Ontologija nacija...

[Turnbull]

Moja poenta je da je to netacna generalizacija. Prvo, nije nacionalizam uopste po tome specifican. Drugo, u jednom trenutku (npr. 19. vek) je nacionalizam, uz sve svoje lose nus-pojave, bio korisna da ne kazem dobra pojava, tj. pomogao je da se ostvari napredak u odnosu na predjasnje stanje. Tvoj stav obojen je iskustvom 90ih godina na ex-yu prostoru, i to je ok, ali nije dobra podloga za generalizaciju o nacionalizmu kao takvom. Nacionalizam je npr. razbio osmanlijska i hapsburska carstva, a to je bilo dobro (revizionisticke osmanljiske/hapsburske apologete da izvinu).

Kao što rekoh, nacionalizam je istorijski fenomen, i ima svoje mesto u istoriji - i ono emancipatorsko, svakako. Ali sada pravi samo štetu. Pravdati današnji nacionalizam devetnaestim vekom je upravo loša generalizacija. Današnji nacionalizam nije onaj devetnaestovekovni, niti ima isti smisao.

[Indy]

Moja poenta je da je nacionalizam jedna štetna i pogrešna generalizacija koja ne služi nikome osim onima koji bi da zavade pa vladaju. Ništa dobro iz toga nije proizašlo, niti će.

Svaka iluzija moze da ima pozitivne i negativne aspekte (zavisi od stanovista). To vazi za sve od ideje sopstva (sebe) pa nadalje. Na neki nacin bez iluzija (to sto ti zoves generalizacija) se ne moze... odnosno, moze se, ali to ima svoju cenu. Tibetanski nacionalizam* npr. moze da se vidi kao metod prezervacije lamaizma (i pridruzene kulture) nasuprot topljenju u kineskom identitetu. Zahvaljujuci tome danas ima priliku da u nekoj meri postane deo globalnog identiteta, zar to nije fin paradoks. (*Nacionalizam ovde znaci borba za ocuvanje karakteristika nacionalnog identiteta, jel'da).

[Bakemono]

Indy, pitanje je da li tibetanski nacionalizam iz tvog primera možda više naginje onome što Orvel naziva patriotizmom, koji je pre svega defanzivnog karaktera (jesi li video citat koji sam postavio?).EDIT: Isto pitanje postavljam i hazardu sa njegovim primerom otomanske i habzburške imperije i "nacionalizmima" potlačenih naroda unutar njih.

Edited April 26, 2013 by Bakemono

[Agni]

Indy, pitanje je da li tibetanski nacionalizam iz tvog primera možda više naginje onome što Orvel naziva patriotizmom, koji je pre svega defanzivnog karaktera (jesi li video citat koji sam postavio?).

Problem sa Orvelovom definicijom je sto mesa sasvim razlicite principe, analizu realnosti i vrednosni sud (patriotizam je pozitivan, nacionalizam je los). Pokusaji da se definise razlika izmedju patriotizma i nacionalizma su obicno motivisani zeljom da se iz nacionalizma izdvoje pozitivni aspekti kako bi ono resto moglo jos lakse da bude odbaceno, problem nastaje kad se takva definicija, dakle nastala na osnovu zelje, pokusa ucitati u stvarnost (sto se Tibeta tice, ima i "dobrih" nacionalista, napr onih svestenika ciji protest samospaljivanjem ne povredjuje nikog do njih samih, a ima i onih koji bi da poniste nametnutu im kolonizaciju etnickim ciscenjem Han naseljenika).

[Indy]

@BakemonoNisam video taj citat, sorry, kasno sam upao na forum. Pogledacu. Video sam da neke knjige koje se bave pitanjem nezavisnosti Tibeta koriste sa "Tibetan nationalism" u naslovu, mada ja licno ne insistiram na tom terminu.Ovde je mozda bitno pomenuti ono sto napisah pre par minuta na Politici, a to je da je termin nacionalizam, makar u smislu koje ima na engleskom, takodje znacenja koje se odnosi na drzavnost, a ne nuzno na 1 etnicku zajednicu. Potrebna je npr. bila tibetanska drzava da bi ocuvala lamaisticke manastire od svojevremenog kineskog progona* svake religije i/ili starih obicaja, a to nema cak ni veze sa tim da li su svi u tim manastirima po etnickom sastavu Tibetanci. Bila je potrebna, ali je nije bilo, pa se ta borba zove (ponekad) i nacionalizam. (Ima, npr, ovo, izgleda zanimljiv rad, vredelo bi ga pogledati).___*O ovome ne znam dovoljno detaljno u smislu neke objektivne™ istorije, ovo naglasavam da me ne bi sad sahranio neki od forumskih istoricara. O tome najvise znam iz verovatno pristrasnog izvora, autobiografije Chögyam Trungpa.

[Bakemono]

Problem sa Orvelovom definicijom je sto mesa sasvim razlicite principe, analizu realnosti i vrednosni sud (patriotizam je pozitivan, nacionalizam je los). Pokusaji da se definise razlika izmedju patriotizma i nacionalizma su obicno motivisani zeljom da se iz nacionalizma izdvoje pozitivni aspekti kako bi ono resto moglo jos lakse da bude odbaceno, problem nastaje kad se takva definicija, dakle nastala na osnovu zelje, pokusa ucitati u stvarnost (sto se Tibeta tice, ima i "dobrih" nacionalista, napr onih svestenika ciji protest samospaljivanjem ne povredjuje nikog do njih samih, a ima i onih koji bi da poniste nametnutu im kolonizaciju etnickim ciscenjem Han naseljenika).

