Sinovi kineskog zmaja

[Prospero]

Naravno, kakav "pravac" kroz desetine zemalja.

[Lord Protector]

Sumnjam da ima neki pravac, vise je to leopardovo krzno ili teritorija slabe regulative i jake korupcije. 

 

Sve je javno, godinama se o tome priča na najvišem nivou, Kinezi ništa ne kriju o svojim planovima, zašto se hvatati samo za jaku korupciju? Uostalom, krajnji cilj su razvijene zemlje EU. Ovde ima planiranja, i to velikog. Kina je centralizovana zemlja, ovo je faktički ušlo u petogodišnje/decenijske planove zemlje direktno sa vrha.

Edited July 1, 2016 by slow

[Lancia]

Sve je javno, godinama se o tome priča na najvišem nivou, Kinezi ništa ne kriju o svojim planovima, zašto se hvatati samo za jaku korupciju? Uostalom, krajnji cilj su razvijene zemlje EU. Ovde ima planiranja, i to velikog.

Jedno su planovi, drugo je teren. Koja je to znacajna kineska investicija npr. u Spaniji? Infrastruktura? Spanija je ima i vise nego sto joj je realno potrebna. Industrija? da se ne zezamo. Sve je u kupovini vec oronulih postojecih objekata po centru gradova, ne bi li registrovali svoje trange frange firme za izvoz smeca, bez kog se realno itekako moze ziveti, ali jebiga kriza je, pa l(j)udi kupuju ono sto mogu, a ne sto zele i sto su ranioje kupovali.

 

Druga vrsta investicija je kupovina skladista po obodima grada. cemu sluze? Operativni deo prve investicije.

 

Treca i najvaznija investicija je sirenje maloprodaje i usluge po gradskim i turistickim zonama, kreditiranim iskljucivo iz prve i druge investicije. Zaposljavanje Spanaca nula, koriscenje bankarskog sistema, nula. Sire se geometrijski i jedini im je problem ako s vremena na vreme stanu na zulj lokalnom politickom ili kakvom drugom bosu. 

 

Sta Spanija ima od toga? Olaksice za plasman  svojih proizvoda na kinesko trziste. Nije nesto bogznakoliko i lako je izracunati ko je na (dugorocnom) dobitku.

[Lord Protector]

Jedno su planovi, drugo je teren. Koja je to znacajna kineska investicija npr. u Spaniji? Infrastruktura? Spanija je ima i vise nego sto joj je realno potrebna. Industrija? da se ne zezamo. Sve je u kupovini vec oronulih postojecih objekata po centru gradova, ne bi li registrovali svoje trange frange firme za izvoz smeca, bez kog se realno itekako moze ziveti, ali jebiga kriza je, pa l(j)udi kupuju ono sto mogu, a ne sto zele i sto su ranioje kupovali.

 

Druga vrsta investicija je kupovina skladista po obodima grada. cemu sluze? Operativni deo prve investicije.

 

Treca i najvaznija investicija je sirenje maloprodaje i usluge po gradskim i turistickim zonama, kreditiranim iskljucivo iz prve i druge investicije. Zaposljavanje Spanaca nula, koriscenje bankarskog sistema, nula. Sire se geometrijski i jedini im je problem ako s vremena na vreme stanu na zulj lokalnom politickom ili kakvom drugom bosu. 

 

Sta Spanija ima od toga? Olaksice za plasman  svojih proizvoda na kinesko trziste. Nije nesto bogznakoliko i lako je izracunati ko je na (dugorocnom) dobitku.

 

Ni Kinezi nisu više zadovoljni sa tim, shvataju da moraju da krenu ozbiljnije  u velike infrastrukturne i industrijske projekte, zato je cela priča o novom putu svile i krenula. Na Balkanu već imaš desetak velikih projekata koje izvode Kinezi i koje će raditi u bliskoj budućnosti (termoelektrane, mostovi, luke, železnice, železare, rudnici), i koje prati garancija kineskih banaka (Eksim banka kao primer takve banke). To više nije ona priča o kineskoj četvrti koja prodaje neocarinjenu robu lošeg kvaliteta. Stvari se menjaju.

