Endarkenment

[MancMellow]

pa da ima svasta, naravno. ali se onda postavlja i pitanje zasto se zivotni vek proizvoda toliko skratio tokom perioda koji je siromasan nekim bitnim inovacijama u odnosu na prethodni, a tokom kojeg je zivotni vek proizvoda bio znacajno duzi

[namenski]

pa da ima svasta, naravno. ali se onda postavlja i pitanje zasto se zivotni vek proizvoda toliko skratio tokom perioda koji je siromasan nekim bitnim inovacijama u odnosu na prethodni, a tokom kojeg je zivotni vek proizvoda bio znacajno duzi

A da se ti zapitas, onako van drustvenjackog^tm diskursa, ima li ipak nesto trulo u sistemu koji proizvodi recimo automobil na koji daje garanciju od 5 i vise godina, a neguje trziste koje stimulise i od kupca ocekuje da taj isti auto menja za recimo 3 godine?

I kupi nov?

[MancMellow]

šta znači "neguje tržište"?

 

Uopšte ne razumem s kojim si sad rant-om uleteo gde. Reci šta ti misliš na temu, pusti to o čemu sam ja zapitivao unutar i van diskursa

[Braća Strugacki]

pa da ima svasta, naravno. ali se onda postavlja i pitanje zasto se zivotni vek proizvoda toliko skratio tokom perioda koji je siromasan nekim bitnim inovacijama u odnosu na prethodni, a tokom kojeg je zivotni vek proizvoda bio znacajno duzi

 

u mnogim oblastima su u određenom trenutku počele da se javljaju jeftine varijante Indije, Kine i sličnih država, pa je valjda neko u nekom trenutku procenio da neće biti još dugo moguće jedan proizvod vrteti po 40 godina, te se strategija promenila - fabrike otišle na izvor, a ujedno su preuzeli deo konkurencije da njima prave razliku u ceni na osnovu cene rada/ logističkih troškova/ troškova za zaštitu sredine & uz smanjenje R&D troškova u matici

[MancMellow]

u mnogim oblastima su u određenom trenutku počele da se javljaju jeftine varijante Indije, Kine i sličnih država, pa je valjda neko u nekom trenutku procenio da neće biti još dugo moguće jedan proizvod vrteti po 40 godina, te se strategija promenila - fabrike otišle na izvor, a ujedno su preuzeli deo konkurencije da njima prave razliku u ceni na osnovu cene rada/ logističkih troškova/ troškova za zaštitu sredine & uz smanjenje R&D troškova u matici

 

to i ja mislim da je uzrok

[Braća Strugacki]

Before Pigment Red 254 appeared on the market in the late 1980s, red paint used by auto manufacturers tended to fade and develop a dusty look known as "chalking." The new pigment, in comparison, was extraordinarily bright, stable and resistant to ultraviolet light and extremes of heat and cold.

Nicknamed "Ferrari Red," the pigment was used on all solid-red Ferraris from 2000 to 2002, and on all solid-red Alfa Romeos, BMWs, Corvettes, Volkwagen GTI models and the Lexus Soarer (SC 430) from 2000 to 2006, according to Ciba.

Luigi Cassar, who shared credit for the 1983 Ciba-Geigy patent, said the company made a fortune from DPP red.

"Ciba was selling this for $100 per kilo[gram], and the cost was $20 per kilo, so it was a big advantage for the company," he said, speaking by cell phone from northern Italy.

 

Pomenuti proizvod se sada prodaje po cenama ispod 20EUR/kg, a najveći deo dolazi iz Kine i Indije. Nestanak hiljada ovakvih proizvoda je praktično ugasio istraživačke aktivnosti velikog broja kompanija, dok je istraživanje još uvek živo u malom procentu multinacionalnih kompanija koje imaju mogućnost da nađu potencijalan proizvod, završe njegov razvoj i potom kontrolišu tržište prilikom njegove distribucije, ma šta se javno pričalo o anti monopolskim zakonima. Čak i kod takvih su i istraživački deo, a još više razvojni pod strahovitim pritiscima, kako bi se što više snizili troškovi razvoja proizvoda, pa se sve češće dešavaju situacije da nedovoljno ispitani proizvodi završe na tržištu. Sada često postupam sa novim proizvodima kao i sa novim windowsom - čekajte ljudi da isprave bagove, instaliraćemo desetku, ali kasnije, pa u prvih par godina bude čestih promena naziva proizvoda, zamene neko slovo ili broj, a prodavci ubeđuju kupce "sve je isto, mi to radimo zbog internig sistema klasifikacije" ili bude neki maštovitiji izgovor. Nikada se ne bih vratio u evropski industrijski r&d, ali nikada.

