Hladni rat

[Prospero]

Washington, DC, May 25, 2016 – Today the National Security Archive is publishing – for the first time in English – the diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev covering the year 1976, along with edits and a postscript by the author.

Anatoly Chernyaev, the deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee (and later the senior foreign policy aide to Mikhail Gorbachev), started keeping a systematic diary in 1972, in which he recorded the highlights (and low points) of his work at the International Department, his attendance at Politburo meetings, participation in speech and report writing sessions at state dachas, as well as his philosophical reflections on daily life in the Soviet Union from the point of view of a high-level Soviet apparatchik.

 

Today, Anatoly Sergeyevich remains a champion of glasnost, sharing his notes, documents and first-hand insights with scholars seeking a view into the inner workings of the Soviet government, the peaceful end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 2004, he donated the originals of his detailed diaries, covering the years 1972 through 1991, to the National Security Archive in order to ensure permanent public access to this record – beyond the reach of political uncertainties in contemporary Russia.

 

The year 1976 sees a continuation of major themes from previous years, such as relations with fraternal Communist Parties, foreign relations, the state of Soviet economic affairs, and an insider’s view of the functioning of the Soviet government and its leadership. A new theme emerges in 1976 as well – the issue of human rights, brought about by the Helsinki Accords.

 

The signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 did not get much attention in Chernyaev’s 1975 diary. However, in 1976 human rights come to the fore in a powerful way and become a leitmotif in the diary. In January, Chernyaev describes Andropov’s report to the Politburo on the situation with dissidents in the Soviet Union. In May, he writes about the effects of the “campaign” by dissidents: “Our prestige in the eyes of the world public has been struck a terrible blow. It will have long-lasting consequences and it may be nearly impossible to recover. We have lost the biggest ideological battle of the XX century.” In November, a CPSU delegation visiting the Labour Party in Great Britain is met with protesters wherever they go. The experience is eye opening even for Chernyaev’s resolutely ideological boss, Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev, who realizes the impact human right issues, particularly the right to leave the country for Soviet Jews, is having on the USSR’s image.

 

The XXV Congress of the CPSU takes place in the early spring of 1976. Chernyaev participated in the drafting of the Congress’ Summary Report at the state dacha in Zavidovo, where he had a chance to observe Leonid Brezhnev in an informal atmosphere. Chernyaev’s views on Brezhnev vary widely throughout the year – from respectful admiration when he observes the General Secretary make sound policy decisions and champion the cause of peace; to frustration when he notices the feebleness of a man in poor health who does not have the physical resources to carry out his duties; to dismay when Chernyaev witnesses again and again the Soviet leader’s growing personality cult. Ultimately, Brezhnev’s evidently sincere commitment to the cause of peace stands out as the defining trait in Chernyaev’s view of the Soviet leader, so much so that in the Postscript to the year, he suggests that Brezhnev probably deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to détente. 

 

The European Conference of Communist Parties, which the International Department of the CPSU had been preparing for over two years, took place in East Berlin on June 29-30. Chernyaev’s diary reflects in detail the internal struggles between the CPSU and European Communist parties over the emergence of Eurocommunism, and over the ideological differences, disagreements, and compromises reached during the preparation process. The diary entry on July 9, the first after the conference, in one breath describes the meeting as a “milestone” and a “circus” – a characteristic contradiction for Chernyaev’s observations across the board in 1976.

 

Throughout the year, Chernyaev periodically writes about daily life in the Soviet Union, outside the bubble of the Soviet political elite. He notices that people are not afraid to express their opinions and art galleries are beginning to exhibit works that had been off-limits for years. Chernyaev’s observations of party intellectuals are sharp and insightful – people like himself, Karen Brutents and Alexander Bovin tied their life to the life of the Party, thus limiting themselves to quiet expressions of discontent and sarcasm inside the protective walls of the Central Committee.

 

Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary for 1976 witnesses a busy and eventful year, covering momentous events from the XXV Congress of the CPSU to the European Conference of Communist Parties. The diary continues to provide an invaluable first-hand account of the internal workings of the Soviet government, as well as a highly informed intellectual’s view of Soviet culture and society.

