Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[zorglub]

Garija u prve redove na posrnule topike, za onakav uvod trebalo mu je skoro mesec dana, ali je vredelo.

[Bakemono]

To se jednostavno ne prihvata? E ni pa meni nije jednostavno da prihvatim da se to "jednostavno ne prihvata".Druga stvar, trećina pobijenog muškog sveta, hiljade poklanih, silovanih i najstrašnije mučenih od strane neprijatelja su preskupa cena za učestvovanje u ratu na "pravoj strani", da bismo danas mogli da se hvalimo kako smo "pobednici". Što kaže Slavko Štimac u Andergraundu, ako smo mi pobedili zašto oni danas slave?Recept za male narode: skini gaće, naguzi se i čekaj da prođe. Worked fine for Danes. Naravno, osim u slučaju da neprijatelj hoće da te istrebi samo zato što si to što jesi.

[Yoda]

To se jednostavno ne prihvata? E ni pa meni nije jednostavno da prihvatim da se to "jednostavno ne prihvata".Druga stvar, trećina pobijenog muškog sveta, hiljade poklanih, silovanih i najstrašnije mučenih od strane neprijatelja su preskupa cena za učestvovanje u ratu na "pravoj strani", da bismo danas mogli da se hvalimo kako smo "pobednici". Što kaže Slavko Štimac u Andergraundu, ako smo mi pobedili zašto oni danas slave?Recept za male narode: skini gaće, naguzi se i čekaj da prođe. Worked fine for Danes. Naravno, osim u slučaju da neprijatelj hoće da te istrebi samo zato što si to što jesi.

Sve je ovo ok za literaturu i film, ali je sve prebaceno na istoriju, na ratni topik. Tolstoj i Slavko Stimac ovde slabo mogu da pomognu.izvini, ali mi je tesko da polemisem sa nekim koji gotovo uopste nije upucen u temu i kontrira argumentacijom koja je neistorijska.

[Bakemono]

Izvinjenje prihvaćeno.

[Yoda]

Generacijska skola, momak.I nemoj previse da se svadjas sa istorijom, od toga ces samo lose da osecas.

[Bakemono]

Generacijska škola... svađati se sa istorijom... Ič te ne razumem. Ako te štogod uvredih, praštaj.

[Yoda]

Ma, nije ni vazno. I sve ok.

[Aće]

Garija u prve redove na posrnule topike, za onakav uvod trebalo mu je skoro mesec dana, ali je vredelo.

ma moze sve, samo ne vidim nesto ni uzdignute glave nakon svih velikih pobeda i mudrih odluka.

[Agni]

Sve je to lepo i humano, ali su Hecendorf i ekipa imali malo drugacije planove - Srbija je trebalo da se rasparca, podeli, da je nema.

Prvo, ishod svetskog rata tesko da je zavisio od ucesca Srbije u njemu. Drugo, ponavljam da je trebalo privremeno zrtvovati drzavu radi naroda, sa naglaskom na privremeno - sta mislis da bi se desilo sa teritorijom "rasparcane" Srbije posle poraza centralnih sila? Da ne bi mozda Bugarska ili Madjarska bile nagradjene za poraz teritorijom Srbije, mimo dotadasnje prakse i Vilsonove doktrine o samoopredeljenju? Italija bi verovatno capila deo Dalmacije, Srbija se ne bi toliko prosirila na racun Madjarske i ne bi bila u poziciji da ujedini Juzne Slovene pod svojom dinastijom, ali gledano sa ove distance, to sve tesko da bi predstavljalo gubitak na duge staze. Naprotiv, Srba bi bilo znatno vise, ne samo zbog izbegavanja hekatombe u prvom svetskom ratu, nego zato sto verovatno ne bi doslo do glozenja sa Hrvatima pa samim tim ni do genocida u sledecem ratu.

[Aće]

upravo tako, a srbija ne bi za jedan vek ostala bez sve zemlje koju je platila glavama 15+% svog stanovnistva.

