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Šta je najbitnije što se u istoriji dogodilo na današnji dan?


Ajant23

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3 hours ago, Anduril said:

Amaterski ima i drugo znacenje a tice se metodologije. U nauci je metodologija slicna a ovo sto ovaj radi je definitivno amaterski.

 

Ovo je bilo izistinski naucnotm: sve je tu, i izvor i Svetlana, reko zika miki, a zika peri... :isuse:.

Anduril, svetlost, mac Zapada, sa sve zanimljivostima, jebemte nauko, jebemte istorijo....

 

 

Edited by namenski
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1 hour ago, namenski said:

Mene bi bili sramota, ali stvarno: Montefiorea kao izvortm:isuse:

Jos ja, budala, krenuo sa Dojcerom, Kohenom...

Ma bezi bre sa sve Vikipedijom...

 

Vikipedija je za tvojih "20 miliona Rusa" Mt Everest a izvore u knjizi izvoli pobiti. 

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Just now, Anduril said:

Vikipedija je za tvojih "20 miliona Rusa" Mt Everest a izvore u knjizi izvoli pobiti. 

Naucnicetm, em sam ziv zaspao, em zaista nemam sta vise da razgovaram s covekom koji mi u raspravi, ma i forumskoj, poteze Koelja Montefiorea kao literaturu/izvor.

Moja greska, na trenutak sam pomislio da ti stvarno nesto znas ili zelis da naucis, sorry.

 

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1 minute ago, namenski said:

Naucnicetm, em sam ziv zaspao, em zaista nemam sta vise da razgovaram s covekom koji mi u raspravi, ma i forumskoj, poteze Koelja Montefiorea kao literaturu/izvor.

Moja greska, na trenutak sam pomislio da ti stvarno nesto znas ili zelis da naucis, sorry.

 

 

Nauci prvo sta je izvor - knjiga autora ne moze biti izvor nego su to originalna svedocenja i dokumenti. Eto, koliki si amater. Poenta je u tome sto je Montefiore imao pristup izvorima koje Deutcher nije - you are way out of date, man.

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7 hours ago, Anduril said:


Da, "pijani Zukov" je cak i kompliment za neke stvari koje je taj lik napravio svojim vojnicima (uz dnevnu dozu od 100g vodke/vojniku) kad ih salje na minska polja da rasciste teren.

Ahh hladnoratovski Ajzenhauer i čuveni prepričani dijalog sa Žukovom ... i naravno još čuvenije zgražanje.

Kao prvo hajd' ti malo bolje pročitaj šta je tačno napisao veliki Ajk, a ako ti nakon toga bude sve jasno kao i sada onda (pod dva) pročitaj uspomene Patona War as I Knew It, pa vidi sa kakvim oduševljenjem o tom metodu piše general vojske koja je čuvala svoje ljude.

I pri tome Paton nema u vidu Žukova nego pukovnika Robert P. Bela, komandanta 10. pješadijskog puka US Army, koji je u toku noćnog napada u borbama za Mec naredio pješadiji da napada kroz minsko polje. Paton na kraju tog opisa kaže (parafraziraću da ne bih sada kopao po kompu) - Neko će reći da su gubici 10. puka bili neopravdani i da je trebalo čekati deminere. Ja tako ne mislim!

 

Još su interesantnija sjećanja Beltona Kupera u njegovoj Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II, gdje on opisuje jednu epizodu iz krvavih borbi za Hartgensku šumu, kada je na raskvašeno minsko polje poslano 64 Šermana. Za prvih 26 minuta uništeno ih je 48 (sa posadama naravno). Kuper govori da je to jedna od najherojskijih epizoda u WWII.

Tako da je pijanih likova bilo na svim stranama.

 

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Ili kad je dao da atomska bomba explodira par kilometara od 40 000 sopstvenih vojnika. 

To su famozni manevri na Tockom poligonu u Orenburgskoj oblasti održani 14.09.1954. u kojima je učestvovalo oko 45 hiljada ljudi i koji su u suštini bili neka vrsta pokušaja da se u usavršavanju protunuklearne zaštite i ljudstva i tehnike ne zaostane za SAD, koji su u nov. '51. počeli to raditi kroz seriju učenja pod nazivom Desert Rock. Serija je trajala do '57. u njoj je učestvovalo negdje oko 40 hilj američkih vojnika.

 

 

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Ili kad se nakrao citavih vagona stvari od tepiha do slika koje je kacio u kupatilu jer vise nije bilo mesta.

