Iran: novi front

[Ryan Franco]

http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/may/15/irans-unequal-revolution-income-disparity

 

Tekst deluje malo nagaženo ali cenim da je istina tu negde.

 

Komentarisali smo pre godinu dana Instagram stranu koja se pominje. 

[Prospero]

Zanimljiv detalj u pregovorima - Samanta Pauer je obećala Kongresu da će, u slučaju postizanja dogovora, pa u slučaju da Iran prekrši neke odredbe, sankcije UN biti primenjene automatski, bez posebne uloge SB UN, tj. bez mogućnosti neke od stalnih članica (Kine i Rusije) da stave veto. Ova tema može postati poveći kamen spoticanja u postizanju samog dogovora:

 

How Russia Could Make or Break the Iran Deal
 
Washington wants to make sure the world will reimpose sanctions the second Tehran violates the terms of its agreement. But will Moscow surrender its treasured U.N. veto?
 
• BY COLUM LYNCH
• JUNE 24, 2015
  
 
There are few things in international diplomacy that Russia values more than its U.N. Security Council veto. It has wielded it to limit Western action from Georgia to Syria to Ukraine. But the success of the historic nuclear talks with Iran may hinge on Moscow’s willingness to voluntarily yield that power.
The United States and its European partners are pressing a proposal that would curtail Russia’s ability to block the U.N. Security Council’s ability to reimpose — or “snap back” — its sanctions on Iran if it breaches an accord placing strict limits on its ability to develop nuclear power, according to diplomats and analysts.

The Islamic Republic is being battered by three sets of sanctions: one package imposed by Washington, one by Europe, and one by the U.N. Security Council. The United States and European governments have multiple ways of reimposing, or snapping back, their own sanctions in the event of an Iranian breach. But it would be far more difficult for the United States and its partners to secure Russian and Chinese support for reimposing the separate multilateral U.N. measures.

 

Retaining the ability to restore the U.N. sanctions has emerged as a precondition for an American agreement to suspend, and eventually lift, a spate of measures that restrict governments’ business dealings with Tehran and demand the suspension of Iran’s uranium-enrichment sanctions. “We will not support a snap-back mechanism or an agreement that includes a snap-back mechanism that leaves us vulnerable” to Iranian cheating, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, assured House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.) at a June 16 hearing. “We will retain the ability to snap back multilateral sanctions architecture back in place without Russian or Chinese support.”

Power did not detail how the administration could ensure that suspended U.N. sanctions could be reimposed without the agreement of the two veto-wielding powers. But diplomats and specialists familiar with U.S. thinking said Washington has for months been exploring an option that would shift decision-making outside the U.N. Security Council.

The plan would work like this. The pending nuclear deal with Tehran would include language establishing a joint commission comprising representatives from the key powers: Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, and the United States. It would also grant each of those countries, under a “mandatory review” provision, the authority to raise a concern about a breach in the nuclear deal before the commission. The entire system would be created in a legally binding Chapter VII resolution of the U.N. Security Council.

If the United States detected an Iranian violation — let’s say U.S. intelligence exposed a secret nuclear-enrichment plant — Washington could invoke a mandatory review and bring the case before the commission to either seek a commitment from Tehran to address the U.S. concern or call for a reimposition of sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would likely be called upon to assess whether a breach had occurred. But the commission would make the decision, by a majority vote, automatically triggering the reimposition of suspended U.N.

The balance of power would rest with the commission’s Western members, which would have four votes, while China, Russia, and Iran would combine for only three. If Russia still wanted to try to shield Tehran from renewed sanctions, they could still resort to introducing a U.N. Security Council resolution reversing the commission’s decision. But the United States would have the power to veto that measure.

“The idea seems to reverse the logic of the veto right,” said Simond de Galbert, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who was a member of France’s nuclear negotiating team until last summer. “The veto would only be used at the U.N. Security Council, likely by Western powers, to oppose a draft resolution preventing automatic sanctions snapback.”

The proposal would potentially cross a traditional Russian red line: Moscow has long opposed any decision that takes the decision to penalize a country out of the hands of the U.N. Security Council, where Russia can block. And some observers remain dubious that Russia, let alone China or Iran, would ever accept such a plan.

