NATO

[namenski]

Isporuke po lend-lizu ostvarene su na osnovu 4 protokola:

 

- Moskovskom iz 1941.

- Vašingtonskom iz 1942.

- Londonskom iz 1943.

- Otavski iz 1945.

 

Najviše je isporučeno po zadnja dva (od jula '43. do maja '45.) nešto više od 60%. Što znači da na ono prije otpada oko 40%. U tenkovima i avionima (oko kojih je počela diskusija) to je negdje 5, odnosno 9 hiljada.

 

A SSSR je proizvela:

 

                     tenkova i SAU               aviona    (u hilj.)

 

1941                      4,7                         11,5 

1942                    24,5                         25,4

1941                    24,1                         34,9

1944                    29,0                         40,0

1945                    16,0                         10,0

 

Pa ti sada računaj i spekuliši.

Dzabe se trudis: Anduril zna.

To pod 1.

 

A pod 2: sve to pada u vodu, beskorisno je, sad ce Anduril da ti objasni da je Zukov bio - pijan.

[Dagmar]

Zapadnjaci su izvrsili najvece genocide u istoriji covecanstva, ali iz nekog razloga uzimaju sebi za pravo da drugima nesto kenjaju po tom pitanju.

 

Pa ko se bolje od njih razume, ne želiš valjda da ti kenja neko ko ne zna o čemu priča. Sem toga oni su demokratija&civilizacija, a svi ostali babuni iz šume kojima treba oteti prirodnih i kulturnih bogatstava.

[Prospero]

Prvo, napravio bih sustinsku razliku izmedju klasicne sfere interesa tipa 19. vek ili odnosa Rusije prema susedima i izmedju odnosa u okviru NATO-a.

Na jednoj strani imas klasicni power play sa varijabilitetom a na drugoj imas i ugovore i institucije koje ogranicavaju power play.

 

Drugo, te nade da bi udovoljavanje tradicionalnim interesima Rusije dovelo do dugorocne stabilnosti su pod a) SBBKBB a pod b) totalno demantovane i izigrane aneksijom Krima i okupacijom dela Ukrajine.

Da se podsetimo, taj modus operandi Rusija sprovodi jos od pocetka devedesetih za vreme Jeljcina (Abhazija, Pridnjestrovlje, Osetija, podrska Milosevcu, itd.) i nije od juce.

NATO je pocetkom devedesetih lako mogao da predvidi da "demokratska" i slaba Rusija nece takva ostati vecno a da su sanse za stabilnu demokratizaciju veoma male.

 

Takodje, sta je bio Budimpestanski ugovor ako ne i ogroman korak tacno u tom pravcu udovoljavanja interesima Rusije?

Ukrajina je bila i ostala daleko od NATO-a, odrekla se dobrovoljno nuklearnog arsenala koji bi joj garantovao sigurnost od Rusije na sledecih 100 godina, ostavila je glavnu rusku pomorsku bazu na svojoj teritoriji, istocna Evropa se totalno demilitarizovala, Nemacka smanjila vojni budzet na 1% GDP-a, Amerikanci su ostali izvan istocne Evrope sa vecim bazama, itd.

Istovremeno je Rusija sistematski trosila 4-5% GDP-a na vojsku i to ne zbog opasnosti iz istocne Evrope nego da bi ponovo parila SAD gde god moze.

 

Imajuci u obzir Ukrajinu, Krim, Abhaziju, Osetiju kao i koga sve Kremlj podrzava, najbolja dugorocna politika EU i istocne Evrope je da se dobro utvrdi, stacionira slican arsenal/ kojim i Rusija operise i ne rizikuje sa nikakvim pisanim ili nepisanim dogovorima.

Potpuno je naivno ocekivati da ce drzava koja nema tradiciju postovanja sopstvenih zakona i ustava na duzi rok postovati medjunarodne ugovore i garancije.

To cine pojedini lideri na ogranicen period uglavnom iz oportunizma kao sto je to bila redovna pojava pre pojave mnogo stabilnijih institucionalnih vojno-politickih saveza poput NATO-a.

 

Kako može biti demantovana "nada u demokratsku Rusiju" nečim što se desilo 15-20 godina nakon što je učinjen korak koji je odmogao demokratizaciji Rusije?

 

Ukrajina sa nuklearnim naoružanjem nije trebala nikome. Zamisli Janukoviča koji 21. februara 2014. drži ruku na nuklearnom koferčetu (a da ga je stekao u međuvremenu)... <_<

 

 

 

 

 

Ukraine and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum

by Jeffrey Lewis | April 29, 2014 | 3 Comments

 

My friend and colleague at Monterey, Philipp Bleek, has been growing weary of the frequent mischaracterization of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, particularly as its relates to Ukraine’s renunciation of nuclear weapons.

He was kind enough to share his weary reflections based on a new article he’s published, the work of our mutual colleague Jeffrey Knopf, and the very strange notion of actually reading the text of the Memorandum.