A Staljin mu se smejao sta ce mu 50 tepiha i samo zapisivao u dosije kao i poroke ostalih marsala i generala. 

 

E ovo je tačno, ali nije bilo 50 tepiha nego 44 tepiha i goblena. I da - Staljin takve stvari nije trpio.  

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Jos je veca komedija nastala kad je imao po nekoliko verzija svojih memoara gde niko ziv vise ne zna sta je istina a sta ne. 

Nema nikakvih nekoliko verzija, nego imaju dvije. Ona prva iz 1969/70. i druga iz doba perestrojke, koju je kao dopunila Ana Davidovna Mirkovna recezent originala i intimus mozga perestrojke - Jakovljeva. Ti "Žukovljevi memoari" kao 10 izdanje izašli su 1989, a u 13 izdanju pojavio se  (našla ga kćerka Žukova) i dio o represijama u armiji.

Prvo izdanje je prije odlaska u štampu Brežnjevljevskim cenzorima izmjenjeno (da te sada ne gnjavim kao da to tebe interesuje) i Žukov je teške muke pristao na to. No u tom prvom izdanju odnos prema Staljinu je krajnje korektan. Žukov pošteno govori i o njegovim manama i onjegovim vrlinama. 

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Zato "pijani Zukov", jer se mnoge stvari ne slazu sa autobiografijama/biografijama drugih sovjetskih generala.

Memoari su takva stvar po deifoltu i to nije povezano sa alkoholizmom.

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A armija naravno da nece da otvori sve arhive da se malo zagrebe sta su neki od slavnih generala radili i kako su se donosile odluke.

A šta ti imaš neke spoznaje pa čekaš zvaničnu potvrdu?

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Pročitaj prvo izdanje pa vidi šta je tamo rekao.

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I sta kazes - jel mogao SSSR bez Staljina ili nije?

Namenski je pogodio u sridu kada je rekao da ti staljinizam uopšte ne poznaješ. Kod tebe se taj fenomen krajnje vulgarno simplifikuje i svodi na raskulačivanje, GULAG i represije.

 

I svega ti nemoj o metodi. Čovjek koji napiše ovo

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Jos jednom, mogu se sovjetske divizije i sovjetski heroji itekako razdvojiti od staljinizma - to je sustina istorijske analize

 

To je zločin nad metodom i pretvaranje istorijskog procesa u nerazumljivu kaledioskopsku predstavu. Mogu ja da se bavim podvizima i herojstvom sovjetskog vojnika, ali oni mogu biti istorijski prožeti samo kroz smisao i racionalno objašnjenje, koji ti podvizi dobijaju kao dio jednog kompleksnog mozaika istorijskog procesa.

Edited by apostata
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Dobro, šta ste uhvatili šta je pijani Žukov pričao o Staljinu. Daj recimo šta je prvi britanski vojnik zapanjeno govorio o njemu posle razgovora na jednoj od mirovnih konferencija.

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11 hours ago, apostata said:

E ovo je tačno, ali nije bilo 50 tepiha nego 44 tepiha i goblena. I da - Staljin takve stvari nije trpio.  

:D 

 

Nije niko, ali je notorna istorijska cinjenica, meni draga, da su sve mlade armije - po pravilu pobedoonosne - imale isti problem: Napoleon je sa svojim marsalima imao isti problem koji je protokom vremena dobio anegdotalna obelezja i usao u folklor, ali su svadje i surevnjivost izmedju njegovih marsala (i njihovih zena) usle u price i pripovedanja.

Sovjeti nisu nista bolje prosli, a ima jos primera onoliko: to je, jednostavno, sudbina armija koje vode bivsi kamenoresci, kozarski kalfe, pekari, podoficiri, itd, itd, i koje deru armije koje vode siti i napiti skolovani oficiri sa pedigreom, po nekad i pravim pravcatim aristokratskim.

Budalastine o tepisima su za Montefiorea i andurile, na dogadjanja u ratu i njegovo vodjenje imaju taman toliko uticaja koliko i kolonjska voda koju su koristili: notorna je cinjenica da su se sovjetski marsali posle rata svadjali k'o piljarice, ali - moglo im se, a i imalo se oko cega svadjati.

 

Interesantno je da niko nije imun: civilizovani Amerikanci su slozno, odmah posle rata, izgurali tihog, sposobnog i svuda prisutnog Spruansa, u korist jednog Helsija i jos poprilicno drugih admirala. Covek koji je dobio Midvej i jos toliko toga, morao je da se zadovolji mestom ambasadora na Filipinima, dok je novinama dragi Helsi, koji je pravio gomilu gluposti

i gresaka, i to ozbiljnih uzivao u nepomucenoj slavi junaka bez mane i straha.

