BrExit?

[MancMellow]

Ako se produze pregovori posle 2019 onda ulaze u izborni ciklus sto posto

 

Inace, mislim da je ovo Borisov pokusaj da se relaksiraju unutartorijevske tenzije pre nego bilo sta drugo

Edited October 13, 2016 by MancMellow

[Dr Arslanagić]

Huge rise in Britons applying for Irish citizenship after Brexit vote

 

[Hamlet Strašni]

Jel moraju da se odreknu britanskog?

 

 

Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

[hazard]

 

 

Ukratko,

 

Dzonson: "Je l' da kontinentu da smo vam isli na kurac sve ove godine, pa eto odlazimo! Jos samo malo da vas izdrkamo sledece 2-3 godine i to je to! Drinks on me!"

[hazard]

Jel moraju da se odreknu britanskog?

 

 

Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

 

Ne

 

Inace Irska daje pravo na drzavljanstvo svakome ko je rodjen na ostrvu Irskoj uklj. dakle i celu Severnu Irsku. Sta reci osim da su republikansko-sinfejnovski nacionalisti i agresori

[Prospero]

Nemam dovoljno veliku kafu za ovo  



 

UK faces Brexit divorce bill of up to €20bn
Unpaid budget appropriations, pension liabilities and other commitments make up total

by: Alex Barker in Brussels and George Parker in London


Britain is facing a divorce bill from the EU for as much as €20bn, according to a Financial Times analysis that shows the bloc’s shared budget is emerging as one of the biggest political obstacles to a Brexit deal.
 
More than €300bn of shared payment liabilities will need to be settled in the divorce reckoning, according to EU accounts. It is a legacy of joint financial obligations stretching back decades — from pension pledges and multi-annual contracts to commitments to fund infrastructure projects — that Brussels will insist the UK must honour.
 
The sheer size of the upper estimate, which some EU-27 officials reckon is too low, threatens to poison the politics of the break-up and derail a Brexit transition and trade deal, according to several senior European figures involved in the process.
 
The €20bn upper estimate covers Britain’s share of continuing multiyear liabilities, including unpaid budget appropriations of €241bn, pensions liabilities of €63.8bn and future contractual and other spending commitments totalling about €32bn.
 
British Eurosceptic MPs are likely to react badly to the news that UK taxpayers might have to pay billions of pounds to Europe as the price of Brexit. One minister said: “It will have to be explained very carefully, to explain what we are getting in return for market access.”
 
The pound hit its lowest level on record on Wednesday, according to a Bank of England trade-weighted index, as markets priced in the possibility of a hard Brexit and the prospect of difficult negotiations with the rest of the EU.



Iain Begg, a London School of Economics expert on the EU budget, who described the premise of FT calculations of the legacy bill as “completely sound”, said the budget fight was shaping up to be a “battle royal”.
 
The FT’s analysis is the first attempt to quantify fully the UK’s legacy liabilities in the EU budget, an issue expected to be a flashpoint in the formal exit talks.
 
To date, economic analyses of Brexit undertaken by bodies such as the UK Treasury have not taken full account of the cost of untangling EU budget commitments.

The precise withdrawal bill is impossible to calculate and will depend on a political deal. However, officials from four EU-27 countries who reviewed the FT’s estimates said they reasonably represented the sums at stake. Some questioned certain assumptions that reduced Britain’s exit bill, arguing that the UK must make good on all its spending promises, not just to 2019 but to the end EU’s long-term budget in 2020.
 
Brexit blows a hole in the EU’s budget, with potentially far-reaching political consequences. It confronts Germany, Italy, France and other net contributors with the dilemma of filling any gap or scrapping programmes that Brussels and eastern and central European countries see as legally binding promises.


The UK could be on the hook for a significant share of EU liabilities
 
Britain’s €20bn reckoning would cover only spending already approved on projects within the EU-27, not the future shortfall created after 2019 by Britain’s withdrawal from the long-term EU budget.

It also excludes EU spending on UK organisations. Philip Hammond, UK chancellor, has pledged to protect the funding for most, but not necessarily all, of these programmes where a British organisation is involved.

Brexit campaigners claimed the UK could save £350m a week by leaving the EU.
 
