Hladni rat

[Prospero]

Soviet nuclear submarine carrying nuclear weapons sank north of Bermuda in 1986

Top Secret Minutes of Politburo discussion show Soviets learned the lessons of Chernobyl

Open U.S.-Soviet communication regarding the accident on the eve of the Reykjavik summit of Reagan and Gorbachev
 

US Navy photo of K-219 on the surface after suffering a fire in a missile tube


Posted October 7, 2016

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 562

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya
 
Washington D.C., October 7, 2016 -Thirty years ago, a Soviet nuclear submarine with about 30 nuclear warheads on board sank off U.S. shores north of Bermuda as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan were preparing for their historic summit in Reykjavik, Iceland.  But instead of Chernobyl-style denials, the Soviet government reached out to the Americans, issued a public statement, and even received offers of help from Washington, according to the never-before-published transcript of that day’s Politburo session, posted today by the National Security Archive.

The submarine, designated K-219, suffered an explosion in one of its missile tubes due to the leakage of missile fuel into the tube on October 3.  The 667-A project Yankee-class boat was armed with 16 torpedoes and 16 ballistic missiles. After the initial explosion, the crew members heroically put out fire and were forced to shut down the nuclear reactors manually because the command-and-control equipment had been damaged.  Three crew members died in the blast and fire. Senior Seaman Sergey Preminin stayed in the reactor compartment to shut down reactors, and could not be evacuated.  The rest escaped safely.

Initially, it seemed the submarine could be salvaged; it was attached to the Soviet commercial ship Krasnogvardeisk for towing.  However, the tow cord broke for unknown reasons and the submarine sank.  Submarine Commander Captain Second rank Igor Britanov stayed with the sub until its final moments.  He initially came under investigation at home but all charges were removed in 1987.  According to statements by U.S. Vice Admiral Powell Carter, the submarine did not present a danger of nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination, as was reported by the New York Times.¹

The Politburo discussion, published in English for the first time, shows how the Soviet leadership learned the lessons of Chernobyl.  The U.S. side was immediately informed about the accident on October 3. The fight for the survival of the submarine lasted three days. Gorbachev notes to his colleagues that Reagan thanked the Soviets for providing information quickly and in a transparent manner.  He suggests that “it would be expedient to act in the same manner as we did the last time, i.e. to send information to the Americans, the IAEA, and TASS.” Gromyko emphasizes the need to inform Soviet citizens as well, by issuing a statement from TASS. 

The Politburo also heard a report from Deputy Defense Minister Chief of Navy Admiral Vladimir Chernavin.  Other members present express concerns about a possible U.S. effort to salvage parts of the submarine and gain access to design information.  But Chernavin assures them that the boat design is outdated and therefore is not of any interest to the Americans.  Another major concern raised is the possibility of a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination due to water pressure at extreme depths.  Chernavin cites Soviet Navy commission experts who ruled out the possibility of a nuclear detonation and concluded that contamination would happen over a long period and would not reach the surface.

This was the first time the Soviets had ever delivered a public information report immediately after an accident of this type and did not view U.S. actions in the area as a provocation. Communications between the two superpowers were therefore very constructive.  Having learned how damaging to the Soviet image the secrecy surrounding the Chernobyl accident was, Gorbachev decided to truly deploy glasnost in this case.  In addition to the shadow of Chernobyl, the conduct of both sides, along with the tone of the Politburo discussion, were clearly influenced by preparations for the upcoming summit, which both leaders considered a top priority.   
 

¹ Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Atomic Sub Sinks in Atlantic 3 Days After Fire,” The New York Times, October 7, 1986.
 
 
READ THE DOCUMENT
6 October 1986 SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC CPSU: "About the loss of nuclear submarine of the USSR Navy."




 Russian original

 English translation

[Anduril]

Slava heroju Sergeju Premininu!

[iDemo]

Soviet nuclear submarine carrying nuclear weapons sank north of Bermuda in 1986

 

Top Secret Minutes of Politburo discussion show Soviets learned the lessons of Chernobyl

 

Open U.S.-Soviet communication regarding the accident on the eve of the Reykjavik summit of Reagan and Gorbachev

 

Posted October 7, 2016

 

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 562

 

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

 

Washington D.C., October 7, 2016 -Thirty years ago, a Soviet nuclear submarine with about 30 nuclear warheads on board sank off U.S. shores north of Bermuda as Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan were preparing for their historic summit in Reykjavik, Iceland.  But instead of Chernobyl-style denials, the Soviet government reached out to the Americans, issued a public statement, and even received offers of help from Washington, according to the never-before-published transcript of that day’s Politburo session, posted today by the National Security Archive.