[bigvlada]

Da li si ga listao? Ima li nešto o nama?

[Prospero]

ne posebno zanimljivi fragmenti o odnosima kpss sa drugim evropskim kp, i njegovo čitanje transkripta razgovora brežnjev-tito

 

 

 

 

I recently read a transcript of a conversation between Brezhnev and Tito in Belgrade. For a long time, I couldn’t come to my senses and make up my mind. Leonid Ilyich calmly and good naturedly (in the presence of both delegations) explained that we, the CPSU, don’t have anything up our sleeve, we don’t have any secret plans, and all the chatter about our intentions to encroach on Yugoslavia is pure nonsense and provocation. We do not support “ [Com]informists”  [Информовцев]. “I cannot imagine that anyone in the USSR could support someone who speaks against the SKJ, against you (Tito)! We recorded in joint and international documents that we recognize each country’s right to choose its own path to socialism. Nobody should interfere or meddle. However, why does your press keep lashing out at us, attributing all sorts of fantastic intentions to us, and your officials sometimes talk of ‘two superpowers’ and ‘two centers of hegemony and suppression, ’dropping all kinds of hints, etc. They keep raising a fuss about Stalinism, even though we are done with it. The resolutions of the XX Congress remain in force. We cannot allow anyone to undermine our friendship and cooperation. Both of us have many enemies and they use ‘all this press’ against us and against you.” This is the essence of it, though not the exact words, of course.

 

Tito responded the next day. He praised L.I. for his frankness and promised to be frank himself. He said, “We see contradictions in your statement yesterday. ”(Brezhnev and Tito mostly use the formal form of address with each other, especially when in the company of others. Brezhnev sometimes slips and uses the familiar form, but Tito – never.)“ There is a lack of understanding of our domestic and foreign policy . You ask, why stir up the past? Of course we should not fixate on it, but we should not lose sight of it either. You cannot remove the past with declarations alone. A lot of things in your (i.e. the CPSU’s) behavior remind us of the past. Yes, there are people on both sides who question the other side’s sincerity. Those on our side are fueled by the CPSU Program’s known positions (on the revisionist leadership of the SKJ). Allow me to quote two paragraphs from the “CPSU Program”... Three Party Congresses have taken place since this Program was adopted, yet you haven’t thought to fix these passages.

 

“Your suggestion to restore ‘Friendship societies’ is unacceptable to us: too much of its work here would be ‘ unnecessary .’ We are grateful to you for supplying us with some military technology, but overflights by military aircraft and ships entering our ports can only be allowed in accordance with our legislation (notification within 60 days).

 

“As for our press, we do not think that criticizing Stalinism, statism, and the cult of personality is anti-Soviet. Moreover, we have developed our own information system that is different from yours. We have no intention of changing it.

 

“... There is a desire to involve Yugoslavia in the socialist community. We believe it will only complicate our relationship and hinder our cooperation with you.

“We consistently adhere to the decisions of the Berlin Conference (i.e. the communique adopted at this year’s conference of 28 European Communist Parties in Berlin), while in your press you allow yourself to continue relations with CPs from “pre - Berlin” positions. Your statements and actions are contrary to the spirit of the conference...”

In response, Brezhnev only praised Tito for being direct and said that he will “take it into consideration, even though he does not agree with all points...”

 

I thought about it for a long time afterwards. In fact, we sincerely want friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and we sincerely have no intention of absorbing it and so on. But we have not recognized it “in theory.” Subconsciously, without realizing it, we consider it to be a “deviation from the norm” and expect it to “reform.” They see this. Maybe Brezhnev was speaking from the heart, they do not doubt it. But the fundamental concept of our socialism remains the same, essentially a Stalinist and “Short Course” one. The Yugoslavs, same as the Italians, and the French – they see it as fundamentally incompatible with them. Hence their reluctance to integrally accept the term “proletarian internationalism,” which reminds them, not without  reason, of the Comintern. Hence its replacement with the “international solidarity” category, which is sporadic on the surface.