The budget will be a big factor in several aspects of the withdrawal talks. Senior EU diplomats expect the EU-27 to tie the settlement of Britain’s budget bill to any Brexit transition arrangements — a priority for UK business, which is keen to retain access to European markets while a long-term trade deal is agreed.
 
Jean Arthuis, who chairs the European Parliament budget committee, said Britain should honour projects signed off when it was a member. “The UK can pull out of the EU but it cannot escape its obligations under international law, especially if it wishes to become a ‘global leader’ in trade,” he said. “This is a matter of credibility. Brexit is not a poker table.”
 
In addition to making good on previous promises, the EU-27 would demand future EU budget payments as a condition of single-market access.

Such a stance is likely to anger many campaigners against UK membership of the bloc.
 

A big headache will be dividing up the risk of joint EU loans to countries such as Portugal and Ukraine

Conor Burns, a Eurosceptic Conservative MP, said: “Leaving the EU doesn’t mean paying money into the EU, having free movement in the EU and applying the law of the EU. Those three things, I believe, were specifically rejected by the British people on June 23.”
 
But one former UK minister said: “We could actually end up paying more into the EU budget. That will be a big story in the next two years.”

 

The calculation

The FT’s analysis of the EU’s public accounts is intended to approximately quantify and share out payment liabilities that the UK has agreed as an EU member but which stretch beyond 2019, the exit date expected by Downing Street.

By aggregating liabilities such as unpaid budget appropriations and pension and spending commitments with a total of about €337bn, it highlights the sheer scale of the bill Britain might have to settle before leaving the bloc.

When calculated according to the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget — roughly 12 per cent, after taking account of a rebate secured by Margaret Thatcher when she was prime minister — Britain’s share would be €40bn. After making full deductions, including for the UK’s share of assets and expected EU budget spending in the UK, the exit bill to the EU stands at close to €20bn.

It excludes so-called shared contingent liabilities of €57.8bn and other loan guarantees of €21.4bn. These liabilities and guarantees are joint pledges to stand behind assorted EU lending and activity, from outstanding EU bailout loans to Portugal and Ukraine and to estimated liabilities from dismantling a nuclear site.


The spending overhang

The most significant element of the divorce bill is a category item known as reste à liquider (RAL), which roughly translates as “yet to be paid” and represents EU appropriations on specific projects that will be paid for in the future. The commission describes these as legally binding pledges.

Britain has, to date, largely ignored this “commitments” overhang. It instead focused on keeping down the annual budget payments, a strategy that is part of the reason why the EU’s unfunded commitments — the equivalent of an unpaid credit card bill — have ballooned in recent years as schemes are signed off but bills are not paid.


The EU's unfunded spending commitments have increased over time

At the end of 2015 the RAL stood at €217.7bn, more than four times its size in 2000. The size of the RAL fluctuates but the FT estimates it could rise to a maximum of €241bn by the end of 2018. Several senior EU diplomats and politicians confirmed that Britain’s share would be demanded in Brexit talks.

Mr Arthuis, the European Parliament’s budget committee chair, said Britain had “commitments to honour”. “It is ultimately up to Brexit negotiators to decide but the RAL will probably fall under the withdrawal agreement foreseen by Article 50 [formal divorce talks],” he said.


The offset

There are factors that bring down the leaving bill in net terms. The UK is expected to lay claim to a share of the EU’s multi-annual assets, which, at book value, are about €22.5bn. This would reduce the Brexit bill by about €2.7bn. London would be likely to request a revaluation of property.

On average, about 45 per cent of Britain’s post-rebate contribution comes back to the UK in public and private receipts, according to FT calculations. That is why the gross €40bn contribution bill would come down to €20bn in net terms.

There is one further hitch. As the Thatcher rebate on contributions is paid to Britain in the following budget year, Britain in 2019 would also expect a €6bn refund from its 2018 budget contribution.


The EU-27 politics

Making Britain pay its EU debts is one issue that unites the EU-27. François Hollande, the French president, last week noted how Thatcher “wanted to stay in Europe” but demanded “a cheque in return”. “Now, the UK wants to leave and pay nothing,” he said. “It’s not possible.”

