Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[Prospero]

taman se prepliće sa onim kod herwiga što sam kačio: (str 155-161)

...What the killings gave Vienna was not a reason, but an excuse, for taking action. They provided the Austrians with grounds for destroying Serbia—a pretext that Europe would accept and believe, and with which Europe might well even sympathize. It was a justification that might bring Germany to support them and prevent Russia from opposing them. In the past two men, Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II, had stood in the way of mounting a crusade against Serbia, and the assassinations had, though in different ways, removed them both: the Archduke killed, and the Kaiser carried away by a desire for revenge and caught up in unthinking rage.In the course of the Balkan wars of 1912-13, Austria had developed a fear of Serbia that bordered on the hysterical. The Kaiser had discounted such fears, to Vienna's intense chagrin. Now, at last, the volatile Wilhelm had been turned around by the events in Sarajevo.In this respect, and from Vienna's point of view, Gavrilo Princip had committed the perfect crime....How could the Hapsburg government enlist the Kaiser's help in carrying out whichever policy it adopted? The solicitation of German support had to be embodied in a plan and it had to be in writing: such was the advice of Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Count Heinrich von Tschirschky.Berchtold, as recounted earlier, already had something in writing: his foreign office memorandum, urging that Serbia be encircled, isolated, and crushed, which with some modifications could become the requisite written proposal. The Emperor of Austria, Franz Joseph, agreed to supply a cover letter to Wilhelm. The letter was written, emperor to emperor, man to man. Count Alexander Hoyos, a firebrand in his mid-thirties who served as Berchtold's chief of staff, volunteered to act as courier.Hoyos had reason to believe that his mission was promising. Only days before, on July i, he had conversed at length with Victor Nau-mann, a German journalist with close ties to Berlin officialdom and especially to the foreign office. Naumann told him that if ever Vienna was going to ask Berlin for support, this was the time: the Kaiser was shocked by the assassinations. Moreover, throughout the government there was less opposition to initiating a preventive war against Russia than there had been ever before. (This is interesting because it suggests that on balance Berlin still was opposed to launching such a war.)This was the time "to annihilate Serbia," Naumann said. In his view, "if at the present moment, when Kaiser Wilhelm is horrified at the Sarajevo murder, he is spoken to in the right way, he will give [Austria] all assurances and this time go to the length of war because he perceives the dangers for the monarchical principle."Naumann may have been speaking not just for himself, but for a group within the German government. Whether he was or not, he was believed to be both shrewd and well informed. In fact, just before journeying to Vienna, he had come from a meeting with Wlhelm von Stumm, a hard-liner in the German foreign office.In Germany at the time there were those who saw what had happened in Sarajevo as an opportunity for taking action: action by Germany or action by Austria. The Saxon ambassador in Berlin reported to his home government on July 2 that the German military was pressing for an immediate war while Russia and France were unready. These views were widespread, reported Austria's ambassador in Berlin. Moltke, Germany's chief of staff, vacationing on July 5, saw another alternative if it were Austria that took the field. "Austria must beat the Serbs and then make peace quickly, demanding an Austro-Serbian alliance as the sole condition. Just as Prussia did with Austria in 1866."Berchtold cabled the German embassy in Vienna that his envoy Hoyos, a personal friend of the nephew of Germany's Chancellor, was en route to Berlin in hopes of seeing the Kaiser and the Chancellor, and would arrive the following morning. It would be a tight schedule; Wilhelm was to leave on July 6 for his annual North Sea cruise.Berlin, July 5. In the morning Hoyos briefed Austria's veteran ambassador to Germany, Ladislaus Szogyeni-Marich, who then left for Potsdam and lunched with the Kaiser. Meanwhile Hoyos had lunch with Arthur Zimmermann, under-secretary of the German foreign office. It was at the lower-ranking lunch meeting that the Austrian envoy was most open about his country's real goals. Hoyos spoke openly of war, of wiping Serbia off the map and of partitioning Serbia among neighboring states afterwards. He met with a sympathetic reception.Meanwhile, at Potsdam, Szogyeni gave Kaiser Wilhelm the two documents that Hoyos had brought with him. The foreign office memorandum concluded by saying that it had been written before the murder of the Archduke and had been confirmed in its analysis by that event. The covering letter was in a more personal and moving vein. Both documents focused largely on Romania, warning of its increasing closeness to Serbia and to Russia. Neither called for specific action, although a stated objective was to be the elimination of Serbia as "a factor of political power in the Balkans."Wilhelm began the discussion by saying that he would have to consult the Chancellor. After lunch, however, pressed to say more, he did so. He pledged Germany's unconditional support for Austria-Hungary in whatever it chose to do in its conflict with Serbia. He gave what historians have called a "carte blanche," or a "blank check." He said he would back the Dual Monarchy even if Russia intervened. He warned his guest, however, that Austria must strike quickly. He then met with the Chancellor and with such of his military advisers as could be found at short notice in summertime, and did so again the following morning. A consensus emerged in support of Wilhelm's decision. Even the Chancellor was in agreement.According to the latest scholarship, it was mainly Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg who worked out the terms of the German response. A career civil servant, fifty-seven years old, he had spent a career trying to restrain powerful forces and intemperate personalities.As Chancellor for five years, he had felt the pressure of army officers who believed war with Russia to be inevitable, and who advocated a preemptive strike before the Russians were ready. He was exposed also to the countervailing pressure from Tirpitz to delay going to war until the distant point when the German fleet could deter Britain. Bethmann