Sve stoji što si napisao. Braniću svoj stav na sledeći način - ima ona kratka priča od Brehta kad jedan čovek operisan od nacionalizma ode u drugi grad gde ljudi mrze ljude iz njegovog grada. Tamo ga neko uvredi na "nacionalnoj" osnovi i on automatski oseća mržnju. Onda se zapita: "Zašto sam upravo postao nacionalista? Pa zato jer sam sreo jednog nacionalistu." I zaključi da to nije ispravno. Poenta je - jedan nacionalizam rađa drugi i to je 1 vicious circle, zmija koja sebi jede rep i na kraju će sama sebe da proguta. Međutim, čovek mora da iznađe načina da ne nasedne na taj začarani krug osvete, koliko god primamljiv bio. Iz tog razloga tvrdim da devetnaestovekovni srpski nacionalizam nije i ne može biti dobar jer on nije prestao sa krajem otomanskog carstva već je na kraju prerastao u ono u šta prerasta svaki nacionalizam ako mu se da prostora. Brzo i primamljivo, ali uvek i svuda loše rešenje. Edited April 26, 2013 by Bakemono

[MancMellow]

Iz tog razloga tvrdim da devetnaestovekovni srpski nacionalizam nije i ne može biti dobar jer on nije prestao sa krajem otomanskog carstva već je na kraju prerastao u ono u šta prerasta svaki nacionalizam ako mu se da prostora. Brzo i primamljivo, ali uvek i svuda loše rešenje.

Kad je bio kraj Osmanskog carstva? I u šta je prerastao srpski nacionalizam neposredno posle toga?

[Bakemono]

Kad je bio kraj Osmanskog carstva? I u šta je prerastao srpski nacionalizam neposredno posle toga?

Htedoh reći sa oslobađanjem od Osmanskog carstva.Srpski nacionalizam eskalirao je okupacijom Albanije. Citiraću ti Tucovića:

Seljačka Srbija više ne postoji... 1912. ona je potpuno nestala. Umesto nje, imperijalistička Srbija, pan-Srbija se pojavila, sa svojom pan-srpskom dinastijom i pan-srpskim militarizmom. Ovaj novi imperijalizam, surov, okrutan, nemilosrdan, sanja o povratku Dušanovog carstva i pokušava da dostigne u narednih deset godina imperijalne sile koje postoje stotinama godina

Edited April 26, 2013 by Bakemono

[MancMellow]

pročitaj bolje pažljivo ovaj tekst, pošto teško da mnogo istoričara u srba bolje od autora zna o čemu priča kad govorimo o tim temama:http://pescanik.net/2013/04/kacaci-na-kosovu/obrati pažnju (a i neki drugi bi mogli) na taj period 1912-1915pa najbolje razmislite malo o razmeri odnosa jedne vojne i političke nužnosti s jedne strane i "srpskog imperijalizma" s druge, pošto ima tu i jednog i drugog.

[Bojan]

Nacionalna država (nacionalni pokret) teži da definiše i zaokruži određeni kulturni prostor, plasirajući pri tome jedan „istorijski utemeljen“ narativ, kako bi se ljudi mobilisali. Utemeljenje nacije/države zapravo i ne mora biti blisko istini, ali je bitno da proizvodi posledice sada. Ono daje ljudima snagu i osećaj pripadnosti nečem velikom. Budući da su ljudi vremenska bića ovakav uticaj se ne može izbeći, niti se, kako je dobro primećeno, može tvrditi da su socijalne tvorevine nešto veštačko.Sa druge strane razuman čovek se vrlo lako može uveriti u ispraznost tog narativa, tako što će oslušnuti isti taj narativ kod svojih suseda.Mogao bih čak i da se zapitam: nije li Marks ponudio ljudima nešto mnogo bolje od ovoga?Naime, kroz nacionalnu ideologiju mi stvaramo jedan kolektivni identitet, koji nije nužno (ili nije uopšte) utemeljen na društvenim prilikama u kojima živimo. On se koristi kako bi država/nacionalni lideri proširili svoju moć. U takvim procesima (sukobima) svakako dolazi do ugrožavanja sloboda drugih ljudi, te se i oni na sličan način mobilišu. U ovakvim prilikama pojedinac ne dolazi u priliku da suštinski menja društvene odnose, već samo pobeđuje/gubi u nekom nacionalnom sukobu.Marks, sa druge strane, nudi jedan narativ koji se temelji na sadašnjem istorijskom stepenu razvoja društva; upućuje pojedinca da sagleda u kakvim društvenim prilikama obitava, da bi se potom ujedinjen sa drugima borio da utiče na te prilike.

[Prospero]

marks se valjda temelji na istorijskom stepenu razvoja od pre 150-170 godina.

