Bajden - jedno staro i očekivano presidency?

[Spooky]

Nego sto se tice uzvatnog udara - jasno je da je njegova jedina snaga u tome da pretnjom spreči druge da ne napadnu - kad su već izvršili opšti napad u kome je stradala vlada, nema mnogo svrhe uzvratiti udar i ubiti jos milione nevinih ljudi... A opet, ako to javno saopštiš, onda nema ni pretnje i odvraćanja...

Zato je za razliku od USA i Rusije koje mislim da imaju javno proklamovanu politiku odgovora na nuklearni udar, meni zanimljiva UK tradicija u kojoj premijer kad stupi na dužnost i kad ga vojni zvaničnici upoznaju sa mogućnstima i štetom koju izazivaju balistički projektili u podmornicama, napiše četiri identična pisma za 4 UK strateške podmornice. Pisma sadrže jednu od 4 opcije - uzvatite, nemojte, po svom nahodjenju, i stavite se u službu naših saveznika, pečatiraju se i stavljaju u sefove podmornica. Otvaraju se samo u slučaju da zaista i dođe do te situacije, a kada na dužnost stupi novi premijer, stara pisma se spaljuju neotvorena.
 

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort

Edited April 26, 2023 by Spooky

[Radoye]

4 hours ago, Zverilla said:

zanimljivo je da je kontrola atomskog oruzja, centralizovana u predsedniku, uvedena da bi se njegova upotreba sprecila a ne omogucila: 

https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/third-shot

(za one koji mrzi da citaju: americka vojska je, nakon sto je dobila pravo da koristi atomske bombe, planirala da baci trecu bombu 19. avgusta, i 15ak do oktobra 1945.!. bukvalno kako se napravi dovoljno plutonijuma za bombu da se baca.

truman je hteo da ponovo uspostavi kontrolu nad njima i spreci ih da bacaju bombe po automatizmu.

 

od tada se dosta toga promenilo, pa postoji i koferce, i ono verovatno ima vise funkcija, ali (koliko bar ja znam) to da li je predsednik taj koji pokrece nuklearni rat, ili taj koji ga sprecava je strogo cuvana tajna (odnosno ceo proces odlucivanja). jer ako protivnik zna proces, moze da planira napad spram njega.

 

 

Ovo boldovano nije tacno.

Saveznici su do kraja 1945. imali na raspolaganju materijala ukupno za 7 bombi - prvu koja je detonirana kao test u Alamogordu u Nju Meksiku (Trinity - prva atomska eksplozija), dve bacene na Japan, trecu predvidjenu da bude bacena / na kraju ostala neupotrebljena (izazvala dve nesrece - takozvana "Demon Core"), dve detonirane posle rata u prvom testu na atolu Bikini (Able i Baker) i materijal za jos jednu. Pored materijala proizvedenog u sopstvenim postrojenjima ovo ukljucuje i sav materijal zaplenjen u Evropi od Nemaca i njihovih saveznika. Do kraja rata su 3 bombe bile spremne, uz jos 3 u pripremi / dve od kojih dovrsene 1946. To je sve, nikakvih 15 bombi do oktobra, nikakve dalje bombe, to im je bio sav uranijum i plutonijum koji su imali na raspolaganju.

15 aviona B-29 je modifikovano u nosace atomskih bombi kao deo "Silverplate" programa do kraja WW2 (i jos 17 dodato nakon toga do kraja 1946). Osim nuklearnih bombi ovi avioni su mogli da nose i velike konvencionalne bombe ("Pumpkin") i njima slicne zapaljive bombe i tako su operativno koristeni u strateskim bombardovanjima japanskih gradova tokom jula i avgusta 1945.

[Zverilla]

11 hours ago, Radoye said:

 

Ovo boldovano nije tacno.