But there are differences of views emerging on the bill. The commission is taking a hardline position on Britain making good on liabilities it signed up to as a member, according to several senior EU-27 officials. “They are on a crusade,” said one.

Net contributor countries such as Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands face a dilemma: they would be expected to cover any Brexit-related budget shortfalls, yet know that demanding too much from Britain risks killing an exit deal.

At the same time, some big net recipients of EU funds — including among Baltic states and in eastern Europe — expect Britain to go even further. Some want the UK to settle its promises made when signing up to the EU’s €1tn long-term budget, which runs from 2014 to 2020. There is some sympathy for this view within the commission. This would almost double the FT’s upper estimate of the bill.

The looming challenge has been noted in some quarters of Westminster. Andrew Tyrie, who chairs the Commons Treasury select committee, wrote that even if the UK decided against participating in EU budget programmes, “it could be as late as 2023” before Britain has settled all the liabilities “for commitments entered into during our time as a member state”.


One big question is UK liability for EU spending after it leaves

Nick Clegg, the former deputy prime minister, said Prime Minister Theresa May had already promised to carry on making EU payments by vowing to still take part in European security and crime-fighting measures.

“It’s a measure of the government’s double standards that it won’t come clean to MPs and the British people about the consequences of its own approach,” he said.

A spokesperson for the British government said: ‘As the prime minister has said, we will invoke Article Fifty no later than the end of March next year. We are not going to provide a running commentary on leaving the EU.’

 

[Roger Sanchez]

pacta sunt plaćanda

[MancMellow]

Nemam dovoljno veliku kafu za ovo  

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Dr Arslanagić]

 

 

 

 

I feel really honoured to be invited by you, especially since today we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the EPC. There is no better way of doing this than by having a common serious and realistic reflection on the future of Europe. Frankly speaking, I also feel a little uncomfortable in the role of a speaker, instead of listening to your advice. The role of a listener would be for sure more natural today. But as you know well, politicians who are able to - and who want to listen to people wiser than them, are still a very rare commodity. But you have taken the risk of listening to my remarks, which I appreciate very much indeed. When I gave my first policy statement ten years ago, as Prime Minister of Poland, I spoke for nearly three hours. One of the commentators correctly observed that had my speech been as wise as it was long, it would have been one of the best in Polish history. From that moment on, I always speak briefly, which doesn't necessarily mean - wisely. Today, I will also be brief.

But before I begin, I would again like to express my gratitude and deep respect for Herman Van Rompuy, who is not only my predecessor and president of the EPC, but also my friend. When two years ago you handed me the little brass bell, a symbol of our presidential power, (the word "power" is in this context a delicate overstatement), I said I was your greatest admirer. Not just because you supported me as your successor. To be honest, I had absolutely no idea what I was getting into. Back then we all admired you for helping to steer us, to steer Europe out of the storm.

For five years - as one of the Prime Ministers around the table - I witnessed your skills: creating compromises; finding solutions; establishing trust, among often tough characters, hardly angels. To tell you the truth, it isn't any better today. Yes: Herman Van Rompuy in fact personifies traditional European political principles, which are also very important to me: trust, common sense, moderation and decency. We all thank you for your excellent work, Herman. We miss you.

Unfortunately, your successes did not put a definite end to European problems. Subsequent crises appeared on the horizon. And please do not link this directly with my taking office as President of the European Council. The migration crisis, the still unresolved dilemmas of the eurozone, lasting tensions in eastern Ukraine, Brexit - this is our daily bread. Before I say a few words about Brexit - the most debated subject both in London and on the continent - allow me to share with you a more general reflection.

The most serious crisis of  modern times is the weakening, if not the breakdown, of faith in the durability and purpose of traditional values, which are a foundation of the European Union and, more broadly, of the whole political community of the West. The West in civilisational, not geographical terms. These are the values which bind all the main ideological currents in Europe: liberalism, conservatism and socialism. Human rights, civil liberties, including the freedom of speech and religion, free market and a competitive economy based on private property, reasonable and fair redistribution of goods, restrictions on power resulting from rules and tradition, tolerance and political pluralism; my generation knows this catalogue by heart. I do not need to remind you that the creation of the European Union was a response to a historic catastrophe. The source of this catastrophe was the questioning of those values and treating national egoisms, the use of violence and the unlimited right of the stronger to dictate conditions for the weaker as the norm.