[Prospero]

evo malo poduže na temu topica, koga ne mrzi da iščita ključne stavke:

instead of being an omnipotent and prevalent discourse that determines the political actions of the majority of people in the Balkans nationalism was a latecomer to the region. Notwithstanding the conventional historical narratives that depict the establishment of independent polities in the South East Europe in the 19th century as “national revolutions”, an overwhelming majority of the population, just as the most active participants in these uprisings, had little or no sense of what nationalism is.Rather than being a home grown invention nationalist ideology was imported slowly, and with a lot of resistance, from Paris, London, Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna and other centres of Enlightenment and Romanticism.In contrast to the mainstream view that sees rampant nationalism and incessant warfare as the principal obstacles to social development in the Balkans I argue that it is the inherent weakness of nationalism and the chronic lack of protracted organised violence that have historically been the key impediments forpolitical and economic growth....Many of the now-forgotten early sociologists such as Gumplowicz’s (1899), Franz Oppenheimer (1914) and Gustav Ratzenhofer (1881) have made persuasive analyses that link state making with organised violence. In their view the institution of the state was born in bloodshed: it was something that emerged through conquest and along history of violent domination. This so-called conquest thesis was later refined by Otto Hintze (1975), and Max Weber (1978), among others, who saw organisational preparation for, and the conduct of warfare, as the decisive structural mechanisms of state building.However, it was Charles Tilly (1975, 1985) who made this link between war and state creation explicit and who also provided a set of unambiguous empirical criteria for tracing causal links between the two phenomena. Tilly’s (1975:42) key point is that state making and war making are mutually constitutive: “war made the state, and the state made war”. More specifically he argues that modern, bureaucratic, centralised and territorialised nation-states have emerged as an unintended consequence of protracted warfare and expensive military campaigns. To pay for these costly wars the rulers of pre-modern polities were forced to dramatically increase resource extraction from the population under their control as well as to mobilize large sections of that population to fight in, work and pay for these wars. There were two principal corollaries of this structural change. On the one hand a greater extraction of resources stimulated the promotion of capital accumulation, the development of advanced and pervasive fiscal capacities of states,the society-wide expansion of legal systems, and the strengthening of communication and transport capabilities of states. On the other hand, the larger tax burden, universal conscription and greaterlabour obligations were countered by all-encompassing state protection, and the gradual extension of parliamentarianism and civil, political, and some social rights....In order to compete militarily with other rising powers the rulers had to neutralise internal threats and in this process pacify the domestic realm thus making the populations under their control dependent on their security for protection. In this ruthless struggle the smaller polities were swallowed by the larger ones and the European map saw a dramatic reduction in the number of independent polities: from as many as 1000 in the 14th century to slightly over 500 in 16th century and only 25 at the beginning of 20th century (Tilly 1975:15). Protracted warfare launched a vicious cycle whereby rulers extracted more resources to fund wars leading directly towards greater repression in the form of higher and more encompassing taxation, more severe military conscription and increased reliance on bank loans and debts, all of which stimulated further statebuilding. To finance wars, the rulers, often unwillingly, increased the infrastructural power of states (Mann 1986) which was most clearly visible in the tighter centralisation of rule, the expansion of the civil service, tax-collecting agencies, exchequers, police forces and judicial systems. As state power grew it threatened the security of other states with most of them embarking on preventive wars thus perpetuating the vicious cycle whereby warmaking leads to state building and state- building leads to more war-making....Since Tilly (1975) sees nations as a largely unintended by-product of state building, a historical construct that remains ultimately dependent on state formation, he does not devote much attention to the birth and expansion of nationalism. In contrast, in Ernest Gellner’s (1964:114, 1983:22, 1997:25) works nationalism is identified as one of the two central pillars of modernity (the other being continuous economic growth). For Gellner nationalism is a contingent but sociologically necessary phenomenon linked to the structuralchanges associated with the transition from the agrarian to the industrial world. More specifically he argues that there is no room for nationalist ideology before modernity as the pre-industrial world consisted of essentially status based polities where culture, rather than being a means of cultural, horizontal, homogenisation, was an instrument of vertical differentiation: the “high culture” of warrior nobility and high priesthood was rigidly opposed to the multitude of “low” vernacular cultures of peasantry. In such aworld there was little social and geographical mobility as neither aristocrats nor peasantry had any interest or sense of loyalty beyond one’s kinship, manor or estate. In contrast, the industrial world is dynamic, fluid and entails a greater division of labour; it requires much greater cultural homogeneity as the nature of work changes dramatically. Gellner (1998:27) explains that in the industrial world “work has ceased to be physical and has become semantic. It consists not of the modification of things, but in the manipulation of meanings and people”. Since industrial society is vibrant and centred on “perpetual growth” it has to be flexible and occupationally mobile. In this sense the industrial world becomes more egalitarian as the continuous development entails meritocracy and a high level of technical expertise. Consequently, in such a world universal literacy becomes a norm as most individuals have to be “mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of the new activity or occupation” (Gellner 1983:35). In other words, modernity generates a “modular man”, a highly flexible creature able to operate in a constantly changing social environment. Furthermore, since the industrial order involves great geographical mobility, as many individuals migrate to urban centres in search for work where they have to communicate with thousands of other unknown individuals, there is a need for a single, standardised, mutually understandable idiom of communication. Hence, the existence and expansion of industry entails the presence of a large, state sponsored and academy supervised educational system. On the one hand the educational system generates a regular “supply” of literate, trained and skilled labour, on the other hand it moulds illiterate peasants versed in mutuallyunintelligible vernaculars into the fluent speakers of standardised, context free, national languages. The unintended consequence of this process is the fact that the modern educational system fosters strong nationalist identifications: “an educational system must operate in some medium, and some language (bothin the literal and the extended sense): and the language it employs will stamp its products . . . Men do not in general become nationalists from sentiment or sentimentality, atavistic or not, well based or myth-founded: they become nationalists though genuine, objective, practical necessity . . .” (Gellner 1964:160). Once monopoly on the educational system is fully established a nationalist ideology becomes a cornerstone of a state’s