 

The submarine, designated K-219, suffered an explosion in one of its missile tubes due to the leakage of missile fuel into the tube on October 3.  The 667-A project Yankee-class boat was armed with 16 torpedoes and 16 ballistic missiles. After the initial explosion, the crew members heroically put out fire and were forced to shut down the nuclear reactors manually because the command-and-control equipment had been damaged.  Three crew members died in the blast and fire. Senior Seaman Sergey Preminin stayed in the reactor compartment to shut down reactors, and could not be evacuated.  The rest escaped safely.

 

Initially, it seemed the submarine could be salvaged; it was attached to the Soviet commercial ship Krasnogvardeisk for towing.  However, the tow cord broke for unknown reasons and the submarine sank.  Submarine Commander Captain Second rank Igor Britanov stayed with the sub until its final moments.  He initially came under investigation at home but all charges were removed in 1987.  According to statements by U.S. Vice Admiral Powell Carter, the submarine did not present a danger of nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination, as was reported by the New York Times.¹

 

The Politburo discussion, published in English for the first time, shows how the Soviet leadership learned the lessons of Chernobyl.  The U.S. side was immediately informed about the accident on October 3. The fight for the survival of the submarine lasted three days. Gorbachev notes to his colleagues that Reagan thanked the Soviets for providing information quickly and in a transparent manner.  He suggests that “it would be expedient to act in the same manner as we did the last time, i.e. to send information to the Americans, the IAEA, and TASS.” Gromyko emphasizes the need to inform Soviet citizens as well, by issuing a statement from TASS. 

 

The Politburo also heard a report from Deputy Defense Minister Chief of Navy Admiral Vladimir Chernavin.  Other members present express concerns about a possible U.S. effort to salvage parts of the submarine and gain access to design information.  But Chernavin assures them that the boat design is outdated and therefore is not of any interest to the Americans.  Another major concern raised is the possibility of a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination due to water pressure at extreme depths.  Chernavin cites Soviet Navy commission experts who ruled out the possibility of a nuclear detonation and concluded that contamination would happen over a long period and would not reach the surface.

 

This was the first time the Soviets had ever delivered a public information report immediately after an accident of this type and did not view U.S. actions in the area as a provocation. Communications between the two superpowers were therefore very constructive.  Having learned how damaging to the Soviet image the secrecy surrounding the Chernobyl accident was, Gorbachev decided to truly deploy glasnost in this case.  In addition to the shadow of Chernobyl, the conduct of both sides, along with the tone of the Politburo discussion, were clearly influenced by preparations for the upcoming summit, which both leaders considered a top priority.   

 

 

¹ Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Atomic Sub Sinks in Atlantic 3 Days After Fire,” The New York Times, October 7, 1986.

 

 

READ THE DOCUMENT

6 October 1986 SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC CPSU: "About the loss of nuclear submarine of the USSR Navy."

 

English translation

 

 

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/525468.Hostile_Waters

 

 

Though there was no official announcement, a published source (citing no sources) said the Soviet Union claimed that the leak was caused by a collision with the submarine USS Augusta. Augusta was certainly operating in proximity, but both the United States Navy and the commander of K-219, Captain Second Rank Igor Britanov, deny that a collision took place.

 

 

Russian naval experts do not exclude the possibility, that "K-219" SSBN of Yankee class (project 667 AU) sank in the Atlantic ocean in October of 1986 because of a collision with a U.S. submarine. Few days after the death of the "K-219", the attack submarine USS Augusta arrived to its home port revealing its damaged hull.

 

I tako... :)

[iDemo]

Džamija nema, ima nešto škola.

 

p.s. Spisak obuhvata projekte izgrađene i do okupacije.

 

http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=9462

Hvala

[apostata]

Nema ba na čemu.

[namenski]

Pomenuh tamo na tehnici posetu Hruscova Britaniji sredinom 50-ih godina proslog veka, pa se setih coveka:

 

Lionel Crabb poznat i kao 'Buster', uvek me asocira na onog prijatelja Delbojeve mame.

 

 

I jeste i nije Le Carre: siromastvo, kriza 30-ih, kraljevska mornarica kao verovatno jedini izlaz, vreme zgodno, uoci rata – i ovog coveka je posluzila sreca da sebe nadje u zanimanju u kome je mogao da se pokaze i iskaze.
Omirisao je more, pokvasio se, izmedju ostalog i sluzbom na razaracu tokom lova na Bismarck-a, nasao se u Gibraltaru kada je trebalo kupiti mine koje su postavili stari majstori za svaku vrstu ronjenja i pripadajuce opreme – Italijani – i sluzeci se zarobljenom italijanskom opremom uveo u Kraljevsku mornaricu moderno ronjenje.
Ali i postao majstor za podvodna razminiranja.