Saveznici su do kraja 1945. imali na raspolaganju materijala ukupno za 7 bombi - prvu koja je detonirana kao test u Alamogordu u Nju Meksiku (Trinity - prva atomska eksplozija), dve bacene na Japan, trecu predvidjenu da bude bacena / na kraju ostala neupotrebljena (izazvala dve nesrece - takozvana "Demon Core"), dve detonirane posle rata u prvom testu na atolu Bikini (Able i Baker) i materijal za jos jednu. Pored materijala proizvedenog u sopstvenim postrojenjima ovo ukljucuje i sav materijal zaplenjen u Evropi od Nemaca i njihovih saveznika. Do kraja rata su 3 bombe bile spremne, uz jos 3 u pripremi / dve od kojih dovrsene 1946. To je sve, nikakvih 15 bombi do oktobra, nikakve dalje bombe, to im je bio sav uranijum i plutonijum koji su imali na raspolaganju.

15 aviona B-29 je modifikovano u nosace atomskih bombi kao deo "Silverplate" programa do kraja WW2 (i jos 17 dodato nakon toga do kraja 1946). Osim nuklearnih bombi ovi avioni su mogli da nose i velike konvencionalne bombe ("Pumpkin") i njima slicne zapaljive bombe i tako su operativno koristeni u strateskim bombardovanjima japanskih gradova tokom jula i avgusta 1945.

 

moja greska.

lepo pise u linkovanom clanku da je po planu grooves.a trebalo da se napravi jos 7 do oktobra.

sa dve vec bacene (i jos po 3 mesecno u novembru i decembru, jer je proizvodnja plutonijuma funkcionisala) do kraja 45te bi bilo (planiranih) 15.

 

naravno, kada se japan predao, smanjili su proizvodnju i promenili ciljeve, pa je na kraju napravljeno manje. onda su pravili mk4, i sve sta je doslo za njima

[Peter Fan]

Score one for Sleepy Joe, ako nista drugo onda kao dobra namjera:

 

Last week, the Biden administration announced the death of global economic governance as we’ve known it.

 

The president has long evinced an interest in shifting the foundational assumptions of American economic policy a few feet to the left. In between singing paeans to “the soul of America” and promising a return to normalcy, Biden spent his first two years agitating for the largest expansion of social welfare and public investment in generations.

In his first address to Congress, the president reminded the country that “public investment and infrastructure has literally transformed America,” bringing us railroads, highways, schools, colleges, vaccines, the internet, and “so much more.” This defense of state intervention in markets crescendoed with the declaration that, in our democracy, the government is “you and I” and not “some powerful force that we have no control over. It’s us.”

 

Nevertheless, while the president and his more progressive economic advisers had routinely conveyed their antipathy for the ideological legacies of Reaganism, they’d never articulated a comprehensive alternative. And this was especially true with regard to the international dimensions of economic governance.

 

But Jake Sullivan changed that last Thursday. In a speech at the Brookings Institution, Biden’s national security adviser detailed the tenets of a “new Washington consensus” in global economic policy, one that would encourage state direction of development instead of punishing it, strengthen labor standards instead of eroding them, sustain the climate instead of despoiling it, and reduce economic interdependence between rival powers instead of increasing it.

Spoiler

Sullivan’s rhetoric, and the policies undergirding it, represent a triumph for a certain contingent of progressive-policy intellectuals. Ideas that were once the exclusive property of iconoclastic academics and think-tank staffers are now official U.S. policy. (Anyone familiar with the ascendant economic thinking in the progressive nonprofit world, or with the NSC’s recent personnel, will see the fingerprints of the Roosevelt Institute and Hewlett Foundation all over Sullivan’s speech.)

 

The promise of Global Bidenism is considerable. It aims to humanize the global economy while simultaneously increasing its growth potential. And contrary to the fears of U.S. allies, America’s gains under this new paradigm need not come at the rest of the world’s expense.

