Grčka - enormni dug, protesti oko mera štednje

[MancMellow]

Logika govori da bi "Da" opcija trebalo da pobedi. Tj, imho, najbolja opcija za Grcku, ne bas za Ciprasa, ali za Grcku je da pobedi "Da", ali ne mnogo ubedljivo (ali ne ni toliko tesno da postoje sumnje), recimo 53 vs 47 

[MancMellow]

guardian je onaj izvestaj turio na naslovnicu. 

 

 

malo i o nama™

 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/758a9070-1f21-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz3eanm841x

Edited June 30, 2015 by MancMellow

[vememah]

Evo još malo karikatura, ima zaista sjajnih, mislim da nisu kačene:

 

 

 

 

[MancMellow]

Martin Wolf. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcb2fb16-1e5c-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3eanm841x

 

Preskocio sam pljuvanje i Grka i Nemaca i dao ovaj deo o izboru koji to nije. Realno - pakao. 

 

 

 

Even this perspective does not help as much as one would like. The bailout extension did not offer a plausible exit into recovery: it left too big a debt overhang and, more important, demanded too much short-term austerity. Given the recent backsliding, it seems to demand a move from a primary fiscal balance (before interest) of close to zero this year to a surplus of 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2018. Achieving this outcome might demand fiscal measures that would raise the equivalent of 7 per cent of GDP and shrink the economy by 10 per cent.

 

One does not put an overweight patient on a starvation diet just after a heart attack. Greece needs growth. Indeed, the economic collapse explains why its public debt has exploded relative to GDP. The programme should have eliminated further austerity until growth was established, focused on growth-promoting reforms, and promised debt relief on completion. If the programme on offer was so bad, should I risk voting No? In deciding that I would need to think through what would happen. The short-term position would be clear. The European Central Bank has curtailed emergency support for the Greek banks, forcing tight limits on withdrawals. Some argue this is a huge error. Others believe it is an incentive for voters to vote Yes.

 

If the Greeks voted Yes, the curtailing of ECB support might be reversed. But it is hard to imagine a successful revival of the eurozone’s programme if the present government were still in charge. After campaigning for a No, the latter would surely have lost all the confidence of the creditors. So a new government would have to emerge. It would then also have to sign on the dotted line.

 

A Yes vote then would offer an unpleasant and uncertain, but at least imaginable future. Now imagine a No vote. There would then be two conceivable outcomes. One would be a true exit. The Greek government would introduce a new currency and convert all contracts under Greek law into it. The new currency would surely then collapse in value relative to the euro. How much it would fall would depend on the policies and institutions (particularly the governance of the central bank) established by the government.

 

One might reasonably fear the worst. Some even argue that Greece would remain “euroised”. If so, the collapse in the external value of the new currency might offer little gain in competitiveness. Personally, I would be more optimistic: the improvements in competitiveness might well be large.

The second outcome would be to stay in the eurozone, despite an insolvent government. This is logically possible. The banking system could be recapitalised by converting uninsured bank liabilities into equity. This looks technically feasible. But it would impose a large negative shock on private wealth.

 

Whether the ECB would then restart emergency lending and on what scale would become the big questions. This looks an unattractive option to me: it would present all the problems of being part of a currency union, with the additional disadvantages of a comprehensive government default. Better than that surely would be to vote Yes.

 

So I, as a Greek voter, face a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. The devil is familiar: the never-ending demands of the eurozone for further austerity against which my people voted in the last general election. The deep blue sea is sovereign default and monetary sovereignty. If I am Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, I think there is a third way — endless bailouts and few conditions. But I am sure he is deluded. So which would I choose? Being cautious I would be tempted to stick with the devil I know. but I might well do better to risk the sea.

 

 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcb2fb16-1e5c-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3eanm841x

 

Edited June 30, 2015 by MancMellow

[vememah]

Sad nažalost nijedan izbor nije dobar i veliko je pitanje koji je gori.

