NATO

[Tribun_Populi]

Pusti Trampa da trampuje još malo, da se izbrexituje situacija i isele evropske institucije iz Londona te podgreje degolizam u Francuskoj, Kinezi da krenu da vršljaju po istočnoj Evropi u kojoj će biti jedini istinski investitori, i dobićeš priličnu želju za full eurovojskom.

A ako već EU zemlje budu morale da plaćaju tu vojsku, što bi onda trpele američku.

Ameri su se brutalno zajebali što su Ruse gurnuli Kinezima u zagrljaj. Brutalno.

[Peter Fan]

2 hours ago, slow said:

 

Što se tiče junior statusa kojim se često od strane zapada plaši Rusija Kinom, to je slab argument. Ne postoji teritorijalni spor Kine i Rusije niti će ga biti skoro u budućnosti. To je jedna od najstabilnijih granica, Rusi pažljivo prate demografska i vojna kretanja i preventivno, planski, deluju. Za sada su idealni parneri, imaju sve što ovaj drugi nema, faktički su komplementarni... energetika, vojna tehnologija, elektronika, roba široke potrošnje, finansije. 

 

 

Ne bih bas rekao. Imaju tu Rusi "mekani trbuh" i ne bih rekao da demografija i stope ekonomskog rasta rade za njih.

 

Ima ovdje dobar osvrt na to:

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But in the early 1990s, after the Soviet collapse, the Chinese migration renewed and gathered pace. Now Chinese traders, builders, entrepreneurs, and farmers have penetrated far beyond the riverside Russian towns, causing resentment and sometimes paranoia. There are fears of Chinese buying up real estate, unfounded rumors of increasing intermarriage and proliferating Chinatowns. Statistics are so erratic and unverifiable that estimates of Chinese migration veer between 300,000 and five million, complicated by seasonal movements, often illegal. Interaction between Russians and Chinese—products of profoundly different cultures—is confined to little more than commerce, and the Russian media routinely treat the migrants as a faceless biomass. One study recorded that “the more frequent and intensive the contacts of the local population with the Chinese, the less it is inclined to evaluate positively the immigrants’ character.”1

At worst, the migrants are seen as tools of a long-term plot, hatched in Beijing, to take…

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http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/10/26/black-dragon-river-runs-through-it/

[Toni Sumaher]

Dobro, ali treba imati u vodu kineski pivot u odnosu na Ruse, pazice se oko tih stvari u perspektivi poprilicno.

[Eraserhead]

2 hours ago, Toni Sumaher said:

 

U sustini, ona to i jeste bila, samo sto je tapsana po ledjima da je stvari idu zarad opsteg dobra.  Problem je u tome sto je kod Amera pobedila dosta rusofobna strategija koja je i od pocetne putinovske pomirljive strukture stvorila prilicno ogorcenog i zilavog neprijatelja.  Strateska greska koju rade SAD odnosi se na sve jace zblizavanje Rusa i Kineza, tj. rade sve kontra od cuvene politike detanata s pocetka sedamdesetih koju su izneli Kisindzer i Nikson. Mislili su da je Kina spakovana i da ce je dodatno pacifikovati ako dodatno sjebu Ruse. Ozbiljan zajeb.

 

Odnosi Rusije i Amerike su bili dobri sve do Ukrajine. Cak je i Gruzija prosla bez vecih zatezanja. Meni nije jasno kako je to kod Amera pobedila rusofobna strategija kada je tada pobedio upravo kandidat koji je imao blazi stav prema Rusiji. Pa su se pritiskala dugmad za resetovanje odnosa (nakon Gruzije) itd. Pa je onda dosla Ukrajina. Meni logicnije deluje da se onda kada se ruska vlast unutra konsolidovala i ojacala pocela da vrsi tu konsolidaciju uticaja i prema spolja. Otprilike u to vreme je krenula i prica o "raspadu SSSRa kao najvecoj katastrofi" itd.

[Toni Sumaher]

3 minutes ago, Eraserhead said:

 

Odnosi Rusije i Amerike su bili dobri sve do Ukrajine. Cak je i Gruzija prosla bez vecih zatezanja. Meni nije jasno kako je to kod Amera pobedila rusofobna strategija kada je tada pobedio upravo kandidat koji je imao blazi stav prema Rusiji. Pa su se pritiskala dugmad za resetovanje odnosa (nakon Gruzije) itd. Pa je onda dosla Ukrajina. Meni logicnije deluje da se onda kada se ruska vlast unutra konsolidovala i ojacala pocela da vrsi tu konsolidaciju uticaja i prema spolja. Otprilike u to vreme je krenula i prica o "raspadu SSSRa kao najvecoj katastrofi" itd.

