NATO

[Dagmar]

A ko je rekao da nije?

 

Kao što je i taj SSSR zdušno pomogao zapadu.

[Dagmar]

Dobro kapiras. Nemci svakako jesu zapadnjaci, ali nemci ne predstavljaju zapad. Posebno zato sto su od tog zapada bili porazeni i sto su danas integrisani u politicki sistem zemalja koje su pobedile, a ne obrnuto.

 

Dakle Nemci su zapadnjaci, kao što sam gore i napisala.

[Prospero]

 

Ne gresi Kenan oko odgovora Kremlja nego sam skeptican oko toga da svaka jaca drzava moze ponovo u Evropi da uspostavlja zone interesa sa crvenim linijama. Ako tako razmisljaju u Kremlju to je OK, ali za EU i NATO povratak tome bi bio kraj. Centralna i istocna Evropa sa svojih 1% izdataka na odbranu do 2014. i gotovo bez americkog prisustva sigurno nisu glavni razlog propasti demokratskih snaga u Rusiji.

 

Svako bi trebalo da bude skeptičan oko zona interesa i crvenih linija.

 

Zaboravljaš da je NATO takođe "sfera interesa" koja ima svoje crvene linije, sada samo dosta istočnije nego pre 25 godina. Crvena linija i dalje postoji, nije nestala, malo joj je promenjena priroda no...

 

Moja zamerka ne ide linijom da je politika NATO-a (tj SAD) bila/jeste nelegitimna (jer je legitimna) nego da je bila kratkovida, brzopotezna i da, imajući u vidu cilj "Europe whole and free" ona predstavlja fejl u odnosu na neke mudrije i dugoročnije odgovore (namesto udovoljavanja političkim resentimanima IE prema eks komunizmu i nepostojećoj pretnji), tj da je deo problema a ne deo rešenja. Pogotovo je fejl u odnosu na akumuliranu moć i slobodu delovanja koja je postojala početkom 90ih, tj. na "vruće gvožđe" koje se moglo kovati i dovesti do nekog pametnijeg seta relacija.

 

A ruska politička scena je svakako prvenstvena odgovornost domaćih elita i građana, kao gotovo uvek i svuda, to nije sporno.

 

 

par crtica:

 

K. Volc:

 

 

One is often reminded that the United States is not just the

dominant power in the world but that it is a liberal dominant power.

True, the motivations of the artificers of expansion - President

Clinton, national security adviser Anthony Lake, and others - were to

nurture democracy in young, fragile, long-suffering countries. One

may wonder, however, why this should be an American rather than a

European task and why a military rather than a political-economic

organization should be seen as the appropriate means for carrying it

out. The task of building democracy is not a military one. The military

security of new NATO members is not in jeopardy; their political

development and economic well-being are. In 1997, Assistant

Secretary of Defense Franklin D. Kramer told the Czech defence

ministry that it was spending too little on defence. Yet investing in

defence slows economic growth. By common calculation, defence

spending stimulates economic growth about half as much as

direct investment in the economy. In eastern Europe, economic not

military security is the problem and entering a military alliance

compounds it.

 

 

Rauhaus:

 

One of the main assaults on the policy came in June 1997, when 50

current and former members of the foreign policy establishment signed

an open letter to the President that was critical of the policy (see

Appendix 4). The letter's long and distinguished list of signatories,

included former Senator Sam Nunn, (D-Georgia), and former Secretary

of Defense Robert McNamara.

In addition to receiving criticism from many in the foreign policy

community, the proposal also received heavy criticism from academics.

The proposal provoked George F. Kennan's often-quoted warning that

NATO enlargement is the 'most fateful error of American policy in the

entire post-Cold War era'. In a similar vein, John Lewis Gaddis called

NATO enlargement a 'blunder of historic proportions'. While

academics are generally divided on most issues, NATO enlargement

affords one of the few opportunities where there appears to have been a

general consensus. As Gaddis noted, although 'Historians normally

don't agree on much', he had 'difficulty finding any colleagues who

think NATO expansion is a good idea'. The same could be said of

political scientists. At a conference held at the University of California

at Berkeley during the spring of 1998, the panel was stacked against

NATO enlargement 12 to 3, despite considerable effort by the

organizers to recruit pro-enlargement scholars. Some of the participants

who initially committed themselves to supporting the policy changed

their mind by the time the conference was held. And as the preceding

essays indicate, even scholars who support the policy often have

reservations and limited expectations. Many concluded that NATO

enlargement was the right thing to do, not because it was a great policy,

but because the policy was 'too far along' to stop or because it was the

'best available alternative' and might make 'modest contributions' to

European security.