[hazard]

to i ja mislim da je uzrok

 

Ne mislim da je samo to, vec i menadzerska kultura jurenja sledeceg kvartalnog izvestaja, za koju ne znam tacno kada se omasovila ali jeste bila drugacija od onoga sto joj je prethodilo. To mozda ima veze sa ,,demokratizacijom" trzista i berze, utiskom (ne nuzno cinjenicom) da je svaki Joe Public sada investitor direktno ili indirektno, rastom biznis medija i njihove publike (gledaju ih i ljudi koji i ne investiraju svoj novac ili investiraju jako malo), te tako rastom ukupnog medijskog pritiska i ocekivanja na kompanije, veci public scrutiny njihovog poslovanja iz kvartala u kvartal. Ovo nagadjam, ne znam koliko je tacno.

 

To sto neki proizvod ne moze da muze vise 40 godina ne moze biti svakako jedini uzrok. Konkretan proizvod naravno ne moze (velika je retkost tako nesto), ali moze klasa proizvoda. E sada da bi ti izumeo novu klasu proizvoda naravno treba dosta love i vremena. Takodje, cak i ako neki proizvod moze da bude aktuelan samo 5 godina recimo, ako je bas nov ili revolucionaran moze u tom kratkom vremenu doneti ogroman profit. Ali istrazivanja koja su potrebna da bi se do njega doslo, pa razvoj tog proizvoda, to moze da potraje i vise od 10 godina...a moj je utisak da malo ko hoce da finansira nesto sto nema vidljiv povracaj u roku od 2 do 5 godina ako uspe (cast izuzecima).

 

Na kraju, mislim da se stvorilo suvise menadzera i biznis eksperata (i ,,eksperata") opste prakse - ljudi koji su skloni da prebrzo i suvise apstrahuju svaku firmu i sve svedu na brojke u finansijskom izvestaju, a ne razumeju se u srz posla koji ta firma obavlja. Kao primer takvog pogleda na svet sad sam se setio diskusije od pre dosta godina sa svojim drugarom koji je studirao biznis...kaze on "Google is an advertising company" a ja kazem "OK, I see what you mean, but Google is a technology company" a on ne ne, "they are just an advertising company" jer oni svu svoju zaradu imaju od reklama, to je ono sto prodaju za pare, dakle oni nisu tehnoloska firma kao Apple ili Microsoft koji ti prodaje tehnoloske proizvode, nego marketinska. Ja kazem gledas brate suvise pojednostavljeno, da nema ljudi koji koriste njihove tehnoloske proizvode - za dz - ne bi oni cent od reklama zaradili. Sad razmisljam dakle, Google su osnovali ljudi koji su polazili od toga da su oni tehnoloska kompanija, koja proizvodi i prodaje tehnologiju - ali sa indirektnim nacinom naplate. I taj deo sa prodajom reklama i marketingom je svakako jako bitan deo firme i verovatno nezamenjiv, ali kada bi im na celo dosao neki novi CEO sa nacinom razmisljanja ,,mi smo samo i na prvom mesto marketinska firma" garantujem da bi propali u roku od 5 godina (tj. mozda ne bi propali skroz, ali bi bili daleko manji i manje uticajniji i sa daleko manjim prihodom i profitom nego danas).

[eumeswil]

pa da ima svasta, naravno. ali se onda postavlja i pitanje zasto se zivotni vek proizvoda toliko skratio tokom perioda koji je siromasan nekim bitnim inovacijama u odnosu na prethodni, a tokom kojeg je zivotni vek proizvoda bio znacajno duzi

Pa to je posledica dinamike kapitala, zar ne?