As Stefan Zweig wrote in those days: "It is an iron law that those who will be caught up in the great movements determining the course of their times always fail to recognise them in their early stages."

There is no point comparing these two periods. I only recall his words because today, in the midst of dramatic events of which we are participants as well as witnesses, we lack the will and the time for a more profound diagnosis of a great risk - different from the one we know from the past, but still great. Today, too many people give in freely to the flow of events, without even trying to recognise the essence or scale of the threat.

The threat today is that of the disintegration of Europe, in a political and ideological sense. It is no coincidence that very often those who question liberal democracy are the same ones who call for the break-up of the European Union. It is not surprising, since the Union is not only a political organisation which restricts national egoisms and eliminates violence as a basis for relations between countries, it is also a unique territory of freedom.

You will have noticed that the anti-liberal virus produces similar symptoms: both in Europe and beyond. Its carriers dislike the Union, so they are happy about Brexit. They don't want trans-Atlantic solidarity, so they promote isolationism. They look up to Putin and support Trump.

They are becoming louder and louder in increasing numbers. In Europe, we see them moving from the political periphery onto the main stage, often relying on support from political allies outside Europe who are already in power. One of their defining features is that they do not offer anything positive, instead feeding only on our weaknesses, conflicts, and the mood of uncertainty.

They proclaim a need for total change, they want to subvert the political order we call liberal democracy. Change for the sake of change has become their fetish. As the leader of Alternative für Deutschland said, commenting on the presidential campaign in the US, and I quote: "it might not be better under Trump, but at least with him there is the chance to change."

What they lack is positive ideas and designs of concrete solutions. But what they do not lack is the energy and determination in their march for influence and power. It is remarkable how all too often politicians of the moderate centre in comparison to them come across as listless, unwilling to fight, with no faith in their own convictions. As if they've fallen into a trap of fatalism, which they have no strength or desire to free themselves from. And we remember from the past that in the most dramatic moment of our history, in the 1930s, the advocates of a liberal order gave up virtually without a fight, even though they had all the cards in their hands. Ordinary people turned their backs on them, seeing how weak and hesitant they were. People didn't turn away from freedom because they were fed up with it. No, they simply lost faith that the freedom camp was able to put a stop to evil, however they understood it. They no longer believed that the moderate centre was a guarantee of security. And I am sure you remember who took their place.

I categorically reject this fatalistic approach. I categorically reject this temptation to give in to these trends. I do not accept arguments about the decadence of Europe and the West, because I deeply believe that we have built together a world which, despite its imperfections, is still the best of worlds. We must prove, however, every single day, that liberal democracy doesn't have to be a synonym of weakness. It is worth keeping in mind the words of Blaise Pascal, "Justice without force is powerless; force without justice is tyrannical." To paraphrase him: liberal democracy without force is powerless, even pathetic.

This is how people interpreted our actions, or rather our lack of action, in the first months of the migration crisis. They saw every day that we were incapable or unwilling to apply the rules and procedures that we had established ourselves. There was not only a lack of realism or rational assessment, but above all, a lack of determination to enforce the law. This became the main reason for the surge in popularity of radicals throughout Europe.

When it comes to migration, we are slowly turning the corner. Because we have rejected the fatalistic approach, expressed in the simple declaration: "There are too many of them to stop them". People are ready to trust us again, as long as we show that we are capable of regaining control, that it is us who once again set the conditions and procedures on our borders.

It's a similar case with free trade. The emotions and confusion surrounding TTIP and CETA are also a kind of fuel for eurosceptics and radicals. And it is up to us whether we maintain Europe's position as the world's centre of free trade. Most people know that free trade is in Europe's interest, but they also know what they want from their leaders negotiating those agreements, namely the protection of European interests. They want to believe and to know that we are able to dictate our own conditions, because free trade must also mean fair trade.

For the last three years, trade ministers and hundreds of experts have been racking their brains trying to answer questions such as: should the EU have the right to defend itself against unfair trade practices by whatever means are necessary and acceptable within the framework of the World Trade Organisation? I would like to put a stop to this endless deliberation. Because we have the right, we have the duty, and we have the capabilities.