 

u nekom širem smislu vidljivo je kako černjajev uočava složenost odnosa u evropi (pre svega među kp) i to da i one veze saradnje tj nadzora koji je kpss nekada imao više ne mogu biti produktivni, stvari izmiču iz ruku polako ali sigurno

Edited May 31, 2016 by Prospero

[Dr Arslanagić]

The Open Society Archives at Central European University (OSA) presents an online, fully searchable database of audio programs produced by RFE/RL Russian Service during the last half a century.

[namenski]

The Open Society Archives at Central European University (OSA) presents an online, fully searchable database of audio programs produced by RFE/RL Russian Service during the last half a century.

-_-

 

 

A i saradnika raznih je bilo, nije da nije  :D

 

I genijalnih zamisli poput ove sa slanjem stampanih stvari preko Zavese pomocu balona:

O ovome moze vise Prospero 

[Dr Arslanagić]

Nije tajna šta je RFE, svejedno je ova baza veoma korisna za istraživače Hladnog rata.

[namenski]

Ma zezam se, nisam postovao da bih bilo kome otvarao oci^tm glede RFE, nego onako, naletelo  :)

 

Inace, interesantna je i - ne znam bolji izraz - RFE i uopste zapadna propaganda i hladnoratovska stilizacija, stajling publike kojoj se RFE obracala tamo preko^tm.

 

 

 

Gajena je izmastana slika neke omladine, nekih mladih, lepih i pametnih, sa skoro potpunim nepoznavanjem situacije na terenu, sa svakoj propagandi svojstvenom samozavaravanju ali i potrebi da se opravda sopstveno postojanje.

Iza RFE tipizacija kao sto su ove na fotografijama/reklamama stajali su monstrumi proslosti probudjeni raspadom socijalizma i umesto vladavine tipiziranih, dobili smo probudjene nacionalizme, divlje tranzicije, ponegde i ratove u kojima su glavnu rec vodili upravo omladinci slicni ovima gore.

Sve skockano, sve zeljno slobodne reci, demokratije, ljudskih prava, trzista i slobode izbora ekspresno zamenjenih za crne Audije, Mercedese i dzipove...

Edited June 19, 2016 by namenski

[kud u maglu Simoviću]

https://zorancicak.wordpress.com/2016/07/12/tihi-amerikanac-u-beogradu-ispovest-operativca-cia/

 

ispovest prvog operativca cia u beogradu

:o

[bradilko]

zahvaljujuci ladnom ratu smo ziveli u miru 50-ak godina.dug period za nas.morao je pasti jebeni zid inace inspirator prave umjetnosti.onda je dosao birokrata sa misijom,flekavom celom i shopingholicarkom suprugom.onda dodje suicidni iz leve reke sa psihosuprugom..

hvala ti hladni rate na srecnom detinjstvu

sorry na upadu

Edited July 12, 2016 by bradilko

[Prospero]

 

“Vi već znate ruski, a od nedavno i bugarski. Koliko vremena će Vam biti potrebno da naučite srpskohrvatski?”

Nisam ni stigao da odgovorim, a ona je već uzela olovku da na karti pokaže Beograd, ali je uporno pokazivala Budimpeštu. Na kraju je odustala:

“Idete u prestonicu Jugoslavije. To je onaj grad na B, nalazi se na Dunavu, snađite se uostalom.”

 

 

Čarls Morton Ingliš

 

 

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/JCWS_a_00070?journalCode=jcws

 

...

4. In a series of interviews in 2005, Charles Morton English,

the CIA station chief in Belgrade from August 1948 until January 1951,

shed light on the U.S.-Yugoslav intelligence-sharing discussions.

 

...

The government’s covert operations

arm, the Offce of Policy Coordination (OPC), was created on 18 June 1948,

following the CIA’s involvement in successful Italian elections the previous

April. This success in Italy, which the CIA attributed to its own covert efforts,

convinced the NSC that covert operations were a viable option for furthering

policy objectives. Under NSC 10/2 and future director Frank Wisner, OPC

was developed to promote “dirty tricks” abroad. The organization was, as CIA

Station Chief English opined, a “renegade outlet,” a “black sheep” organization.