[Yoda]

Prvo, ishod svetskog rata tesko da je zavisio od ucesca Srbije u njemu. Drugo, ponavljam da je trebalo privremeno zrtvovati drzavu radi naroda, sa naglaskom na privremeno - sta mislis da bi se desilo sa teritorijom "rasparcane" Srbije posle poraza centralnih sila? Da ne bi mozda Bugarska ili Madjarska bile nagradjene za poraz teritorijom Srbije, mimo dotadasnje prakse i Vilsonove doktrine o samoopredeljenju? Italija bi verovatno capila deo Dalmacije, Srbija se ne bi toliko prosirila na racun Madjarske i ne bi bila u poziciji da ujedini Juzne Slovene pod svojom dinastijom, ali gledano sa ove distance, to sve tesko da bi predstavljalo gubitak na duge staze. Naprotiv, Srba bi bilo znatno vise, ne samo zbog izbegavanja hekatombe u prvom svetskom ratu, nego zato sto verovatno ne bi doslo do glozenja sa Hrvatima pa samim tim ni do genocida u sledecem ratu.

Sta znaci uopste privremeno zrtvovati drzavu? Ucitavas sadasnje vidjenje u proslost, modelirano u 20godisnjoj frustraciji koju jos zivimo, ali dozirano, do onog nivoa koji bi se sigurno desio.Nisam sagovornik na ovakav nacin na ovom pdf. Edited January 18, 2013 by Yoda

[Prospero]

uloge u Beču:Richard F. Hamilton & Holger Harwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917., str.49-53