But the project faces a pair of related hazards. One is that there is no actual consensus about the “new Washington consensus,” which cannot be fully realized without bipartisan congressional support and remains vulnerable to rollback under a future Republican administration. The other hazard is that Bidenism’s hostility toward China could theoretically increase the risks of geopolitical conflict. This is especially worrying when one considers that the White House has set a new baseline for what constitutes toughness toward America’s chief rival, a threshold which any future Republican administration may feel duty-bound to exceed.

 

Sullivan defined his new model of global economic governance in opposition to its predecessor. Although he did not use the term, the object of the national security adviser’s critique was neoliberalism — the market-oriented economic orthodoxy that emerged out of the collapse of Bretton Woods and the stagflation crisis of the 1970s.

In Sullivan’s telling, that orthodoxy was premised on three flawed assumptions. One was that “markets always allocate capital productively and efficiently.” Another was that “all growth was good growth.” A third was that “economic integration would make nations more responsible and open” and “the global order would be more peaceful and cooperative.”

 

In reality, the whims of markets and the imperatives of shared prosperity do not tightly align. Investors are reluctant to assume the risks necessary for midwifing nascent technologies. And they also fail to price the environmental impacts of commerce or the geopolitical risks of transnational supply chains.

All forms of growth, meanwhile, are not created equal. Gains in national income that derive from the expansion of a bloated financial sector and concentrate among the wealthy are not as valuable as those that arise from investment in the production of critical technologies spread equitably across the population.

Finally, integrating China into the global economic order did not liberalize its politics or temper its martial ambitions. To the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party has grown more authoritarian and geopolitically ambitious as its nation has grown wealthier and more economically integrated with the west.

Thus, in the Biden administration’s account, neoliberalism left the United States an unenviable inheritance: an atrophied industrial base that undermines America’s capacity to innovate and prosper from cutting-edge technologies; a perilous economic dependence on an emboldened geopolitical rival; a steadily worsening climate crisis; and a democracy stricken by the related ailments of stark inequality and low social trust.

Bidenism posits industrial policy as the core answer to all of these problems. Through subsidies and direct public investment, the U.S. government can channel capital toward forms of production that render U.S. growth more sustainable and resilient to geopolitical shocks. By promoting domestic semiconductor production, the CHIPS Act mitigates America’s perilous reliance on Taiwan for those key inputs. The Inflation Reduction Act, meanwhile, encourages critical mineral mining in both the United States and allied countries; currently, China processes more than 80 percent of the world’s critical minerals. And, of course, by subsidizing the innovation and deployment of green technologies, the IRA also encourages decarbonization.

At the same time, these industrial policies can mitigate income inequality by tying eligibility for certain subsidies to wage standards and reduce geographic inequality by incentivizing investment in left-behind regions. This in turn, theoretically, fortifies democracy by demonstrating the government’s responsiveness to the working class’s economic needs.

Critically, Bidenism does not prescribe industrial policy for the United States but conventional free-trade norms for everyone else (norms that generally forbid or constrain the subsidization of domestic production). Instead, as Sullivan declared, “We will unapologetically pursue our industrial strategy at home — but we are unambiguously committed to not leaving our friends behind. We want them to join us.”

Why Europe should not fear Global Bidenism.

America’s allies have not all applauded this paradigm shift. Indeed, widespread skepticism of the “new Washington consensus” was one impetus for Sullivan’s address. To some European observers, Global Bidenism looks like a scheme for enriching America at the rest of the world’s expense.

From this perspective, a world in which every country is allowed to lure capital by subsidizing domestic production is one in which factories and jobs will concentrate in the United States. After all, as the world’s largest economy and printer of the global reserve currency, the U.S. can more easily afford to pay out hundreds of billions in subsidies than a fractious European Union, let alone developing countries. Thus, economists such as the Peterson Institute’s Adam Posen have argued that Bidenism will undermine the growth prospects of nations in the Global South, which will struggle to compete in a world where immense fiscal capacity is a precondition for attracting capital.

But these concerns are likely overblown. And Sullivan’s speech illustrated the considerable benefits that Global Bidenism offers to developing countries.