Skoro ista, doduse pretezno medijska sudbina, zadesila je i tihog i neprimetnog Bredlija, koga su u stranu potisnule galamdzije popu Patona.

Kod Britanaca je 1 Dauding, mozak i pravi tvorac pobede u Bici za Britaniju prakticno nestao, ubiven od likova poput Harisa i njemu slicnih.

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2 hours ago, apostata said:

E vidiš to ne znam ... šta je govorio?

 

From the memoirs published by those who took part in the negotiations in Teheran, it would appear that Stalin dominated the conference. Alan Brook, chief of the British General Staff, was later to say: "I rapidly grew to appreciate the fact that he had a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye. In this respect he stood out compared with Roosevelt and Churchill."

 

У другим изворима наводи исти епитет кад су покушали да погурају Совјете да изврше напад на Јапан пре 3 месеца од капитулације Немачке, колико су обећали.

Стаљин је одмах одговорио са прецизном калкулацијом колико трупа, залиха, и материјала треба да пребаце транс-сибирском железницом, која није чак ни имала довољан капацитет, и објаснио зашто не може пре три месеца.

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6 hours ago, vathra said:

 

From the memoirs published by those who took part in the negotiations in Teheran, it would appear that Stalin dominated the conference. Alan Brook, chief of the British General Staff, was later to say: "I rapidly grew to appreciate the fact that he had a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye. In this respect he stood out compared with Roosevelt and Churchill."

 

У другим изворима наводи исти епитет кад су покушали да погурају Совјете да изврше напад на Јапан пре 3 месеца од капитулације Немачке, колико су обећали.

Стаљин је одмах одговорио са прецизном калкулацијом колико трупа, залиха, и материјала треба да пребаце транс-сибирском железницом, која није чак ни имала довољан капацитет, и објаснио зашто не може пре три месеца.

Ovo onako, ofa radi: nije Sveti Josif nista racunao tom prilikom, to je posao nekog ili nekolicine opskurnih generalstabnih pukovnika iz zeleznickog ili kog vec odeljenja Generalstaba.

Za uzeti kao sigurno je da su se Sovjeti pripremali za temu, proucavali je, a skoro sigurno je da su na Dalekom istoku imali i sopstvene planove: sve ovo ni u koliko ne umanjuje sa vise strana priznatu Staljinovu sposobnost da prati vojna dogadjanja, razume ih i - u krajnjoj liniji - donosi odluke, a ponajmanje rusi Brukovu poentu jer je matori Bruk sigurno znao da slusa i gleda, uostalom i Cercil priznaje da je bio zapanjen brzinom kojom je Staljin shvatio konsekvence, kako vojne, tako i politicke, iskrcavanja u Severnoj Africi, ma koliko mu bilo nedrago sto to znaci odlaganje pravog drugog fronta.

 

 

I, narocito glede Pontijakovog potsecanja na Hirosimu i Nagasaki: zapadna istoriografija redovno, ali redovno preskace cinjenicu da je narocito Jalta velikm delom bila moljakanje Sovjeta da stupe u rat sa Japanom sto pre posle poraza Nemacke u Evropi i to iz prostog razloga sto su se u konacnom obracunu sa Japanom ocekivali ogromni gubici i da je poprilicno ustupaka Sovjetima nacinjeno upravo zbog toga.

Jos vise zaboravljaju da napomenu da je uspesna proba Bombe ucinila sovjetsku inrevenciju protiv Japana suvisnom, sta vise - nepozeljnom, tako da nema sumnje, ali bas nimalo, da je jedan od bitnih elemenata koji su odlucili o upotrebi Bombe protiv Japana bila upravo teznja da se Sovjeti 'oslobode' obaveze da udju u rat sa Japanom, sto ovima, naravno, nije bilo ni na kraj pameti, ne toliko zbog interesa svojih vrlih Saveznika, vec zbog sopstvenih, sa sve propagandnim bonusom o pridrzavanju datog obecanja...

 

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Podsecanja radi, na danasnji dan 1961. godine u Vijetnamu koji je sa inostrancima ratovao vec vise od 20 godina, Francuzi, Japanci, pa opet Francuzi, pa Amerikanci u zastitu slobodnog sveta i demokratije, pocela je operacija obelezena kao Ranch Hand u sirokim narodnim masama poznatija kao vezana za takozvani Agent Orange, ali i ne samo njega.