The Cast of 1914A small coterie, not more than eight or ten persons, made the key decisions of July 1914. This coterie consisted of the emperor, Franz Joseph, the political leaders, the senior diplomats, and the top military leaders – collectively, the Council of Ministers (to be discussed later)....The emperor often delegated the leadership of foreign policy to the Imperial and Royal Minister of the Household and of Foreign Affairs. From 1906 to 1912, this was Aehrenthal, a forceful personality, a man of considerable charisma, and one with a sense of mission. His aim, basically, was to see the revival of the empire. The takeover ofBosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was his work, for better or for worse, his most important achievement. As he put it: “We have reconquered again the place that belongs to us among the Powers.”Aehrenthal took on and trained the next generation of diplomats, imbuing them with his sense of purpose. They were staunch admirers of their mentor, his loyal and devoted disciples. They had entered the diplomatic corps at the turn of the century and had served in varying capacities in the Balkans. They held social Darwinist viewpointswith respect to the “lesser Balkan peoples.” Sometimes called the Young Turks or the Young Rebels (rebelling against Austria’s easygoing ways), they would have considerable influence on Aehrenthal’s successor.Aehrenthal died in February 1912 and was succeeded by Count Leopold Berchtold. At age 49 years he was the youngest foreign minister in Europe. For five years Berchtold had been Vienna’s ambassador to Russia where he served with distinction. But he lacked experience in the management of foreign affairs, never having been a section chiefin the Ministry. He also lacked experience in domestic affairs and in military matters, a persistent problem for the monarchy. A reluctant office holder, Berchtold served in what he once called the “simmering cauldron at the Ballplatz” against his own will and better judgment. One authority describes him as “intelligent and hard-working and possessed of a great personal charm,” but “entirely lacking in that self-confidence that carried Aehrenthal through.” Berchtold showed “indecisiveness and diffidence,” and quick reversals of policy became serious problems.Berchtold’s feelings of inadequacy made him heavily dependent on the advice and opinions of his personal staff at the Foreign Ministry and to compensate, he quickly adopted a “consultative” style. During the July Crisis the leading officials met regularly with Berchtold late in the evening to discuss the day’s events and prepare for the next.Some scholars have portrayed Berchtold as a pawn in the hands of Aehrenthal’s aggressive disciples, but in July 1914 that does not appear to have been the case. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., writes that on this occasion Berchtold “commanded and managed the process.”The leading members of the Young Turk faction at the Ballhausplatz constituted the most vocal pro-war diplomatic cadre during the July Crisis. At their head stood the assertive Count Alexander Hoyos, a personal friend of Berchtold with diplomatic experience in Europe and Asia. In 1912 he became chef de cabinet in Berchtold’s ministry.At age 36, “Alek” Hoyos headed the foreign minister’s small immediate staff and thus was at the center of decision-making. Early in July Berchtold dispatched Hoyos to Berlin with Vienna’s pleas for German support in its planned campaign against Serbia.Just below Hoyos were the Foreign Ministry’s five section chiefs. Count Janos Forgach had served as minister to Belgrade from 1907 to 1911. Thus, he played a significant role during the Bosnian crisis of 1908, but the following year discredited himself by providing forged documents for a highly publicized treason trial at Agram (Zagreb).Sent into professional exile at Dresden, in the fall of 1913 Forgach returned to the Foreign Ministry as chief of its Political Section. The major participants in the July Crisis assign Forgach (along with Hoyos) a prominent role in those events. As head of the Political Section, he was responsible for preparing Berchtold’s personal correspondenceand material for Common Ministerial Council meetings. During the July Crisis, Forgach maintained daily telephone contact with both Minister-President Count Istvan Tisza at Budapest and Baron Istvan Burian, the Hungarian emissary to Vienna.Next in importance came Baron Franz von Matscheko, a senior section chief and Berchtold’s Balkan expert. On 24 June, just four days before the killings at Sarajevo, Matscheko had counseled a more aggressive diplomatic policy, one requiring the support of both Tisza and the Germans. He had spoken of Russia’s “encirclement” of theDual Monarchy and demanded “energetic” steps to break that alleged iron ring. As well, Matscheko identified Bulgaria as a potential ally and Romania (an ally) as a potential foe. After Sarajevo, Matscheko replaced his strident call for a more militant diplomatic policy with one for an aggressive military policy. And finally, there was BaronAlexander von Musulin, a diplomat and bureaucrat in the Foreign Ministry who was entrusted by Forgach with drafting the ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914.Among senior Habsburg ambassadors, the two most important were at Berlin and St. Petersburg. Count Frigyes Szapary von Szapar had been Forgach’s predecessor as head of the Political Section; late in 1913 he was named ambassador to St. Petersburg, the