For one thing, a majority of the funding in the IRA has no domestic-content requirements, and only a small minority of its appropriations consist of direct subsidies to U.S. manufacturers. Further, as the Roosevelt Institute’s Jennifer Harris notes, the IRA’s clean-energy investments “add up to just half of Europe’s clean-energy subsidies,” while Biden’s efforts to require the federal government to purchase American-made inputs still leaves “the portion of U.S. procurement open to trading partners” vastly higher than “that of our closest trading partners.”

What’s more, the notion that the U.S. and E.U. competing to see who can stimulate more investment in green technology constitutes a zero-sum “race to the bottom” seems fundamentally misguided. Everyone has an interest in the development and deployment of renewable energy and low-carbon alternatives to internal-combustion vehicles and fossil-powered industrial processes. The more that the United States invests in the production of such technologies, the faster cost-lowering efficiencies will be discovered and novel tech developed. The benefits of cheaper solar panels, batteries, and EVs will not be exclusively captured by whichever nation catalyzes the most progress on those fronts. It is possible that overcapacity will eventually become an issue, but we are a long ways away from saturating global demand for chips, renewable energy, and electric vehicles.

Meanwhile, Sullivan’s vision of global economic governance included many ideas that should benefit ordinary workers in the Global North and South alike. He called for a progressive reorientation of American trade policy: Rather than prioritizing further reductions to historically low tariffs, or the invidious agendas of American multinationals, Sullivan argued that new economic agreements should seek the elimination of corporate tax havens and the strengthening of labor and environmental standards.

The old Washington consensus punished developing nations that sought to promote their export industries through state subsidization. The new one not only officially encourages such public investment, but also seeks to facilitate it by “mobilizing trillions in investment into emerging economies.”

Specifically, Sullivan called on the World Bank and other multilateral development banks to “stretch their balance sheets to address climate change, pandemics, and fragility” and “expand access to concessional, high-quality finance for low-income and for middle-income countries.” In recent weeks, the Treasury Department has pushed for the IMF to advance debt restructuring for low-income nations.

Sullivan also touted the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which aims to direct hundreds of billions in investment toward “energy, physical, digital infrastructure” in developing countries.

Taken together, Washington’s new outlook seems more favorable to equitable growth in the Global South than the neoliberal one it seeks to displace.

There is no consensus about the “new Washington consensus.”

Alas, the Biden administration’s bid to forge a post-neoliberal consensus faces a fundamental problem: There is nothing close to a bipartisan consensus in favor of progressive industrial policy in the United States.

The Inflation Reduction Act has funneled a disproportionate share of new jobs and investment to red states. Although this might render the GOP more supportive of decarbonization in the fullness of time, at present, Republicans remain profoundly hostile to Biden’s green jobs program. Indeed, the House GOP is currently threatening to engineer a global financial crisis unless Biden agrees to defund his signature climate bill.

Republican support for using international diplomacy to raise global corporate tax rates, strengthen environmental and labor standards, or increase investment in poor nations is also far from assured. To its credit, the Trump administration actually did strengthen the labor provisions of America’s trade agreement with Mexico, and Sullivan cited this as a model to duplicate in future treaties. But betting on the GOP’s concern for labor rights is a risky endeavor.

Thus, there is a significant chance that wide swathes of Biden’s vision would be rolled back or nipped in the bud upon a Republican presidential victory in 2024. And even before then, the administration cannot realize many of its international aims without House Republicans’ cooperation. The Biden administration reached an agreement with 136 other countries on a global minimum tax in 2021. But giving that agreement the force of law will require congressional approval. And many of the administration’s other progressive ambitions, including promoting infrastructure development in the Global South, will be difficult to realize without further congressional appropriations.

Strip Global Bidenism down to the provisions for which there is a genuine “Washington consensus,” and you’re left with proposals for reducing U.S. economic dependence on China and constraining that nation’s economic development. Whatever its merits, this adds up to a decidedly less liberatory revision of global governance. And it is one that also entails significant risks.