 

Crabb i Sydney Knowles, Gibraltar, 1942.

 

Prava prica dolazi posle rata: hladna i racionisana Britanija placa cenu jedne pobede, posla za ovom coveku slicne nigde ili vrlo malo, tu je negde i MI6, da se nadje, sacekali su ga bas kako treba: posle nekoliko neuspelih pokusaja da trazenja potopljenog blaga, spanskog naravno, ali i onog koje je tonulo sa brodovima tokom minulog rata.
Patriciji sa petog sprata, medju kojima – to se cesto zaboravlja – sedi i nekoliko pravih pravcatih i to prvoklasnih sovjetskih agenata, su nekako pravi fon na kome se otslikavaju Crabb i njemu slicni iz sveta i polusveta.
Imperija se osipa, propada, vidi se na svakom koraku. Oni koji su do juce, kako bi se to danas reklo, postavljali standarde za ovu vrstu posla, muljanja ili zabave za prave dzentlmene – kako ko vise voli – spadaju na poprilicno niske grane.
Verovatno bi Le Carre uspeo da – a takozvana fikcija je ovde uvek tacnija od takozvane stvarnosti – opise razgovore u Londonu i Portsmouth-u, razgovore u kojima se dogovaralo i uglavljivalo da se zaroni pod jedan sovjetski ratni brod tokom njegovog boravka u poseti Britaniji.
Ne bilo kakvoj poseti i ne bilo kakav brod.
Naslednici velikog brkatog oca svih naroda i zastitnika radnika i seljaka, Hruscov i Bulganjin su gosti. Brod je Ordzonikidze (Орджоникидзe, klase Sverdlov (Свердлов), moderna krstarica Zapadu sumnjiva zbog navodnih odlicnih manevarskih sposobnosti, brzine i tako to i tome slicno.

 

 

Sumnjivi su propeleri, ali i oblik podvodnog dela trupa pa treba zaroniti i malo pogledati ako se moze.
Sluzbe k'o sluzbe: petljaju, to im je uostalom i posao.
A upetljali su da se upetljati vise ne moze: Crabb je zaronio da nikada vise ne izroni.
Tu do skora su se javljali bivsi sovjetski ronioci koji su, izronivsi iz otvora na trupu krstarice presreli Crabb-a i sredili ga u dzemsbondovskoj bici ispod vode, u masnoj i prljavoj vodi luke slave Kraljevske mornarice, javio se i jedan koji ga je licno preklao, javljaju se sovjetski snajperi koji su Crabb-a smakli samo tako, javljaju se – vremena su Filbija i drugova – i oni koji tvrde da je Crabb zarobljen da bi nestao bez traga.
Ili samo da je prosto usetao u krstaricu i vratio se kuci, kao zasluzan dvostruki agent.
Broja se ne zna modernim zastupnicima prve, druge, trece ili cetvrte teorije.
Poprilicno meseci posle tog aprila 1956. godine, pronadjeno je telo obuceno u ronilacku opremu, koje je do danas ostalo neprepoznato.
Vode Portsmoutha, vode Hladnog rata, Hruscov, Eden, krstarice, razaraci, kamioni, avioni….
Eden, tadasnji premijer, je bio besan: u ta vremena sovjetske slave, labudove pesme, kada Zapad nije imao dovoljno visoke stepenice da opsluzi najnoviji sovjetski putnicki avion, a Sputnjik samo sto nije poleteo, crvenima nije trebalo mnogo da naprave prvoklasan skandal.
Odleteo je John Sinclair, glava MI6, covek koji je nasledio oca svih spijuna, coveka koji se zvao Stewart Menzies.
Podrska Crabb-u, oni koji su ga otpratili na ronjenje i koji je trebalo da ga docekaju je najbrze sto je mogla napustila Portsmouth.
Bilo bi zanimljivo znati da li su ovom coveku dogovarajuci se s njim rekli ono cuveno: ako se nesto dogodi mi te ne poznajemo, ti nemas nikakve veze sa nama i tako dalje, sto se vec u takvim prilikama navodno govori.
Ronis za sebe, iz zabave i zadovoljstva ili smisli vec nesto.
Nesto sto bi vec mogao da smisli birokratski mozak kad pocne da razmislja.
I sto nije nista kada se takozvanog ponovnog iscitavanja istorije dohvate novokomponovani politicki korektni, pa tako neki Rob Hoole za Warship World iz januara/februara 2007. clanak o enigmi Crabb pocinje mrtav 'ladan recima kako je proslo vec 50 godina od kako se Commander Lionel Crabb nije vratio sa redovnog i rutinskog ispitivanja opreme za ronjenje u Stokes Bay, a jos uvek traju spekulacije….
Pa dalje kaze da je Crabb bio fuj od MI6, da je samo radio u Experimental Clearence Diving Team, nesto sto je pripadalo Underwater Cointermeasures Weapons Established (UCWE) i da je bio skoro pa naucnik koji se slucajno nasao tu gde ga nikad vise nisu nasli.
Novokomponovana slabost prema specijalnim operacijama i specijalcima svih fela ne propusta da pomene da je, prema neidentifikovanim izvorima, 1953. godine – kao naucnik naravno – ucestvovao na nekoliko tajnih zadataka oko Sueca….
Ni rec o tome da su 17. aprila, dan uoci dolaska sovjetskih brodova u Portsmouth, Crabb i neko po imenu Smith dosli u grad i prijavili se u Sally Port Hotel.
Ni reci o tome da je Smith verovatno bio mladi agent Teddy Davies, Crabbov MI6 rukovalac.
Ni reci o tome da su se njih dvojica u hotelu sreli sa policijskim sefom po prezimenu West koji im je dodelio policajca po imenu i prezimenu Jack Lamport.
Da im bude policijska veza i pokrice za motanje po ipak cuvanoj ratnoj luci u kojoj je, uz to, bila u toku pozamasno jaka poseta.
Na najvisem drzavnom nivou i u duhu uzajamne saradnje i razumevanje.
Da su se dva hotelska gosta srela sa komandantom HMS Vernon, inace broda za podrsku ronilaca, da su sedeli na popodnevnom caju sa oficirom Vernona po imenu George Franklin…
Ni reci o tome da je, kada je bilo jasno da Crabba nema, pratilac brze bolje odjavio obojicu iz hotela, pokupivsi se zajedno sa stvarima.
Ni reci o tome da je policija pocupala nekoliko strana iz hotelske knjige gostiju, ali ne pre nego sto su novinari zavirili u istu.
Ni reci o tome da su se Sovjeti dobro zabavljali, pisuci i saljuci notu u kojoj su tvrdili da su Crabba videli sa broda ili bese jednog od svojih brodova koji su pratili krstaricu.