first Russophobe to hold the position for some time. Personal problemsforced Szapary to leave St. Petersburg almost as soon as he had arrived, leaving much of the work to Legation Secretary Count Ottokar Czernin. During the first weeks of the July Crisis, Szapary was again absent due to the illness of his wife, which of course hindered both intelligence and diplomatic efforts. But in Vienna during those weekshe participated in several important sessions dealing with the crisis. He returned to his post in the Russian capital in mid-July.Count Ladislaus Szogyeny-Marich had held the critical ambassadorship to Berlin since 1892. The most senior Habsburg ambassador, Szogyeny loyally acted as a conduit for diplomatic messages rather than as a shaper of relations with Berlin. The arrival of Hoyos in Berlin as a special envoy of both Franz Joseph and Berchtold effectively reduced the ambassador’s role during the most sensitive phase of the July Crisis. The two minister-presidents, Counts Karl Sturgkh of Austria and Tisza of Hungary, like Berchtold were also members of the Common Ministerial Council. Their primary concerns, ordinarily, were with internal affairs. Each ruled his half of the monarchy on the basis of separate Austrian and Hungarian constitutions. Each appointed a Cabinetdirectly responsible to the two respective legislatures at Vienna and Budapest. And while the conduct of foreign policy was assigned to a “common” foreign minister (Berchtold) for the entire monarchy, in reality war could be declared (and conducted) only with the consent of the two minister-presidents, who thus had what de facto if not de jure amounted to veto powers. St ¨urgkh was a professional bureaucrat, a man of limited vision whose career should have ended with his appointment as ministerof education in 1908. Instead, he was appointed minister-president in November 1911. A bureaucrat of German centralist tendencies, Sturgkh proved to be disaster. In July 1913 he overthrew the Bohemian constitution, and in March 1914 he prorogued the Austrian parliament, the Reichsrat. As a result, Austrian politicians played no role inthe events following the Sarajevo assassination.Tisza was cut from a different cloth. Minister-president since June 1913, the Magyar aristocrat firmly believed in the Compromise of 1867 as the supreme guarantor of Hungarian rights against Germans, Romanians, and Slavs. Tisza ruled his half of the Dual Monarchy with an iron first. No decision could be reached at Vienna without his support. Early on in the July Crisis, Tisza indicated some concerns, some grounds for dissent with respect to war with Serbia, but he eventually yielded.Tisza’s activities, understandably, were based largely in Budapest. For this reason, his emissary in Vienna, Count Burian, during the July Crisis was an influential participant in Council discussions. Serious, unimaginative, and prone to strict legalistic approaches to issues, Buri´an in July 1914 was little more than Tisza’s mouthpiece in Vienna.The common finance minister, Ritter Leon von Bilinski, was an avowed “hawk.” Already during the Balkan Wars, he had demanded that Habsburg forces intervene not only in Montenegro, but also that they march against the Serbs – even if this brought about war with Russia. A victorious war against Montenegro-Serbia, Bilinski counseledin May 1913, alone could bring new territories to the Dual Monarchy and arrest the forces of nationalism. During the July Crisis, Bilinski, not surprisingly, reiterated his strident calls for military action against Serbia, with or without German support. After the GreatWar, he admitted to a friend that Austria had decided on a war course atthe latest by 3 July.And finally, there was the common minister of war, Ritter Alexander von Krobatin. The son of an army officer, he had been schooled exclusively in military institutions. He taught at the Technical Military Academy and later headed the Artillery Cadet School. From 1896, he served in the War Ministry and, in 1912, was named as its head.Krobatin worked tirelessly to modernize the Austro-Hungarian artillery. In July 1914 he vigorously supported the “hawks” in calling for an immediate military strike against Serbia. The two minister-presidents and the several ministers listed above operated through the Dual Monarchy’s Common Ministerial Council, the highest agency in the empire’s complicated governmental system. Officially, the emperor presided over its meetings but more often his appointed foreign minister chaired it. This select group had the authority to summon others, such as the chief of the General Staff, to participate in their discussions. At its disposal were all of the resources of the government, which for July 1914 meant effectively all the personnel of the Foreign and War Ministries. The Common Ministerial Council, in the words of John Leslie, was “more a discussion group than an executive cabinet.” In fact, between October 1913 and July 1914 it met only three times. It was not regulated by any constitution or laws. Apart from an ineffectual oversight agency, called the Delegations, it was not subject to any seriousrestraints. The Dual Monarchy was constructed so as to preserve, as best it could, the empire’s absolutist character. But, as stated earlier, it should not be overlooked that its decisions could be enacted only if the governments of both halves of the monarchy were united behind the Council’s decisions. The Common Ministerial Council would make the decision for war in July 1914.