 

 

 

So would it be possible for capital accumulation to move beyond the exponentials it has exhibited over the past two centuries on to a similar S-shaped trajectory as has occurred in the demographics of many countries, culminating in a zero-growth, steady-state capitalist economy? The answer to this prospect is a resounding no, and it is vital to understand why. The simplest reason is that capital is about profit seeking. For all capitalists to realize a positive profit requires the existence of more value at the end of the day than there was at the beginning. That means an expansion of the total output of social labor. Without that expansion there can be no capital. A zero-growth capitalist economy is a logical and exclusionary contradiction. It simply cannot exist. This is why zero growth defines a condition of crisis for capital. If prolonged, zero growth of the sort that prevailed in much of the world in the 1930s spells the death knell of capitalism.

 

How, then, can capital continue to accumulate and expand in perpetuity at a compound rate? How can it do so when it seems to entail a doubling if not tripling in the size of the astonishing physical transformations that have been wrought across planet earth over the last forty years. The dramatic industrialization and urbanization of China over those years is a foretaste of what would have to be accomplished to keep capital accumulation going in the future. For much of the last century large parts of the world were attempting to mimic the growth path of the United States. In the coming century most of the world would have to mimic the growth path of China (with all its ghastly environmental consequences), which would be impossible for the United States and Europe and unthinkable almost everywhere else (apart from, say, Turkey, Iran and some parts of Africa). Throughout these last forty years, it is worth remembering also that there have been multiple traumatic crises, usually localized, cascading around the world, from South-East Asia and Russia in 1998 through Argentina in 2001 to the almighty global financial crash of 2008 that shook the world of capital to its very roots.

 

But it is here that the cautionary tale of Malthus’s mistaken dystopian vision ought to give us pause. We need to ask: in what ways can capital accumulation change its spots to adapt to what appears a critical situation in order to reproduce itself? There are, in fact, a number of key adaptations that are already occurring. Can the difficulties be staved off and if so can they do so indefinitely? What behavioral adaptations, akin to Malthus’s ‘moral restraints’ (though the term ‘moral’ will hardly end up being appropriate), might reshape the accumulation dynamic while preserving its necessary essence of compounding growth?

 

There is one form that capital takes which permits accumulation without limit and that is the money form. This is so only because the money form is now unchained from any physical limitations such as those imposed by the money commodities (the metallic moneys like gold and silver that originally gave physical representation to the immateriality of social labor and which are largely fixed in terms of their global supply). State-issued fiat moneys can be created without limit. The expansion of the contemporary money supply is now accomplished by some mix of private activity and state action (via the state–finance nexus as constituted by treasury departments and central banks). When the US Federal Reserve engages in quantitative easing it simply creates as much liquidity and money as it wants at the drop of a hat. Adding a few zeros to the quantity of money in circulation is no problem. The danger, of course, is that the result will be a crisis of inflation. This is not occurring because the Federal Reserve is largely refilling a hole left in the banking system when trust between the private banks broke down and interbank lending, which was leveraged into massive money creation within the banking system, broke down in 2008. The second reason why inflation is not on the horizon is because organized labor has almost zero power (given the disposable surplus labor reserves) In these times to raise wages and thereby influence the price level (though class struggles in China have raised labor costs there marginally).

 

But, plainly, the perpetual accumulation of capital at an exponential rate by way of an exponential creation of money is almost certain to end in disaster unless accompanied by other adaptations. Let’s go through a number of these before deciding whether they add up to what a sustainable future for the reproduction of capital might look like under conditions of perpetual compound growth.

 

Capital is not only about the production and circulation of value. It is also about the destruction or devaluation of capital. A certain proportion of capital is destroyed in the normal course of capital circulation as new and cheaper machinery and fixed capital become available. Major crises are often characterized by creative destruction, which means mass devaluations of commodities, of hitherto productive plant and equipment, of money and of labor. There is always a certain amount of devaluation going on as new plants drive out old before their lifetime is over, as more expensive items are replaced by cheaper items because of technological changes. The rapid deindustrialization of older industrial districts in the 1970s and 1980s in North America and Europe is an obvious example. In times of crisis, of war or of natural disasters, the devaluation can be massive. In the 1930s and the Second World War losses were considerable. Estimates from the IMF suggested that the net losses worldwide in the financial crisis year of 2008 added up to close to the value of one whole year’s global output of goods and services. But large though these losses were, they did little more than generate a brief pause in the trajectory of compounding growth. In any case, as property values recovered, particularly in the USA and the UK, where they had been hit hard during the crisis, so a lot of asset values were recovered (though, as always, they now lay in the hands of the rich folk, thereby contributing to the massive regressive redistribution of wealth that, in the absence of revolutionary interventions, typically occurs in the course of a crisis). The devaluations would have to be vastly greater and longer-lasting than those experienced in 2008 (closer, perhaps, to those of the 1930s and 1940s) to really make much of a difference.