Next week already I will try to convince as many European leaders as possible to take the same approach. An EU which does not have the tools to defend itself against trade hooligans will not build support for free trade, which will lead to Europe ultimately dropping out of global competition. Either we demonstrate that we are able to defend our interests, or the political winners will again be the populists and isolationists.

Finally, let's move on to Brexit. As for the negotiations, the situation is pretty clear. Its framework will be set out by the European Council - that is by the guidelines foreseen in the Treaty. Our task will be to protect the interests of the EU as a whole and the interests of each of the 27 member states. And also to stick unconditionally to the Treaty rules and fundamental values. By this I mean, inter alia, the conditions for access to the single market with all four freedoms. There will be no compromises in this regard.

When it comes to the essence of Brexit, it was largely defined in the UK during the referendum campaign. We all remember the promises, which cumulated in the demand to "take back control". Namely the "liberation" from European jurisdiction, a "no" to the freedom of movement or further contributions to the EU budget. This approach has definitive consequences, both for the position of the UK government and for the whole process of negotiations. Regardless of magic spells, this means a de facto will to radically loosen relations with the EU, something that goes by the name of "hard Brexit".

This scenario will in the first instance be painful for Britons. In fact, the words uttered by one of the leading campaigners for Brexit and proponents of the "cake philosophy" was pure illusion: that one can have the EU cake and eat it too. To all who believe in it, I propose a simple experiment. Buy a cake, eat it, and see if it is still there on the plate.

The brutal truth is that Brexit will be a loss for all of us. There will be no cakes on the table. For anyone. There will be only salt and vinegar. If you ask me if there is any alternative to this bad scenario, I would like to tell you that yes, there is. And I think it is useless to speculate about "soft Brexit" because of all the reasons I've mentioned. These would be purely theoretical speculations. In my opinion, the only real alternative to a "hard Brexit" is "no Brexit". Even if today hardly anyone believes in such a possibility. We will conduct the negotiations in good faith, defend the interests of the EU 27, minimise the costs and seek the best possible deal for all. But as I have said before, I am afraid that no such outcome exists that will benefit either side. Of course it is and can only be for the UK to assess the outcome of the negotiations and determine if Brexit is really in their interest. Paraphrasing Hannah Arendt's words: "a full understanding of all the consequences of the political process is the only way to reverse the irreversible flow of history". Thank you.

[Dr Arslanagić]

Kleg u Parlamentu juče. Dobar.

 

[MancMellow]

Dobar je. E, a sad je 2016. Pa sve do (minimum) 2019. Tri cele godine ovakvih stvari, govora, argumenata i preganjanja...

 

Dobar je Tusk. Pa ne naravno da nije u drzavnom interesu, al ajd sad budi pametan, posebno sa stanovista demokratinosti. Zato i kazem, najbolje izbori na kojima bi stranke stavile do znanja za kakav se Brexit zalazu i onda ko pobedi to je bar nekakav mandat. 

Edited October 14, 2016 by MancMellow

[MancMellow]

 

[Budja]

Dobar je. E, a sad je 2016. Pa sve do (minimum) 2019. Tri cele godine ovakvih stvari, govora, argumenata i preganjanja...

 

Dobar je Tusk. Pa ne naravno da nije u drzavnom interesu, al ajd sad budi pametan, posebno sa stanovista demokratinosti. Zato i kazem, najbolje izbori na kojima bi stranke stavile do znanja za kakav se Brexit zalazu i onda ko pobedi to je bar nekakav mandat. 

 

Ne vidim u cemu je Tuskov govor dobar osim u kalimerisanju, elitizimu i cvrstoj odbrani sopstvene politicke pozicije be ikakve naznake shvatanja krize i uloge EU u istoj - po njemu je cekla kriza uvezena spolja, Rusi, lud narod, populisti i tako to...

.

[MancMellow]

govorio sam samo o ovom delu o britaniji: i jedni drugi ce biti worse off (bar na kratak rok)

[frn1782]

Nije ni cudo da EU ide u kurac ako Poljska tripuje da je tu neka sila.