In his most aggressive attempt to redress neoliberalism’s geopolitical consequences, Biden has sought to choke off China’s access to the world’s most advanced semiconductors, or the inputs necessary to manufacture them itself, no matter where in the world either are produced. The ostensible aim of this policy is to prevent the Chinese military from growing more powerful on the back of technologies produced or designed by the U.S. and its allies. But the administration’s export controls are not limited to firms with proven ties to the Chinese military. Rather, all Chinese businesses are barred from accessing the most advanced chips. In effect, this means that it is official U.S. policy to prevent China from achieving its economic development goals. Without access to the world’s most advanced semiconductors, Chinese firms will struggle to compete at the cutting edge of e-commerce, robotics, medical imaging, pharmaceutical research, self-driving vehicles, and myriad other markets.

It is conceivable that these restrictions will improve the prospects for world peace by deterring China from launching an invasion of Taiwan or other military offensive — although it is difficult to see advanced microchips having much bearing on a war in the Taiwan Strait.

On the other hand, it seems plausible that making it impossible for China to achieve its economic goals under the existing global order might render the CCP more inclined to challenge it martially or otherwise.

In his speech, Sullivan emphasized that America’s restrictions on U.S.-China commerce are narrowly tailored and that bilateral trade between the two countries actually hit a record high last year. But given the GOP’s perennial commitment to attacking Democratic foreign policy as excessively friendly to America’s adversaries, there’s reason to fear that the next Republican president will feel compelled to broaden Biden’s export controls, further poisoning the U.S.-China relationship.

Neoliberalism’s loosening grip over American political and intellectual life has created an opening for a progressive reformation of global economic governance. Jake Sullivan’s speech last week confirmed that the Biden administration intends to seize that opportunity. But absent sustained Democratic control of the White House, the president will have a hard time entrenching a new economic paradigm. And so long as the Republican Party remains jingoistic, the new Washington consensus will be at risk of devolving into something more destructive than its predecessor.

 

[Budja]

Pogresna tema.

 

 

Edited May 8, 2023 by Budja

[theanswer]

Trump sinoć imao townhall na cnn-u iz NH. Greatest hits, 2016 all over again. 

[black mirror]

cnn radi isto ono sto su uradili 2016. pomazu trampu da bude republikanski kandidat nadajuci se da ce on biti lak plen za demokratskog kandidata

[Weenie Pooh]

11 hours ago, theanswer said:

Trump sinoć imao townhall na cnn-u iz NH. Greatest hits, 2016 all over again. 

 

Novina je Ukrajina, gde debil od voditeljke pokušava da ga natera da kaže za koga navija, a on trubi da će izdejstvovati obustavu ratnih dejstava za 24 sata.

 

35 minutes ago, black mirror said:

cnn radi isto ono sto su uradili 2016. pomazu trampu da bude republikanski kandidat nadajuci se da ce on biti lak plen za demokratskog kandidata

 

Sumnjam da neko ovog puta ima taj cunning plan, pre će biti da samo jure rejtinge. 

 

Odriču ih se javno raznorazne shitlib™ figure zbog toga što "daju platformu" jednom Trampu. (Kao da bez tog jednog town halla niko ne bi znao ko je on.)

 

 

[black mirror]

1 minute ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Sumnjam da neko ovog puta ima taj cunning plan, pre će biti da samo jure rejtinge. 

 

sumnjam da su pali toliko nisko

 

 

 

1 minute ago, Weenie Pooh said:

Odriču ih se javno raznorazne shitlib™ figure zbog toga što "daju platformu" jednom Trampu. (Kao da bez tog jednog town halla niko ne bi znao ko je on.)