 

The problem of the uneven development of devaluation and of geopolitical struggles over who is to bear the cost of devaluation is significant, in part because it frequently relates to the spread of social unrest and political instability. So while devaluation does not work very well as an antidote to compounding growth worldwide, its geographical concentrations do have a significant bearing on the dynamics of anti-capitalist sentiment and struggle. The two ‘lost decades’ of development throughout most of Latin America produced a political climate of opposition to neoliberalism (though not necessarily to capital) and this has in turn played an important role in protecting the region from the worst impacts of the global crisis of devaluation that broke out in 2008. The differential imposition of losses on, for example, Greece and southern Europe more generally amounts to a geographical version of the redistributions of wealth occurring between rich and poor.

 

Conversely, privatization of public assets, the creation of new markets and further enclosures of the commons (from land and water to intellectual property rights) have expanded the terrain upon which capital can freely operate. The privatization of water provision, social housing, education and health care and even war making, the creation of carbon trading markets and the patenting of genetic materials have given capital the power of entry into many areas of economic, social and political life that were hitherto closed to it. As an outlet for compounding growth these additional market opportunities have been significant, but, as with devaluation, I do not believe they constitute enough potential to absorb compounding growth, particularly in the future (they did, I believe, play a significant role in the 1980s and 1990s). Besides, when everything – but everything – is commodified and monetized, then there is a limit beyond which this process of expansion cannot go. How close we are to that limit right now is hard to judge but nearly four decades of neoliberal privatization strategies have already accomplished a great deal and in many parts of the world there is not much left to enclose and privatize. There are, in addition, many signs of political resistance to the further enclosure and commodification of life forms beyond where we are now and some of these struggles, against, for example, water privatization in Italy and genetic patenting, have been successful.

 

Consider, thirdly, the limits that might be encountered with respect to final consumption and the realization of capital. One of the ways that capital has adapted to compound growth has been through radical transformations in the nature, form, style and mass of final consumption (aided, of course, by population increases). Economic limits to this are set by the aggregate effective demand (roughly, wages and salaries plus bourgeois disposable incomes). Over the last forty years that demand has been strongly supplemented by private and public debt creation. I focus here, however, on one important physical limit which is set by the turnover time of consumer goods: how long do they last and how quickly do they need to be replaced?

 

Capital has systematically shortened the turnover time of consumer goods by producing commodities that do not last, pushing hard towards planned and sometimes instantaneous obsolescence, by the rapid creation of new product lines (for example, as in electronics in recent times), accelerating turnover by mobilising fashion and the powers of advertising to emphasize the value of newness and the dowdiness of the old. It has been doing this for the last 200 years or so and concomitantly produced vast amounts of waste. But the trends have accelerated, capturing and infecting mass consumption habits markedly over the last forty years, particularly in the advanced capitalist economies. The transformations in middle-class consumerism in countries like China and India have also been remarkable. The sales and advertising industry is now one of the largest sectors of the economy in the United States and much of its work is dedicated to the acceleration of the turnover time of consumption.

 

But there are still physical limits to how fast the turnover of, say, cellphones and fashions can be. Even more significant, therefore, has been the move towards the production and consumption of spectacle, a commodity form that is ephemeral and instantaneously consumed. Back in 1967 Guy Debord wrote a very prescient text, The Society of the Spectacle, and it almost seems as if the representatives of capital read it very carefully and adopted its theses as foundational for their consumerist strategies. Everything from TV shows and other media products, films, concerts, exhibitions, sports events, mega-cultural events and, of course, tourism is included in this. These activities now dominate the field of consumerism. Even more interesting is how capital mobilizes consumers to produce their own spectacle via YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media. All of these forms can be instantaneously consumed even as they absorb vast amounts of what might otherwise be free time. The consumers, furthermore, produce information, which is then appropriated by the owners of the media for their own purposes. The public is simultaneously constituted as both producers and consumers, or what Alvin Toffler once called ‘prosumers.’ There is an important corollary here and this broaches a theme that we will encounter elsewhere: capital profits not through investing in production in these spheres but by appropriating rents and royalties on the use of the information, the software and the networks it constructs. This is just one of several contemporary indications that the future of capital lies more in the hands of the rentiers and the rentier class than in the hands of the industrial capitalists.