 

Reading the (not so) fine print

or

Why Ukraine wasn’t a nuclear power in the early 1990s and the West has no legal obligation to come to its aid now

Philipp Bleek

 

Following Putin’s Crimean land grab and ongoing mischief in eastern Ukraine, Kiev’s mid-1990s decision to give up the nuclear weapons on its soil after the collapse of the Soviet Union has suddenly gotten a lot more attention. But armchair pundits have been mischaracterizing both Ukraine’s early-1990s nuclear capabilities and the commitments it received in exchange for giving them up.

The fact that Ukraine never had operational control over the weapons in its possession is often ignored. While it had physical control, it’s not clear former Soviet military personnel would have executed Ukrainian launch orders, and regardless Kiev lacked the codes to overcome the permissive action links, electronically encrypted locks to prevent unauthorized use. (Conversely, Ukraine might have been capable of impeding a Russian attempt to launch nuclear weapons on its soil.) As negotiations over the weapons’ status dragged on into the mid-1990s, Western intelligence agencies were reportedly concerned that Ukraine was making efforts to gain operational control over the weapons, but no reports have emerged that it was successful in doing so. And when Ukraine publicly suggested it might seek operational control, Russia made clear this would constitute an act of war.

It’s possible Ukraine might eventually have managed to obtain control over the weapons. But at a minimum the frequent characterization of Ukraine (as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan) as nuclear-armed states that chose to disarm misses some key nuances. (Relatedly, a fellow policy wonk in Kiev reports that rumors are circulating that Ukraine covertly retained some tactical nuclear weapons that might come into play now. That seems highly implausible, if admittedly difficult to conclusively rule out.) And even if Ukraine had somehow managed to hold onto nuclear weapons, it’s far from clear they would have helped rather than hurt in the current situation. During the political instability after President Yanukovych fled to Russia in February, command and control of those weapons would presumably have been uncertain—much as it was in the Soviet Union during the 1991 coup against Gorbachev—and Moscow would have had substantial motivation to intervene aggressively to ensure the weapons were secure. (Founding publisher Jeffrey Lewis has a lengthier discussion here.)

As for the purported treaty commitment to come to Ukraine’s aid, that appears to be based on a misreading (or non-reading) of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum that extended guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for its joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. Signed by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (with France and China, the other two NPT nuclear weapons states, separately making similar commitments), the document was part of the price Ukraine demanded in order to join Belarus and Kazakhstan in transferring nuclear weapons on their soil after the collapse of the Soviet Union to Russia, a diplomatic coup for the Clinton administration, eager to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states.

A lot of folks, including apparently a former British ambassador to Moscow, now seem convinced that NATO’s failure to respond more robustly to Russia’s crass annexation of Crimea, and perhaps more of Ukraine in the coming weeks, violates commitments the United States and United Kingdom made under the agreement. One gets the impression that many of those opining about the Budapest Memorandum haven’t read it, despite the fact that it’s readily accessible online, only a few hundred words long, and written in what passes as exceptionally clear language in the often arcane world of international law. At the risk of being snarky (and what fun is an Arms Control Wonk blog post without a little snark?), it’s tempting to cite Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s famous query after the Clinton administration failed to foresee the 1998 nuclear tests India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) conducted shortly after winning election and consistent with their published election manifesto: “Why don’t we learn to read?”

In that spirit, let’s review the key points of the Budapest Memorandum (there are only six, condensed a little here, available in their full glory at the various links above). Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom all committed to:

1) Respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Ukraine;

2) Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and pledged that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter;

3) Refrain from economic coercion;

4) Seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to assist Ukraine, should it be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons;

5) Not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine unless attacked by Ukraine in association or alliance with a nuclear-armed state;

6) Consult if a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments.

That’s it. Russia is pretty clearly in violation of its end of the bargain (though Moscow argues the West is the violator for having “indulged a coup d’etat” that ousted President Victor Yanukovich). Washington and London have obligations to consult with Moscow—of which they’ve been doing plenty—but it’s hard to read any further obligations into the agreement.

Russia’s cavalier disregard for Ukraine’s sovereignty is doubly troubling because it sets a rather unhelpful nonproliferation precedent. There is something close to consensus among scholars and policymakers that security guarantees—the more robust sort, anyway—do play a key role in dissuading countries from pursuing their own nuclear arsenals (shameless plug, I have a just-published article that seeks to bolster that consensus). Whether and to what degree lesser guarantees, of the sort Ukraine received and the nuclear weapons states have extended to non-nuclear weapons states in the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, aid nonproliferation efforts is more contentious.

To the extent that such lesser assurances matter, the precedent of Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and perhaps more of Ukraine in the coming weeks, in blatant violation of its commitments in Budapest, seems unlikely to encourage future countries mulling giving up nuclear or other potential deterrent capabilities. But arguably neither did NATO’s military support to the effort to topple Gaddhafi not long after he agreed to renounce his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs (though it’s worth emphasizing that in Gaddhafi’s case those capabilities weren’t very robust).