was aware that the Kaiser, no matter what he said, in the end usually opted for peace.Now there was the July 4 written inquiry from Vienna as to whether Germany would protect Austria-Hungary against Russia if Austria-Hungary tried to crush Serbia. What the Austrians wanted to do was not spelled out in writing. It was not clear that they had the nerve to do anything at all. But both sides—Berlin and Vienna—were worried, as it turned out, about what might happen if the requested guarantee were not given.Each side was conscious of its international isolation. Each was afraid of losing its only real ally. In German government circles one concern was that, after Franz Joseph died, the Hapsburg Empire could disintegrate. Another concern was that, as in the Moroccan crisis of 1911, the Dual Monarchy would not back Germany in its quarrels; it would fight only in its own. In Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, some worried that Germany would walk away from an ally that proved useless because it lacked the courage to fight at all.The essence of the consensus that developed among the Germans on July 5-6 was that circumstances now were favorable to a bold design: that Austria-Hungary could deal with its Serbian problem without risking a larger war, provided that Vienna struck swiftly. The German response to the Hoyos mission, according to Berghahn's authoritative work, bore the stamp of Bethmann, who apparently devised it. It was Berlin's plan (though the world was to be kept from knowing this) that Vienna undertook to follow. The plan was for Austria to strike rapidly, crush Serbia, and present Europe with a fait accompli.On July 6, Bethmann confirmed to the Austrians the Kaiser's secret commitment to support Austria in case of war.Most historians have condemned the German pledge as reckless. Samuel Williamson, a leading scholar of Austria-Hungary's role in the origins of World War I, writes: "Germany, by its pledges, had surrendered the direction and the pace of the July crisis" to Austria.Yet the check may not have been entirely blank. The Germans may have believed that it was their own plan—a quick strike—that Austria would carry into effect, so they were not really turning over decision-making to Vienna. Then, too, there were qualifications to Germany's pledge—or at least Kaiser Wilhelm may have believed that they were implicit. The guarantee was issued in the context of several years of warfare in the Balkans during which Austria already had asked at least three times for the statement of support that Hoyos had received, eliciting one yes and two noes. The Kaiser had certain preconditions in mind for pledging full support to Austria-Hungary in its continuing conflicts with Serbia, preconditions that become clearer if viewed within the context of 1912-14 rather than of 1914 alone.• Austria-Hungary had to be seen—at least by the German people, and preferably by all of Europe—as the provoked party. That, in Wilhelm's view, had not been the case in the early autumn of 1912 or the late spring of 1914 but had been true in the late autumn of 1912—and now was true again because of the Sarajevo killings.• Austria-Hungary had to act by itself and with lightning speed.• The Kaiser clearly believed that Austria intended to punish Serbia for the killings. He either was not told or did not understand that the Dual Monarchy proposed to destroy Serbia—a goal that Wilhelm had blocked in the past when it was openly avowed.• Circumstances had to be such that Russia, France, and England were unlikely to intervene. That is what the Kaiser and much of his entourage believed to be the case in July 1914. Bethmann, who was designated to watch over the operation against Serbia on behalf of Germany, understood that there was a risk of igniting a conflagration, but believed it to be only a slight risk. Wilhelm believed that for all practical purposes there was no risk at all.• The Kaiser's conviction was that the crisis would pass quickly: "that the situation would be cleared up within a week, because of Serbia's backing down."• Alternatively, Wilhelm explained to one of his naval officers, "the Austrian government will demand the most far-reaching satisfaction from Serbia and will, as soon as this is not given, move its troops into Serbia." As he saw it, there would be a quick Hapsburg military occupation of Belgrade, the Serb capital, which was conveniently located on the river that formed the Austro-Hungarian frontier, followed by an imposed peace treaty forcing Serbia to become an Austrian ally.On July 5-6 neither the Kaiser nor his advisers believed that they were risking much by extending their guarantee. Erich von Falkenhayn, Prussian minister of war, was not convinced that Vienna "was really in earnest" or "had taken any firm resolution." Germany risked nothing because in all likelihood it would never be called upon to make good on its guarantee. The consensus was that "the Russians— though friends of Serbia—will not join in after all." The Kaiser said to Szogyeni that Russia "was not by any means prepared for war," and he told his military advisers that France would "scarcely let it come to a war" because it still lacked heavy artillery. Moreover, he did not believe that the Czar would enter a war on the side of regicides. Falkenhayn asked if additional preparations should be made for a war involving the Great Powers, and Wilhelm said no.Germany's military leaders had made it clear that, in any case, they were prepared for all eventualities. The Kaiser and his generals may have supported the blank check decision for opposite reasons. He was in favor of it because he believed that war would not result from it, while some of them may have been in favor of it because it raised the possibility that a war would result from it.But the lies—or at least misleading statements—told by the Austrian and German governments threatened to catch up with them.Austria-Hungary lied when it claimed to be striking back for the murder of the Archduke. In fact, the killings at Sarajevo had relatively little to do with the Hapsburg desire to crush Serbia. What gave away Austria's lie in the first instance was that it did not attack immediately, which is what one does when one strikes out in anger or in self-defense. Alternatively, one would pursue a full judicial inquiry to its conclusion, and then publish its results to the world, which Vienna lacked the patience to do.The fact—known now, though not then—that the memo submitted to the Kaiser in support of the plan to go to war was the same memo that had been prepared before the murders in Sarajevo shows that it did not arise from that event....