 

Ma, gde su bili dobri. SAD su pizdele oko energetskog ugovora Rusa i Nemaca, bilo je vrlo neprijatnih stvari na liniji Vasington-Berlin. Sta tek reci za pokusaj energetskog dila EU i Rusa oko Juznog toka.

 

Ruska konsolidacija je stvar dosezanja defanzivnog zida i, samim tim,  jacanja ekstremnije ekipe u strukturama vlasti.

Edited December 14, 2017 by Toni Sumaher

[MancMellow]

Treba voditi računa o tome da oni jedni o drugima znaju unapred šta planiraju i šta se deševa mnogo mnogo više nego što izlazi u javnost (i ono što izađe) i da se onda prema tome postavljaju. I jedni i drugi. 

[Peter Fan]

12 minutes ago, Toni Sumaher said:

Dobro, ali treba imati u vodu kineski pivot u odnosu na Ruse, pazice se oko tih stvari u perspektivi poprilicno.

Dvije stvari:

1) "paznja oko tih stvari" ne uklanja taj ruski "meki trbuh", samo ga stavlja na milost Kinezima, a Rusija nema realan odgovor

2) pitanje je koliko Kinezi zapravo hoce i mogu da paze oko toga. Ja bih rekao da se tok ekonomije i migracije ne moze tek tako kontrolisati, cak i ako postoji dobra volja izmedju dva vrha. To je kao ono o jahacu i slonu. Jahac upravalja slonom, ali samo donekle.

[Toni Sumaher]

1 minute ago, Peter Fan said:

Dvije stvari:

1) "paznja oko tih stvari" ne uklanja taj ruski "meki trbuh", samo ga stavlja na milost Kinezima, a Rusija nema realan odgovor

2) pitanje je koliko Kinezi zapravo hoce i mogu da paze oko toga. Ja bih rekao da se tok ekonomije i migracije ne moze tek tako kontrolisati, cak i ako postoji dobra volja izmedju dva vrha. To je kao ono o jahacu i slonu. Jahac upravalja slonom, ali samo donekle.

Ok je sve to, ali imaj u vidu spoljnopoliticki kontekst i tajming u kojem izlazi ovakva knjiga.

[Anduril]

On 14/12/2017 at 4:03 PM, hazard said:

 

Nisam mislio samo na nas, nego na sve zemlje u Evropi koji su posmatrači i nevoljni učesnici te igre velikih sila i kojima bi bilo bolje da se s Rusijom sarađuje i trguje a ne gleda preko nišana

 

Zemlje EU, a posebno istocne Evrope, nisu nevoljni ucesnici nego prosto imaju free-ride deal sa US posto vec skoro 2 decenije mnogo manje ulazu u vojsku dok im Amerikanci fakticki placaju odbranu u zamenu za status globalne sile.

U poslednjih 20 godina je rusko naoruzavanje raslo dok je u istocnoj i centralnoj Evropi stagniralo ili se cak smanjivalo.

To su cinjenice koje su mnogo lakse merljive od ruskog argumenta o nicim izazvanom okruzivanju od strane US.

Okruzuju ih jer ih pustaju ili cak prizivaju ove male drzave koje nece da plate i jos nisu u stanju da se vojno ujedine bez US prokroviteljstva. Slicno je i sa Kinom.

Rusija od pocetka devedesetih ima istoriju direktnog vojno-politickog mesanje u susedne zemlje i sasvim je naivno ocekivati da male evropske drzave nece pribeci nekim merama protiv toga. 

Naravno da bi i samoj Rusiji vise odgovaralo da na drugoj strani ima jedino defanzivnu EU vojsku a ne i imperijalnu US. Ali, takvo stanje su sada sa ovom ukrajinskom pricom sami sebi navalili na grbacu. Mogli su mnogo lakse da igraju na kartu finlandizacije Ukrajine uz mnogo veci uticaj. Ovako, ce US samo povecati svoje problematicno prisustvo koje je pre krize bilo maksimalno smanjeno na terenu centralne i istocne Evrope.