[Agni]

Sta znaci uopste privremeno zrtvovati drzavu? Ucitavas sadasnje vidjenje u proslost, modelirano u 20godisnjoj frustraciji koju jos zivimo, ali dozirano, do onog nivoa koji bi se sigurno desio.Nisam sagovornik na ovakav nacin na ovom pdf.

Da, zato si ti siguran da bi Srbija bila rasparcana da je prihvacen ultimatum, to je ozbiljna istorija (kao da nije bila okupirana i rasparcana za vreme tog rata). A o tome sta znaci privremeno zrtvovati drzavu umesto stavljanja kurca na panj moze se nauciti iz istorije Ceha i Slovaka.

[Prospero]

i malo više o julskoj krizi:

The July CrisisWhen news of the assassination arrived in Vienna late on 28 June, most of the monarchy’s leaders were away for a long weekend or on vacation. There was neither panic nor even a sense of great grief. Franz Ferdinand was not a beloved figure: the emperor and the court had been scandalized by his morganatic marriage to Sophie Chotek; the Magyars detested what they perceived to be his anti-Hungarian stance; the imperial bureaucracywas concerned about his alleged reformplans for the empire; and Conrad von Hotzendorf feared for his job as long as the archduke was alive.There was no hard evidence that the Serbian government had a hand in the assassination – the Vienna press, in fact, presented its readers with a host of possible “conspiracies” to commit murder by the likes of German intelligence, Freemasons, and even Minister-President Tisza of Hungary! Almost unanimously, the sympathy of Europe’s royal families (only France was a republic) was squarely with Austria-Hungary; regicide appealed to few crowned heads. Moreover, members of royal houses and aristocratic families had been murdered before without serious consequences. Recent wars in the Balkans and in northern Africa had not led to a wider war. Why should 28 June 1914 be different?The Austrian case is striking in that a great power, without certain knowledge of the regicides and their putative handlers, decided almost immediately on war. There was much informal debate about “punishing” Serbia for its alleged support of the archduke’s murderers, but the real discussions at the Ballhausplatz focused almost at once on using the assassination to advantage. As one senior Habsburg diplomat, Baron Leopold von Andrian-Werburg, indelicately stated, “precious fruits for the Monarchy were to ripen” from Franz Ferdinand’s spilled blood. Put differently, leaders in Vienna quickly grasped that an aggressive stance against Belgrade could change the perception of Austrian weakness, decadence, and decline not only in Serbia but also in much of the rest of Europe. Two of the Young Rebels at the Foreign Ministry, Forg´ach and Matscheko, met right after news of the assassination arrived. They rewrote Matscheko’s 24 June memorandum, which called for a more aggressive diplomatic policy at the Ballhausplatz, and instead counseled a military solution to the Serb “problem.” Foreign Minister Berchtold “commanded and managed” the decision-making at Vienna in the aftermath of the killings at Sarajevo. His primary concern was to learn the reactions of Franz Joseph, Tisza, and Wilhelm II. Several members of the Common Ministerial Council, most notably Austrian Minister-President Sturgkh, Common Finance Minister Bilinski, and War Minister Krobatin, pressed for immediate action against Serbia. Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf announced that the murder was “Serbia’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary [and that] the only possible response to it [was]war.” He wished to mobilize on 1 July without furtherdiscussions with Serbia. Berchtold later summarized Conrad’s views during the July Crisis with three words: “War, war, war.” Despite those pressures, the foreign minister moved cautiously in the first days after the assassination.On Tuesday, 30 June, Berchtold met with Franz Joseph. Both agreed that they should “await the judicial investigation,” that they should learn Tisza’s views, and, most importantly, that they should inquire about Berlin’s attitude. They learned the same day that Tisza opposed an immediate military confrontation. Fearing new annexation of Slav subjects to Hungary, Tisza wrote letters to Franz Joseph on 1 July and later on 8 July to seek assurance that diplomatic actions preceded any military effort.By Thursday, 2 July, some information based on the interrogation of the conspirators revealed links to Serbia. Three of them, including Gavrilo Princip, had just returned from Belgrade where they had been given pistols and bombs. Complicity by several members of Serbian military intelligence – most notably by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic (“Apis”) – was suspected. This incomplete report (which said nothing of the “Serbian” leaders’ involvement) helped reinforce the already existing consensus. Oskar Potiorek, the governor-general of Bosnia (and the man most responsible for the failure of security at Sarajevo), also argued for an attack on Serbia, this to help put down the alarmingand pervasive “unrest” he now, with generous distortion, reported in the recently annexed territory. That same day Berchtold drafted a private letter from Franz Joseph