I, konacno, svuda se nadje po neko da iskopa po nekog generala: 2006. se pojavila i teorija #5 koja tvrdi da je Crabba likvidirao niko drugi nego uvek budni kontraobavestajni MI5 – to su, inace, oni pored kojih su Filbi i drustvo godinama radili ono sto su radili – i to zato sto je saznao da se ovaj sprema da prebegne u CCCP pa se, eto, bas namestila prilika….

 

Ipak, za Lionela Crabb-a, poznatog kao Buster, coveka iz vremena kada su se ronioci svakoj politickoj korektnosti uprkos slikali sa cigaretom.

[bigvlada]

Jedna od nenormalnijih ideja hladnog rata, koja srećom nije zaživela - IPBM, Interplanetary ballistic missile ili kako iskoristiti Mesec kao poligon za testiranje vodoničnih bombi. 

 

[bigvlada]

Tražio sam neke stare crteže kosmičkih brodova pa sam naleteo na ovo. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[namenski]

Tipicno, da tipicnije ne moze da bude: u pauzi partijskog kongresa, komada 4 ekstremno tipicnih partijskih aparatcika, kako su ih popularno zvali, slikaju se za uspomenu i dugo secanje.

Partija je istocnonemacka, komunisticka, kamuflirana doduse u Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), ali tvrdolinijska, onako bas, bas...

Ali cetvorica na fotografiji, s leva na desno, nikako nisu obicni, naprotiv: Kleinjung, Mielke, Weikert, Felber…

Predstavljaju vrh istocnonemackih sluzbi^tm koje su, skoro svi se slazu, spadale u 5-6 najefikasnijih u svakom pogledu i to u takozvanim svetskim razmerama; toliko su, izmedju ostalog, ispekli zanat, da su sefovi i jednom Markusu Volfu, jednom od omiljenih zapadnih spijuna nad spijunima.