Edited July 1, 2016 by slow

[palikaris]

Koliko sam ja shvatio, cilj new silk road strategije je da se Kina poveze kopnenim i morskim putevima sa zapadnom Evropom kao glavnim trzistem (skroz do luka u Roterdamu i Hamburgu). Zapadna evropa vec ima sve od infrastrukture, ali istocna Evropa i centralna Azija ne, i zato njih zanima da tu grade puteve, zeleznice i luke. Tako da se new silk road pravi kroz centralnu aziju i istocnu evropu, tamo gde infrastruktura nedostaje. Da bi se kineska roba lakse, brze, jednostavnije i jeftinije transportovala u EU.  

 

Win win situacija i za Kinu i za zemlje u kojima se gradi, Kinezi plasiraju svoj kapital i uposljavaju svoje firme, a ove bedne zemlje kao Srbija i Poljska i sta ja znam dobijaju infrasktrukturne projekte o kojima inace ne bi mogle ni da sanjaju.

Edited July 1, 2016 by palikaris

[Tribun_Populi]

^^U neku ruku.

 

S druge strane Kina je bila i ostala najnepoželjniji investicioni partner, jer oni uzimaju sveee™. Njihov materijal, njihove sirovine, njihovi izvođači. To je još gore nego dinkićeve subvencije.

 

Da nije tako, ne bi se oni zaletali u slabašne istočnoevropske zemlje, koje trenutno nemaju drugi izbor.

Edited July 1, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[palikaris]

Da, takav glas ih bije. Ali pitanje koliko je to stvarno tacno, ovaj tekst na koji sam naleteo nedavno kaze suprotno:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-investment-in-africa/

 

Za most zemun borca su navodno nase kompanije radile 50-50% sa kineskim.

[Prospero]

https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/westward-ho-china-dream-and-one-belt-one-road-chinese-foreign-policy-under-xi-jinping
 
 Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping

 

 

...
Xi Jinping has been credited with launching a number of new foreign policy
‘concepts’. Three are worthy of note. The first is the ‘new type of Great Power
relations’, which is supposed to characterize Sino-American relations since Xi
met Obama.45 Second, there is the issue of relations with states around China’s
borders.46 But the most eye-catching—and possibly the one with the longest-term
significance—has been the third: the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative (OBOR).
Hu Jintao had earlier evoked the possibility of some kind of new Silk Road
initiative, but it had not gone anywhere. Then in autumn 2013 President Xi
visited Kazakhstan and Russia, where he announced plans primarily for transport
projects with a view to creating an ‘economic belt’ or corridor linking
China with Mongolia, central Asia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, central and
eastern Europe, and ultimately Germany and the Netherlands. Soon afterwards
Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited south-east Asia, where he announced plans for
a ‘Maritime Silk Road’ linking south-east China with south-east Asia, Bangladesh,
India, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, ultimately also ending up
in Germany and the Netherlands. The two projects together comprise a series of
overlapping elements—upgraded and developed transcontinental railway routes,
highways, port facilities and energy pipelines. OBOR potentially involves over
60 countries with a combined population of over 4 billion people, whose markets
currently account for about one-third of global GDP.47

This makes it an enormously ambitious plan for long-term infrastructural development
that will take decades to complete. China itself has recently committed
up to US$1 trillion to develop infrastructural investment transport links inside the
country, much of which will go to the western part of China that will be part of
the ‘belt’. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which China set up in
2015 to both complement and compete with the US- and Japan-dominated Asian
Development Bank, reportedly has US$65 billion in initial capital to support
investments of this type; the China Development Bank has notionally reserved
a further US$890 billion for the development of various sections of the corridor
outside the country. Some western estimates put the capital requirement for the
latter much higher. The overall time-scale for the project has been set at roughly
35 years.48

...