Ukraine’s leaders in the mid-1990s, and for that matter Gaddhafi’s regime more recently, were presumably under no illusions about how binding commitments they received were. But leaders in Kiev, and perhaps also Tripoli, appear to have calculated that even less-binding commitments would have some political effect. As my colleague Jeffrey Knopf, who has published some of the most thoughtful scholarship on security assurances, pointed out in response to an earlier draft, future nonproliferators may not be willing to settle for so little.

 

Edited May 15, 2016 by Prospero

[namenski]

Andurile, da citas malo i neke drugacije^tm knjige, ne samo one koje ti demokratski komesari na kruzoku propisu kao obaveznu literaturu. 

 

Da bar procitas i malo mucnes sopstvenom glavom, a ne samo da verglas k'o papagaj istu pricu

 

Evo, preporucujem za pocetak, mozda cak i ti shvatis da nije sve tako jednostavno:

 

 

[Anonymous]

Izmiču ti razni tipovi silogizama?

 

Tebi je onda prvi silogizam sasvim OK, čim postavljaš to pitanje?

[Dagmar]

Tebi je onda prvi silogizam sasvim OK, čim postavljaš to pitanje?

 

Ja mislim da ti ni ne kapiraš šta sam te pitala.

Da ilustrujem, ako kažemo da su Nemci, Italijani, Austrijanci, danski kvislnizi itd pripadnici vrste homo sapiens. Onda kažemo da su oni pobili 20 miliona Rusa. Tvoj zaključak je da Ruse nisu pobili pripadnici vrste homo sapiens? Nego recimo Marsovci?

 

Mada kapiram, decenijama vas uče da su to bili nacisti, eventualno Nemci, i da su pobili Jevreje a ne Ruse, Jevreje, Srbe i Rome, i onda su oči nenaviknute na te dodatne informacije, a dobro istrenirani mozgovi se bune, šta je pa sad to, šta to ovi ljudi pričaju, kakvi Rusi pobijeni, kakvi zapadnjaci...

[Anonymous]

Da ilustrujem, ako kažemo da su Nemci, Italijani, Austrijanci, danski kvislnizi itd pripadnici vrste homo sapiens. Onda kažemo da su oni pobili 20 miliona Rusa. Tvoj zaključak je da Ruse nisu pobili pripadnici vrste homo sapiens? Nego recimo Marsovci?

 

Znači tvoj stav je zaista da su zapadnjaci pobili 20 miliona Rusa, a ne nacisti. OK hvala, to me je zanimalo.

[MancMellow]

 

Mada kapiram, decenijama vas uče da su to bili nacisti, eventualno Nemci

 

[Dagmar]

Znači tvoj stav je zaista da su zapadnjaci pobili 20 miliona Rusa, a ne nacisti. OK hvala, to me je zanimalo.

 

  Eto dotle to ide, ne može glava da primi da su nacisti zapadnjaci, naravno jasno je svima da civilizovani zapadnjaci ne bi mogli tako nešto. Ustvari nacisti su Rusi, i sami su sebe pobili.

[Roger Sanchez]

 Kako može biti demantovana "nada u demokratsku Rusiju" nečim što se desilo 15-20 godina nakon što je učinjen korak koji je odmogao demokratizaciji Rusije?

[Roger Sanchez]

+1 g

[Anonymous]

Brate.

 

Naravno Musolini, Pavelić, Ljotić, Horti su sve sami zapadnjaci.

[MancMellow]

Brate.

 

Naravno Musolini, Pavelić, Ljotić, Horti su sve sami zapadnjaci.

 

A - čekaj. msje Ljotić je sumnjiv. Mada meni je najbolji deo onaj kad su se belci i nešto malo crnaca iskrcali i pobedili Zapadnjake Sa Zapada. 

Edited May 15, 2016 by MancMellow

[Lord Protector]

Imajuci u obzir Ukrajinu, Krim, Abhaziju, Osetiju kao i koga sve Kremlj podrzava, najbolja dugorocna politika EU i istocne Evrope je da se dobro utvrdi, stacionira slican arsenal/ kojim i Rusija operise i ne rizikuje sa nikakvim pisanim ili nepisanim dogovorima.

Potpuno je naivno ocekivati da ce drzava koja nema tradiciju postovanja sopstvenih zakona i ustava na duzi rok postovati medjunarodne ugovore i garancije.

 

 

Ovo tvoje je čisto gubljenje vremena. Najbolje je da preventivno napadnu  Rusiju svi odjednom: Ukrajina, Poljska, Gruzija, Rumunija, Švedska, Norveška, Estonija, Litvanija, Turska. Amerikanci i Britanci im daju oružje i logističku podršku a oni sledeće godine pobodu barjak na zidine Kremlja. U protivnom će Rusija da nastavi sa aneksijom teritorija slobodnih i naprednih demokratija istočnoevropskih država. I to bez pisanih i nepisanih dogovora.

Edited May 15, 2016 by slow

[Anonymous]

Nacizam, fašizam i komunizam su došli sa Zapada.

 

Ovaj topik je za deponiju. a NATO (koji nije organizacija isključivo vezana za prokleti Zapad) stalno daje onoliko materijala za smislenu kritiku.

Edited May 15, 2016 by Anonymous