 

Ko bi u cikici sa fotografije prepoznao coveka po imenu Karl Kleinjung, generala sluzbe bezbednosti, prepoznao momka koji je, svojevremeno, u Adolfovu Nemacku unosio i iz nje iznosio ono sto su oni sa kojima je svim srcem i od srca radio, smatrali da treba uneti ili izneti, kako kad. ko bi prepoznao pripadnika internacionalnih brigada i to od one sorte kojoj je u Spaniji verovatno bilo najteze – ako se ne racunaju Spanci naravno – Nemcima, emigrantima, onima koji su iz Adolfove Nemacke uspeli da pobegnu.

 

Ko bi prepoznao ucenika i saradnika coveka po imenu Станислав Алексеевич Ваупшасов, u litvanskom originalu Stanislovas Vaupšas, sa kojim je uspeo da u zadnjem trenutku izvuce iz Spanije arhivu Republike.

Vaupsasova, sovjetskog agenta u predratnoj Poljskoj, ГПУ organa na gradnji kanala Moskva - Volga, jednog od glavnih, ako ne i najglavnijih za organizaciju spijunskog posla na teritoriji koju je drzao Franko, ilegalca u Svedskoj i Finskoj uoci rata, komandanta jednog od najvecih i najuspesnijih partizanskih odreda u nemackoj pozadini tokom WW2, cistaca japanske agenture u Mandzuriji uoci sovjetskog napada avgusta 1945...

Ko bi u ovom na oko bezopasnom cikici prepoznao, a to je najvazniji deo price o ovom coveku, ilegalca – ubacenog iz Moskve – obucenog u nemacku uniformu koji se ilegalisanjem bavi u od Nemaca okupiranom Minsku.

 

 

I to ne bilo kako, nego maskiran u pravog pravcatog pripadnika Geheime Feldpolizei, firme opasne u svakom pogledu.
Rodjen 1912. godine u gradu koji se zove Remscheid, Severna Rajna – Vestfalija, u dane od Nemaca okupiranog Minska imao je tridesetak godina; bilo mu je, moralo je biti, barem malo teze nego Sovjetima sa kojima je i za koje je radio i to ne samo iz prakticnih razloga pod kojima podrazumevam cinjenicu da bi ga zemljaci Nemci – da su ga se docepali – tretirali vrlo, vrlo posebno, onako kako dolikuje zabludelom zemljaku, nego i iz razloga takozvane moralne i svake druge eticke prirode.
I on je protiv sebe, naime, imao – zemljake.
Bracu Nemce.
I – tada, tih dana Drugog svetskog rata, te 1942. i 1943. godine – ovaj covek, spanski borac, nije imao one dileme po negde poznate kao ima li smisla da puca Nemac na Nemca.
Dilemu su imali drugi, kao na primer danas nasiroko slavljeni oficiri nad oficirima, kojima su trebale godine i milioni mrtvih i svakojako unesrecenih da shvate da ipak ima smisla da puca Nemac na Nemca.
Pod uslovom da se taj Nemac zove Adolf Hitler.
Oni oficiri nad oficirima kojima nije uspelo ni da Adolfu uvale jednu jedinu bombu, a koje danas slave kao arhipripadnike nemackog otpora Hitleru, izbegavajuci da pomenu nacizam i ostale pratece pojave; doduse, zasto bi ih i pominjali kada je oficirima jedini cilj bio da maknu Adolfa posle cega bi svi shvatili da je problem bio samo u Adolfu i da je pred svima svetla buducnost….
Oni oficiri i diplomate koji u svojoj tankocutnosti i postovanju svetinje kakva je zakletva, nisu hteli da prljaju i savest pucnjem u – danas bi se reklo – sistem.
Oficiri legalisti, takoreci.
Ovaj covek je sve to uzeo na sebe i svoju savest: sta je mogao da misli i kako je mogao da se oseca Nemac pa jos komunista, ubacen iz Moskve, maskiran u pripadnika nemacke tajne vojne policije, Nemac koji je svakog trenutka mogao da bude uhvacen, provaljen i od Nemaca tretiran kao – Nemac, izdajnik za koga su malo svi Mathauzeni Adolfovog rajha i svi islednici u Albertstraße.
Covek koji je gradio Istocnu Nemacku, general sa stalnim zaposlenjem u ozloglasenoj STASI sluzbi nad sluzbama.
Covek koji je odbio da primi (zapadno)nemacku penziju i ispred cije se kuce u Berlinu do kraja zivota, ne tako davne 2003. vijorila zastava – DDR….

 

Covek koji se posle uspelog atentata na nemackog guvernera Belorusije, Vilhelma Kubea, atentata u cijem je pripremanju i izvodjenju ucestvovao, povukao na zasluzeni odmor.
U – (belo)rusku partizansku sumu.
Jedan – Nemac.