 

Excerpted from Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism by David Harvey. 

[eumeswil]

Ne mislim da je samo to, vec i menadzerska kultura jurenja sledeceg kvartalnog izvestaja, za koju ne znam tacno kada se omasovila ali jeste bila drugacija od onoga sto joj je prethodilo. To mozda ima veze sa ,,demokratizacijom" trzista i berze, utiskom (ne nuzno cinjenicom) da je svaki Joe Public sada investitor direktno ili indirektno, rastom biznis medija i njihove publike (gledaju ih i ljudi koji i ne investiraju svoj novac ili investiraju jako malo), te tako rastom ukupnog medijskog pritiska i ocekivanja na kompanije, veci public scrutiny njihovog poslovanja iz kvartala u kvartal. Ovo nagadjam, ne znam koliko je tacno.

 

Pisao je o tome Chang.

 

 

 

Druga „stvar“ je još skandaloznija – da kompanije ne treba da se vode u interesu njihovih vlasnika. O čemu pričam? Zvuči nenormalno. Deoničari su vlasnici kompanija, a svi znamo da bi vlasnici trebalo bolje da se brinu o svom vlasništvu nego neko ko ga, na primer, iznajmljuje. Vlasnici imaju najveći interes u dugoročnom uspehu kompanije, pa samim tim ono što je dobro za njih mora da bude dobro i za kompaniju.

 

To je tačno, u slučaju da jedan pojedinac poseduje dugotrajnu materijalnu imovinu, ali to ne važi i za savremene kompanije. Jer to su društva sa ograničenom odgovornošću, što znači da ljudi rizikuju samo kapital koji su investirali u svoje deonice. Nekada ograničena odgovornost nije postojala, pa ste tada, kad vaša firma bankrotira, morali da prodate sve što imate – posuđe, odeću itd. Ako i nakon toga ne otplatite dugove, idete u dužnički zatvor. Dakle, društva sa ograničenom odgovornošću su noviji izum, iz 19. veka.

 

U savremenim kompanijama sa ograničenom odgovornošću, koje ponekad imaju desetine hiljada deoničara, uprkos tome što su zakonski vlasnici, deoničari su ponekad najmanje posvećeni dugoročnom uspehu kompanije. Zato što imaju najveću slobodu da je napuste. Deonice se lako prodaju, ali ako hoćete da se kao radnik zaposlite u drugoj kompaniji, možete računati na značajne troškove pronalaženja novog posla. Tako da nemate takvu slobodu da odete. Naročito u poslednje tri decenije, uz pojačanu finansijsku deregulaciju, „leteći“ deoničari postali su još moćniji nego ranije. Na primer, u Britaniji je šezdesetih prosečan period posedovanja deonica bio oko pet godina – dakle kada kupite deonicu, u proseku je u vašem vlasništvu pet godina. Danas je taj period oko sedam meseci.

 

U medijima se spominje „kvartalni kapitalizam“, što praktično znači znači da uprava vodi kompaniju imajući u vidu maksimizaciju profita u narednom kvartalu. Nije baš kvartalni, ali praktično ste pod pritiskom takozvanih vlasnika da napravite profit za dva, najviše tri kvartala. Kao rezultat toga, najamni menadžeri odlučuju da vode kompaniju u interesu maksimizacije profita deoničara.

 

Kako se to radi? Prvo se maksimizuje kratkoročni profit. Kako? Otpustite svakog ko vam padne na pamet, ne investirate, naročito ne u dugoročne stvari poput istraživanja i razvoja. Naravno, to izaziva probleme. Radnici su demoralisani, iscrpljeni, tehnologija zastareva. Ali da li se to vas tiče? Jer ovo će se odraziti na kompaniju za tri, četiri, pet godina. Kao najamni menadžer, verovatno ni nećete biti tu kad se to desi.