[zorglub]

Najviše mi se svideo deo o "izmeštanju" au trupa u Srbiju, takoreći walk in a park. Daje dobar uvid o promišljenosti njihovog vojnog i političkog vrha, i to odmah nakon dvostruke srpske prezentacije.

[dekki]

Шта штампа непријатељска штампа Има свега неколико дигатализованих бројева загребачког Јутарњег листа из ратног периода и знатно више из предратног времена.Извор:http://dnc.nsk.hr/ne...E-02712C0BC297#

[Cane Vukic Prebranac]

Јел то ђед извјесне пјевачице?

Edited January 22, 2013 by Cane Vukic Prebranac

[Hamlet Strašni]

Da li na Ilirskom nadobudni znaci isto sto i na srpskom

[Прслин]

Надо-будни, онај који буди наду, пред којим је будућност. Чести су такви случајеви да људи потпуно погрешно користе неке речи па се значење мења. Ево, даћу ти пример у реченици: "Онај дунстер Ивица Дачић је импотентни и надобудни ретард" у ствари значи "Оно село у Сомерсету Ивица Дачић је немоћан и буди наду у одлагање".

Edited January 23, 2013 by Праслин

[Roger Sanchez]

ekekekepočelo je :wicked:hodor

[Dagmar]

Zasto stranci uvek insistiraju na Crnoj ruci kao organizatoru atentata, a nasi na Mladoj bosni? Ko je pravi organizator, a ko saucesnik, ako je yo uopste jasno danas?

[Filipenko]

Zasto stranci uvek insistiraju na Crnoj ruci kao organizatoru atentata, a nasi na Mladoj bosni? Ko je pravi organizator, a ko saucesnik, ako je yo uopste jasno danas?