[bigvlada]

Jedna interesantna pričica iz 1973. godine; ako je tačna postojala je ideja da se Iranu prodaju stari A-11 prerađeni u F-12 varijantu. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Meazza]

Udzbenik ruskog jezika za Amerikance iz doba hladog rata. NEPROCENJIVO!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vladimir: Slab sam, druze, direktore. Slab sam od nedovoljne uhranjenoosti.

Direktor: Zna li tvoj otac da si slab od nedovoljne uhranjenosti?

Vladimir: Otac zna, ali mu je svejedno. On ceo dan lezi na kaucu i pije alkoholna pica.

 

 

A ovo je najjace:

 

 

Sta je zivot? Sta su ljudi? Ljudi su mravi, a zivot je mravinjak.

Sta je na kraju zivota?

Na kraju zivota je nula.

Edited December 23, 2016 by IndridCold

[Prospero]

Thatcher saw Soviets as allies against Germany

 

National Archives 1989-1990: Premier feared reunified Germany could dominate Europe

 

by: Henry Mance, Political Correspondent

 

 

Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with German chancellor Helmut Kohl was so bad that the US feared she was preparing an entente cordiale with the Soviet Union to contain Germany, declassified files show.

 

The revelations underline how the then prime minister struggled to come to terms with European politics after the fall of the Berlin Wall and how, in her last months in office, she suspected a unified Germany could dominate the continent.

US diplomats were particularly alarmed by a phone call between Thatcher and President George H W Bush in February 1990, when she reportedly said the USSR was “an essential balance to German power”.

 

Mr Bush “could not conceive how you could think of the Russians as possible allies against Germany”, Thatcher was told in an ensuing briefing paper. At the time Washington viewed Moscow as a “deeply hostile” power.

Although British diplomats sought to play down Thatcher’s comments, the prime minister appears to have been unrepentant — writing “1941-45” in the margins of the briefing paper, a reference to the period when the USSR and Britain were allies during the second world war.

 

Cabinet Office papers reveal other occasions where she expressed scepticism about German intentions. At a private meeting at Chequers in March 1990, Thatcher and eminent historians discussed how Germans were characterised by “angst [underlined], aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality”.

 

The prime minister, who had become more Eurosceptic in the late 1980s, clashed with Douglas Hurd, her foreign secretary, who warned that Britain could not be “a brake on everything” in European integration. In response she proposed “a wider European association” that would rival or replace the European Community, and which the Soviet Union could join in the long term.

 

The exchanges illuminate how Thatcher sought to steer British foreign policy after her central role in supporting Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms. In contrast to her warm relationship with Mr Gorbachev, she was frequently wary of Mr Kohl.

 

She tried to obstruct German reunification, the chancellor’s grand project, fearing it would undermine Nato. In her memoirs, Thatcher said that was the “one instance in which a foreign policy I pursued met with unambiguous failure”. In his memoirs, Mr Kohl accused her of being “ice-cold” and “dangerous”.

 

The files show relations became so bad that Mr Kohl suggested he might use Mr Hurd as “a political point of contact”, instead of Thatcher. That was flatly rejected by the prime minister, who wrote “NO” in the margin of one document.

Although Germany and Britain were working together to complete the single market, Thatcher’s advisers opined that Britain “might one day need a closer relationship with the Soviet Union to balance an over-mighty Germany”.

 

Her Chequers seminar on Germany included historians Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) and Timothy Garton-Ash. A minute taken by her private secretary Charles Powell concluded that the Germans were using “their elbows . . . in the European Community”, and that Britain should “be nice” while remaining wary. The “real credit” for German reunification “should go to the people of eastern Europe and to Mr Gorbachev” — not to the Germans themselves.

Norman Stone, a historian who was among the attendees, told the Financial Times that Thatcher’s thinking was influenced by her 1930s childhood, including her friendship with a Jewish girl in Vienna persecuted by the Nazis. He added that the prime minister’s opposition to European monetary union had proved “dead right”.

 

Thatcher and Mr Kohl were at the time seeking to dampen press rumours of difficulties in their relationship. Among their disagreements, the prime minister wanted less strict sanctions on South Africa, while the chancellor took offence to what he saw as rudeness. In February 1990, British diplomats reported that Mr Kohl “was not happy at the state of our official relations”, and was offended by Thatcher having accused him of nationalism.

 

Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democrat politician, said that “whenever Kohl used the word ‘Margaret’ he looked in the opposite direction and injected a certain steely tone into his voice”. However, relations between the two leaders did occasionally thaw — including a meeting in March 1990 when both leaders were “rather jovial”.