“I can’t tell you what the Russians are thinking about this, but my gut reaction is that it is very unlikely they will rescind their veto power,” said a senior Western diplomat who has been regularly briefed on the talks. “This is something they have never done. It would set in their eyes a terrible precedent.” The Russian Embassy in Washington did not responded to a request for comment. The White House also declined to comment. “We’re not going to get into the details at this stage from here,” said Ned Price, a spokesman with the National Security Council.

The six world powers, known in diplo-speak as the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany), are seeking to conclude a final agreement on Iran’s nuclear program by June 30, though many diplomats have conceded that negotiations are likely to extend into early July.
A final deal would subject Iran’s nuclear program to far greater scrutiny by international arms inspectors in exchange for the phased suspension, and ultimate lifting, of the punishing Western sanctions over the next two decades. If an accord is reached, the United States and European governments will suspend a range of financial, trade, and nuclear-related sanctions. The U.N. Security Council would then eliminate several of its own sanctions resolutions aimed at compelling Tehran to halt its nuclear program. In their place, the council would adopt a new resolution specifying Iran’s rights and obligations under the accord.

The United States and its European partners say the terms of such a resolution, which have not yet been agreed upon, would keep strict controls on Iran’s ability to purchase dual-use equipment from abroad that could be used for a nuclear weapons program as well as a civilian one. Instead, Tehran would have to go through a carefully monitored “procurement channel” that would limit what it could buy for its energy facilities. They are also seeking to extend a U.N. conventional-arms embargo, including a ban on Tehran’s purchase of supplies for its ballistic missile program. Iran is holding out for a deal that would eliminate all those measures and offer immediate greater economic relief.

Besides figuring out how to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Tehran in the event of a violation, a number of other key issues remain unresolved in the talks, according to an official from a government involved in the negotiations.

Negotiators still need to forge agreement on: the level of access Tehran will allow to non-declared military facilities, such as Parchin, where experts suspect illicit bomb testing has occurred; how Iran will account for the so-called possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program; the type of equipment, potentially including high-tech reactors, the West will offer Iran in exchange for restrictions on enrichment; the rollback of the U.N. arms embargo on Iran; and the duration of the deal itself. There is also disagreement over how much research and development Iran will be permitted to carry out on its most advanced centrifuges. “This gets very technical and political. What kind of R&D are we talking about? The devil is in the details,” said the senior Western diplomat. “We don’t want them to leap forward with highly sophisticated new centrifuges after those 10 or 15 years.”

Robert Einhorn, a sanctions expert and a former official in President Barack Obama’s administration, said a snap-back agreement “hasn’t been fully nailed down” yet, but that there is broad agreement that the reimposition of sanctions won’t be subject to a veto at the Security Council. “Administration officials are confident they can get this,” he said.

Another diplomat speaking to Foreign Policy said certain aspects of the snap-back mechanism are still under negotiation. For instance, there is some discussion about also giving the European Union a seat on the joint commission, which would grant the West an even stronger majority, even though it could also theoretically lead to a tied vote. “That’s one area still being worked out because they’re leading the negotiations but not technically part of the P5+1,” said the diplomat.

The diplomat also stressed that the joint commission will not be the only avenue available for the “snapping back” of sanctions. “There will still be ways without the commission of ensuring that the membership of the P5+1 could take an issue to the Security Council,” according to the diplomat, who declined to explain how such a provision might work. “How that will function is still on the negotiation table, [but] don’t assume that the commission is the only way to snap back sanctions.”

Hans Blix, a former head of the IAEA who oversaw weapons inspections efforts in Iraq before the U.S. invasion, said that the shift could be a hard sell in Moscow and Beijing.

“I doubt the Russians and Chinese would go for it,” he said. But if they did, he added, it would represent a “remarkable” concession by Moscow that could help unblock council deadlock.

Blix said the joint commission could prove to be a two-edged sword for Washington because the other members could theoretically unite against the United States, particularly if they disagreed with American intelligence about potential Iranian violations or didn’t want to jeopardize their future economic dealings with Tehran. Blix recalled the bitter divisions between the United States and its traditional allies, France and Germany, over their clashing assessment of the threat to the world posed by the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. “It would cut both ways,” said Blix. “I don’t think anyone should take it for granted that the United States would have the French or the German votes, or even the British vote.”