 

ne znam za tebe ali ja gledam i uzivam (uz kokice)

[Weenie Pooh]

6 minutes ago, black mirror said:

ne znam za tebe ali ja gledam i uzivam (uz kokice)

 

E, a znaš koji su još dobri, oni što fantaziraju kako bi ga oni sasekli da im se kojim slučajem dozvoli da vode intervju  

 

Evo npr. ovaj nesnosni lik sa Guardiana:
 

Spoiler

You Have to Grind This Motherfucker Down
The only correct way to interview This Guy has never been tried.

HAMILTON NOLAN
MAY 11, 2023

 

Again, last night, on CNN. We have to see it all again, from this guy. Stoop shouldered, puffy midsection, rich suit buttoned unflatteringly over his gut, big red tie hanging down to his dick. The sculptured wispy hair that curves into horns from a certain angle, the palms out hand gesturing, the thing where he pulls down his bottom lip and lets his bottom row of plastic teeth shine and takes a dramatic pause before making a dumbass point. The weird fluctuations in his voice from trilly to gravelly to breathy, the painted eyelids that sit uncomfortably in a pale tanning booth puddle, the lies. And the crowd. The pink-cheeked enraptured crowd. The retired lawyers and insurance agents and young guys with bad haircuts in Men’s Wearhouse suits who never had the benefit of reading a good book in their lives. The pathetic crowd, with such a low bar for entertainment. The same crowd that used to cheer for the lions to eat the slaves in gladiator times. This is the best they can get now.

 

And the words. The torrent of words, pushing forward through any air or brains or other words in their path. Not sinuous, sly words, but instead just loud, maximal words, the most words, the biggest words, words like a whole rugby team running full speed into a wall for fun. Words from a bad sitcom, a lowest-common-denominator show with scab writers aired in laundromats to bored people slumped in chairs who will take any stimulation they can get. Words that do not connect to one another sentence by intelligible sentence, but instead just leap out brashly, showing themselves off phrase by phrase, each standing proudly alone, and independent, and irrational.

 

“I’m not talking about terminating the constitution. I’m talking about cherishing the constitution,” he said. “Things are happening that are very positive,” he said. “Drill baby drill,” he said. “They don’t even speak English in that Chinatown,” he said. “She’s a wack job,” he said. “They’re destroying our country,” he said. “Many people were killed,” he said. “Cold, blank range, they shot her,” he said. “That thug.”

 

And the reporter, meek and gesturing, standing in a firehose and trying to catch a futile drop. Saying “Mr. President” to the swollen declaiming half insane man who would not stop talking. Saying something was not true, and then getting defiantly blown away by an empty tidal wave of nothingness, as the crowd cheered. We want transgression! We want fantasy! We want blood! Doesn’t matter who the reporter is. Always the same. If he picked her up and choked her and slammed her to the stage and planted a foot on her chest and raised his arms, he would get the loudest cheers of the whole night. This is pro wrestling, and he is experienced. He knows it, and the crowd knows it, but the people who are paid to analyze it never quite seem to get it. He is an idiot savant, a professional in a sea of self-serious amateurs. A big dumb rhinoceros ramming his head into the side of a Land Rover over and over to the squealing delight of the tourists within.

 

There is only one way to properly interview this guy. It has never been done to the best of my knowledge. It can be, though. He will show up for it, like a moose to a salt lick. Here is how it’s done: A table and two chairs and no audience. Him, his shifty padded ass in the chair, and an interviewer. An interviewer who is not a patsy or a pushover and who has been in fistfights and whose professional veneer is something cultivated to cover a deep sense of rage. You sit there and you ask him a question. He says his bullshit. You let him say his bullshit just long enough to determine that he is not answering the question. Then you break in and ask him the question again. You let him say his bullshit again, to launch off on a wild tangent, to do his faux outrage and accusations and all that. When it is clear he is doing that, which will not take long, you break in and ask him the question again. You put the question to him clearly. You let him blah blah blah and then you put the question to him again. Don’t let him run off down a side path forever. You let him speak until it’s clear he won’t answer and then you ask again. Cut off his mic, if necessary. He won’t like that. Doesn’t matter. Ask the clear question again. When he doesn’t give a clear answer, ask it again. The same question. Ask it again. Ask it again. Ask it again. Ask it again.