 

 

Documents: Powell’s note to Thatcher and the PM’s history seminar

Note to Margaret Thatcher, March 5 1990

SECRET AND PERSONAL

RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH: GERMAN UNIFICATION

“We have had a slightly curious report from within the White House to the effect that President Bush is very worried about some of your views on German unification, and about the poor state of Anglo-German relations […]

The basic points are:

● That when you spoke to the president on the telephone before Kohl’s visit to Washington, you appeared to him to be proposing that the Soviet Union should be brought in to an entente cordiale as a counterbalance to a united Germany. The president is reported to have found this deeply worrying […] He could not conceive how you could think of the Russians as possible allies against Germany. My record shows that you were making two points: first, that it was important to develop the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] framework so that the Russians did not feel isolated in discussions of the future of Europe: and second that, looking to the much longer term, the Soviet Union was the only country which would be of equivalent size to a united Germany in Europe, and therefore politically a balance to it. The president does not seem to have grasped the sophistication of the point […]

● That relations between Britain and Germany were unprecedentedly bad […] there is evidence that Kohl sees slights in almost everything we do at the moment.

● It is alarming that the White House should be so muddled. The problem is magnified by the absence of an effective American embassy here to explain and interpret our thinking. But it suggests a number of lessons:

● When you speak to the president on the telephone, you should explain your points in very simple language and repeat them […]

● And it shows that we have a major problem in our relations with the Germans: it is caused much more by them than by us, but we need to be thinking how we can ease back into better relations with Kohl without surrendering any of the essential aspects of our policies.

CDP [Charles Powell]

 

Powell’s note on the Germany seminar with eminent historians, March 24 1990

Attendees:

Margaret Thatcher

Douglas Hurd

Prof Gordon Craig

Prof Fritz Stern

Lord Dacre

Prof Norman Stone

Timothy Garton-Ash

George Urban

Who are the Germans?

We started by talking about the Germans themselves and their characteristics. Like other nations, they had certain characteristics, which you could identify from the past and expect to find in the future. It was easier — and more pertinent to the present discussion — to think of the less happy ones: their insensitivity to the feelings of others (most noticeable in their behaviour over the Polish border), their obsession with themselves, a strong inclination to self-pity, and a longing to be liked. Some even less flattering attributes were also mentioned as an abiding part of the German character: in alphabetical order, angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality.

Two further aspects of the German character were cited as reasons for concern about the future. First, a capacity for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the traces. Second, a tendency to overestimate their own strengths and capabilities […]

Have the Germans changed?

[…] there was a strong school of thought among those present that today’s Germans were very different from their predecessors [ . . . Since 1945] There was no longer a sense of historic mission, no ambitions for physical conquest, no more militarism. Education and the writing of history had changed. The institutions were different. Democracy was deep rooted. There was an innocence of and about the past on the part of the new generation of Germans. We should have no real worries about them.

This view was not accepted by everyone […]

In sum, no one had serious misgivings about the present leaders of political elite of Germany. But what about 10, 15 or 20 years from now? Could some of the unhappy characteristics of the past re-emerge with just as destructive consequences?

Conclusions

[…] The overall message was unmistakable: we should be nice to the Germans. But even the optimists had some unease, not for the present and the immediate future, but for what might lie further down the road than we can yet see.”

 

grej - benkendorf 

[hazard]

 

When you speak to the president on the telephone, you should explain your points in very simple language and repeat them […]

 

:D

 

otac sina svoga

[Prospero]

Nixon’s Vietnam Treachery

 

By JOHN A. FARRELL

 

DEC. 31, 2016

 

 

Richard M. Nixon always denied it: to David Frost, to historians and to Lyndon B. Johnson, who had the strongest suspicions and the most cause for outrage at his successor’s rumored treachery. To them all, Nixon insisted that he had not sabotaged Johnson’s 1968 peace initiative to bring the war in Vietnam to an early conclusion. “My God. I would never do anything to encourage” South Vietnam “not to come to the table,” Nixon told Johnson, in a conversation captured on the White House taping system.

 

Now we know Nixon lied. A newfound cache of notes left by H. R. Haldeman, his closest aide, shows that Nixon directed his campaign’s efforts to scuttle the peace talks, which he feared could give his opponent, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an edge in the 1968 election. On Oct. 22, 1968, he ordered Haldeman to “monkey wrench” the initiative.

 

The 37th president has been enjoying a bit of a revival recently, as his achievements in foreign policy and the landmark domestic legislation he signed into law draw favorable comparisons to the presidents (and president-elect) that followed. A new, $15 million face-lift at the Nixon presidential library, while not burying the Watergate scandals, spotlights his considerable record of accomplishments.