Economic dimensions

One view of the rationale for these policy innovations is that they are primarily
aimed at developing the western parts of China, which have been left behind
by the eastward export-oriented strategy of the last four decades. These are the
regions that are most distant from the coast, and so have had the greatest difficulty
in competing with the more easterly provinces. They also have suffered from the
political frictions with their neighbours to the west, for example in central Asia and
India, which are also less developed. All these factors have hindered development
in the western parts of China.53 In 2013 per capita income in western provinces
such as Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai and Xinjiang was only between a third and a
half of that in eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, and
only a quarter of that in Shanghai and Beijing.54 In 2000 Beijing announced a plan
for opening up the western part of the country, but by 2015 it was estimated that
it was still going to need 30–50 years to catch up with the rest of China.55 The
OBOR initiative is partly aimed at speeding up that process.

Another—more immediate—consideration has been the Chinese government’s
search for alternative investment opportunities abroad for companies in China
(predominantly state-owned enterprises, SOEs) that have been engaged in extensive
infrastructural projects across the country for a decade or more, and now need to
find alternative markets as the national economy is supposed gradually to rebalance
away from its dominant focus upon investment and towards greater consumption.
Participation in these new projects might both help individual companies and
reduce the disturbance to the economy caused by the overall rebalancing.56 The
experience of becoming involved in projects overseas might help SOEs to become
more internationally competitive—not an unimportant consideration, given that
sector’s generally lower profitability than the private sector.57 And the plans to
develop high-speed rail links were no doubt framed with an eye to deepening and
then later marketing China’s expertise in this technology.

In general, this slew of projects, and the fact of large-scale Chinese funding,
could help a lot of Chinese companies—private as well as state-owned—to ‘go
out’ (zouchuqu) and become implanted in new markets, so it should contribute
to the further internationalization of the Chinese economy.58 One commentator
from Tajikistan specifically mentioned this in the context of the need to develop
a regional integration project which avoided western-style neo-liberal economic
policies. ‘For some perspective areas of Silk Road Economic Belt could be used
not the principle of free trade, but the principle of soft protectionism [sic].’59
More generally, particularly in the case of the Eurasian ‘belt’ initiative, commentators
both in China and in central Asia have remarked on the opportunity the
project would create for China to develop the use of the renminbi in international
markets. This would increase Chinese experience in operating the renminbi as an
international currency and represent a step towards the long-term goal of making
it an international reserve currency.60

At the same time there is a very wide range of risks to which this project may
expose China. There are the political risks of instability in potential partner
countries—for example, Afghanistan, Pakistan, various countries in the Middle
East, possibly also in central Asia. There is the danger of a more high-profile China
getting sucked into existing conflicts such as that between Israel and the Arab
states, or at any rate being forced to take one side against another. There will be
much greater involvement with the world of Islamic finance, which so far it has
neglected. There is the danger of an increased Chinese presence in neighbouring
regions stimulating fears about Beijing’s long-term intentions. For example,
no matter how close Sino-Russian relations may be at present, especially given
Russia’s chilly relations with the West over the conflict in Ukraine, it will still be
difficult to mollify Russian fears about possible long-term Chinese designs upon
Siberia. Already there are anxieties in Russia about this Chinese initiative eclipsing
Russia’s own project for a Eurasian Customs Union and a Eurasian Economic
Community linking Russia with central Asia.61

In addition to these political risks, there are various potential risks for Chinese
companies in doing business along the economic belt. For example, if a Chinese
company operating there were taken to court by local businesses and appeared to
receive unfair treatment from a less than impartial local legal system, what could
and would either the company or the Chinese state do about it? After all, few of
these states are noted for the rule of law. Or if it seemed that enhanced transport
integration enabled Chinese companies, or even individual Chinese businesspeople,
to put local companies out of business, how would China respond to
demands from local businesses for greater protection, as has already happened in
some African states? Not surprisingly, Chinese commentators have devoted quite
a lot of space to analysing the various kinds of risks and the ways in which China
might try to cope with them.62

 

...