 

I don’t care if you need to spend the entire hour-long interview repeating the same question in a calm, clear, and forceful way. In fact this would be fine. With each passing round of question-and-no-answer, his petulance will increase, as will the evident absurdity of this stupid, cowardly man. Keep asking the question until you get an answer. If you never get a real answer, you will not move on from that question. You will sit across a small table in close physical proximity and let him wave his hands and whine and then you will put the question to him again. You will break him. Break him. You have to follow him down every turn of the rhetorical maze until there is nowhere else for him to go. First he will bloviate, then he will get annoyed, then he will get truly angry, then he will get frustrated, then, at last, he will be faced with his own helplessness. This is where he will break. Maybe he will get up and storm out, a contemptible little baby, unable to answer a single question. Fine. Maybe he will scream himself hoarse with accusations of bad faith and bias and conspiracy, retreating ever further into an ever more obvious cocoon of stubbornness and fear, a scared, small man, unwilling to face anything so terrifying as reality. Fine. Or maybe he will, after all of the gnashing of teeth and rending of shiny ties, answer the question. Fine.

 

The point is that you are there to get the answers to questions. You don’t leave the question without the answer. You don’t let him pound you with loud and empty words until you just move on because it seems best. You don’t say, “Well sir, that’s just not true,” and then move to another question. You don’t say, “Well, we have a lot of other questions to get to.” You don’t let him build a fortress of stupidity that you feel unable to pick apart with tweezers. His entire hurricane of lies will blow right past you if you just sit there calmly, unmoving, and then, when the breeze dies down a little bit, ask the question again. And ask the question again. If the entire thing descends into an Andy Kaufman-esque spectacle of moody silence, a standoff with a mute and angry refusenik, fine. That’s fine. You have one job and it is not a complicated one. Your job is to get the answer to the question. Did you get an answer? A real answer? No? Then you ask the question again. That’s all.

 

If and when you get your answer, you move on to the next question. And repeat.

 

Until we get this, we will just get what we got last night, over and over and over again. Might as well not do that at all. “Well sir, the facts say you’re just incorrect on that, Mr. President.” What the fuck is the point. That is not worth doing. It’s not worth scheduling that sort of thing and planning it and finding a crowd and airing it on national television. In fact it is detrimental to the health of our sickly democracy to do it. All of this fretting by journalists and pundits and cable news network chiefs about How To Cover This Man at This Fraught Time in Our History is unseemly. Put that motherfucker in a small chair and turn the thermostat in the studio up. Make that motherfucker sweat. Bore in. Stay there. And stay there. And stay there longer than him. He can’t fucking last. He is destined to fold. Have a little fucking nerve, please. You ask the question. And you ask the question again. Eventually he will either pass out, or cry, or answer the question. Fine. We have all the time in the world.

[black mirror]

trebao bi neko ovom amateru da objasni da town hall ne traje 3 meseca nego samo sat i kusur

[black mirror]

dobar troll bajdena tokom jucerasnjeg DeSastera 

 

 

[black mirror]

 

ne znam jos koliko puta treba da padne da bi demokrate svatili da ne treba bajden da bude njihov kandidat u sledecim izborima. amerikanci ovako samo mogu da gade demokratiju celom svetu

[Amos]

Kandidovanje Bajdena je at this point molestovanje starog čoveka. 

[x500]

Najveca prednost Dzoa je da prilikom padova ne dolazi do lomova. Padne, podugnu ga i ide dalje - ko macka

 

Prema reakcijama ljudi iz obezbedjenja, vrlo sporo reaguju, on to cesto radi pa su izgleda svikli. Izgleda da se i on navikao da pada, cak se nije ni iznerviral.