Zato što je Crna ruka polutajna organizacija u našoj vojsci čiji je vođa bio istovremeno šef naše obaveštajne službe (Apis), pa bi ispalo da su Austrijanci u pravu što su upirali prstom u nas. Mlada Bosna je grupa jugoslovenskih patriota iz Bosne svih vrsta i fela koji nisu želeli austrijsku okupaciju. Urbani pokret otpora. Čije je pojedince Crna ruka obučavala u Srbiji, uključujući Gavrila Principa. Najverovatnije je Crna ruka sve organizovala, a članovi Mlade Bosne izveli. Sad, jedino što nemamo audio snimak svedočenja i video link prema zaštićenim svedocima, ali jebiga.Mnogi članovi Mlade Bosne su, dodao bih, bili dobrovoljci u srpskoj kraljevskoj armiji pa i četničkim odredima, ne samo Srbi već i Bošnjaci, Hrvati...i u balkanskim ratovima i u prvom svetskom ratu. Moj pradeda, između ostalog (u vojsci , ne u četnicima )

[Prospero]

pa mlada bosna je organizator, imali su izlete i ranije (bogdan žerajić prema marijanu varešaninu), crna ruka je tapšala po ramenu i doturala alat.mene fascinira potreba da se klasični politički atentator poput principa uporno naziva teroristom, kao da je ubio gomilu civila zarad političkog cilja. po toj logici je i l.h. osvald terorista, kao i leon čolgoš i dž.v. but plus mnogi drugi. no, ako je zarad inherentno zločinačkih balkanaca, nema problema, anything goes.

[Filipenko]

Hm...Mlada Bosna jeste izvršilac, e sad, do kog stepena je Crna ruka organizovala, to verovatno nikad nećemo saznati. Sasvim je sigurno da su ih obučavali i da je Princip otišao u Bosnu iz Srbije malo pre atentata. Jebem li ga. Naravno, Aleksandar je uništio Crnu ruku i pobio ih sve u tzv. solunskom procesu, ko zna šta bi se moglo saznati.

[MancMellow]

In sketching the characters of the key players, Clark makes a fascinating point I’ve not seen before: not simply were all the political players in the drama male, but they were men caught in a “crisis of masculinity.”

verovao ili ne, ovde sam pretao da citam. sve sve (ko da do sada nismo citali ovakve stvari), ali ovo je previse :D Sve je to deo starog dobrog obracuna u engleskoj istoriografiji da li je ili nije trebalo... Inace, vencan Nemicom :P sta reci, osim, uzeti i citati izvore. iz njih je jasno ko je vec godinama hteo rat. svaki drugi zakljucak je ne samo pogresan, nego i totalno nelogican. Ono sto je utesno, je sto mogu da napisu 200 ovakvih knjiga i - nista. Nisu ih Srbi i Rusi ubijali na Somi i gadjali London nego neko drugi. Sve dok nose poppies - nema brige oko Cambridge-a...

[Prospero]

@filippa bilo je suđenje, može se verovati ili ne, ali nije da je sve ostalo obavijeno tajnom. inače preporučujem "sarajevo 1914", možda i najbolje dedijerovo delo, pisano na harvardu i uz obilje arhivskih izvora. ima jedan fin segment o apisovim vezama u berlinu, kontaktu sa milošem bogićevićem (kreatorom ponude o separatnom miru između srbije i nemačke), o suđenju karlu radeku u moskvi '37. koji je tvrdio da je princip "odneo tajnu 1SR sa sobom u grob", itd, dakle 1 bogatstvo teorija zavere.@mancpa to, akademske dileme koje se delom reflektuju prema ulozi offshore balansera, "jesmo li ili nismo trebali", i svaki stav služi kao pouka za današnje teme (pominje se i rambuje koji je bio, kako autori kažu da pojačaju svoj stav, još oštriji od onog iz 1914). čudo da takvih dilema nema baš nešto u francuskoj istoriografiji - izgleda da je njima najkasnije od pjera renuvena jasan odgovor na pitanje "ko, kako i zašto".

[MancMellow]

Pa nema iz vrlo prostog razloga. Tj. dva. Prvi je 1871, a drugi je sto napad na Luksemburg zato sto se Rusija mobilisala ni pas s maslom u Francuskoj ne moze da pojede. U Engleskoj moze pas. S maslom. Jbg, losije gastronomske navike.

[Prospero]

nisi razumeo - nemci, temeljni kakvi jesu jednostavno nisu predvideli rat samo protiv jednog protivnika nego double penetration, balls deep. kada je nicky naredio mobilizaciju (nakon što je k.u.k naredila svoju btw) jadnom willyju nije ostalo ništa drugo nego da primeni jedini plan koji su mu generali zdelali - rat na dva fronta. i eto nemaca u luxemburgu zbog ruske mobilizacije.