 

Da je Cipras izbore dobio sa realnom politikom, brže bi se dogovorio sa kreditorima ili o novom programu ili o plišanom izlasku. Problem nije samo u njemu, već i u elektoratu: on je pričao ono šta biračko telo voli da čuje kako bi dobio izbore, a nije bio dovoljno iskusan ili inteligentan da čita znakove i na osnovu njih brže prilagodi politiku realnim okolnostima, a i sama heterogena struktura Sirize mu nije išla na ruku.

 

Birokratija u Briselu je takva kakva je, daleko je od dobre, ali je trebalo otpočetka imati svest o tome da su šanse da se ona pridobije za ozbiljnije popuštanje minimalne.

 

 

_________________________________

 

Tajms potvrđuje da su Nemci otpisali Ciprasa:

 

Greece will not get a cent in new eurozone bailout loans while Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis remain in power, because Germany will block any such deal, one of Europe’s most influential politicians has told The Times.

“Today there is the question of do we trust Tsipras and Varoufakis? The answer is clear to all parties, no,” the senior German conservative said.

 

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4484201.ece

Edited July 1, 2015 by vememah

[vememah]

Nešto mi nije dalo mira, našao sam ceo članak na sajtu The Australiana. U njemu se još tvrdi da Šulc radi na cepanju Sirize kako bi se u slučaju pobede opcije "da" napravila nova vlada bez izbora i da je Grexit neminovan u slučaju pobede opcije "ne".
 

Greek default: ‘No new bailout unless Tsipras goes’

Greece will not get a cent in new eurozone bailout loans while Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis remain in power, because Germany will block any such deal, one of Europe’s most influential politicians has told The Times.

“Today there is the question of do we trust Tsipras and Varoufakis? The answer is clear to all parties, no,” the senior German conservative said.
 
He also lifted the lid on a European Union attempt to push Mr Tsipras’s left-wing Syriza out of power regardless of the outcome of the vote on July 5.
 
If Greece’s prime minister and finance minister remained in office, even after a “yes” vote in Sunday’s referendum, then Athens would stand no chance of a new bailout, he indicated.
 
Under the rules of the European Stability Mechanism, the euro’s bailout fund, the German parliament, or Bundestag, has a veto or blocking vote over any new program such as that requested by Greece at the 11th hour.
 
The senior German conservative said that Angela Merkel’s ruling Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and its Bavarian allies the Christian Social Union (CSU) would block any request made while the pair, described as “communists”, remained in power.
 
“In my party the CDU/CSU there would be a lot of colleagues who would vote ‘no’ if Varoufakis and Tsipras are asking. For sure. Because there is simply no trust any more. They say, I am not going to give taxpayers’ money to Greece without a reliable partner,” he said. Referring to Syriza, he added: “We need a reliable partner who wants to do the job.”
 
The EU’s plan is to back a “yes” vote strongly by posing it as an in/out question on membership of the euro rather than austerity measures and then, in the event of a victory, to oust Syriza after the expected resignation of Mr Tsipras.
 
“We will do everything to get a ‘yes’. Then we will need a new government, then we have to implement measures,” he said.
 
The politician revealed that the socialist Martin Schulz, the president of the European parliament, was involved in secret talks, possibly including Mr Tsipras — whom he sees as a moderate — to “split the Syriza movement”.

The aim was to create a “technical government” as a precondition for a new EU bailout, incorporating moderate MPs in Syriza to avoid new elections.
 
In the event of a “no” vote and Syriza continuing to hold the reins of power, the German conservative said, “it’s over” and Greece would have to leave the euro after defaulting on ECB loans on July 20. “We will talk about a humanitarian rescue program but not an additional [bailout],” he said.
 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/greek-default-no-new-bailout-unless-tsipras-goes/story-fnb64oi6-1227422961480

[vememah]

"For Germans, economics is still part of moral philosophy": why Germany won't help Greece

 

Updated by Dylan Matthews on June 30, 2015, 6:09 p.m. ET @dylanmatt dylan@vox.com

 

Jane Kramer's profile of Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi in last week's New Yorker only mentions Greece by name once. But toward the end, there's a paragraph that perfectly sums up why Germany has been pushing policies on Greece that look clearly unsustainable to most outside observers:

 

    [Former Italian prime minister Mario] Monti told me that, when he was Prime Minister and visited Barack Obama at the White House, Obama admitted to being at a loss to know "how to engage Merkel on matters of economic policy." Obama asked his advice, and Monti replied, "For Germans, economics is still part of moral philosophy, so don’t even try to suggest that the way to help Europe grow is through public spending. In Germany, growth is the reward for virtuous economics, and the word for ‘guilt’ and ‘debt’ is the same."