Opposition to the policy also appeared to be mounting in the US

Senate. Early in 1998, 20 senators signed an open letter to the President

asking that the administration answer a number of tough questions.

Given the letter's tone and who the signatories were, many saw it as more

of a signal to the White House than a request for information - it was

potentially a round robin.

 

Despite all the early signs of an impending heated debate over the

policy, it never materialized. Both the Senate and the public reacted to

the proposal with a collective yawn. To say that there was even a real

debate may indeed be an overstatement. Aside from Foreign Affairs and

a few leading newspapers such as the Washington Post and the New York

Times, the policy never captured much attention.

Why did the policy fail to generate much debate? Two types of

answer are advanced to explain why the policy never triggered a wave of

real opposition. The first relates to the discussion above about learning

and an internationalist ideology. It is possible that the vast majority of

the American public and elites believe that NATO enlargement was the

right thing to do. Eastern Europe has, after all, borne the brunt of two

world wars and the Cold War. There might be a general sentiment that

the West should help ensure stability in eastern Europe and see to it that

history does not repeat itself.

The second explanation is much less flattering. Perhaps the

American public and political elites are simply too apathetic or

preoccupied really to care about the policy. Things are going very well

domestically. With the economy booming, the Dow and National

Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)

climbing and the budget 'balanced', Americans do not appear to be

worried about the immediate costs of expanding the alliance. Perhaps

recent events in Yugoslavia will change this, especially if the NATO

peacekeeping effort underway runs into difficulty, which is likely to

happen.

While the lack of public debate is perhaps understandable, the

Senate's failure adequately to debate the strengths and weaknesses of

the policy is not. Regardless of whether one is for the policy or against

it, the US Senate's decision not to give the policy more serious

consideration is alarming. There are, of course, many good reasons for

supporting the policy. Nevertheless, the issue here is not that the Senate

ultimately approved enlargement, but rather that it did so without even

forcing the administration to answer any tough questions about NATO

expansion.

 

The final 'debate' in the Senate was friendly and congenial. Few

senators even raised the questions first asked in their open letter to the

President, despite the fact that the administration never answered most

of them. Some have been quite harsh in their criticism of the Senate.

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, for example, asserts that

'Senators Jesse Helms, Joe Bidden, & Co. rolled over like puppies having

their bellies rubbed'. This stems from the fact that even the

administration's cost estimates, which were roundly criticized in the

press for failing to offer serious assessments, failed to receive much

scrutiny in the Senate. The Protocols on enlargement (see Appendix 3)

ultimately were passed out of the Foreign Relations Committee on 4

March 1998 by a vote of 16 to 2; it was passed by the full Senate on 30

April by a vote of 80 to 19.

Why did the Senate fail to debate the policy seriously? Some have

been very cynical about the political motives of some senators. At the

Madrid summit, Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, summed up

the Senate ratification process in the following way: '[uS Senators] are

selling their votes, they are selling their votes ,.. "You want me to vote for

NATO? Don't forget the bridge in my district" ... It's incredible. In

your country or mine, all the politicians would be in prison'. Of course

when the Prime Minister made these remarks, he was unaware that

microphones were recording his conversation with Belgian Prime

Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene.

 

 

 

 

Open Letter to President Clinton

26 June 1997

We, the undersigned, believe that the current US-led effort to expand

NATO, the focus of the recent Helsinki and Paris Summits, is a policy error

of historic proportions. We believe that NATO expansion will decrease

allied security and unsettle European stability for the following reasons:

In Russia, NATO expansion, which continues to be opposed across

the entire political spectrum, will strengthen the non-democratic

opposition, undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with

the West, bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War

settlement, and galvanize resistance in the Duma to the START II

and III treaties;

In Europe, NATO expansion will draw a new line of division

between the 'ins' and the 'outs', foster instability, and ultimately

diminish the sense of security of those countries which are not

included;

In NATO, expansion, which the Alliance has indicated is openended,

will inevitably degrade NATO's ability to carry out its

primary mission and will involve US security guarantees to

countries with serious border and national minority problems, and

unevenly developed systems of democratic government;

In the US, NATO expansion will trigger an extended debate over

its indeterminate, but certainly high, cost and will call into

question the US commitment to the Alliance, traditionally and

rightly regarded as a centerpiece of US foreign policy.

