Zašto se Jugoslavija/SFRJ zaista raspala

[Tribun_Populi]

Vidim da ga i Jović citira u knjizi. Nisu oni nudili ništa više (u pogledu članstva) od onoga što su tada dali Bugarima i Rumunima - nekakvo pridruženo članstvo, a punopravno znamo već kad. Skloniji sam verovanju onome što pročitah nedavno - da je neki naš diplomata u razgovoru sa Karingtonom devedesetih upitao koliko je tačno da je Juzi nuđeno članstvo, a ovaj odgovorio nešto u stilu "imamo već Portugal i Grčku, šta će nam još jedan ekonomski bogalj".

 

Što se tiče Miloševića, igra je bila gotova, ostalo je ili to (da proba) ili razlaz. Momentom izlaska Slovenije koja je očigledno sa svih strana (i vlasti i opozicije) tada već imala zakucanu poziciju nastaje game over. On je probao i ispušio.

Problem kod njega je kako je odigrao posle.

Edited August 19, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[Dr Arslanagić]

Zameraš mu što nije išao jako i do samog kraja ili što nije pustio Srbe van Srbije niz vodu?

[Tribun_Populi]

Zameraš mu što nije išao jako i do samog kraja ili što nije pustio Srbe van Srbije niz vodu?

 

Ma zameram mu što nije bio politički veštiji u datom momentu. Ne možeš probati da refederalizuješ Jugoslaviju iz pozicija Srbije, morao se tražiti neki drugi modus - bilo kroz podršku spolja (koje je načelno bilo), bilo kroz savezne institucije. Jugoslaviji je, ispražnjenoj od sadržaja, kardeljanoj totalno, trebala relegitimacija - nešto što se je moglo prodati širokim narodnim masama a da bude zajedničko i jugoslovensko, pogotovo što bi takvo nešto naišlo na plodno tle (jer sam ja duboko ubeđen da Jugoslavija nikada nije bila jugoslovenskija i prihvatljivija među običnim narodom nego osamdesetih). To pre svega.

 

A drugo, zameram mu što nije terao do kraja u smislu guranja svoje agende na kongresu, taj kapital se je nekako morao iskoristiti, to je jedino za šta je mogao da se uhvati.

[iDemo]

Ima li negde da se kupi elektronskih izdanja i jednog i drugog Jovića?

Bori ko veruje nek' napise neki sazetak - ja bi isti vrlo rado procitao...

[ObiW]

A drugo, zameram mu što nije terao do kraja u smislu guranja svoje agende na kongresu, taj kapital se je nekako morao iskoristiti, to je jedino za šta je mogao da se uhvati.

Pa jesmo ti rekli da je hteo da se kongres nastavi, ali da je vecina preostalih delegata izglasala prekid kongresa? Kako je on to mogao da gura bez ovih koji hoce prekid?

[Tribun_Populi]

Pa jesmo ti rekli da je hteo da se kongres nastavi, ali da je vecina preostalih delegata izglasala prekid kongresa? Kako je on to mogao da gura bez ovih koji hoce prekid?

 

Koji ste mi rekli? :D

Nisam mislio da nastavi kongres, nego svoju agendu na kongresu/sa kongresa. Kapital koji je tamo ostvario jeste veliki broj glasova pro Jugoslavije kao države, a ne kao saveza država. Nešto je s tim mogao dalje, poduprti neke savezne institucije, Antu Markovića, gurati savezne izbore pre nego da se pojavi Tuđman itd.

[hazard]

Pa ispada po tome da su lagano minirali zemlju jer nisu hteli da se refederalizuje?

 

I onda se meni čude kad ja uvek kažem da su mi Slovenci po takvim pitanjima ,,najgori" <_<

[noskich]

Tako ispade, zakuvali, pa zapalili i ostavili druge da se kuvaju. Zbog shake maraka (eura). Ali neka, sve se vraca, sve se placa. Pre ili kasnije.  

Edited August 19, 2016 by noskich

[ObiW]

Koji ste mi rekli? :D

Ja i moji podstanari :D

 

Nisam mislio da nastavi kongres, nego svoju agendu na kongresu/sa kongresa. Kapital koji je tamo ostvario jeste veliki broj glasova pro Jugoslavije kao države, a ne kao saveza država. Nešto je s tim mogao dalje, poduprti neke savezne institucije, Antu Markovića, gurati savezne izbore pre nego da se pojavi Tuđman itd.

Pre nego se pojavi Tudjman? Kongres je bio u januaru 1990. HDZ registrovan istog meseca, Tudjman izabran za predsednika HDZa mesec dana kasnije. Istog meseca je Sabor raspisao visestranacke izbore u Hrvatskoj koji su odrzani u dva kruga, krajem aprila i pocetkom maja.  

[noskich]

Tuđman je verovatno bio najispravniji jer je jedini jasno i glasno rekao šta hoće i još za to dobio ogromnu prodršku hrvatske javnosti na izborima.