 

Even since World War II, German economic thinking has been dominated by "ordoliberalism," a philosophy developed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and other policymakers as West Germany recovered in the late 1940s. Ordoliberalism isn't purely laissez-faire, and maintains a role for state intervention in the economy, but it strongly emphasizes keeping debt to a minimum. This anti-debt economic dogma is very deeply held. University of Helsinki researchers Timo Harjuniemi and Markus Ojala analyzed German newspaper coverage of the eurozone crisis and found that the coverage overwhelmingly blames Greece and other indebted countries: "their fiscal policies have been too lax, social spending has been too generous, and the public sector has become overblown. As a result of countries living beyond their means, the public debt burden has become too heavy, thus causing the debt crisis." Harjuniemi and Ojala find that this consensus is held by both center-left and center-right German newspapers.

 

And because Germany is by far the most powerful actor in Europe, European policy toward Greece has reflected the ordoliberal consensus within Germany. The whole approach is premised on the idea that Greece needs to pay back what it owes, both to private investors who bought the country's bonds and to the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund, the "Troika" that has been funding Greece's bailouts. The Europeans — led by Germany — have also insisted that Greece not take on any more debt and pass austerity budgets.

 

Those budgets have, in turn, prevented Greece from growing, raising the prospect that growth requires letting Greece deficit-spend. But as Monti notes, Germans' ordoliberalism is so deep as to be more of a moral principle than an economic theory. That — and the fact that German taxpayers want their bailout money paid back — eliminates any chance of chancellor Angela Merkel and other European policymakers letting Greece spend more.

 

http://www.vox.com/2015/6/30/8871981/germany-angela-merkel-greece

[MancMellow]

Sad nažalost nijedan izbor nije dobar i veliko je pitanje koji je gori.

 

Da je Cipras izbore dobio sa realnom politikom, brže bi se dogovorio sa kreditorima ili o novom programu ili o plišanom izlasku. Problem nije samo u njemu, već i u elektoratu: on je pričao ono šta biračko telo voli da čuje kako bi dobio izbore, a nije bio dovoljno iskusan ili inteligentan da čita znakove i na osnovu njih brže prilagodi politiku realnim okolnostima, a i sama heterogena struktura Sirize mu nije išla na ruku.

 

Birokratija u Briselu je takva kakva je, daleko je od dobre, ali je trebalo otpočetka imati svest o tome da su šanse da se ona pridobije za ozbiljnije popuštanje minimalne.

 

 

_________________________________

 

Tajms potvrđuje da su Nemci otpisali Ciprasa:

 

Drugim rečima - da su glasači za nešto drugo nego za ono za šta su. Pri tom, glasači su, kao što vidimo - u pravu i uopšte nisu bili nerazumni. Ekonomska logika, vidimo čak i po analizama samih članica Troike, podržava opravdanost njihovog gledišta.Plus, tokom pegovora Syriza je backtrackovala i na takva obećanja i suštinski sama kreditorima ponudila austerity mere, samo za nijansu manje, ali austerity mere (to je, btw, ta "radikalna" levica). Dakle ostaje da žalimo što želje grčkog elektorata i vlade nisu u skladu ama baš potpuno sa političkim računicama stranaka na vlasti pre svega u Nemačkoj, pa onda i u nekoliko drugih zemalja EZ.

 

 

But what made the episode a true scandal was that European leaders were also mindful that German and French banks held sizeable chunks of Greece’s sovereign debt on their books. A write-down would have forced those banks to record big losses. They might have even needed a public bailout.

It’s perhaps no surprise that Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to avoid that. But a technocratic institution such as the IMF should never have gone along with it.