for presentation to Wilhelm II. It placed the blame for the assassination on Russia and on Serbian Pan-Slavs. While not specifically calling for war, it stated that “the band of criminal agitators in Belgrade” could not go “unpunished.” The intention was unmistakable.Berchtold made clear his bellicose stance on 3 July in conversation with Heinrich von Tschirschky, Germany’s ambassador to Vienna. He spoke of the need for a “final and fundamental reckoning” with Belgrade. While Tschirschky reacted with great caution, Wilhelm II fully endorsed Berchtold’s demand with the marginal note, “now or never.” The kaiser’s terse comment on Tschirschky’s warning against “precipitate steps” was “nonsense.” Ordinarily, the monarchs of Europe would have come to Vienna for a state funeral at which time some discussion of appropriate responses could have occurred. But because of Franz Joseph’s advanced age and infirmcondition, other arrangements were made. That change meant that the Dual Monarchy’s leaders had to make a special effort to ascertain Germany’s response. A member of the Foreign Ministry was sent, secretly, to Berlin for this purpose. “Alek” Hoyos, Berchtold’s personal friend and chef de cabinet, volunteered for the mission.One of the most articulate “hawks” in Berchtold’s circle, Hoyos would be a most competent advocate of the “pro-war” position. By choosing Hoyos, Berchtold made sure that the Germans would hear of Vienna’s resolve to strike at Serbia; that the aged and unimaginative Ambassador Szogyeny at Berlin would, as much as possible, bebypassed; and that any further intrusions by Tisza into the diplomatic process would be preempted. The secret mission had only one purpose: war. On 5 July Szogyeny and Hoyos reviewed the two documents from Vienna. Szogyeny then had lunch with the kaiser at Potsdam. Hoyos had lunch with Arthur Zimmermann, the under-secretary of the Foreign Office (Gottlieb von Jagow, the foreign secretary, was away on his honeymoon). At 10 p.m. Szogyeny cabled Berchtold the kaiser’s pledgeof “full German backing” in any action that Vienna took, requesting only that it proceed promptly. It would be deplorable, Wilhelm had counseled Sz¨ogy´eny, if Vienna did not exploit “the present situation which is so favorable to us.” The kaiser’s only reservation was that he would have to consult with Chancellor Theobald von BethmannHollweg before taking a final decision. Independently, Zimmermann conveyed much the same sense to Hoyos.Late that afternoon, the kaiser and the chief of his Military Cabinet, Baron Moriz von Lyncker, met with Bethmann Hollweg and Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian minister of war. These four men “considered the question of Russian intervention and accepted the risk of a general war.” And on the 6th, Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann ratified the commitments made by Wilhelm II. Ambassador Szogyeny cabled Berchtold that evening that Bethmann Hollweg regarded Austria-Hungary’s “immediate intervention” against Serbia as the “most radical and best solution” of its “difficulties in the Balkans.”These declarations of support for Austria-Hungary’s imminent war on Serbia have been referred to as the “blank check.” The Dual Monarchy could “fill in” the contents when it chose. Those issuing “the check” urged them to do so quickly. These promises of backing were of immense importance. Without them, Austria-Hungary could nothave moved to war. Upon his return to Vienna on 6 July, Hoyos met secretly with Berchtold and the two minister-presidents, St¨urgkh and Tisza. The German ambassador, Tschirschky, also participated in their discussion and informed the Austrians of what they already knew – namely, that Bethmann Hollweg considered the present moment to be more suitable for action than a later occasion.The following day, Tuesday, 7 July, the Common Ministerial Council met to determine the next steps to be taken with respect to Serbia. The promise of German backing strengthened the predominant sentiment, that of “settling accounts with Serbia.” Over four hours, the ministers (Berchtold, Bilinski, Sturgkh, Tisza, Krobatin) as well as aguest, Conrad von H¨otzendorf, examined each option. The decisions taken, in the words of Williamson, were “carefully evaluated choices.” A consensus developed on the possibility of a “strongly worded ultimatum to Belgrade,” one which Serbia would have to reject, thus providing the justification for a “local” war. In the afternoon, Conrad reviewed the military plans including the possibility of Russian intervention. He minimized the risks involved and, to Tisza’s objections, repeated his “better now than later” phrase. Given the decisions taken on 7 July, it follows that Austria-Hungary’s leaders would seek to avoid, or block any later peacemaking efforts. Those decisions, it should be noted, were taken before any official “Serbian” role in the murders had been established. And, despite that problem, the decisions enjoyed the full support of the GermanForeign Office. On 8 July Zimmermann informed the Austrians that “now was the right moment – a moment, which might not ever reappear under such favorable conditions – energetically