Ideja je bila da se hemijom skine lisce sa drveca u dzunglama Vijetnama, da se sjebu usevi, a sve to da bi se gerila isterala na cistinu.

Nije bilo reci o problemima sa zabranom koriscenja hemijskog oruzja, uostalom, radilo se o borbi protiv mrskih komunista potezao se argument da su Britanci nesto slicno vec radili u Malaji, takodje u pokusaju da doakaju takodje komunistickoj gerili, ali - sve u svemu - dogadjaj nije ni izbliza privukao niti privlaci takozvanu medijsku paznju, a i cemu kada je u borbi za uterivanje demokratije sve dozvoljeno.

Za 10 godina, racuna se, 24% povrsine Juznog Vijetnama je bilo posuto hemikalijama, ukupno nekih skoro 80,000 kubika defolijanata i herbicida, neselektivno, uredno i sistematski.

 

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Uspelo je, nije da nije, a zasto i ne bi, moderna hemija cuda cini...

 

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Sa sve urednom oznakom za ucestvovanje u borbenim akcijama.

 

I sa sve posledicama koje se i danas osecaju, a o kojima i danas raspravljaju tankocutni intelektualci, uglavnom sluzeci se argumentom poznatim kao 'pa stvarno nema smisla...', obaska sto su medijima i svetu kudikamo poznatije muke jadnih Amerikanaca izlozenih delovanju primenjivanih henikalija, nego muke citavog jednog naroda.

 

 

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Dok je gerila, k'o svaka uspesna gerila - izdrzala, sta joj je drugo i preostajalo.

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I pobedila, a sta bi drugo.

 

 

 

 

Edited by namenski
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On 9.8.2018. at 23:59, apostata said:

Ahh hladnoratovski Ajzenhauer i čuveni prepričani dijalog sa Žukovom ... i naravno još čuvenije zgražanje.

...

 

Ima gomila ozbiljnijih izvora od toga - recimo general pozadinske armije Andrei Kruljev:

Spoiler

Order concerning the purveyance of front-line Red Army servicemen with vodka in the quantity of 100g per day
N 0320 25th of August 1941
According to the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 22nd of August 1941 (¹ 562 cc), I hereby order that:
1. Since the 1st of September 1941 the front-line servicemen and commanders of the Field Forces should receive 100 g of 40-degree vodka each per day. 
The Red Airforce airmen, that fulfil combat duties, and the technical personnel, that maintains the field airstrips of the Field Forces, should receive vodka just as the combat front-line troops do.
2. The Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should take the measures to:
a. Organize the vodka distribution exclusively for the contingents that are defined by the State Committee of Defense Decree and most strictly supervise the exact observance of it. 
b. Ensure the timely delivery of vodka on the frontline of the Field Force and organize a reliable guarding service of vodka in the field conditions. 
c. At the expense of the purveyance administration of the units and formations, provide the selection of special personnel that should be held responsible for the correct distribution of vodka portions, accounting of the vodka expenditure and conduct the balance sheets. 
d. Order the intendants of the Fronts to deliver once in every ten days to the Main Intendant Board the information concerning the remains of vodka and to compose applications for the necessary quantity of vodka every month before the 25th. As a basis for such application the exact number of front-line troops should be taken into account and be ensured by the Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies.
1. The necessary quantity of vodka for the month of September should be established by the Chief Intendant of the Red Army without submissions of applications from the Fronts and Armies.
The order should be made valid via telegraph.
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
State Committee of Defense Decree 
N GOKO-1227 of the 11th of May 1942
Moscow, Kremlin
Concerning the purveyance of Field Force of the Red Army with vodka
1. Since the 15th of May 1942 the mass everyday distribution of vodka among the personnel of the Field Force should be abolished. 
2. The existing distribution of vodka should be maintained only among the front-line troops that have exhibited successful conduct of operations against the German invaders; moreover, the portion of vodka from now on should be increased to the 200 g to each serviceman per day. 
To achieve this, every month vodka should be delivered to the disposal of the Front Commands in the quantity of 20% of total strength of Front or Army depolyed on the front-line.
3. The remaining personnel of the front-line troops should receive vodka in the quantity of 100 g to each serviceman exclusively on the following revolutionary and social holidays: Great October Socialist Revolution anniversary (7th and 8th of November), the Constitution Day (5th of December), New Year Day (1st of January), Red Army Day (23rd of February), International Labor Days (1st and 2nd of May), All-union Athlete's Day (19th of July), All-union Aviation Day (16th of August) and International Youth Day (6th of September), also on the day of Unit Holiday (unit's formation date). 
4. State Committee of Defense Decree N 562 cc of the 22nd of August 1941 should be abrogated.
State Committee of Defense Chairman I. Stalin
Order concerning the rules of vodka mainteinance and distribuition among Field Force troops
N 0470 of the 12th of June 1942
Despite the repeated directions and explicit demands concerning the distribution of vodka among the Field Force troops strictly and purposefully, according to the established portions, up to this time the cases of unlawful vodka distribution take place. 
Thus vodka is given to staff personnel, commanders and units that do not have any rights to claim it. Some commanders of units and formations, as well as staff officers, exploiting their ranks and positions, receive vodka from the warehouses, ignoring the orders and established rules.
The control of the vodka expenditure is performed badly by the Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies; accounting of vodka quantities in the units and warehouses is in the unsatisfactory condition.
According to the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 6th of June of this year ¹ GOKO-1889c, I hereby order: 
1. The distribution of vodka in the quantity of 100g to each serviceman per day should be performed only in relation to the personnel of the frontline units that conduct offensive operations. 
2. The remaining personnel of the front-line troops should receive vodka in the quantity of 100 g to each serviceman exclusively on the following revolutionary and social holidays: Great October Socialist Revolution anniversary (7th and 8th of November), the Constitution Day (5th of December), New Year Day (1st of January), Red Army Day (23rd of February), International Labor Days (1st and 2nd of May), All-union Athlete's Day (19th of July), All-union Aviation Day (16th of August) and International Youth Day (6th of September), also on the day of Unit Holiday (unit's formation date). 
3. The distribution of vodka among the personnel of Armies and other formations should be co-ordinated with the Chief Purveyance Officer of the Red Army according to the directions of General Staff and the applications of Military Councils of Fronts and Armies. 
4. For the maintenance of vodka special warehouses should be created within Front and Army food stores. The manager of the warehouse and one storekeeper should be chosen out of the specially selected honest, reliable personnel, able to secure total security and safety of the vodka stocks. 
The warehouses should be sealed up after the distribution procedures, and guards should be kept at the doors, chosen out of the reliable soldiers.
5. The Chiefs of Purveyance boards of the Fronts and Chiefs of Purveyance departments of the Armies should register all available vodka stocks as of 15th of June and transfer them for the maintenance to the Front and Army warehouses. 
6. The registration of the vodka distribution should be performed by the Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance involving the Chiefs of boards and departments of the Purveyance of the Fronts and Armies according to the directions of the Chief Purveyance Officer of the Red Army concerning the terms of vodka distribution and numerical composition of units liable to it. 
7. Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should be held responsible for the correct maintenance, expenditure and accounting of vodka, vodka bottles and packing. 
8. This order should be made valid via telegraph. 
9. State Committee of Defense Order N 0373 of 1942 should be abolished.
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
Order concerning distribution of vodka among the troops of Red Army Field Force since 25th of November 1942
N 0883 13th of November 1942
1. In accordance with the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 12th of November 1942 N 2507c, starting from the 25th of November this year vodka should be delivered to the trooops as follows:
a. 100 g to each serviceman per day should be given to the units, whose troops are directly involved into combat actions and are deployed on the frontline in trenches; to the units on reconnaissance missions; also to artillery and mortar units attached to infantry and deployed on the fire positions; aircraft crews after they fulfil combat missions; 
b. 50 g to each serviceman per day should be given to: regimental and divisional reserves; technical service units and formations that work on the front-line; units that fulfil important duties in special circumstances (erection and reconstruction of bridges, highways and other) and in special conditions under enemy fire; wounded personnel deployed within field sanitation service, according to the doctors' directions.
1. The remaining personnel of Red Army Field Force should be given 100 g of vodka to each serviceman per day on the occasion of revolutionary and social holidays mwentioned in the Sate Committee of Defense Decree N 1889 of the 6th of June 1942. 
2. Concerning the Transcaucasus Front's troops, instead of 100 g of vodka 200 g of strong wine should be given (or 300 g of table wine); instead of 50 g of vodka 100 g of strong wine or 150 g of table wine should be given. 
3. The Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should establish monthly limits of vodka distribution to the Armies by isssuing Army orders and securing the expenditure within the limit, established for every month separately. 
4. Upon the expenditure of monthly limit, the Fronts should report to the Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance in order to receive the next month's limit. In case the Fronts do not submit the reports of vodka expenditure before the 10th day of the coming month to the Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance, the Fronts that have not submitted the reports will receive no vodka portions. 
5. The limits of vodka consumption should be established for each Front for the duration of 25th of November-31st of December 1942 according to the Appendix. 
6. The Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance - Brigade Engineer com. Pavlov and Chief of Red Army's Military Communications-Major General com. Kovaljev-should attend to the fact that vodka portions are delivered to the troops of South-Western, Don and Stalingrad Fronts before the 16th of November, and to the remaining Fronts before the 20th of November, according to the limits. 
7. The Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance should establish permanent control of the vodka expenditure in strict accordance with the current Order. 
8. The military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should organize the return of used packing and bottles from vodka to the vodka factories and refineries People's Commissariat of Food Industry, attached to the Fronts. 
Units that have not returned the packings should receive no vodka portions.
9. This order should be made valid via telegraph.
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
Appendix 
To the People's Commissariat of Defense Order N 0883
Limits of vodka expenditure for the troops of Red Army's Field Force from 25th of November to 31st of December 1942
Fronts and Separate Armies Limits of vodka expenditure (in litres)
Karelian Front 364 000
7th Army 99000
Leningrad Front 533 000
Volkhov Front 407 000
North-Western Front 394 000
Kalinin Front 690 000
Western Front 980 000
Brjansk Front 414 000
Voronezh Front 381 000
South-Western Front 478 000
Don Front 544 000
Stalingrad Front 407 000
Total: 5 691 000 
Transcaucasus Frtont 1 200 000 (wine) 
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Khruljev.
Order concerning the establishment of vodka portions and distribution procedure among the technical personnel of Airforce units of the Red Amy's Field Force
N 0311 of the 13th of January 1943.
In addition to the People's Commissar of Defense Decree N 0883 of the 1942 concerning the procedure of vodka distribution among Red Army's Field Force personnel, I henceforth order that:
1. 1. In the Airforce units of Red Army's Field Force and in the Airforce units deployed within military districts, but with the People's Commissariat of Defense Orders put on the same foot as the former, 50 g of vodka should be given to each serviceman, including technical personnel, only on the days when operational sorties are flown by the aircraft they directly operate and maintain on the airfields. 
2. The order of vodka distribution should be established according to the personal lists, compiled by the commanders of airforce units, approved by an air-division commander.
The order should be made valid via telegraph.
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Colonel General of Intendance Service Khruljev.

