take a bigger position in the liquified natural gas market. But perhaps the most obvious place is the area that's driven so much of the change in the global oil sector: U.S. shale. One of the knocks on Exxon, as on most other major oil companies, is that it missed the fracking boom in the U.S. when it pulled investments in the late 1990s and focused on Arctic and deep-water plays. But as oil prices have crashed, that decision is looking smarter by the day and gives Exxon a great chance to get into the fracking game on the cheap. The U.S. oil patch is littered with struggling companies: Many of the small and midsize independent wildcatters that drove the shale boom, helping boost U.S. oil production to its highest levels since the early 1980s, are now drowning in debt and low on cash. "This is an excellent time for Exxon to swoop down on some of these smaller shale players," said Steven Kopits, president of Princeton Energy Advisors. 

The question is whether to buy assets or just swallow up companies whole. In 2009, Exxon pulled off a $41 billion deal to buy XTO Energy. The deal expanded Exxon's reach into the U.S. shale gas market but was widely seen as a bad move because the price was high and Exxon had trouble integrating XTO.  Brad Heffern, an oil analyst at RBC Capital Markets, thinks that will give Exxon pause if it considers swallowing up a fracking company. "I do think they'll be looking to make shale investments, but I'd be surprised if they did a big corporate deal. XTO wasn't fun for them." Heffern thinks Exxon would be much better off simply buying up oil wells from small fracking companies that are looking to raise cash.

 

Edited February 3, 2015 by Ravanelli

[bigvlada]

Oil erases losses for 2015 as majors take action

 

 

It came as BP CEO Bob Dudley told CNBC on Tuesday that the number of U.S. shale rigs was "dropping like a stone," but added that it would be a while before excess supply worked its way out of the market.

"The really good parts of the shale (industry) can sustain $30, but those that are around the fringes of that, they're going to struggle. I think we'll see eventually … (the number) flatten out and then drop."

 

http://www.cnbc.com/id/102391749

[Muwan]

Evo ga blagi bounce back, Brent zamalo pa $58 ali danas opet kreće nadole jer US bilduju rezerve.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-markets-oil-idUSKBN0L704K20150204

[Ravanelli]

bio je juče lik na cnbc i objašnjavao da je ovaj oporavak "dead cat bounce".plus štrajkovi i remont rafinerija u usofa, pad dolara... ali se nadam da nije samo do toga.

Edited February 5, 2015 by Ravanelli

[Zaz_pi]

Koga zanima sve oko nafte, borbe za prevlast na Bliskom istoku, predlazem da pocne da gleda seriju BBC 2 koja trenutno ide-Planet Oil: How to Overthrow a Government.

Mozda je ovo bolje na dokumentarcima ali eto ovde stavih.

[Ravanelli]

malo o renewables, tačnije o tome koliko solar otpočinje biti ozbiljan.