 

Because of these serious objections, and in the absence of any reason for

a rapid decision, we strongly urge that the NATO expansion process be

suspended while alternative actions are pursued. These include:

Opening the economic and political doors of the European Union

to Central and Eastern Europe; developing an enhanced

Partnership for Peace program; supporting a cooperative

NATO-Russian relationship; and continuing the arms reduction

and transparency process, particularly with respect to nuclear

weapons and materials, the major threat to US security, and with

respect to conventional military forces in Europe.

Russia does not now pose a threat to its western neighbors and the

nations of Central and Eastern Europe are not in danger. For this reason,

and the others cited above, we believe that NATO expansion is neither

necessary nor desirable and that this ill-conceived policy can and should

be put on hold.

 

[namenski]

Znaci "zli zapad" koji bi da se domogne Sibira je ipak zdusno pomogao SSSR. Ok hvala.

Poslednja prebijanja glede Lend Lease pomoci tokom WW2 obavljena su 1996. godine.

U parama..

 

Pri cemu niko ne spori da je pomoc bila dragocen doprinos borbi protiv Nemacke.

Ponekad samo malo usmeren na konkretne ciljeve i (ne)sovjetsku korist: na primer, mogu cokule i kamioni, mogu avioni lovci i laki bombarderi, ali ne mogu avioni koji daleko lete, moze od aviona ono sto se kod nas™ nije bas pokazalo, ali ce za vas™ biti dovoljno dobro...

 

@Slow: ti da cutis :P

[Anonymous]

Dakle Nemci su zapadnjaci, kao što sam gore i napisala.

 

Hitler = zapadnjak, Hitler = nacicta => zapadnjaci = nacisti.

 

Aristiotel juri, lokomotiva juri => Aristotel je lokomotiva.

[Dagmar]

Hitler = zapadnjak, Hitler = nacicta => zapadnjaci = nacisti.

 

Aristiotel juri, lokomotiva juri => Aristotel je lokomotiva.

 

 

Izmiču ti razni tipovi silogizama?

[Anduril]

Da ovako to fino izgleda.

 

No kada se pogleda sa druge strane tih 13 hiljada aviona (što nije tačno, jer ih je bilo zapravo 22 hiljade) je 15% od onoga što su sovjeti sami napravili, a ono 514 hiljada vozila sa tenkom kao simbolom je zapravo kada su baš tenkovi u pitanju negdje oko 13 hiljada komada, što je negdje oko 13% posto sovjetske proizvodnje tenkova u VOV-u.

 

 

Napisi i kada je stigao veci deo te pomoci i kakva je tada bila sovjetska proizvodnja. Mislim, nije isto 1941/42./43. kada je najvise trebalo i 1944./45. kada se naveliko stancalo a saveznici otvorili drugi front.

 

Nacizam, fašizam i komunizam su došli sa Zapada.

 

Naravno. A odakle je dosao staljinizam? Lenjinizam?

 

Dakle Nemci su zapadnjaci, kao što sam gore i napisala.

 

Govorili smo o Zapadu u danasnjem kontekstu u sta si uvela da je taj Zapad pobio 20mil Rusa.

Ti dakle smatras da danasnji Zapad nastavljaju tradiciju nacista a ne saveznika koji su ih pobedili dok Ruse (iz danasnje Rusije) koji su zaista poginuli ne znas ni da izbrojis (Ukrajina i Belorusija?).

Dobro.

Edited May 15, 2016 by Anduril

[frn1782]

Ti i tebi slicni jos niste uspeli da objasnite poentu sirenja na istok.

U ovom obimu kako je to sad ta situacija je neodrziva to svi priznaju znaci moze da bude samo odskocna daska za dalju ekspanziju.

Pitanje od milion dolara je gde tacno i na koji nacin.

Price o nepostojanju sfere uticaja ne piju vodu jer nesto sumnjam da bi se amerima fuckalo da Rusija danas opet pozeli da se instalira na Kubi.