 

Haldeman’s notes return us to the dark side. Amid the reappraisals, we must now weigh apparently criminal behavior that, given the human lives at stake and the decade of carnage that followed in Southeast Asia, may be more reprehensible than anything Nixon did in Watergate.

 

Nixon had entered the fall campaign with a lead over Humphrey, but the gap was closing that October. Henry A. Kissinger, then an outside Republican adviser, had called, alerting Nixon that a deal was in the works: If Johnson would halt all bombing of North Vietnam, the Soviets pledged to have Hanoi engage in constructive talks to end a war that had already claimed 30,000 American lives.

 

 Anna Chennault, 1969. Credit Ira Gay Sealy/The Denver Post, via Getty Images

 

But Nixon had a pipeline to Saigon, where the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, feared that Johnson would sell him out. If Thieu would stall the talks, Nixon could portray Johnson’s actions as a cheap political trick. The conduit was Anna Chennault, a Republican doyenne and Nixon fund-raiser, and a member of the pro-nationalist China lobby, with connections across Asia.

 

“! Keep Anna Chennault working on” South Vietnam, Haldeman scrawled, recording Nixon’s orders. “Any other way to monkey wrench it? Anything RN can do.”

 

Nixon told Haldeman to have Rose Mary Woods, the candidate’s personal secretary, contact another nationalist Chinese figure — the businessman Louis Kung — and have him press Thieu as well. “Tell him hold firm,” Nixon said.

 

 

 

Document

 

H.R. Haldeman's Notes from Oct. 22, 1968

During a phone call on the night of Oct. 22, 1968, Richard M. Nixon told his closest aide (and future chief of staff) H.R. Haldeman to "monkey wrench" President Lyndon B. Johnson's efforts to begin peace negotiations over the Vietnam War.

 

 

OPEN Document

Nixon also sought help from Chiang Kai-shek, the president of Taiwan. And he ordered Haldeman to have his vice-presidential candidate, Spiro T. Agnew, threaten the C.I.A. director, Richard Helms. Helms’s hopes of keeping his job under Nixon depended on his pliancy, Agnew was to say. “Tell him we want the truth — or he hasn’t got the job,” Nixon said.

 

Throughout his life, Nixon feared disclosure of this skulduggery. “I did nothing to undercut them,” he told Frost in their 1977 interviews. “As far as Madame Chennault or any number of other people,” he added, “I did not authorize them and I had no knowledge of any contact with the South Vietnamese at that point, urging them not to.” Even after Watergate, he made it a point of character. “I couldn’t have done that in conscience.”

 

Nixon had cause to lie. His actions appear to violate federal law, which prohibits private citizens from trying to “defeat the measures of the United States.” His lawyers fought throughout Nixon’s life to keep the records of the 1968 campaign private. The broad outline of “the Chennault affair” would dribble out over the years. But the lack of evidence of Nixon’s direct involvement gave pause to historians and afforded his loyalists a defense.

 

Time has yielded Nixon’s secrets. Haldeman’s notes were opened quietly at the presidential library in 2007, where I came upon them in my research for a biography of the former president. They contain other gems, like Haldeman’s notations of a promise, made by Nixon to Southern Republicans, that he would retreat on civil rights and “lay off pro-Negro crap” if elected president. There are notes from Nixon’s 1962 California gubernatorial campaign, in which he and his aides discuss the need to wiretap political foes.

 

Of course, there’s no guarantee that, absent Nixon, talks would have proceeded, let alone ended the war. But Johnson and his advisers, at least, believed in their mission and its prospects for success.

 

When Johnson got word of Nixon’s meddling, he ordered the F.B.I. to track Chennault’s movements. She “contacted Vietnam Ambassador Bui Diem,” one report from the surveillance noted, “and advised him that she had received a message from her boss … to give personally to the ambassador. She said the message was … ‘Hold on. We are gonna win. … Please tell your boss to hold on.’ ”

 

In a conversation with the Republican senator Everett Dirksen, the minority leader, Johnson lashed out at Nixon. “I’m reading their hand, Everett,” Johnson told his old friend. “This is treason.”

 

“I know,” Dirksen said mournfully.

 

Johnson’s closest aides urged him to unmask Nixon’s actions. But on a Nov. 4 conference call, they concluded that they could not go public because, among other factors, they lacked the “absolute proof,” as Defense Secretary Clark Clifford put it, of Nixon’s direct involvement.

 

Nixon was elected president the next day.

[bigvlada]