Iran: novi front

[Prospero]

Iranu su sancije uvele i UN, dake i Rusi i Kinezi.

[namenski]

Iranu su sancije uvele i UN, dake i Rusi i Kinezi.

Ne menja stvar, Zapad, SAD pre svega su vodili skoro pa histericnu kampanju glede zabrane/propisivanja ko je podoban, a ko nepodoban nuklearni revolveras.

Mozda se varam, ali imam utisak da su i Rusi i Kinezi kudikamo odgovorniji nuklearni igraci od Zapada, pre svega mnogo pragmaticniji, da ne kazem da prosto manje seru - sto je u ovakvim situacijama uvek 1 veliki + - i mnogo, mnogo manje misionarski raspolozeni.

Misionarski naravno u smislu da za svoj nastup po pravilu prave scenografiju sa poprilicnim ideoloskim primesama, licemerisanjem o demokratiji i ljudskim pravima, itd, itd, sto uvek, ama bas uvek, za posledicu ima mnogo eksplozivniju smesu i mnogo teze izlazenje iz krize.

[Prospero]

February 28, 2016 4:55 pm

 

Blow for Iran’s hardliners as moderates win key seats

Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran

 

 

Moderates close to President Hassan Rouhani have seized crucial seats in elections for Iran’s parliament and experts assembly, dealing a blow to hardliners desperate to block the centrist leader’s efforts to open the country to foreign investment.

After dominating parliament for 12 years, hardline politicians failed to win even one seat of the 30 available in the capital, Tehran. They were also roundly defeated in the experts assembly — made up of senior clerics — with all but one prominent hardliner trounced in the fight for Tehran’s 16 seats.

 

Mohammad-Sadegh Javadi-Hesar, a reformist politician, said the results from the capital “sent the message that people feel sick of radicalism and those who theorise violence”. He added “People seek progress, good relations with other countries and want Iran to be developed.”

More than 60 per cent of Iranians eligible to vote took part in Friday’s elections, widely seen as a verdict on the policies of Mr Rouhani after last year’s landmark nuclear deal which led to the lifting of crippling international sanctions against Iran.

Competition between Iranian hardliners and moderates had been fierce ahead of the poll to choose 290 members of parliament and 88 clerics to sit in the experts assembly.

The assembly result is particularly significant because the body will choose Iran’s next supreme leader should Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the 76-year-old incumbent, die during its eight-year term.

Voters responded to calls by pro-reform leaders, notably former President Mohammad Khatami, who used a video recording to urge people to vote for so called “hope” lists across the country. Almost all on those lists won in Tehran and most constituencies where “hope” candidates for both elections were introduced.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former centrist president who played a key role in mobilising support for moderate forces, came top in Tehran’s experts assembly election, while Mr Rouhani came third, according to the latest count. Mohammad-Reza Aref, a reformist politician, was first in Tehran’s parliamentary poll while his main hardline rival, Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, a former parliamentary speaker, lost out.

 

Hardliners may have conceded defeat in Tehran, but as counting continued they said they had held on to their majority once other cities and towns were taken into account. Reformists reject the claim and say both sides equally hold minorities for now. They say that moderate candidates have a good chance to form a majority through coalition with candidates who ran independently but have pro-reform tendencies.

The election took place under what reformist politicians said were unfair circumstances after most prominent pro-reform figures were disqualified by the hardline Guardian Council, the constitutional watchdog. Moderate forces chose unknown figures in many constituencies but had no candidates for one-third of parliamentary seats and a quarter of the experts assembly.

Hardliners on the other hand fielded their most prominent figures, with little scrutiny over their vetting procedures and a free run in campaigning. They suffered a setback though, when the poor — who traditionally vote for more conservative figures — stayed away from the polls in an unspoken protest over economic hardship.

Results from some major constituencies such as the holy city of Mashhad, the historical city of Isfahan and Karaj, west of the capital, have not been announced yet, amid rumours of serious tensions between moderate and hard line forces over the count.

 

Analysts believe even if rigging does occur it will not dramatically alter the election results. But there is a concern over how defeated hardliners, who remain in powerful bodies such as the elite Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary and the Guardian Council, will react.

“Our responsibility is going to be heavier after the parliament is more moderate and people’s expectations are higher,” said Hossein Marashi, a senior moderate politician. “How can we implement our policies despite serious opposition by hardliners in powerful bodies? We are worried about continuation of political infighting and its impact on economic reforms and the country’s development.”