Zbog pretnje od Cecenskih terorista naravno.

[Anduril]

Svako bi trebalo da bude skeptičan oko zona interesa i crvenih linija.

Zaboravljaš da je NATO takođe "sfera interesa" koja ima svoje crvene linije, sada samo dosta istočnije nego pre 25 godina. Crvena linija i dalje postoji, nije nestala, malo joj je promenjena priroda no...

Moja zamerka ne ide linijom da je politika NATO-a (tj SAD) bila/jeste nelegitimna (jer je legitimna) nego da je bila kratkovida, brzopotezna i da, imajući u vidu cilj "Europe whole and free" ona predstavlja fejl u odnosu na neke mudrije i dugoročnije odgovore (namesto udovoljavanja političkim resentimanima IE prema eks komunizmu i nepostojećoj pretnji), tj da je deo problema a ne deo rešenja. Pogotovo je fejl u odnosu na akumuliranu moć i slobodu delovanja koja je postojala početkom 90ih, tj. na "vruće gvožđe" koje se moglo kovati i dovesti do nekog pametnijeg seta relacija.

A ruska politička scena je svakako prvenstvena odgovornost domaćih elita i građana, kao gotovo uvek i svuda, to nije sporno.

par crtica:

K. Volc:

Rauhaus:

 

Prvo, napravio bih sustinsku razliku izmedju klasicne sfere interesa tipa 19. vek ili odnosa Rusije prema susedima i izmedju odnosa u okviru NATO-a.

Na jednoj strani imas klasicni power play sa varijabilitetom a na drugoj imas i ugovore i institucije koje ogranicavaju power play.

 

Drugo, te nade da bi udovoljavanje tradicionalnim interesima Rusije dovelo do dugorocne stabilnosti su pod a) SBBKBB a pod b) totalno demantovane i izigrane aneksijom Krima i okupacijom dela Ukrajine.

Da se podsetimo, taj modus operandi Rusija sprovodi jos od pocetka devedesetih za vreme Jeljcina (Abhazija, Pridnjestrovlje, Osetija, podrska Milosevcu, itd.) i nije od juce.

NATO je pocetkom devedesetih lako mogao da predvidi da "demokratska" i slaba Rusija nece takva ostati vecno a da su sanse za stabilnu demokratizaciju veoma male.

 

Takodje, sta je bio Budimpestanski ugovor ako ne i ogroman korak tacno u tom pravcu udovoljavanja interesima Rusije?

Ukrajina je bila i ostala daleko od NATO-a, odrekla se dobrovoljno nuklearnog arsenala koji bi joj garantovao sigurnost od Rusije na sledecih 100 godina, ostavila je glavnu rusku pomorsku bazu na svojoj teritoriji, istocna Evropa se totalno demilitarizovala, Nemacka smanjila vojni budzet na 1% GDP-a, Amerikanci su ostali izvan istocne Evrope sa vecim bazama, itd.

Istovremeno je Rusija sistematski trosila 4-5% GDP-a na vojsku i to ne zbog opasnosti iz istocne Evrope nego da bi ponovo parila SAD gde god moze.

 

Imajuci u obzir Ukrajinu, Krim, Abhaziju, Osetiju kao i koga sve Kremlj podrzava, najbolja dugorocna politika EU i istocne Evrope je da se dobro utvrdi, stacionira slican arsenal/ kojim i Rusija operise i ne rizikuje sa nikakvim pisanim ili nepisanim dogovorima.

Potpuno je naivno ocekivati da ce drzava koja nema tradiciju postovanja sopstvenih zakona i ustava na duzi rok postovati medjunarodne ugovore i garancije.

To cine pojedini lideri na ogranicen period uglavnom iz oportunizma kao sto je to bila redovna pojava pre pojave mnogo stabilnijih institucionalnih vojno-politickih saveza poput NATO-a.

[Dagmar]

 

 

Govorili smo o Zapadu u danasnjem kontekstu u sta si uvela da je taj Zapad pobio 20mil Rusa.

Ti dakle smatras da danasnji Zapad nastavljaju tradiciju nacista a ne saveznika koji su ih pobedili dok Ruse (iz danasnje Rusije) koji su zaista poginuli ne znas ni da izbrojis (Ukrajina i Belorusija?).