 

In general, the OBOR initiative marks a new stage in the growing salience of
geopolitical considerations in Chinese foreign policy.76 While economic development
issues still play a big role in structuring policies, the dream of restoring
China to its traditional place in world affairs begins to loom over them.

But OBOR also rests upon a hope, indeed an assumption, that all of the many
projected partners will respond with corresponding enthusiasm, because without
their active cooperation the project will fail to live up to Chinese expectations
and, worse, may founder amid a welter of recriminations over responsibility for its
failure. In that sense it represents a serious test for Chinese assumptions about how
the global community might move, or be induced to move, towards the better
global order that it both advocates and expects. For all China’s (and Xi Jinping’s)
self-confidence, the project depends upon active cooperation from others. China
cannot realize it on its own. It makes great play of the fact that its vision for a
future, and better, world order rests upon a commitment to shun the hegemonic
policies of the United States and instead develop a more ‘democratic’ community
in which all nations exercise their right to make a proper contribution to global
governance, and in which they are all treated equally, irrespective of size. China
overtly downplays the use of pressure to leverage cooperation—in any case, it
lacks resources on the American scale to do this. So China expects other states to
rise above potentially narrow self-interest. But all the talk of ‘win–win’ solutions
to global development assumes that other states share China’s calculus about what
‘winning’ might mean. In fact, it is not difficult to think of obstacles. What about
the possibility of, to use a common Chinese saying, ‘same bed, different dreams’
(tong chuang, yi meng)? Not every problem is susceptible to ‘win–win’ solutions.
Some are zero-sum. For example, one dimension of the scenario outlined for
the Maritime Silk Road is an expectation that this will lead to a more integrated
Asian economic community, including states in south-east Asia.77 Yet whether
those states can be counted on to go along with this trend, even if it might lead
to greater trade, when some of them are increasingly concerned about China’s
uncompromising stance on its maritime territorial claims, is at least questionable.

There is a paradox about all this. As we have seen, the Xi Jinping administration
has shown a determination at home to train ‘dreams’ of a better future into
more ideologically acceptable channels. It is fully aware of the possibility of other

kinds of dreams taking hold if it is not careful. Yet at home the regime is still
(largely) in control. It can—and increasingly again does—punish people who seek
to promote alternative visions or values. But internationally China does not have
that control. It cannot make other states give up dreams which conflict with its
own. At most it can offer material inducements and appeal to other governments’
better natures. In that sense it really is true that, as is often platitudinously repeated
by Chinese commentators, the ‘China dream’ is, or has to be, the world’s ‘dream’.

[Tribun_Populi]

Pa takav iskorak bi svakako moralo da prati i aktivnije uključivanje Kineza u konflikte po svetu.

 

Ovo je barem proaktivan plan, jer bi ih to (konflikti) svejedno čekalo, hteli oni to ili ne. Sad koliko je realan, to će zavisiti od mnogo faktora.

[porucnik vasic]

А како се уклапају у целу ту причу кинкеске инвестиције у италијански фудбал.  Изгледа да су ту решили да инвестирају огромне суме новца'?

[Pontijak]

Jedno su planovi, drugo je teren. Koja je to znacajna kineska investicija npr. u Spaniji? Infrastruktura? Spanija je ima i vise nego sto joj je realno potrebna. Industrija? da se ne zezamo. Sve je u kupovini vec oronulih postojecih objekata po centru gradova, ne bi li registrovali svoje trange frange firme za izvoz smeca, bez kog se realno itekako moze ziveti, ali jebiga kriza je, pa l(j)udi kupuju ono sto mogu, a ne sto zele i sto su ranioje kupovali.