 

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/greece-crisis-imf-was-pushed-around-by-angela-merkel-and-nicholas-sarkozy--and-now-it-is-being-humiliated-10356247.html

 

Šta god ko mislio o Syrizi, oni su poslednji koji su krivi za ovakvo stanje u GR. Prevashodna je odgovornost upravo na onima koji se danas predstavljaju kao nekakvi spasioci evropske opcije u Grčkoj, pa onda na evropskim institucijama i IMF-u. Mada je i odgovornost čak i 1 IMF-a manja u svetlu toga da su bili od strane Merkelke i Sarkozija naterani na to da odustanu od svoje standardne procedure da žestoke mere štednje moraju biti praćene i BAR debelim restruktuiranjem duga, ako već nije moguća devaluacija. IMF je pre svega kriv sam sebi

 

I sad, pošto je više-manje naučno dokazano da ovakve mere samo kontrahuju grčku ekonomiju, jasno je da se njima šanse da se dug ikada vrati samo smanjuju. I onda, logično pitanje - zašto jebeno uništavate jednu zemlju? Razlozi su, naravno, čisto politički, pa tako dolazimo do zaključka da su sve te vizije o "ever-closer union" i solidarnosti, etc, samo mrtvo slovo na papiru. I to ne vide samo Grci, nego i ogroman broj ljudi izvan Grčke i time se, objektivno, ugrožava sam evropski projekat. Neko će zbog toga glasati za Podemos, ali neko za Le Pen, a neko i za Brexit. 

 

Tako izgleda slepačka politika na najvišem nivou.

Edited July 1, 2015 by MancMellow

[vememah]

Greek Analyst podseća na tvit Varufakisa iz 2011:

 

[Muwan]

Da je Cipras izbore dobio sa realnom politikom, brže bi se dogovorio sa kreditorima ili o novom programu ili o plišanom izlasku. Problem nije samo u njemu, već i u elektoratu: on je pričao ono šta biračko telo voli da čuje kako bi dobio izbore, a nije bio dovoljno iskusan ili inteligentan da čita znakove i na osnovu njih brže prilagodi politiku realnim okolnostima, a i sama heterogena struktura Sirize mu nije išla na ruku

 

Grčki elektorat ima legitimno i demokratsko pravo da nešto želi. Nesklad izmedju želja i realnosti je drugi par cipela, a isto tako partije imaju pravo da prave programe na osnovu muzičkih želja. Grci se dave već pet godina i hvataće se za svaku moguću slamku, ma kako tanušna i jadna bila.

[Prospero]

bilo ovo?

Greece would face an unsustainable level of debt by 2030 even if it signs up to the full package of tax and spending reforms demanded of it, according to unpublished documents compiled by its three main creditors.[/size]

The documents, drawn up by the so-called troika of lenders, support Greece’s argument that it needs substantial debt relief for a lasting economic recovery. They show that, even after 15 years of sustained strong growth, the country would face a level of debt that the International Monetary Fund deems unsustainable.

The documents show that the IMF’s baseline estimate – the most likely outcome – is that Greece’s debt would still be 118% of GDP in 2030, even if it signs up to the package of tax and spending reforms demanded. That is well above the 110% the IMF regards as sustainable given Greece’s debt profile, a level set in 2012. The country’s debt level is currently 175% and likely to go higher because of its recent slide back into recession.

The documents admit that under the baseline scenario “significant concessions” are necessary to improve Greece’s chances of ridding itself permanently of its debt financing woes.

Even under the best case scenario, which includes growth of 4% a year for the next five years, Greece’s debt levels will drop to only 124%, by 2022. The best case also anticipates €15bn (£10bn) in proceeds from privatisations, five times the estimate in the most likely scenario.

But under all the scenarios, which all assume a third bailout programme, looked at by the troika – the European commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF – Greece has no chance of meeting the target of reducing its debt to “well below 110% of GDP by 2022” set by the Eurogroup of finance ministers in November 2012.

In the creditors own words: “It is clear that the policy slippages and uncertainties of the last months have made the achievement of the 2012 targets impossible under any scenario”.