Dobro.

 

Kakvo nastavljanje tradicije, o čemu pričaš? Ja sad tvrdim da je tradicija zapadnjaka da idu na napade na Rusiju i ubijaju po 20 miliona, onako svake godine o Đurđevdanu? O čemu pričaš jbt? Ja ni o kakvim tradicijama nisam govorila, rekla sam da su zapadnjaci pobili 20 miliona Rusa, prilično sam sigurna da su Nemci, Austrijanci, Italijani, Finci zapadnjaci. Mislim sad će ispasti da su Nemci ustvari Afrikanci, a Italijani Papuanci.

[dillinger]

 

Da. To je i Milosevic nama prodavao da oce da nas oslabe i iscepkaju kako bi nas pokorili. Ista retorika. Medjutim u praksi ne vidimo bas da se nesto na tom planu desava niti se desavalo kad je Rusija bila bukvalno na kolenima.

 

 

 

A kakva je to retorika & praksa kad se postavlja antiraketni štit u Rumuniji pod izgovorom opasnosti od - Irana?!

 

Šta je to, cinična laž ili kolosalna paranoja?

[hazard]

Kakvo nastavljanje tradicije, o čemu pričaš? Ja sad tvrdim da je tradicija zapadnjaka da idu na napade na Rusiju i ubijaju po 20 miliona, onako svake godine o Đurđevdanu? O čemu pričaš jbt? Ja ni o kakvim tradicijama nisam govorila, rekla sam da su zapadnjaci pobili 20 miliona Rusa, prilično sam sigurna da su Nemci, Austrijanci, Italijani, Finci zapadnjaci. Mislim sad će ispasti da su Nemci ustvari Afrikanci, a Italijani Papuanci.

 

Ne zaboravimo tevtonske, poljske, litvanske i francuske pohode na Rusiju kroz istoriju

[apostata]

Napisi i kada je stigao veci deo te pomoci i kakva je tada bila sovjetska proizvodnja. Mislim, nije isto 1941/42./43. kada je najvise trebalo i 1944./45. kada se naveliko stancalo a saveznici otvorili drugi front.

Isporuke po lend-lizu ostvarene su na osnovu 4 protokola:

 

- Moskovskom iz 1941.

- Vašingtonskom iz 1942.

- Londonskom iz 1943.

- Otavski iz 1945.

 

Najviše je isporučeno po zadnja dva (od jula '43. do maja '45.) nešto više od 60%. Što znači da na ono prije otpada oko 40%. U tenkovima i avionima (oko kojih je počela diskusija) to je negdje 5, odnosno 9 hiljada.

 

A SSSR je proizvela:

 

                     tenkova i SAU               aviona    (u hilj.)

 

1941                      4,7                         11,5 

1942                    24,5                         25,4

1941                    24,1                         34,9

1944                    29,0                         40,0

1945                    16,0                         10,0

 

Pa ti sada računaj i spekuliši.

[Dagmar]

Ne zaboravimo tevtonske, poljske, litvanske i francuske pohode na Rusiju kroz istoriju

 

Ne jbt, nekim ljudima ne smeš da kažeš da su vrli zapadnjaci ubijali milione, što u Rusiji, što po konc logorima, ako im još kažeš da su bacali nuklearke po deci, ubijali Vijetnamce na najstrašnije načine, držali full aparthajd i terali crnce iz javnog prevoza, a da danas spaljuju ljude po bolnicama, ima u šok da upadnu. Gde zapadnjaci takvi, pa oni su zaboga civilizovani.

[hazard]

Ne jbt, nekim ljudima ne smeš da kažeš da su vrli zapadnjaci ubijali milione, što u Rusiji, što po konc logorima, ako im još kažeš da su bacali nuklearke po deci, ubijali Vijetnamce na najstrašnije načine, držali full aparthajd i terali crnce iz javnog prevoza, a da danas spaljuju ljude po bolnicama, ima u šok da upadnu. Gde zapadnjaci takvi, pa oni su zaboga civilizovani.

 

Zapadnjaci su izvrsili najvece genocide u istoriji covecanstva, ali iz nekog razloga uzimaju sebi za pravo da drugima nesto kenjaju po tom pitanju.