 

Pošto ste maksimirali profit, deoničari imaju sve veću zaradu kroz povećane dividende i otkup deonica – to je postupak kada kompanije kupuju svoje deonice da bi povećale cenu deonica, pa su deoničari zadovoljni. Ovaj podatak nije naveden u knjizi, zato što je objavljen kasnije, ali prema proračunu američkog ekonomiste Vilijama Lazonika, najvećih 500 američkih kompanija potrošile su 94% svoje zarade na dividende i otkup deonica, a slične britanske kompanije potrošile su 88%. Imajući u vidu da većina kompanija u bogatim zemljama poput Amerike i Britanije investira iz zadržanog profita, to znači da uopšte ne investiraju. Procenat profita koji je izdvajan za deoničare, čak i u Americi gde je to bilo najrazvijenije, nekada je bio između 45-50%. Znači, polovina profita se ulaže u mašine, istraživanje i razvoj itd, a druga polovina ide deoničarima. Danas je taj razmer 5% prema 95%. Nemate novca za ulaganje. Nije ni čudo da je kompanija kao što je General Motors bankrotirala.

 

 

Ljudi često ne razumeju koliko je istorijski značajan bankrot General Motorsa. Rekao bih da je to značajniji događaj od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza. General Motors je 1955. proizveo 3,5 miliona automobila. Iste godine, svih 12 japanskih proizvođača automobila, uključujući i Tojotu, zajedno su proizveli 70.000 automobila. Tojota je proizvela 35.000 automobila, dakle 1% proizvodnje General Motorsa. Pedeset godina kasnije, ova mala kompanija preuzela je General Motors, a dve godine kasnije General Motors je bankrotirao. Zato je Džek Velč, autor izraza „maksimizacija vrednosti deonice“ rekao da je maksimizacija vrednosti deonice, citiram, „najgluplja zamisao na svetu“. To je kao da Karl Marks osuđuje komunizam.

 

http://pescanik.net/23-stvari-koje-vam-nisu-rekli-o-kapitalizmu/

[MancMellow]

Pa to je posledica dinamike kapitala, zar ne?

 

This is just one of several contemporary indications that the future of capital lies more in the hands of the rentiers and the rentier class than in the hands of the industrial capitalists.

 

 

Dobar je Harvey (uglavnom). Ali ovaj zaključak je upravo ono što je problem tj gde detektuje glavni problem. Naime, (ugrubo govoreći) rentijerski kapitalizam, odnosno kapitalizam kojim ne dominiraju proizvodne, inventivne i kreativne snage je osuđen na (ma kako sporu) propast, uvek bio i biće . Tj ne na propast, nego na stalnu krizu i potrebu da se njegovi interesi brane...neekonomskim merama, a to ima svoje limite, ekonomske i političke. Ali dobar je tekst. Ovo najviše zabrinjava

 

 

 

The problem of the uneven development of devaluation and of geopolitical struggles over who is to bear the cost of devaluation is significant, in part because it frequently relates to the spread of social unrest and political instability. 

[Braća Strugacki]

Pisao je o tome Chang.

 

 

Dobar je tekst na tom linku

[MancMellow]

Pisao je o tome Chang.

 

Naravno, to je to. Ali kako je do toga došlo? Pa recimo da 1955 neko je, naravno, mogao da proda svoje deonice u GM, ali sve što je sa tim param mogao je da, verovatno (nisam se udubljivao u cifre, ali pretpostavljam, možda grešim) kupi neke druge sa marginalno drugačijim povratom od prodatih. Ili ako ne marginalno, onda ne ludački većom razlikom i mnogo manjim rizikom. Globalno tržište postoji, ali samo za kapital. Ne postoji za radnu snagu i ne postoji, što je još važnije, za uslove poslovanja koji u velikoj meri zavise od države. Uopšte nisam optimista.

[MancMellow]

To sto neki proizvod ne moze da muze vise 40 godina ne moze biti svakako jedini uzrok. Konkretan proizvod naravno ne moze (velika je retkost tako nesto), ali moze klasa proizvoda. E sada da bi ti izumeo novu klasu proizvoda naravno treba dosta love i vremena. Takodje, cak i ako neki proizvod moze da bude aktuelan samo 5 godina recimo, ako je bas nov ili revolucionaran moze u tom kratkom vremenu doneti ogroman profit. Ali istrazivanja koja su potrebna da bi se do njega doslo, pa razvoj tog proizvoda, to moze da potraje i vise od 10 godina...a moj je utisak da malo ko hoce da finansira nesto sto nema vidljiv povracaj u roku od 2 do 5 godina ako uspe (cast izuzecima).