But others say this could provide an opportunity for Russian and American cooperation. Despite sharp differences between the United States and Russia on a range of issues, from Syria to Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown some willingness to find areas where the two powers could work together.

The United States and Russia, for instance, negotiated a landmark deal to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons program. While the United States believes Syria continues to weaponize chlorine, it maintains that the bulk of Syria’s deadliest weapons, including stockpiles of sarin and VX, have been destroyed.

Ilan Goldenberg, a former U.S. State Department and Pentagon analyst with expertise on Iran, said the Russians may be showing flexibility on the snap-back provision because “they fundamentally agree it’s important to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons.” But it also provides an opportunity to find areas where they can work together because “the relationship is so bad everywhere else.”

Power and others have noted that the United States and its European partners have considerable power to snap back U.S. and European sanctions. But persuading Russia and China to reimpose lapsed sanctions would be extremely difficult. “While it’s true that we were able to get a multilateral sanctions regime through the Security Council” in the past, Power told Congress, “it does not therefore follow that in the event of a breach that we would be able to get that same resolution through a second time.”

 

[Lord Protector]

The Neoconservative Pivot

Posted By Justin Raimondo On June 23, 2015 @ 11:00 pm In Uncategorized | 18 Comments

 

As the June 30 deadline for the conclusion of talks on Iran’s nuclear program looms, the main foreign policy issue of our time comes ever more sharply into focus. And by that I don’t just mean the immediate question of whether a deal can be reached, but also the larger question of whether Washington’s post-9/11 military rampage has finally lost its momentum.

 

The relatively narrow debate over how to implement and verify the deal continues, with an op ed in the New York Times by Alan Kuperman, an associate professor and coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation and Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, claiming that the deal is “fatally flawed.” Kuperman’s piece itself is flawed, however, by several false premises, as Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball point out over at the Arms Control Association web site:

 

“He assumes that Iran could immediately reassemble, reinstall, re-calibrate and begin to operate the 14,000 centrifuges the agreement will require Iran to disconnect and remove and put under IAEA seal. Such an assumption ignores the fact that it would take many months, if not years, to achieve such a stunt, which would be detected and could be disrupted within days of any such effort.”

 

The framework agreement reached at Lausanne calls for inspections, and one wonders how the inspectors would react to such blatant violations of the agreement. Does Kuperman think they would fail to notice such a massive project, or is he just counting on the public’s ignorance of the technical details to be able to get away with this kind of legerdemain?

 

Davenport and Kimball continue:

 

“He assumes that the agreement would allow Iran to keep large amounts of current low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in solid form (oxide powder instead of gas), which is entirely incorrect. Under the agreement, Iran must verifiably reduce its current stockpile of some 7,600kg of LEU gas to no more than 300kg of LEU in any form.

 

Again, Kuperman relies on the public’s ignorance of the technical details of the framework agreement – which are pretty heavy going – in order to seemingly confirm Israeli charges that the developing agreement is “a bad deal.” And of course he brings up Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “I want 100,000 centrifuges” to drive home his point:

 

“Kuperman repeats an old line from Iran’s Supreme Leader that he wants more than 100,000 centrifuges. That statement was made many months ago to describe the uranium-enrichment capacity Iran would need to power its one operating light-water reactor at Bushehr – and to try to gain bargaining leverage in the talks. Since then, Russia, which supplies the fuel for the reactor, has extended further fuel supply assurances for Bushehr, obviating any such ‘need’ for Iranian enrichment capacity of that scale. Iran has also agreed to limits on its enrichment capacity that make the achievement of such capacity out of reach for well over a decade.”

 

Ignorance is the War Party’s strength: that has always been the case, and never so much as in this instance, where the arcane details of nuclear technology can be easily manipulated for propagandistic purposes. And when it comes to the larger issue – US policy in the wake of our withdrawal from Iraq – the same ignorance is the main weapon in the warmongers’ arsenal. For example, a recent piece by Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, both of Bloomberg News, points excitedly to a military base in Iraq jointly occupied by US “advisors” and “Iran-backed militias”:

 

“The U.S. military and Iranian-backed Shiite militias are getting closer and closer in Iraq, even sharing a base, while Iran uses those militias to expand its influence in Iraq and fight alongside the Bashar al-Assad regime in neighboring Syria.