16 UnderWisner, OPC managed to involve itself in missions—some successful,

others disastrous—in Europe, in the Far East, and elsewhere across the

globe. A year after its inception, OPC had ªve foreign stations, 302 agents,

and a $4.7 million budget. Those numbers soared over the next years: by

1952, 2,812 agents (plus 3,142 contractors) operated 47 stations with a budget

of $84 million.17

...

The agency had no station in

Belgrade when the split occurred, and it scrambled to put intelligence officers

into the field. “We were going to have a five man station,” English recalled,

but Ambassador Cannon “was unwilling.” The ambassador had no use for

spies who could interfere with what were sure to be intricate diplomatic issues.

In general, the State Department, wary of blurring lines between intelligence-

gathering and diplomacy, objected to the CIA’s use of its embassies and

communications devices. The department also clashed with the CIA over

how much control ambassadors could exert over agency employees. In Belgrade

higher forces ªnally prevailed against Cannon’s refusal, English said, but

not without compromise. “So the National Security Council ordered him to

take a single person. Well, grade-wise I wasn’t high enough. But I was a cryptographer,

I’d learned enough of the language, and I was a code clerk—we had

our own code system. So I ended up, instead of ªve people going, I went

alone. I was the CIA presence in Yugoslavia.”

 

English arrived in August 1948. Under cover as an interpreter and head

of a joint U.S.-British translation service, he set out to absorb Yugoslavia. His

primary function was as an analyst. Apart from stealing phonebooks, English

performed no operational activities. His was a dual mission. First, because the

CIA knew very little about the Balkans, the agency ordered English to learn as

much as possible about the country’s politics and culture, to be “the eyes and

ears for the Agency.” Second, English helped further the overarching mission

of the Belgrade embassy, which crystallized on 28 June 1948: “The directive

to the American Embassy in Yugoslavia,” English stated, “was to try and do

everything they could to move Tito away from Stalin.”

...

 

The U.S. embassy in Belgrade was also concerned about a “Korea all over

again.” According to CIA station chief English, one night soon after North

Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, he and several embassy colleagues

went to the American Military Cemetery, which stood on a Belgrade hill near

the conºuence of the Danube and Sava Rivers. Despite the unlikelihood of

invading forces making it as far as Belgrade without warning, the group worried

that the Korean hostilities might be a feint to divert U.S. attention from

the Balkans. English and his colleagues remained all night, watching the horizon

for hostile forces.

...

Yet the Yugoslav government still had not formally requested any military

assistance. Perhaps the Yugoslavs did not believe that a Soviet invasion was

forthcoming. Soon after the outbreak of war in Korea, CIA Station Chief

English received a NIACT—a Night Action Cable—requesting input on any

concerns held by the Yugoslav leadership. Ambassador Allen met with Tito

the next day and was assured that Tito was calm and did not fear an invasion.

...

English, who returned to Washington in January 1951, reported that he

served as a point man during the Smith-Popovib negotiations, operating under

the cover of an interpreter.148 Cooperation was advantageous to Yugoslavia

for a number of reasons. The CIA, specifically Wisner’s powerful OPC,

“could assist Yugoslavia in the field of psychological warfare. In addition, CIA

could assist the Yugoslavs in setting up a communication system with the

West to be used in case Yugoslavia should be attacked.” The CIA offered a

small liaison group of intelligence officers from OPC and the Office of Special

Operations. Referring to the arms transfers, pieces of which were facilitated

by OPC,Wisner explained that “the CIA would be in a position to supply Yugoslavia

with certain limited amounts of American military equipment for

training purposes, etc. etc. The CIA might also be able to supply from its own

stock certain items now in short supply.”

...

Conªrming the CIA-UDB cooperation, English explained that the agreement

entailed a “formal exchange of intelligence . . . primarily military information.”

151 The station chief asserted that the agreement’s first manifestation

came in the form of a crashed SovietMiG-15 fighter jet, offered by Yugoslavia

to the CIA shortly after the agreement was ªnalized. According to English,

the Yugoslavs—refusing to allow Soviet agents inside their borders—told the

Soviet Union that the MiG had crashed in Yugoslav territory and was damaged

beyond salvageable condition. The MiG was subsequently offered to the

United States for inspection, on the condition that English facilitate the transfer

(as far as he knew, the Yugoslavs were unaware of his CIA connections; he

was likely chosen because of his rapport with Yugoslav Ambassador Popovib).