 

Ono za menadžere islim da su ovi tekstovi gore razjasnili

 

A ovo za 40 godina - to i nije uzrok, to je više posledica. I ovo sve dole što si opisao/napisao. Mislim da je jasno da a) tako ne može u nedogled b) i da može to je čista stagnacija, ako i to. 

 

 

Na kraju, mislim da se stvorilo suvise menadzera i biznis eksperata (i ,,eksperata") opste prakse - ljudi koji su skloni da prebrzo i suvise apstrahuju svaku firmu i sve svedu na brojke u finansijskom izvestaju, a ne razumeju se u srz posla koji ta firma obavlja. Kao primer takvog pogleda na svet sad sam se setio diskusije od pre dosta godina sa svojim drugarom koji je studirao biznis...kaze on "Google is an advertising company" a ja kazem "OK, I see what you mean, but Google is a technology company" a on ne ne, "they are just an advertising company" jer oni svu svoju zaradu imaju od reklama, to je ono sto prodaju za pare, dakle oni nisu tehnoloska firma kao Apple ili Microsoft koji ti prodaje tehnoloske proizvode, nego marketinska. Ja kazem gledas brate suvise pojednostavljeno, da nema ljudi koji koriste njihove tehnoloske proizvode - za dz - ne bi oni cent od reklama zaradili. Sad razmisljam dakle, Google su osnovali ljudi koji su polazili od toga da su oni tehnoloska kompanija, koja proizvodi i prodaje tehnologiju - ali sa indirektnim nacinom naplate. I taj deo sa prodajom reklama i marketingom je svakako jako bitan deo firme i verovatno nezamenjiv, ali kada bi im na celo dosao neki novi CEO sa nacinom razmisljanja ,,mi smo samo i na prvom mesto marketinska firma" garantujem da bi propali u roku od 5 godina (tj. mozda ne bi propali skroz, ali bi bili daleko manji i manje uticajniji i sa daleko manjim prihodom i profitom nego danas). 

 

Pa da, ali ja to vidim samo kao 1 drugu stranu konzumerizma i identiteta, ne samo ličnih, koji iz njega izranjaju. Ako je pojedinac "ono što konzumira" tj kupuje, onda je i proizvođač ono što prodaje. Mislim, nit je ovaj ovo, nit je onaj ono, ali mi smo ovde već na nivou percepcija, a ne suštine. Pri tom lično nemam problem da se forma posmatra kao jednako važna koliko i suština, ali bavljenje percepcijama je čist postmodernizam koji u stvarima kao što je biznis, ili ekonomija generalno, može samo štetu da donese imho.

[Peter Fan]

Mislim da previše mračite.

 

Jeste anegdota, ali svaka firma koju sam radio u zadnjih 15-ak godina, je podizala R&D budžet. Čak i u periodu 2007-2009.

 

A evo jedno istraživanje na tu temu:

 

Abstract: The use of research and development (R&D) spending as an empirical proxy for managerial discretion, information asymmetry and growth opportunities, is pervasive in empirical corporate finance research. Underlying this is the implicit assumption that firms choose levels of R&D to maximize value, given firm and industry characteristics. An alternative framework views the level of R&D spending as subject to idiosyncratic behavior as managers myopically manipulate R&D expenditures to meet short-term earnings goals. Using aggregate firm and industry level data, we find evidence consistent with the view that R&D is determined by firm and industry characteristics. Time invariant firm and industry fixed effects explain most of the cross-sectional variation in observed R&D spending, while time-varying factors like size, profitability, or market-to-book explain little of the cross-sectional variation. We find that R&D spending continues to grow faster than advertising and capital expenditures. We also find no evidence of managerial myopia as corporate aggregate R&D expenditures are growing faster than aggregate profitability and the number of firms that undertake R&D has increased over the period from 1976-2010

www.uwyo.edu/hskiba/web/papers/skiba_rd_spending.pdf

 

 

 

[MancMellow]

Ne mračimo mi nego verujemo autorima tih članaka da ne lupaju bez veze 

 

Stani jbt, pa ovde je u obzir uzet (skoro) ceo svet

Edited August 1, 2016 by MancMellow