These projections are from the report Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis for Greece, one of six documents that are part of the full set of materials that comprise the “final” proposal sent to Greece by its creditors last Friday.

These, which the Guardian has seen, were obtained by Süddeutsche Zeitung after they were sent to all German MPs with the expectation that the deal would need to be approved by the country’s parliament.

 

ima još

 

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/30/greek-debt-troika-analysis-says-significant-concessions-still-needed

 

"Sustainable" je valjda birokratski termin. Tj, sada imaju dug oko 180%GDP, u suštini su ga redovno otplaćivali kroz bejlaut paket (koji im je omogućavao da uzimaju spoljni novac po "normalnim" kamatama, što na slobodnom tržištu ne bi mogli ni pod razno). Kako je sad to smanjenje debt-to-GDP-ratio zapravo "unsustainable" kada veličina duga zapravo pada (pretpostavljam da anuiteti ostaju u nekom sličnom ili razumnom okviru od par % GDPa)?

 

Ciljane brojke neće biti postignute, ali to je valjda tema za razgovor za buduće bejlaut pakete. Efektivno, tekst kaže "Grcima će biti "bolje" nego danas, ali ne toliko bolje koliko smo mislili", ili ja čitam baš pogrešno. I nije li ovakav papir, poslat bundestagovcima, zapravo politička poruka da bi možda trebalo u buduće biti "blaži" ili posvetiti više pažnje rastu, itd?

[Prospero]

Logika govori da bi "Da" opcija trebalo da pobedi. Tj, imho, najbolja opcija za Grcku, ne bas za Ciprasa, ali za Grcku je da pobedi "Da", ali ne mnogo ubedljivo (ali ne ni toliko tesno da postoje sumnje), recimo 53 vs 47 

 

Najgora opcija je da razlika bude smešno mala ko god da pobedi, sve manje od 60:40 za bilo koju stranu i bojim se da će otvoriti can of worms podela u Grčkoj.

[Prospero]

Ajde kad već chain-postujem:
 
 


Anketa

 

Raspoloženje pre i posle zatvaranja banaka u ponedeljak, 86% je reklo da bi izašlo na referendum.

[Prospero]

A grčka TV Mega potura slike iz J. Afrike iz 2012. kao da se sada dešava (potencijalni napad na podizača novca), šireći paniku:

 

Edited July 1, 2015 by Prospero

[MancMellow]

Ciljane brojke neće biti postignute, ali to je valjda tema za razgovor za buduće bejlaut pakete. Efektivno, tekst kaže "Grcima će biti "bolje" nego danas, ali ne toliko bolje koliko smo mislili", ili ja čitam baš pogrešno. I nije li ovakav papir, poslat bundestagovcima, zapravo politička poruka da bi možda trebalo u buduće biti "blaži" ili posvetiti više pažnje rastu, itd?

 

Exactly. Blazi austerity koji bi trebalo da se orijentise na rast pre svega, to je poruka. Ali, ako bude "Da" na referendumu, i ako se budu ugovarali novi uslovi, Dijjsselbloem je rekao da uslovi mogu biti samo tezi. Mislim, ok, naravno, svak je izabran da brani interese svoje zemlje. Al nemojte onda to da prodajete kao spas i pomoc. Ne kazem da bas isto, ali ponasanje mnogo vise lici na nekog ko je dosao da ti pleni imovinu, nego nekog ko je dosao da te spasava. 

 

Ovo sto Syriza radi poslednjih dana su teske igrarije, objektivno nedostojne ozbiljne spoljne politike. No, prvo uvek sam vise spreman da cut some slack za ispodpojasne udarce slabijem u fajtu, a drugo druga strana, tj hard core deo druge strane daleko od toga da je u ovih 5 godina igrao samo na fer. 

 

Mislim, ja se stvarno nadam da ce glasati "Da". Ne volim samoubistva, pa i onda kad te neko dovede da kopas rupu u koju ce da te ubaci kad te ubije, sve dok kopas ima nade. Ali to je bukvalno jedini razlog. 

Edited July 1, 2015 by MancMellow