legitimacy. In the industrial age all culture becomes “high culture” and the vertical cultural divide is replaced by the horizontal cultural divide: instead of identifying with one’s village or one’s strata an overwhelming majority of people see themselves first and foremost as members of distinct nations. Therefore, for Gellner, there is no nationalism before industrialisation and literacy and no “marriage of culture and state” without an effective and sustainable educational system....For example, Mouzelis (2007:132–3) argues: “In the nineteenthcentury Balkans . . . nationalist ideologies as well as the building of nation-state occurred in a context where large-scale industrialisation simply did not exist. Here the relatively rapid development of nationalist ideologies before and during the nation-building process took place at least a century before we can call these societies industrial”. Similarly Pavlowitch (1999:23) and Mazower (2003: 14, 43) indicate the emergence of nationalism in the Balkans long before any sign of industrialisation as they write about “the awakening of [balkan] nationalities, [in] 1804–30”, about “Balkan nationalism’s first triumph” in 1836 and “the emergence of massnationalism in the nineteenth-century Balkans”.Most attempts to rescue Gellner’s argument have focused on identifying special circumstances for the Balkans (and Latin America). Thus Gellner himself (1997:41–43) attempts to explain the Greek war of independence by invoking the religious divide between Christian peasantry and its Muslim overlords and links this with the diffusion of Romanticism and Enlightenment which allegedly made Balkan rebels into “ideological bandits: in other words nationalists”. Similarly, Mouzelis (1998:160; 2007:132–135) understands industrialisation in much wider terms and reconceptualises Gellner’s model through the notion of “modernisation”: “the elective affinity that Gellner tries to establish is not between nationalism and industrialisation, but between nationalism and modernity” (Mouzelis 1998:160).However, here too, just as in the case of Tilly, the empirical criticism is built on the poor foundation. Instead of looking at the character of nation formation (the dependent variable), the critics,as well as the defenders (including Gellner himself), have focused almost exclusively on the independent variable – industrialisation/ modernisation. Nevertheless, to properly understand the social change in the Balkans one cannot take the nationalist historiography at face value and simply assume the widespread presence of nationalism in the 19th century. In other words, while there is no dispute that the 19th century Balkan peninsula was for the most part a long way off from reaching the industrial stage of development,the central question is whether the revolutions and wars of independence of the early 19th century were principally motivated by specific nationalist goals. I argue that not only is there no empirical evidence that the nationalist ideology played any substantial role in the early 19th century Balkan revolutions and wars but also that nationalism remained a marginal phenomenon in the South East Europe for much of the 19th and early 20th century. In what follows, I attempt to show that although Tilly’s model seems able to explain the weakness of state formation in the early 19th century Balkans this theory falters in the context of late 19th and early 20th century warfare. Hence, to fully understand the logic of state building in the Balkans it is necessary to integrate segments of Tilly’s model with Gellner’s theory of nationalism. In other words, to account for the inherent infrastructural weakness of states in the Balkans one has to tackle the relationship between the state and nation formation....Despite the popular perceptions of Balkan wars as being frequent, protracted, excessive and highly destructive this region is no more prone to organised violence than other parts of Europe. In fact, when compared to the Western half of the continent, the 19th century Balkans seemed rather peaceful. For example, while the British Empire was involved in war for nearly all of the 19th century, including over sixty large scale violent conflicts, the Balkan states took part in only seven wars during the same period (Clodfelter1992). Moreover, with the partial exception of the Greek war of independence (1821–29), all of these wars were small scale conflicts resulting in relatively limited destruction of property and comparativelylow human casualties....much of 19th century Balkan warfare was sporadic and small scale, thus, following Tilly’s argument, generating little increase in state capacity to extract material, people and money. In other words, the low organisational basis did not allow for efficient war making and, in turn, the absence of large scale, protracted warfare meant rulers” inability to neutralise their domestic rivals or acquire enhanced organisational means for extraction of wealth. The 19th century Balkan wars were fought by polities with small administrative and fiscal apparatuses and with miniscule and highly unprofessional armies. Out of seven violent conflicts that can be termed wars, six (First and Second Serbian Uprising (1804–1813; 1815–1817), Ottoman-Montenegrin warfare (1852–3;1858–9, 1861), Serbo-Ottoman war of 1876, Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885 and Greco-Ottoman war of 1897) were little more thanlimited and largely disorganised skirmishes resulting in a few thousand fatalities each. In fact, most of these small wars have proved less destructive than peasant rebellions and other social upheavals and revolutionary events such as the Wallachian uprisings of 1821 and 1848, the Cretan Insurrections (1821–24; 1856; 1866; 1897, 1905), the Herzegovinian rebellion of 1875 and the Bulgarian (April) uprising of 1876....In contrast to the 19th century history of small wars and weak states, the early 20th century Balkans, just as the rest of Europe, was defined by large scale protracted and highly destructive warfare. Since from the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 much of Europe enjoyed an unprecedented period of “long peace”,the onset of the First (1912–13) and Second Balkan wars (1913) were experienced as a shock and a throwback to the past, barbarian, epochs. Most Western politicians, intellectuals and the press depicted the Balkans as a medieval, backward and uncivilised region, an “Asiatic khanate”. However, it was rather the acceleratedmodernisation and state building on the Western European model, which took off in the last two decades of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, that was at the heart of the mass destruction provoked by these two and other 20th century wars. Rather than being a historical reversal, the Balkan wars were apreview into the European future, a prelude to the two total wars of the 20th century.The dramatic intensity of these two wars paralleled the speedy development of state structures at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century in the Balkans. The administrative apparatus of all Balkan states expanded spectacularly during this period. For example, in Serbia state bureaucracy increased from 492 administrators in 1837, to 1,151 in 1842 to the point where between 1895–1902 more than 22% of all households of Belgrade were inhabited by bureaucrats (Stokes 1975). This trend continued in monarchist Yugoslavia where Serb- dominated bureaucracy grew to 172,000 in 1928 (Lampe 1996:130). Similarly, in Bulgaria public sector employment rose from 27,989 in 1904 to 49,683 in 1911 and jumped to 130,000 (if the families of public sector employees are included this amounts to 650,000) in 1941 (Kulischer 1948; Stoianovich 1994:202). This meant that more than 25% of Sofia’s population were civil servants and their families: 1 in 4 employed individuals in Sofia and 1 in 12 in the rest of the country was a state administrator (Roudometof 2001:162). In their attempt to quickly modernise Serbia, the constitutionalist oligarchs, who ruled the state from 1842 to 1858, introduced tenured administrative