to move against Serbia.”Then, curiously, a period of quiet followed. The ordinary citizen would have read of the assassination in Monday morning newspapers on 29 June. The next major event, signaling the alarm, was the delivery of Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July, three and a half weeks later. For Germany’s leaders, that period of quietbecame a source of concern: why was the move against Serbia being delayed?Three factors led to the postponement of the Monarchy’s response. Tisza, as indicated, wished that an effort be made to establish Belgrade’s role in the assassination so as to legitimate the Austro-Hungarian response. His concern led to the dispatch of an investigative body to Sarajevo, headed by a prominent lawyer and member of the Foreign Ministry, Ritter Friedrich von Wiesner. This source of the delay, however, does not appear to have been decisive. A second and more compelling consideration was that the Monarchy’s troops were not immediately available. As a concession to agrarian interests, Conrad had instituted a policy of harvest-leaves allowingmen in the military to return home on temporary leave to help harvest the crops. On 6 July Conrad “discovered” that many units were on leave and not scheduled to return until 25 July. To cancel those leaves would disrupt the harvest, upset railroad schedules, and, most importantly, alert Europe to Vienna’s “possible military intentions.”A third factor was the scheduled visit of France’s President Raymond Poincar´e and Premier Ren´e Viviani to St. Petersburg. To block a concerted response by the two entente partners, Vienna’s leaders planned to deliver the ultimatum on 23 July, after the visit ended and when the French leaders would, literally, be at sea. The second and third factors meant that “settling accounts” with Serbia could not begin before the last week of July. Since a general mobilization would take some time, the “settlement” could not possibly begin until at least mid-August. At a meeting on 14 July, Berchtold, Tisza, Sturgkh, and Burian reviewed matters again and agreed on the overall plan and content of the ultimatum to Serbia. The document was to be delivered to Belgrade with a 48-hour time limit. Tisza accepted the harsh ultimatum with its unacceptable demands and short deadline, but only on two conditions: there was to be no annexation of Serbian territory following a Habsburg victory, and defensive military measures were to be initiated immediately along the Romanian frontier.One crucial aspect of Austrian decision-making deserves special note. Franz Joseph, as discussed earlier, had “the last word” with respect to these fundamental decisions. But he was not present at any of the discussions of the Common Ministerial Council where these policies were being formulated. On the morning of 7 July, prior tothe key Council meeting, he left Vienna for his summer estate in Bad Ischl, five hours by train from Vienna. He remained there for the next three weeks. Since all key decisions had to be ratified by the emperor, Berchtold on 9 July had to travel to Bad Ischl to review the Council’s decision. He made the journey again on the 19th for the emperor’s review of the text of the ultimatum. Berchtold, Krobatin, and Bilinski were there with the emperor on the 25th to await word of the Serbian response. Franz Joseph was in complete agreement with the directions chosen but had, clearly, delegated all further questions to his immediate subordinates.Vienna’s leaders at this point were engaged in a “policy of deception.” They were “lulling Europe.” The aim was to suggest that no exceptional measures would be taken against Serbia. The local press was asked to curtail its comments about Serbia. Attempts were made to obtain more favorable treatment in the foreign press. To allaypossible fears of impending war, Generals Krobatin and Conrad left Vienna “with conspicuous fanfare” ostensibly on leave. “No military moves were undertaken, and Habsburg officers on leave were left undisturbed.”On the weekend of 18–19 July, three weeks after the assassination, information regarding Austro-Hungarian intentions was discovered and passed on to several European governments. The “leak” began on 11 July when the German foreign secretary, Jagow, informed the German ambassador in Rome of “the general thrust of Habsburg intentions.” The ambassador then “mentioned” the substance of this message to the Italian foreign minister, Antonio di San Giuliani, who passed this information, on 16 July, to the Italian embassies in St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade. Austrian cryptographers had broken the Italian codes and thus discovered that this information was available in the four capitals, two of them “unfriendly.” It is likely that Russian cryptographers also broke the code. Another possibility, of course, is that the Italian ambassadors passed the information directly to their hosts – in St. Petersburg and in Belgrade. The reactions of the European nations changed dramatically. On 18 July Serbia began calling up reservists. On the same day Vienna received a memo from the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergei Sazonov, warning