 

[bigvlada]

Kolike su šanse da se Iran reši te Geruzije u sledećih deset godina? 

[ObiW]

Kolike su šanse da se Iran reši te Geruzije u sledećih deset godina? 

Uz pomoc CIA ili bez pomoci CIA?

[bigvlada]

Sami. 

[ObiW]

pa negde 1-2%

[Roger Sanchez]

[Shan Jan]

I, jel se dobro udo?

[MancMellow]

 

 

Iran Is Stuck With China to Finance Its Oil Dreams

 

• Efforts to nudge Iran toward the West stymied by U.S. policies
• Chinese companies continue to dominate energy, oil in Iran

 

• Amid the snake-infested marshlands on Iran’s border with Iraq, the control room monitoring North Azadegan oil field is manned entirely by Chinese technicians. In central Tehran, hundreds of Chinese pour out at noon from the telecommunications company Huawei to its canteen. There are now so many Chinese expatriates here, some say they outnumber all other nationalities combined.
•  

A decade of international sanctions aimed at blocking Iran’s nuclear program has left China the country’s dominant investor and trade partner. Now, with those restrictions formally lifted, a more pragmatic Iranian government has been trying to ease dependence on China, only to find itself stymied by hard-line resistance and residual U.S. sanctions.

 

“China has done enough investment in Iran,” said Mansour Moazami, who was deputy oil minister until taking over as chairman of the massive Industrial Development & Renovation Organization this year. “We will provide opportunities and chances for others.”

 

 

The tension illustrates a more nuanced situation in post-sanctions Iran than is often presented. Many in the U.S., including Donald Trump, portray Iran as the big winner from last year’s nuclear sanctions deal as European companies rush into one of the world’s last big, untapped emerging markets. Yet in Tehran, the government is attacked for failing to deliver and pandering to a still hostile West.

Western investors have been slow to arrive, forcing Iran back into the arms of the Chinese. That’s especially true in the energy sector, where pressure to increase production is intense. Elsewhere, Western clearing banks still refuse to do business with Iran for fear of falling foul of non-nuclear U.S. sanctions that remain in effect, meaning Western companies can’t raise project finance.

 

dalje...

[Lord Protector]

Саудијци Иран гађају Курдима

 

Курди у Ирану могли би да се сете како је Турска употребила Курде за масакр над Јерменима 1915, а после им ускратила сва права

 

Аутор: Бошко Јакшић уторак, 06.12.2016.

 

 

Хладни рат који сунитска Саудијска Арабија и шиитски Иран воде за превласт у региону и исламском свету однедавно се се укључили и ирански Курди охрабрени аутономним зонама које су њихова браћа извојевала по Сирији и Ираку.

На северозападу Ирана, где живи највећи број од око десет милиона Курда, дошло је до оружаних окршаја између бораца Демократске партије иранског Курдистана (ПДКИ) и припадника Револуционарне гарде у којима је било мртвих на обе стране.

У Техерану верују да Ријад стоји иза одлуке курдске опозиционе групе да прекрши примирје и да се први пут после 20 година оружјем супротстави иранским властима.

Мохсен Резаи, бивши командант Револуционарне гарде, процењује да ирански Курди добијају новац из Саудијске Арабије и да Ријад у покушају дестабилизације Ирана на побуну подстиче и друге сунитске мањине, као што су Балуџи на југоистоку и Арапи на југозападу земље. Саудијци и ПДКИ то демантују.

Истовремено, Ријад годинама оптужује Иран да саудијске шиите на истоку краљевине користи да би ослабио режим по истој матрици по којој је шиите у Јемену подигао на побуну против централне власти, или побунио већинске шиите у Бахреину. Техеран то демантује.

После Другог светског рата Курди су у области око северозападног иранског града Махабада накратко успоставили независну републику која је имала подршку СССР-а. Након Исламске револуције 1979. обновљени су сукоби све док ПДКИ није 1996. прогласио унилатарелни прекид ватре, али тензија никада није попуштала.

Најновија фаза оружаних дејстава и ангажовање иранских Курда против власти у Техерану несумњиво је у функцији иранско-саудијског конфликта и велике нервозе у Ријаду откако је Иран са светским силама прошле године потписао споразум о нуклеарном програму.

Саудијци су, упркос свим америчким уверавањима да нема разлога за забринутост, проценили да расте опасност од Ирана. Краљ Салман и амбициозни млади принчеви који га окружују закључили су да неке кораке морају да предузимају сами.