posts and expanded the rights and privileges of civil servants (Djordjevic 1985). From the mid 19th century all the way to the present day the state became and remained themost important source of employment. The number of public sector employees in Greece gradually rose from 23,187 in 1870 to 31,001 in 1879 and 33, 027 in 1889 to reach the staggering count of 130,000 in 1941 which with family members (650,000) constituted a third of the entire urban population of Greece (Roudometof2001:165–6)....The consequence of these structural changes was the ability of Balkan states to mobilise large sections of their population to fight in the two Balkan wars and WWI. In the first Balkan war (1912), Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece were capable of mobilising up to million soldiers with Bulgarian government managing tocall up ’599,878 men out of total male population of 1,914,160 (Hall 2010:16–19, 24). By 1918 900,000 men, that is 40% of entire male population of Bulgaria had been conscripted (Bell 1977:122).The second Balkan war (1913) was similar with Bulgarian military fielding 360, 000 troops against 300,000 Serbian, 121,000 Greek, 13,000 Montenegrin soldiers and up to 400,000 Romanian and 250,000 Ottoman troops (Hall 2000: 108–119). The human costs of these wars were enormous with, for example, Bulgaria losing by 1918 300,000 men (out of which 100,000 were killed) to several wars (Bell 1977:123).Although this strong initial link between increased military mobilisation and state development vindicates in part Tilly’s thesis, the outcome of these wars appears to contradict the Western European experience. While in Tilly’s original cases prolonged warfare proved beneficial to long term state building as it enhanced infrastructural powers as well as civil societies, the consequences of the Balkan wars were rather different. Despite the fact that, for example, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania were the clear winners of both Balkan wars and WWI and significantly expanded their territories, mobilised huge sectors of the population and large resources for the wars, this fact in itself did not determine the direction of state building. Not only did the 1920s and 30s bring about infrastructurally weak Balkan polities but more importantlythere were no substantial differences between those Balkan states that lost these wars, such as Bulgaria and Turkey, and those that found themselves on the winning side, such as Serbia, Montenegro or Greece....Thus, to understand such a different outcome in Western Europe and the Balkans it is crucial to focus on the role nationalism played in forging strong states. As many analysts of the nation-formation have demonstrated the Western European experience was often marked by the successful combination of state and nation building. As Breuilly (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) and Mann (1993, 1995) show, in much of Western Europe nationalismwas a backbone of cohesive state formation. In this part of the world early proto-nationalist movements were usually promoters of liberal ideals, democratisation and republicanism. Nationalism was one of the early pillars of social change helping politicise wider populations and encourage a broader sense ofcivil citizenship. As Mann 1995) argues, in France and Britain nationalism was a crucial legitimising device for effective state centralisation, fiscal control and infrastructural expansion. For Breuilly (1982), nationalism was vital for the development of the modern liberal state as it offered a “solution” to the great divide between the public and the private sphere, a divide generated by intensive modernisation. For Shils (1995), there is no vibrant civil society and cohesive state without a popular conception of nationhood and in the Western Europe they have evolved together.The fact that warfare has proved to be a less decisive factor in Balkan state development than in the rest of Europe has a great deal to do with the weaknesses of nationalism in this part of the world....Furthermore the pioneering sociological account of the rise of nationalism, that of Ernest Gellner (1964, 1983), is, as already emphasised, disputed on the grounds that it seems unable to explain the origins of national uprisings in the early 19th century Balkans. It is alleged that since Gellner ties nationalism to industrialisation his theory can not explain the emergence of potent Greek and Serbian nationalismsbefore industrialisation in the Balkans (O’Leary 1998, Minogue 2001; Mouzelis 1998, 2007).This is, I would argue, a highly problematic view that often projects contemporary concepts into the past. If nationalism is understood as a cross class ideology that advocates unity of culture and politics, that is, the moral right of culturally homogenous entities – nations – to live in politically independent and sovereignstates, than there was little if any nationalism in the Balkans before the late 19th century. Furthermore, if nationalism is conceptualised as a sociological phenomenon whereby a large majority of the population see themselves and are perceived by others as members of distinct, mutually exclusive, nations who have a “distinct character”, whose “national interests and values” take “priority over all other interests and values” and who advocate “attainment of political sovereignty” (Breuilly 1993:2) then I argue nationalism waspolitically irrelevant for most of the 19th century Balkans....To understand the development of nationalist ideology in the Balkans it is necessary to take a brief look at the role of religion and cultural difference in the Ottoman Empire. As with all premodern polities, the Ottoman Empire was a deeply stratified social order where the tiny military aristocracy (Askeri) ruled over a huge peasantry (reaya). This was a world where religion and aristocratic lineage rather than cultural difference were a principal source of social inclusion and exclusion. Hence, this was a polity that legitimised its existence in relation to the Islamic religious doctrine and ruled its subjects through the relatively segregated confessional communities – millets. The fact that millets were run by the highclergy who were able to rely on autonomous legal courts to enforce their will meant that these religious authorities were in a position to foster cultural assimilation under the guise of religious unity.Consequently, the Orthodox Christian millet, called the Rum millet, was defined, named after and run by the Greek (Romioi) religious hierarchy although it included all Orthodox Christians.The privileged position of the Greek Orthodox clergy proved to be crucial in the later stages of the Ottoman Empire as it operated as a mechanism for the cultural assimilation of non-Greek speaking Orthodox Christians. As Roudometof (2001:48) emphasises: “before 1850s social mobility frequently implied acculturation into theethnie associated with a particular niche in the social division of labour”. Hence there was an overlap between one’s class and ethnic background: being a “Serb” or “Bulgar” or other “Slav” implied one’s peasant status and moving to town and becoming a merchant meant often becoming a “Greek”. Even until mid 19thcentury Greek was the language of the Christian upper middle classes in Belgrade who “went about with worry beads (brojanice) and wore a half-melon cap (dinjara) in the manner of the Greeks” (Stoianovich 1994:294). The legacy of the millet system was the fact that until the early to mid 19th century most middle class Orthodox Christians were inclined to see themselves as Greek. However, this in itself was no sign of their willingness to support the establishment of an independent Greek state or even propensity to think along these lines. Rather than conceptualising “Greekness” in ethno-national terms, this was a status category that one could acquire by climbing the social ladder (Fine 2006; Roudometoff 2001; Kitromilides 1994).What is in the traditional historical accounts often interpreted as the “awakening of nations” in the early 19th century Balkans was in reality a rather confused, unarticulated