that Russia would not permit an attempt against Serbia’s independence. The Habsburg ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Szapary, apparently allayed Sazonov’s concerns at that point, convincing him that Vienna “planned nothing unusual.” Three days later, however, Poincare, in St. Petersburg, sought out the same ambassador and “left no doubt of France’s support of Russia and Russia’s support of Serbia.” The conclusion, as Williamson puts it, is that “before the French delegation had ever left St. Petersburg, the two allies were able to shape the broad outlines of their policy for the approachingcrisis.”On Sunday, 19 July, the Common Council of Ministers met at Berchtold’s home, the members arriving in unmarked vehicles. The tasks were simple – to review again the terms of the ultimatum, to confirm the dates of delivery and reply, and to confirm the steps that would follow Serbia’s anticipated rejection of the demands. Conradreviewed the military situation, focusing on his Plan B, the attack on Serbia, largely neglecting the likely Russian response. The ministers “did not probe further.” To assuage Tisza (who wished “no more Slavs” in the monarchy) and to fend off possible criticism by other nations, the group pledged that Austria-Hungary would take no Serbianterritory. Conrad was not pleased by that decision but assumed it would be altered after the coming victory.On 21 July Berchtold traveled to Bad Ischl, where he again briefed the emperor. And again, Franz Joseph assented to the plan of action. The same day, a sealed copy of the ultimatum was delivered to the Habsburg ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen. The final version of the ultimatum was delivered to Berlin on 22 July. And, following the plan, Ambassador Giesl handed the note to the acting head of the Serbian government at 6:00 p.m. the following evening. At about the same time, copies of the ultimatum were delivered to the governments of the major European powers. All of the recipients recognized the seriousness of the move. Serbia had commenced full mobilization three hours prior to receipt of the Austro-Hungarian note. On the following day, 24 July, Russia ordered a “period preparatory to war,” a partial mobilizationof four military districts bordering the Dual Monarchy. Franz Joseph ordered a partial mobilization against Serbia on 25 July, shortly after Belgrade rejected the Austrian note.The first official day of mobilization would be 28 July. Before then, however, reports of accelerating Russian military measures, initiated on 25 and 26 July, arrived in Berlinand Vienna. It must be remembered that Russia had openly warned Austria-Hungary that it would mobilize if Habsburg troops crossed the Serbian frontier. Thus, senior leaders in Vienna could have no doubt about the wider (European) implications of their actions. This notwithstanding, Berchtold asked Franz Joseph to sign a declaration of war against Serbia. Again the emperor assented and the Dual Monarchy declared war on 28 July. The first hostile action occurred the next day when Austria-Hungary bombarded the Serbian capital. The Russian general mobilization came shortly thereafter.The Austrian decision for war, as seen, was the end result of a careful, well thought out, and rational process. Early on, the leaders sought and secured a promise of support from their major ally. Then Vienna’s senior ministers, diplomats, and military leaders met twice in planned formal sessions to review the issues and to weigh their options.On 7 July and again on 19 July they reached the same conclusion, namely, that the empire’s “Balkan problems” could be solved only by war against Serbia. They then sought, and received, formal approval for their decision from the ultimate decision-maker, Franz Joseph. But then, curiously, having decided on war, they failed utterly in planning for the implementation and execution of that decision. The impact of the assassination itself should be noted. A rash, impetuous act of murder committed by a teenager at Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 removed the Dual Monarchy’s most influential and outspoken opponent of war with Serbia and, consequently, of war with Russia. The killing allowed Conrad von Hotzendorf to remain chief of staff and it emboldened Count Berchtold to act on the “hawkish” advice of Conrad and of the Young Rebels at the Foreign Ministry.

[Dr Arslanagić]

Imam osećaj kao da si vešto izbegao da odgovoriš na pitanje zašto je odbijena baš ta tačka ultimatuma, dok su sve ostale prihvaćene. Ali dobro, to sam samo ja.

Čak i da je prihvaćeno poniženje toga što organi jedne države (AU) dobijaju pravo da vrše istrage na teritoriji druge suverene države (iako tim činom ta država praktično gubi nezavisnost), ostaje neprihvatljiva za Srbiju činjenica da bi ti austrougarski istražitelji svakako utvrdili da su ekipu KK Mlade Bosne pomagale određene strukture iz Srbije, preciznije iz vojske, što bi bio casus belli protiv Srbije. Odnosno, Srbija bi svakako bila napadnuta samo što bi u slučaju dopuštanja istrage Srbija na tacni dala Austrougarskoj legitiman povod za napad.Srbija je u tom ratu morala učestvovati, htela ona to ili ne.