Зашто онда Саудијци не би покушали да играју на курдску карту? Ријад је не једном сумњичен за подршку разним радикалним исламистичким групама. Било каква дестабилизација власти у Техерану била би најлепша вест за Саудијску Арабију.

Милитантнији однос према Ирану могао је да се утврди овог јула у Паризу када се бивши шеф саудијске обавештајне службе, принц Турки ел Фејсал, демонстративно појавио на митингу организације Муџахедин Халк, највеће иранске опозиционе групе која жели да сруши техерански режим.

Иако званичници ПДКИ понављају да се аутохтоно боре за политичка права у Ирану и да немају никакве званичне везе Саудијцима или са сународницима по Ираку, Сирији и Турској, очито је да се у временима блискоисточног хаоса сви боре за наклоност Курда – махом да би их употребили за сопствене циљеве.

Американци и Руси ослањају се на сиријске Курде у борби против исламиста, али је питање да ли их неће „продати” да не би кварили односе са Турском која не допушта било какав раст курдске моћи.

Чак и Исламска држава покушава да придобије Курде иако су курдске пешмерге међу њеним најефикаснијим противницима у Ираку. Исламисти сунитске Курде сматрају за јеретике због њихове секуларне идеологије, али крајем лета су лансирали видео на коме четворица бораца калифата хвале улогу Курда у исламу, од мислилаца до Салахадина ел Ајубија – на Западу познатијег као Саладин. Подсећају да је он поразио крсташе као што ће Исламска држава поразити савремене „крсташе”.

Чинило се 2015. да ће Курди капиталисати на блискоисточном хаосу. У Ираку су и раније обезбедили аутономију која је на корак од независности. У Турској је једна прокурдска политичка странка први пут ушла у парламент. У Сирији су се оружјем изборили за делове севера.

Годину дана касније перспективе су се осенчиле. Ирачки Курди, потиснути ратом у Сирији, појачали су притиске за независност. У Турској је обновљен деценијама дуг оружани конфликт припадника Радничке партије Курдистана и армије. У Сирији војна интервенција Анкаре спречава Курде да територијално повежу области на северу.

Да ли су сада и Курди у Ирану пиони једне од регионалних табли? Ирански Курди, који најављују да ће наставити да се оружјем „штите и бране”, могли би да се сете како је Турска употребила Курде за масакр над Јерменима 1915, а после им ускратила сва права. Такву судбину сада им режирају Саудијци.

Edited December 6, 2016 by slow

[Lord Protector]

What Flynn Could Learn From Kerry About Iran

 

Even the most inexperienced commander knows not to escalate without having de-escalatory options at hand. That is the most troubling issue with National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s harsh “notice” to Iran yesterday in response to Tehran’s ill-advised missile test. Flynn’s statement may have been bluster. The Donald J. Trump presidency is only a few days old and there is pressure to signal its firmness and the approach it will take in the Middle East. But bluster without having established a channel for de-escalation is profoundly dangerous, and it is likely to increase rather than decrease the administration’s challenges with Iran.

 

Most pundits and journalists have pressed the White House to specify what it would do in case Iran continues testing ballistic missiles or aiding Houthi rebels in Yemen (a connection that Flynn greatly exaggerated in his statement). Will the U.S. fire at Iranian vessels in the Persian Gulf? Will it impose new sanctions? Will it walk away from the Iranian nuclear deal?

 

But the more important question is not how the U.S. will escalate, but how it will calm down the situation once it has achieved its yet-to-be revealed objectives. This is what remains unclear.

 

It is disappointing but unsurprising, given Trump’s campaign and his chosen advisors, that this administration has begun its tenure by raising tensions with Iran without first having established lines of communication with the higher echelons of the Iranian leadership. Twitter is not an acceptable line of communication for U.S. leadership to engage the world. The Obama administration did the opposite ― it first tried to establish strong, authoritative channels before it made any positive gesture or issued any threats.

 

These lines of communication not only helped secure a nuclear deal that prevented both war with Iran and blocked Iran’s potential paths to a nuclear weapon, but the channels also proved crucial in securing the freedom of 10 U.S. sailors after they had accidentally drifted into Iranian waters. Instead of a standoff that could have taken months to resolve, the Americans were released unharmed within only 16 hours.