set of ideas shared by a very small number of, mostly upper middle class, individuals interested in the transformation or overthrow of the Ottoman rule. The establishment of secret societies in the early 19th century such as “Society of Friends” (Philiki Etairia), Macedonian Society, Big Brotherhood, Philorthodox organisation and others is often wrongly interpreted as an early attempt towards promoting national independence. Instead, most of these societies were composed of culturally and politically highly diverse individuals who advocated different and largely undeveloped, vague concepts of cultural, religious and political renewal. Thus, instead of promoting nationalist ideas, they oscillated between a wish to re-create the ByzantineEmpire, establish a Christian pan-Balkan polity, reform the Ottoman state or create a federation of Balkan peoples (Pavlowitch 1999:26; Roudometoff 2001:77)....On the other side, the majority of the Christian population were peasants whose principal concern was daily survival and for whom their Christian overlords were just as unbearable as the Muslim ones. For example, inWallachia and Moldova “the peasantry desired the overthrow of boyars, whereas the lower boyars desired the overthrow of the Phanariot princes and the usurpation of administrative power for themselves” (Roudometoff 2001:231).Therefore what would later be termed as “the Greek War of Independence” started not in Greece but in, what is today, Romania as infighting between the Christian elites as Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu’s forces rebelled against Phanariot rule. Although in today’s nationalist narratives these two leaders are seen as“national liberators” their own motives were very much more complex and contradictory, having little to do with the modern ideology of nationalism (Georgescu 1991: 78–99: Glenny 2000: 57–59)....As this part of Europe was not exposed to secularist ideas and tendencies articulated by the Enlightenment and Romanticism and vigorously imposed through French and American revolutions, the political and cultural life was still dominated by the religious and confessional worldviews. Consequently, the first to rebel against the Ottoman rule were not motivated by nationalist goals but by religious millenarianism or locally based attachments. Rather than conceptualising politics in terms of popular sovereignty, these early 19th century visions were inspired by the religious prophecies that tied the collapse of the Ottoman rule to the Second Coming of Christ (Mango 1965) or return of individual saints such as St. Sava (Stoianovitch 1994:168). The focus here was not on providing political room for culturally distinct communities, as in nationalistprinciples, but on achieving spiritual regeneration through the resurrection of a Christian kingdom on the ruins of a Muslim empire. These millenarian visions were sustained by little understood natural events such as eclipses of the moon and sun (in 1804), the appearance of visible comets (in 1781, 1791, 1807), andlarge thunderstorms (in 1801) (Stoianovich 1994:169). In this sense millenarian ideas were supported by the Orthodox clergy: “Millenarianism provided the official Church doctrine with a political orientation that led to de facto recognition of Ottoman rule and at the same time denied –in principle- the Sultan’s legitimacy”(Roudometoff 2001:53).Thus, the two Serbian uprisings and the Greek war of Independence had very little to do with nationalist zeal and coherent programmes of “national self-determination”. These and other Balkan rebellions were undertaken by the motley crew of pig traders, merchants, pastoralists, bandits, military renegades and some peasants all of whom were motivated by different interests and goals. While peasants rebelled against the imposition of a“second serfdom” and increasing despotism of self-ruling ayans (such as Ali Pasha Tepelenli, Mehmed Ali, Pasvanoglou) and janissaries, pig traders and merchants wanted the restoration of order to increase trade, while most bandits were opportunists willing to easily switch sides for money. The First and Second Serbian Uprisings (1804–1813, 1815–1817) were essentially peasant rebellions led by the two illiterate pig-traders and bandits, Karadjordje and Obrenovic´, who did not rebel against the Ottoman rule but attempted to “restore order’ on behalf of the Sultan and against the usurpers of legitimate authority” (Roudometoff 2001: 24). Neither Karadjordje nor Obrenovic´ knew much about, nor were interested in, promoting Serbian nationalism. Rather their principal goal was political and economic control over the small patch of land with a view to expanding their own economic interests. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the population, the peasantry, had no sense of nationhood and only a vague feeling of religious solidarity....From the second half of the 19th century onwards most Balkan states consisted of two principal strata: peasant small holders and state employees. For example, from 1834 85% of Bulgarian peasants owned their own land; from 1835/8 the Serbian state legalised possession of fields and forests by village communities and prohibited large land ownerships; in Greece after 1832 land was nominally in state ownership but in reality was occupied by a huge number of small land holders (Mouzelis 1978). In contrast, the ever rising urban population remained heavily dependent on state employment. However, as this strata increased to huge levels, in some instances constituting one third of the population, it presented an enormous burden for overall economic development. Consequently, political life became hostage to state administration’s dependence on peasantry which ultimately led towards a lack of commercial cities, absence of industrial development, authoritarianism,proliferation of clientlist networks and dependency on foreign capital and loans. The ultimate result of this was that receptiveness towards nationalist ideologies was present almost exclusively among the state supporting strata – administrators, military, politicians and cultural elite, whereas a large majority ofthe population – free land owning peasants – had little or no interest in nationalism (Paxton, 1972; Stokes; 1976; Djordjevic 1985). As Roudometoff (2001: 158) puts it succinctly: the “creation of an independent free holding peasantry in Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, coupled with the peasantry’s ability to influence electoralresults, led the Balkan elites to employ the state as a mechanism of fiscal extraction and income redistribution toward the statedependent urban strata. From 1880 to 1920, it was the urban strata that favoured irredentism, with the military corps at the forefront”....The late 19th and early 20th centuries were periods of intensive state sponsored propagation of nationalist ideologies and the military mobilisation of large sectors of the population. The acquisition of territory was seen as a principal source of economic growth, geopolitical stability and state pride. All Balkan states invested a great deal in educational systems, publishing, cultural events, language policies and mass media to articulate and spread particular versions of nationalist narratives. In this sense Serbiangovernment made the ekavian dialect an official language of Serbia in order to bring the official Serbian much closer to the spoken vernacular of the Slavs living in Macedonia (Poulton 1995:63). The school textbooks of history, geography and literature focused on moulding new generations of “nationally conscious” Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians etc. Greek historians, folklorists and artists were encouraged to produce works which would celebrate the Greek nation and “prove” the existence of an uninterrupted continuity between the ancient Greeks, Byzantine Empire and modern Greeks which would give credence to further territorial claims....However, despite all of these intensive state sponsored activities intended to turn peasants into Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, or Albanians, as all available data