 

Druga vrsta investicija je kupovina skladista po obodima grada. cemu sluze? Operativni deo prve investicije.

 

Treca i najvaznija investicija je sirenje maloprodaje i usluge po gradskim i turistickim zonama, kreditiranim iskljucivo iz prve i druge investicije. Zaposljavanje Spanaca nula, koriscenje bankarskog sistema, nula. Sire se geometrijski i jedini im je problem ako s vremena na vreme stanu na zulj lokalnom politickom ili kakvom drugom bosu. 

 

Sta Spanija ima od toga? Olaksice za plasman  svojih proizvoda na kinesko trziste. Nije nesto bogznakoliko i lako je izracunati ko je na (dugorocnom) dobitku.

 

ovo meni zvuci jezivo, kao sirenje nekog smrtonosnog virusa, uostalom sta cu kada sam desnicar i pristalica totalne zabrane uvoza kineskog djubreta koje se naziva tekstilom, obucom, sitnim kucnim potrepstinama itd.

[Shan Jan]

Da, takav glas ih bije. Ali pitanje koliko je to stvarno tacno, ovaj tekst na koji sam naleteo nedavno kaze suprotno:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-investment-in-africa/

 

Za most zemun borca su navodno nase kompanije radile 50-50% sa kineskim.

 

Jaoj nemoj molim te. Ima itekako razloga zasto u svakoj jebenoj africkoj zemlji sada mrze kineze vise nego i mrske bledolike kolonijaliste. Kinezi dobijaju projekte zahvaljujuci teskoj korupciji ili prosto ko u Srbiji mahanjem para na kredu koju posle treba drzava da vraca narednih 20 godina, pola tih projekata se zavrsi kao totalni fijasko, ukljucujuci termoelektrane, aerodrome i puteve. Gde god mogu ne koriste domacu radnu snagu a one tovare zutih mrava koje dovode nemaju nameru da odvezu nazad no ovi ostaju i preuzimaju druge profitabilne poslove od domace raje (uz isti recept - korupcija, niska cena, use i u svoje kljuse, jebo krajnji rezultat).

 

Men se cini da se ovde malo idealizuju kinezi ko neki dobri fini istocnjaci ("nasa braca rusi" fazon). Oni rade odlicno spoljnu politiku - u svom interesu. Nemoj se zajebati i pomisliti i jednog trenutka da ih zabole sta ce biti sa Srbijom ili nekom trecom zemljom. 

[porucnik vasic]

ovo meni zvuci jezivo, kao sirenje nekog smrtonosnog virusa, uostalom sta cu kada sam desnicar i pristalica totalne zabrane uvoza kineskog djubreta koje se naziva tekstilom, obucom, sitnim kucnim potrepstinama itd.

Ти си само расиста. Тежак.

[Pontijak]

Ти си само расиста. Тежак.

 

e kada mi dveras kaze da sam rasista....

[palikaris]

@shan: verujem ti za sve to sto pricas, niti imam neke iluzije da kineze zabole za srbiju. Ono sto hocu da kazem je da ne vidim kako se sustinski njihove investicije razlikuju od bilo cijih drugih - i kad se gradi od evropskih para evropske firme radei hoce mmm sveee, domace eventualno dobijaju najgluplje sporedne poslove, vidi most na adi.

 

uspesnost tih investicija zavisi od drzave u kojoj se gradi, drzava (bi trebalo da) ima projekte koje namerava da realizuje pa investitori kazu da li ih zanima da za to daju kredit ili ne. ono sto je bino za nas ovde je da kinezi imaju visak para i hoce da investiraju, ostali em slabo stoje sa parama em ih totalno zabole da investiraju u srbiju bilo sta, a nama trebaju investicije u infrastrukturu. kako cemo mi da pregovaramo sa kinezima i kakve uslove cemo dobiti, to je druga stvar, ali imamo sansu da dobijemo neku lovu.