 

The Trump administration does not have any such channels and has not bothered to create them either. While former Secretary of State John Kerry developed an extremely useful rapport with his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif over the course of two years of negotiations, this channel has not been handed over to Secretary Rex Tillerson (who wasn’t confirmed by the Senate until Wednesday).

 

And even if an attempt was made now to put it in place, it would begin under the worst circumstances precisely because Trump’s first communique to Iran was a threat. Moreover, Iran is hypersensitive to American signals as it enters the early phases of its political season. The history of U.S.-Iran relations in the past 35 years is ripe with examples of how such tough talk is more likely to cause Tehran to dig in its heels than to cause it to back down.

 

Kerry secured the release of the 10 American sailors precisely because he did not engage in such language. As I reveal in my forthcoming book Losing an Enemy ― Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy, Zarif was first informed about the 10 American sailors as he was leaving a theater in Tehran. His first concern was to ensure that the U.S. wouldn’t make any public threats against Iran as that would dramatically complicate their release and force him to adopt a much harsher position. As Zarif likes to say, Iranians are allergic to threats. “Knowing the United States,” Zarif told me, “the language they’d use would be ‘Iran must release our guys.’ And then Iran would take it as a threat. And then we would have responded, and then this whole thing would have taken a life of its own.”

 

Fortunately, he already had a scheduled call with Kerry that same evening, so there was time to convey this to Kerry before he would address the media. “Do you know the story?” Kerry asked. “Had you not called, I would have called you,” Zarif replied. Kerry pressed Zarif to quickly release the sailors, arguing the incident otherwise would jeopardize both the nuclear deal, which was nearing “Implementation Day” when sanctions would be lifted in return for Iran’s completion of initial nuclear steps, as well as the secret prisoner swap that was in the making. Zarif, in turn, pressed Kerry not to issue any public threats. If Kerry’s message was, “Don’t let this unravel the nuclear deal,” Zarif’s argument was, “We don’t want the sailors, so don’t force us to keep them by making threats.”

 

Zarif and Kerry spoke to each other five times that day. Instead of making threats, the Obama administration kept its cool and quietly negotiated the sailors’ release. Clearly, the Iranians were cooperating, and the channels of communication were open and effective. President Obama saw no value in raising the issue in the State of the Union Address, even though the news had broken. By contrast, his critics rushed to declare that it was the start of another hostage crisis and portrayed him as weak, indecisive and foolish, all the while blatantly ignoring the intrusion of the sailors into Iranian waters. “The fact that you have an active conversation going on diplomatically means you’re not going to be talking about this,” a White House official explained.

 

Had Kerry acted like Flynn, it is possible these 10 Americans could still be stuck in Iran. The prisoner exchange likely would have fallen part, resulting in a prolonged imprisonment for former Washington Post journalist Jason Rezaian and several American citizens. And it is extremely difficult to imagine any nuclear deal coming to fruition while American sailors are detained ― torpedoing the Iran deal and leaving the U.S. and Iran on a path to war.

 

Rather than following Kerry’s successful diplomatic path, Flynn has put the U.S. in an escalatory cycle with no clear exit. Iran is likely to respond to Washington’s notice with another provocative measure, which in turn will beget yet another ― and perhaps a more tangible ― threat from Washington. At some point, what started off as bluster, may turn into a real military conflict or even open warfare precisely because Flynn and the Trump administration prioritized threats over direct diplomacy.

 

Amateur hour at the Trump White House continues.

 

 

 

 

 

Edited February 4, 2017 by slow

[boshoku]

možda bi bilo umesno da tekstove stavljate u spojlere, a par rečenica da idu u quote...

[Frank Pembleton]

Meni blesavo kako se Iran"upecao" sa ovim testiranjem projektila...

 

....shit has hit the fan...

[Lord Protector]

 

Donald Trump's Twitter aggression towards Iran will deepen sectarian conflict in the Middle East 

Patrick Cockburn

 

In pursuit of an anti-Iranian line, the Trump administration is making the same mistake as that made by Western governments after the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world. They tended to think in terms of nationalities and the nation state, but in the Middle East these count for less as communal bonds than religious identity

President Trump is adding further venom to the raging sectarian hatreds tearing apart Iraq and Syria by his latest ill-judged tweets. These have far greater explosive potential than his better known clashes with countries like Australia and Mexico, because in the Middle East he is dealing with matters of war and peace. In this complex region, the US will have to pay a high price for switching to a vaguely belligerent policy which pays so little regard to the real situation on the ground. 

 

...

 

 

Edited February 5, 2017 by slow