shows, a majority of the population at the turn of the 20th century remained mostly indifferent towards nationalist ideology (Kitromilides 2010; 1994, Djordjevic 1985; Stokes 1976). In all Balkan states peasantry constituted the majority and, as Gellner and other theorists of nationalism have persuasively argued, peasants are not natural born nationalists. Theirlack of literacy, localism, inherent suspicions about city based authorities, non-participation in military draft and economic exploitation by the state have traditionally made peasantry deeply resentful of nationalism. In the Balkans of this period all of these suspicions were further reinforced by the fact that peasants were small land holders and as such were deeply reluctant towards military adventures stemming from nationalist aspirations. In this context they often found themselves in conflict with an urban, moreeducated and more state dependent, population who by the turn of the century did become more nationalist....As new states embarked on the large projects of state and military building the peasantry became discontent as it had to fund these projects. Even the onset of two Balkan wars and WWI when peasantry was politicised and mobilised to fight for the national cause did not dramatically change this non-nationalist, and in many instances anti-militarist, attitude. These highly destructive wars brought about more disillusionment with the state as it was the peasantry that lost the most during the wars. In Bulgaria the main politicalparty representing peasantry, Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, was from the beginning opposed to the Bulgarian involvement in the Balkan wars and WWI. The Bulgarian peasant soldiers wereoften reluctant to fight and “wanted to go home” (Hall 2000:103). On the eve of the second Balkan war in 1913 the Bulgarian officer characterised their general mood: “The spirit of the soldiers was, in general, considerably reduced and not answerable to the theoretical operative calculations of the high command” (Hall,2000:103). The military defeat in this war and again in WWI just reinforced the anti-militarism and anti-nationalism of the Bulgarian peasants (Bell 1977; Crampton 1983). Although Greece, Serbia and Montenegro found themselves on the winning side, in all three wars the aftermath of war did not bring about a significant increase in nationalist feelings among the still majority peasant population (Roudometoff 2001:174–5). Hence for most of the 19th century and early 20th century Balkan populations were not particularly responsive to nationalist ideologies. Rather than being a principal cause of various wars nationalism remained a marginal ideological force for much of this period....While there is no doubt that global and regional geopolitical, economic and other external factors played an important part in making the Balkans economically and politically undeveloped, to fully understand the state weakness in the region it is necessary to focus on the structural historical imbalance between state andnation formation. Since Tilly neglects the cohesive role that ideology plays in state and nation building his model cannot explain different outcomes in the relationship between state and war in the Balkans. As Centeno (2002:106) puts it: “Wars can only make states if they are preceded by at least a modicum of politicalorganisation. Without institutional cohesion, wars will make for chaos and defeat. Wars . . . cannot create institutions out of thin air. The consolidation of central authority and the creation of a modicum of a bureaucracy appear to have preceded the statemaking stage of war in England, France and Prussia”. In otherwords, warfare is no more than a catalyst of state building but to ignite and sustain fire one needs solid and durable wood; that is there has to be potent political organisations and social movements to capitalise on the war experience. As Breuilly (1982) and Mann (1986, 1995) demonstrate, in Western Europe nationalismwas an important catalyst of social mobilisation. The nationalist cultural, political and economic movements have proved decisive in popularising the Enlightenment and Romanticist ideas of popular sovereignty, autonomy, citizenship, liberty, fraternity, democracy, republicanism and equality. Although national revolutions, uprisings and political and social reforms did not radically alter the stratified characters of their polities these social movements and political organisations were vital in transforming the ideologicaldiscourse through which new states were legitimised. Hence, instead of the divine origins of monarchs the new principles of legitimacy have centred on popular representation which often blended ethnic and civic categories and reinforced state building with nation building. In contrast to Western Europe, the polities that emerged in the early 19th century Balkans were not the result of “ancient national aspirations” nor have they transpired as a consequence of strong nationalist movements. Instead “independence” arrived as a highly contingent historical outcome that often came againstthe will of all social strata inhabiting these polities: the rulers, the clergy, the merchants, the bankers and the peasantry. The new political entities came about as an unintended by-product of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse and as such were not states in any sociologically meaningful sense. Once established they graduallybecame a locus of highly personalised rule whereby the new rulers attempted to maintain themselves in power through the constant expansion of, initially rudimentary, administrative strata. When confronted with peasant rebellions and uprisings the rulers were forced to give away land and allow the emergence of free peasant small holders. The outcome of such policies were highly polarised societies where the large scale peasantry and ever growing patrimonial bureaucrats were at each other throats and where the majority of the population for much of the 19th century did not identify with their states. Hence, not only did nationalist ideology play little or no part in the establishment of new Balkan states, but nationalism remained an insignificantideological force until the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, even when the nationalist rhetoric was embraced as a principal political discourse it still continued to be a preserve of minority in all Balkan states: the military establishment, political and cultural elites and bureaucrats and their families. Thus, it is not the strength but the weakness of nationalism that proved crucial for underdevelopment of states in this region....The aftermath of the two Balkan wars and WWI demonstrated clearly the limits of nationalism for state building in the region. While the war successes could have served as a catalyst of intensive political and economic development in Serbia, Greece or Romania, as they had earlier in Prussia, England and France,this did not happen. Instead of catching up with the rest of the developed world, the Balkan states were further going in the opposite direction. In this context, rather than being a cohesive glue of state formation, nationalism often developed as an antistate force fuelled by social discontent, economic backwardness and rural dissatisfaction. The Balkan case indicates that although wars can prove important catalysts of state formation they may not necessarily contribute to nation formation. When the state and nation emerge together wars are likely to act as an impetus for further state development but when the two processes develop around different trajectories they can find themselves on collision course and nation-formation (or the lack of it) can undermine statedevelopment. To sum up, contrary to the mainstream views that explain the fragility of states and the economic underdevelopment in the Balkans by invoking the imagery of persistent warfare and endemicnationalism, it is the lack of prolonged inter-state warfare and the frailty of nationalist ideologies that have proved historically to be fundamental obstacles for social development.