 

“Two senior administration officials confirmed to us that US soldiers and Shiite militia groups are both using the Taqqadum military base in Anbar, the same Iraqi base where President Obama is sending an additional 450 US military personnel to help train the local forces fighting against the Islamic State. Some of the Iran-backed Shiite militias at the base have killed American soldiers in the past.

 

“Some inside the Obama administration fear that sharing the base puts US soldiers at risk. The US intelligence community has reported back to Washington that representatives of some of the more extreme militias have been spying on US operations at Taqqadum, one senior administration official told us. That could be calamitous if the fragile relationship between the US military and the Shiite militias comes apart and Iran-backed forces decide to again target US troops.”

 

And of course John “bomb-bomb Iran” McCain is cited, bloviating about how this coexistence is “very hard to understand” for the families of soldiers supposedly killed by Shi’ite militias in Iraq. What’s really hard to understand, however, is how this Bizarro World history of the Iraq war relates to reality. Those Shi’ite militias were and are affiliated with the political parties that took over the country – in much hailed elections – after Saddam’s defeat. The ruling Ba’ath party, which supported Saddam, was composed almost exclusively of Sunni Muslims, and it was the Sunnis – dubbed “dead-enders” by Donald Rumsfeld – who fought the Americans. Indeed, President George W. Bush invited the leader of the biggest Shi’ite militia, the Badr Brigade, to a meeting at the White House.

 

In the absence of those Shi’ite militias – which are, in reality, composed of Iraqis, although you’d never know it from reading the Rogin-Lake propaganda – ISIS would already be in Baghdad, laying siege to the US Embassy. Their presence is nothing new: they have constituted the backbone of the Iraqi police for years. Their power is the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq, which destroyed the Sunni-controlled Iraqi military establishment and guaranteed Shi’ite dominance. That the same people who supported the Iraq war are now bemoaning its inevitable consequences is yet another example of how deftly the neoconservatives evade any responsibility for their own bloody handiwork.

 

And it’s funny how the Sunnis – who fought the Americans tooth and nail – are so easily forgiven by McCain & Co. After all, it was these very Sunni tribesmen who were mobilized during the much-touted “surge,” and hailed as the heroes of the so-called “Anbar Awakening,” and yet they had the blood of American soldiers on their hands. But we aren’t supposed to remember that.

 

The War Party and its Israeli backers are in the midst of a rather delicate pivot: their goal is to redirect US animosity, shifting it from the suicide-bombers of the Sunni “dead-enders” to Iran and its regional proxies. In order to do this they need to invert the history of the Iraq war and reposition the Sunnis as our valiant allies. Again, this revisionism is counting on the ignorance of the American public as to the arcane details of the religious differences that fuel the region’s sectarian conflicts. And in a sane world there is no good reason why the average American should know – or care – about those differences. However, in the world we are living in – the Bizarro World of the post-9/11 era – this lack of knowledge has the potential to start World War III.

 

The de facto Saudi-Israeli alliance aimed at Iran – and the Obama administration – necessitates some unusual ideological gymnastics on the part of the War Party in this country. Suddenly the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria is being held up as a viable alternative to the now virtually nonexistent “Free Syria Army” – and yet nobody has asked the families of the 9/11 victims for their opinion of that particular tactical move. And while the Israelis are busy tending to wounded al-Qaeda fighters in Syria, their own Druze population is attacking the ambulances transporting these fighters to Israeli hospitals.

 

Bibi Netanyahu and the heirs of Osama bin Laden – together at last! Now there’s an alliance that might be dubbed the Stalin-Hitler Pact of our times. Don’t expect either Josh Rogin or Eli Lake to be writing about that any time soon.

 

In George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, when it is suddenly announced that a war with Eastasia has broken out and that Eurasia is no longer the enemy, Big Brother appears on the telescreen declaring “We have always been at war with Eastasia!” In the dystopian world of Orwell’s prescient novel, no one questions this – although everyone knows it’s a lie – out of fear of the omnipresent Thought Police. In our world, however, while there is a would-be Thought Police patrolling the discourse, there are still a few of us who can call out the neoconservatives’ brazen rewriting of history.