 

Pa i Milosevic je jasno i glasno rekao sta hoce i dobio skoro celovitu podrsku srpske javnosti, samo sto to nije mogao da izgura.

A ne vidim kako iko moze da Tudjmana nazove ispravnim u bilo cemu, od negacije Jasenovca pa do etnickog ciscenja. Od cele garniture jedini ko se nedvojbeno moze nazvati neo-fasistom od pocetka do kraja. 

Edited August 19, 2016 by noskich

[Prospero]

Nego je cela armija. <_< Ja sam ko klinja trčao za kolončinom tenkova i oklopnjaka koje su terali na voz, a kojoj se kraj nije video, s početka na kraj dugačke ulice u komšiluku.

 

Nego, evo ga Kiro.

 

Eh, u epskom narativu kontakt EEZ i SFRJ uvek nekako počne tim sastankom u Beogradu, ali i za to postoji podloga:

 

 

 

...

With the rise of Gorbachev in March 1985 many in Western Europe followed Gorbachev’s internal reforms with fascination. Constantly, rumours of Gorbachev being toppled circulated. The international agenda was concentrating on new approaches to arms control. The prospect of overcoming nuclear deterrence loomed on the horizon. How much the Bush administration in particular concentrated on Soviet policy can be observed by looking at the memoirs of Secretary Baker, who starts his chapter on Yugoslavia with his visit in June 1991, as if nothing had happened before.

 

In 1988 the growing frictions in the Warsaw Pact surfaced, with Hungary and Poland taking the lead. It was a breath-taking chain of events leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification and the dissolution of Comecon and Warsaw Pact. Thus, the whole post War order in Europe broke down with a rapidity that almost no-one had deemed possible, while diplomacy tried to catch up with what the people themselves had initiated.

 

Yugoslavia, however, during this period was completely pushed to the margins, with Western media as well as policy makers concentrating elsewhere. When German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met Yugoslav president Janez Drnovšek in December 1989, he was preoccupied with his Ten-Point-Plan, trying to win Drnovšek’s approval in a time of mounting international criticism. Only the reduction of asylum seekers from Yugoslavia did hold his attention. Still, the trend in Yugoslavia appeared at first sight to be similar to what happened in the rest of Europe: the league of communists dissolved, opposition parties able to form, free elections taking place in all republics. Maybe Yugoslavia would just have its own revolution. That the elections might be a prelude to warfare, especially with Tuđman and Milošević getting overwhelming popular support, was hardly recognised. For most observers, what happened in the individual republics was highly confusing, with Slovenia choosing the democratic alternative, Serbia and Croatia the nationalist, the other republics remaining ambivalent.

 

Only when Slovenia and Croatia in December 1990 announced their intention to declare independence in six months time and fighting increased in Krajina, a feeling began to spread that things in Yugoslavia might run completely different from the other former socialist countries. In addition, Yugoslavia, the former “model”, did hardly command attention any more. It was by now perceived as a country of trouble. It lost much of its remaining attractiveness when, with the first free elections in Poland and the Hungarian reforms in summer 1989, Yugoslavia fell behind in terms of democratisation and market reforms. The EC now had for the first time to develop a coherent foreign policy, first with regard to the incorporation of Eastern Germany into the EC, then concerning assistance to the transition countries in Eastern Europe. Belgrade was the “great loser” of 1989, experiencing “a steep devaluation of its international position”.

 

The course of international politics did not grant Yugoslavia a favour. Instead, just before finishing the two-plus-four negotiations, Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. International diplomacy shifted immediately to this new hotspot, with the US trying to rally support for an international campaign to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In January 1991 the invasion in Kuwait followed, then Saddam Hussein was fought in his Northern and Southern territories by US and British airplanes after killing thousands of Curds and Shiites. Thus, only in late spring 1991 did the time of extraordinary challenge for international diplomacy subside, giving way to a more relaxed atmosphere where capacity was freed to look at what happened in secondary places like Yugoslavia. It was hardly by accident that international attention now shifted to Yugoslavia.

 

To be sure, there were experts who did discuss the scenario of a break-up of Yugoslavia already in 1989/90 and who issued serious warnings early enough. The German embassy for example sent a cable to minister Genscher already in October 1989 warning that revolutionary changes might occur after the elections in Slovenia. Most people there preferred to leave Yugoslavia. In August 1990 another, pessimistic cable discussed options for the future of Yugoslavia, with confederalization characterized as the optimistic variant, break-up the more realistic one, arguing that willingness to compromise was never a strong point of Yugoslav politics.

 

The American ambassador Warren Zimmermann sent similar cables. In July 1990 the Bush administration circulated a non-paper for one of the regular NATO meetings of Balkan experts in Brussels, arguing that Milošević needed to be stopped if a bloody break-up of Yugoslavia was to be avoided. Increased contact with the leaderships of the republics would be highly advisable now. The response of the European counterparts in NATO was muted: The situation in Yugoslavia should not be dramatized. Obviously Yugoslavia was transforming into a confederation. Milošević should not be singled out. Contact should be further concentrated on the federal level, mainly Ante Marković. The German side was most leaning towards the American analysis, the French and British much less. A CIA report in November 1990, leaked to the New York Times, predicted a bloody collapse of Yugoslavia, provoked by Serbia, in two years.