Five U.S. Air Force colonels went to Yugoslavia, said English, and “dismantled

the plane and took it out in parts.”

...

According to English, a seemingly innocuous event was also a key moment

in the two countries’ thaw. A party on 4 July 1950 in Bled, home to

Tito’s summer residence, thrown by Ambassador Allen and attended by Tito,

signiªed in English’s mind the first tangible improvement in relations between

the United States and Yugoslavia. “The ambassador is required, or it is custom,

to give a party in the capital for the American citizens in the country,”

English remarked.154 At the post-Korea meeting at which Allen and Tito discussed

the prospects of Soviet aggression, the ambassador invited Tito to the

embassy’s planned Fourth of July party in Belgrade. The invitation, Allen later

noted, was merely a “courtesy.” Tito would be in Bled rather than Belgrade

at the time and had not, according to English, visited any foreign embassy

since the split. To Allen’s great surprise, Tito accepted on the condition that

the party be held in Bled. “I could only reply,” wrote Allen dryly, “that the

party would be held in Bled.”155 English continued the story:

The interesting thing was that the State Department in typical fashion said they

would pay for it in Belgrade, but not in Bled. So [Allen] sold his personal vehicle

to put on a party. . . . [T]he ambassador and his wife were in Bled, and they

rented a villa. They were going to give a garden party—it was going to be a

beautiful, beautiful evening. They set the tables up, and there were going to be

Japanese lanterns, and candles and so on and so forth. The Yugoslav militia

came and said, “You can’t put the tables there. They’re not in the line of the machine

guns.” They were protecting Tito for coming to this party. So poor Kitty

Allen went upstairs to put her five year old son to bed, and there were two militia

men standing in the windowsill with their guns aimed at the party. . . . Anyway,

[Tito] came to that party and that was the first positive indication that he

was moving in that direction.156

The ambassador agreed: “It was the ªrst time he had been to a foreign embassy

since the break with Soviet Russia in 1948, so a good deal of signiªcance

was attached to his presence.”

 

 

 

edit: ima ovde više, od str. 136

Edited July 12, 2016 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

 

 

To je onaj grad na B, nalazi se na Dunavu, snađite se uostalom.”

 

 

 

 

“The directive

to the American Embassy in Yugoslavia,” English stated, “was to try and do

everything they could to move Tito away from Stalin.”

 

^_^

 

 

 

 English and his colleagues remained all night, watching the horizon

for hostile forces.

 

:0.6:

Edited July 12, 2016 by MancMellow

[kud u maglu Simoviću]

i onaj momenat valona i petrovac na moru je isto ili možda pre

[kud u maglu Simoviću]

zahvaljujuci ladnom ratu smo ziveli u miru 50-ak godina.dug period za nas.morao je pasti jebeni zid inace inspirator prave umjetnosti.onda je dosao birokrata sa misijom,flekavom celom i shopingholicarkom suprugom.onda dodje suicidni iz leve reke sa psihosuprugom..

hvala ti hladni rate na srecnom detinjstvu

sorry na upadu

gledajući šta je bilo posle bolje bi prošli da su rusi ušli onomad

[bradilko]

kad vidimo u kakvom ropstvu su ziveli polonezi,cesi,istnemci i da ima i dalje tu velikh umjetnika i duha a kod nas hiljade mrtvih i proteranih..tito nam prodao konzumerizam

[Prospero]

 

“The directive

to the American Embassy in Yugoslavia,” English stated, “was to try and do

everything they could to move Tito away from Stalin.”

 

 

^_^

 

Inače je Robert Borden Rims (u tekstu pomenut kao Robert Rems) prvi od Amera, krajem juna '48. ukapirao da se dešava raskol sa Staljinom, pa je o tome poslao depešu pre nego što je ovde to obnarodovano. A ovoj direktivi je trebalo malo duže™ da stigne u Beograd.