[Prospero]

Habemus dogovor:
 
 

Iran nuclear deal reached in Vienna
The agreement – after 17 days of negotiations and 12 years of deadlock – to be unveiled by foreign ministers on Tuesday morning


 Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif waves from a balcony of the Palais Coburg Hotel, Vienna, on 13 July. Photograph: Joe Klamar/AFP/Getty Images

Julian Borger in Vienna
Tuesday 14 July 2015 10.10 BST
 
A comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear programme has been reached, according to diplomats in Vienna, bringing to an end a 12-year standoff that had threatened to trigger a new war in the Middle East, and potentially marking the beginning of a new era in relations between Iran and the west.

Live Iran nuclear deal: historic agreement in Vienna – live updates

Agreement to end 12-year standoff over Iran’s nuclear programme expected to be unveiled imminently in Vienna. Follow the latest developments live

A formal announcement on the agreement will be made at a press conference in Vienna at midday (11am BST), after a final plenary meeting at 10.30am. At some point it is expected that the US president, Barack Obama, and his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, will make statements from their capitals.

The deal follows 17 days of almost uninterrupted negotiations in Vienna involving foreign ministers from seven countries – Iran, US, UK, Russia, China, France and Germany – and the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini.

The talks only came to an end in the early hours of Tuesday morning, and diplomats stayed up through the night “scrubbing” the text, looking for mistakes and discrepancies.

It is expected that the estimated 100 pages of text – including five annexes – that make up the agreement will be published in the next few days. The agreement will be made official when it becomes an attachment to a planned UN security council resolution later this month. However, the operative parts of the resolution, lifting sanctions, for example, will be suspended for a few months.

Much of the outline of the agreement is already known, having been provisionally settled in Lausanne in April. It involves Iran accepting curbs on its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief, but many of the critical, politically charged details will only be made public on Tuesday.
It is understood that the conventional arms embargo will last another five years, and restrictions on ballistic missile technology will last eight years. Under a complicated arrangement, a violation could lead to the automatic “snap-back” of sanctions within 65 days, if a dispute-resolution process failed. 

The full agreement, known as the joint comprehensive plan of action, is likely to come under instant and ferocious attack from its opponents – mostly in the US, Iran and Israel – but its defenders portray it as one of the most important arms control accords of modern times and a rare diplomatic success in the Middle East.

Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who has faced mounting criticism at home over his handling of the diplomacy around Iran, moved pre-emptively to denounce the deal even before the details had emerged.

Heading a chorus of condemnation from Israeli politicians – many members of his rightwing coalition – he said the agreement was a capitulation and a mistake of historic proportions. The deal was also denounced by hardline former foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman as “a total surrender to terror”.

Yair Lapid, head of the Yesh Atid party, said Netanyahu’s campaign over Iran had been a “colossal failure”.
On Monday, the Iranian president’s office was forced to delete a premature tweet in his name that appeared to welcome a nuclear agreement that had yet to materialise.

The deleted tweet on the English-language account under Rouhani’s name declared: “#IranDeal is the victory of diplomacy & mutual respect over the outdated paradigm of exclusion & coercion. And this is a good beginning.”
Soon after, a new tweet was posted in its place, adding the word ‘if’ at the beginning.

As the Monday evening target came and went, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, appeared on the balcony of the Palais Coburg hotel in Vienna hotel, the venue for the talks, and faced shouted questions from the journalists in the street below.
Asked how he was feeling, Zarif replied: “Sleepy and overworked.” Asked if there would be a deal on Tuesday, he said: “It is possible.”

Once an agreement is announced, it will not take effect for some time: it must first survive a trial by fire from its critics in Washington and Tehran.

The greatest hurdle will be the US Congress, where Republicans have a majority and are expected to vote against the deal after a review period of up to 60 days. They will seek to win over 12 Democrats in an attempt to defeat a presidential veto

[Radoye]

Na kraju ce Obama tunjav vec kakav jeste za sobom ostaviti pozamasan legacy - normalizacija odnosa sa Kubom i Iranom, jedino slicno cega mogu da se setim je Nikson i Kina...

[Indy]

Otkud je sad Obama "tunjav"? Ili, ko onda nije "tunjav"?