 

Ambassador Hansjörg Eiff, who had advocated to stay aloof of the Yugoslav conflict, finally in early 1991 urged his minister to come and mediate. He thus endorsed calls by the leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia to start international mediation in the inter-republican negotiations. Budimir Lončar also, a close friend of Genscher, pressed his German colleague to come to Belgrade, not as usual for a flying visit of a few hours, but for a substantial mediation effort. These actors at that point of time finally realized that the Yugoslav parties themselves were not able to solve the mounting problems themselves. However, Genscher again and again postponed his visit, which was originally arranged for March 1991, coming finally in June 1991. Before, one of the rare exceptions of the pattern of non-intervention, a letter had been sent by Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Prime minister Ante Marković dated 7 February 1991 warning not to use violence to solve the Yugoslav crisis. Among German diplomats, this was already deemed to be a highly unusual interference in internal affairs.

 

It was also in the same month, on 21 February, that the first plenary meeting of the German Bundestag on the crisis in Yugoslavia took place, followed by many others. The knowledge displayed about developments in Yugoslavia was strikingly limited. Expressions of “concern” and “alarm” were coupled with appeals to the Yugoslav parties to be “sensible and willing to compromise”. In May, the weak one-man Yugoslav desk in the German MFA was finally expanded to become a small bureau on South Eastern Europe, reflecting heightened interest in the topic. Then hectic last minute diplomacy started, with all the main international actors suddenly appearing in Belgrade, carried by the illusion of being able to solve in one hour what had been built up for years. Now, Yugoslavia became the number-one issue of European foreign policy, for several years. However, precious time had been lost. A feeling grew that something might have gone wrong.

...

 

 

 

http://www.eu-historians.eu/uploads/Dateien/jeih-19-2004_1.pdf

[MancMellow]

Od oko 800-900k rezervista iz RS to mu dođe 200ak k, što za ondašnju raspodelu snaga na frontu ne da nije malo nego...

 

ne znam cifre da budem iskren. ali je moral u proseku bio katastrofa, to pricaju i tadasnji oficiri i rezervisti. ali potrebno je nesto egzaktno (osim onih valjevaca)

[Prospero]

Meni je ostala u glavi brojka rezervista a onda sam izvukao ovu drugu po Tribunovoj proceni procenata mobilisanih.

 

Ali mislim da je to - odziv, moral itd - stvar za internu raspravu u Srbiji, OK, i za evaluaciju političkog "htenja" stanovništva, tj manjka entuzijazma za rat u celini.

 

No, ako gledaš iz Zagreba - za njih se JNA mobilisala i nije bitno da li je stiglo 50, 100 ili 200k vojnika. Štagod da je mobilisano - JNA nije uspela da uradi veliki i brzi zahvat i da "slomi" HR snage ali je uradila "the next best thing" - sprečila je HR da uspostavi kontrolu nad svojom teritorijom i omogućila pobunjenim Srbima da zadrže i pojačaju vojne efektive tj transformišu delove JNA u srpsku vojsku, popune se dobrovoljcima i spreme se za višegodišnji sukob.

 

 

Meni je dan danas teško da razumem šta je u leto/jesen bila autonomna politika JNA a šta je radila pod pritiskom Miloševića ili nekakvih srpskih nacionalista u vrhu JNA. Ali je konačan rezultat u kasnu jesen 91 pa do proleća 92 bio potpuno u funkciji grubih crta koje su bile prihvatljive Miloševiću, i stoga je mobilizacija u suštini ostvarila svoju političku svrhu.

[CPP]

Meni je fascinantno da se skoro trideset godina kasnije i u situaciji u kojoj je i Srbija a pogotovo Srbi u Hrvatskoj danas ovde diskutuje sta je Milosevic (ili srpsko rukovodstvo) uradio dobro, te provejava teza da sustinski nije moglo mnogo bolje.

Moglo je, na primer, da se ne ratuje i prihvati raspad po avnojskim granicama. Ili da se samo ne ratuje i cera politicki i sudski.

[reginald]

No, ako gledaš iz Zagreba - za njih se JNA mobilisala i nije bitno da li je stiglo 50, 100 ili 200k vojnika. Štagod da je mobilisano - JNA nije uspela da uradi veliki i brzi zahvat i da "slomi" HR snage ali je uradila "the next best thing" - sprečila je HR da uspostavi kontrolu nad svojom teritorijom i omogućila pobunjenim Srbima da zadrže i pojačaju vojne efektive tj transformišu delove JNA u srpsku vojsku, popune se dobrovoljcima i spreme se za višegodišnji sukob.

 

 

 

The worst thing za "pobunjene Srbe" koji su time stavljeni pred gotov čin "bivanja pobunjenim".