[Agni]

Super tekst. Ovo mi je posebno zanimljivo:

The legacy of the millet system was the fact that until the early to mid 19th century most middle class Orthodox Christians were inclined to see themselves as Greek. However, this in itself was no sign of their willingness to support the establishment of an independent Greek state or even propensity to think along these lines. Rather than conceptualising “Greekness” in ethno-national terms, this was a status category that one could acquire by climbing the social ladder (Fine 2006; Roudometoff 2001; Kitromilides 1994)....Neither Karadjordje nor Obrenovic´ knew much about, nor were interested in, promoting Serbian nationalism.Rather their principal goal was political and economic control over the small patch of land with a view to expanding their own economic interests. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the population, the peasantry, had no sense of nationhood and only a vague feeling of religious solidarity....However, despite all of these intensive state sponsored activities intended to turn peasants into Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, or Albanians, as all available data shows, a majority of the population at the turn of the 20th century remained mostly indifferent towards nationalist ideology (Kitromilides 2010; 1994, Djordjevic 1985; Stokes 1976).

[MancMellow]

prilično zanimljivo. zapravo, hvala, možda nešto od ovoga i iskoristim. Nešto što mi je doduše, odmah upalo u očiDespite the fact that, for example, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania were the clear winners of both Balkan wars and WWI and significantly expanded their territories, mobilised huge sectors of the population and large resources for the wars, this fact in itself did not determine the direction of state building.Jedini "clear winner" od ovih je Rumunija. Teško da je Grčka clear winner pošto se rat produžio do 1922/3, a svi znamo kako se to završilo. Srbija je clear winner alright, ali to nije moglo po definiciji da odredi pravac state buildinga pošto država koja je na toj pobedi građena nije bila "Srbija". Dalje i Italija je clear winner ako tako gledamo, a takođe znamo kako je to dalje išlo. Hoću da kažem objektivna pobeda je jedno, a kako se taj rezultat doživljava u samoj zemlji je nešto drugo, a posledice rezultata rata više zavise od tog subjektivnog doživljaja nego od nekog "objktivnog". Inače je super članak

[Prospero]

čini mi se da je mislio na to da recimo 20 godina posle 1SR, tj pred 2SR, nije postojala osetna razlika između tih država u socijalno-ekonomskom smislu. anyhoo, koga interesuje ceo tekst a ne može da skine sa wiley-a za dž nek pošalje pm.