 

Ima i epizoda sa De Golom:

https://books.google.at/books?id=f-HerzgvxssC&pg=PA477&dq="stalin+swigging+champagne"&hl=en&sa=X&ei=f4LBUsThJ_SrsASsjICQDw&q="stalin+swigging+champagne"&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q="stalin swigging champagne"&f=false

 

Da ne duzim, poenta nije da i drugi nisu pili ili zrtvovali svoje vojnike.

Ne, poenta je u meri i na to se odnosi "pijani" Zukov a ne na alkoholizam.

Zukov u tome nijenesto odudarao od drugih Sovjeta. 

 

Quote

To je zločin nad metodom i pretvaranje istorijskog procesa u nerazumljivu kaledioskopsku predstavu. Mogu ja da se bavim podvizima i herojstvom sovjetskog vojnika, ali oni mogu biti istorijski prožeti samo kroz smisao i racionalno objašnjenje, koji ti podvizi dobijaju kao dio jednog kompleksnog mozaika istorijskog procesa.

 

Ti ocigledno nikad nisi ucio kako se u nauci razclanjuje mehanizam kompleksnih pojava.

Ne moze se sistemskom analizom ignorisati uloga pojedinih igraca u sistemu. 

To je generalizacija koju u ozbiljnoj naucnoj analizi niko ne radi - u nauci se analiziraju u detalj kljucni igraci sistema kao i njihova interakcija sa drugim igracima, spoljnim uticajim  i vremenom. 

Tako se dolazi do razumevanja mehanizma kljucnih dogadjaja - to ti se naziva jos i redukcionisticki pristup koji se primenjuje svuda u nauci gde se pokasava objasniti mehanizam neke pojave.

A posle takve analize se moze zakljuciti da je Staljin imao negativnu ulogu u skoro svakom domenu sovjetskog zivota i da bi bez njega a sa nekim ko nije paranoidna ubica SSSR odigrao mnogo pozitivniju ulogu u odnosu na milione svojih gradjana, vojnika, istocnu Evropu i svet.

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