[ObiW]

Momci., dzabe se lozite, Nece proci ovo kroz Kongres pun republikanaca koji jedva cekaju da se pokenjaju Obami u legacy work. 

[Prospero]

Ne mora da prođe kroz Kongres, neka UN i EU skinu sankcije i to je već poveći dobitak za Iran.

[Gandalf]

Congress will have 60 days to review the deal, once all documents have been sent to the Capitol, after which it can pass a resolution of approval, pass one of disapproval or do nothing. Mr. Obama would veto a resolution of disapproval, and the opponents could derail the agreement only if they could rally the required two-thirds vote of Congress to override his action.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/congress-iran-nuclear-deal.html

[Ayatollah]

Nije za ovu temu, ali IMHO Obama je bio dosta dobar US predsednik što se tiče spoljne politike, i za USA i za ostatak sveta, osim možda za Rusiju. Nije se američko sveprisustvo tako osećalo kao ranije, uglavnom su uzdržano nadzirali stvari sa strane, ne mešajući se direktno, počeli su mirno da rešavaju neke stare probleme koji su se vukli decenijama (Iran, Kuba)...

 

Bojim se da će se ceo svet rado sećati Obame kada bude bio bivši, ovo naročito kada vidim ko su mu potencijalni naslednici...

[ObiW]

Congress will have 60 days to review the deal, once all documents have been sent to the Capitol, after which it can pass a resolution of approval, pass one of disapproval or do nothing. Mr. Obama would veto a resolution of disapproval, and the opponents could derail the agreement only if they could rally the required two-thirds vote of Congress to override his action.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/congress-iran-nuclear-deal.html

 

Ovo boldovano uopste nije nemoguce. Secas se Bibijeve posete? Vidis sta po novinama pisu -  "ovaj sporazum je smrt za Izrael"

 

Nije za ovu temu, ali IMHO Obama je bio dosta dobar US predsednik što se tiče spoljne politike, i za USA i za ostatak sveta, osim možda za Rusiju. Nije se američko sveprisustvo tako osećalo kao ranije, uglavnom su uzdržano nadzirali stvari sa strane, ne mešajući se direktno, počeli su mirno da rešavaju neke stare probleme koji su se vukli decenijama (Iran, Kuba)...

 

Bojim se da će se ceo svet rado sećati Obame kada bude bio bivši, ovo naročito kada vidim ko su mu potencijalni naslednici...

To ja pricam (u svoja cetiri zida) vec godinama, a to je ovde (dok sam bio odsutan) pricao Rodjer Sanchez, najbolji poznavalac americke politike.

 

To sto je svet od Obame ocekivao da bude Ulof Palme (koji se grlio sa Kastrom i Jaserom), pa se grdno razocarao sto je dobio "samo" novog Dzimi Kartera je 1 sasvim druga prica.

Edited July 15, 2015 by ObiW

[Radoye]

Otkud je sad Obama "tunjav"? Ili, ko onda nije "tunjav"?

 

"Tunjav" u odnosu na (verovatno prevelika) ocekivanja u vreme kad je biran. Ne zaboravi da mu je dodeljena Nobelova nagrada a da konkretno do tada jos nista nije ni stigao da uradi. Toliki je hype tada napravljen oko njega da je medju onome sto se u Americi naziva liberalnom levicom u medjuvremenu zavladalo ogromno razocarenje Obaminim predsednikovanjem.

 

A evo ga sada covek sebi napravio sasvim lep istorijski legacy. Jos ako i Obamacare istinski zazivi...

[Gandalf]

Ovo boldovano uopste nije nemoguce. Secas se Bibijeve posete? Vidis sta po novinama pisu -  "ovaj sporazum je smrt za Izrael"

moguce jeste, ne bih rekao da je vrlo verovatno. republikanci i izraelski lobi ce pokusati, ali je demokratski establishment cvrsto na strani administracije. cak je i Hilari pozdravila sporazum.

Edited July 15, 2015 by Gandalf

[ObiW]

Cekaj, republikancima treba 66 a ne 60?

 

[Gandalf]

Cekaj, republikancima treba 66 a ne 60?

67. 2/3 ili vise da zeznu predsednicki veto.