[namenski]

Quote

 

Britain and its NATO allies must defend deep sea cables against a potentially catastrophic attack by the Russia navy that could disrupt trillions of dollars in financial transactions, the head of Britain’s armed forces warned.

The cables which crisscross the world’s oceans and seas carry 95 percent of communications and over $10 trillion in daily transactions.

“There is a new risk to our way of life, which is the vulnerability of the cables that criss-cross the seabeds,” the BBC quoted Stuart Peach, chief of the defense staff, as saying.

Peach said the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s modernization of the once mighty Soviet navy now posed a serious threat to Western communications.

“Russia in addition to new ships and submarines continues to perfect both unconventional capabilities and information warfare,” Peach said.

 

 

[Braća Strugacki]

meni je ovo super

 

"samo da znate, ako želite da nas gadno oštetite, možete da nam precvikate kablove"

 

hvala, doviđenja

[Radoye]

Da, samo sto i Rusija i Kina i svi ostali igraci na globalnoj sceni jednako zavise od tih istih kablova kao i Britanija i njeni NATO saveznici jerbo se i njihova trgovina i komunikacija odvija istom infrastrukturom.

[Lord Protector]

Trump launches tirade at NATO summit: 'Germany is totally controlled by Russia'

• “Germany is totally controlled by Russia … They will be getting between 60 and 70 percent of their energy from Russia and a new pipeline, and you tell me if that is appropriate because I think its not,” Trump said.

 

President Donald Trump launched a scathing attack on German support for one of Europe's most contentious energy developments Wednesday, saying Germany is “totally controlled” by Russia.

Speaking in Brussels, Belgium on the first leg of his European trip, the U.S. president said a flurry of oil and gas deals had given Moscow far too much influence over the continent’s largest economy. In particular, he singled out the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project as being especially "inappropriate."

“Germany is totally controlled by Russia … They will be getting between 60 and 70 percent of their energy from Russia and a new pipeline, and you tell me if that is appropriate because I think it's not,” Trump said, before criticizing Berlin's failure to significantly increase defense spending.

 

Trump was speaking at a press conference Wednesday morning in front of NATO representatives ahead of a two-day summit.

“I think it is a very bad thing for NATO and I don’t think it should have happened and I think we have to talk to Germany about it. On top of that, Germany is just paying a little bit over 1 percent (on defense) … And I think that is inappropriate also,” he added.

 

Edited July 11, 2018 by slow

[Lord Protector]

[Lord Protector]

Breitbart...

Quote

 

Caroline Glick: NATO Is the Author of Its Own Demise

Matt Dunham / AFP / Getty

 

10 Jul 2018

Is President Donald Trump going to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) when he attends its summit in Brussels on July 12?

To watch and read the commentary being broadcast and published by the foreign policy elite on both sides of the Atlantic, it certainly seems like it.

One of the interesting aspects of the hysteria is that NATO’s supporters never seem to think it is necessary to explain why it would be a bad idea to end the alliance. In a spate of interviews ahead of the summit, NATO Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchinson enumeratedthe many ways that Russia threatens Europe and U.S. interests. But while the threats she mentioned – political subversion through social media, nerve agent attacks in Great Britain, support for Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) treaty, and annexation of Crimea – are all major threats, they are not the main threats that the U.S. faces today. Moreover, NATO has been ineffective in confronting these malign actions by Russia.

NATO’s ineffectiveness ought to be the key issue of discussion when considering its future. But to date, that weakness has been largely overlooked in the rush to blame Trump for allegedly  destroying America’s alliances.

NATO was established in 1949. It was the second major organization, after the United Nations, which was formed in the aftermath of World War II. Like the U.N., NATO was envisioned as a means to secure the peace in the post-war era.

To a significant degree, NATO was established because the U.N. was not up to the task. At the outset of World War II, then-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt envisioned the establishment of an organization whose goal would be to preserve the peace that would be secured through an Allied victory. Its establishment was agreed to by the key World War II Allies — the U.S., the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China.

The basic notion at the heart of the U.N. was that Germany had to be restrained. After it started two world wars in 25 years, the U.N. would ensure that Germany would be in no position to start a third one.

While the notion of organizing the international community around the goal of restraining Germany made sense in 1942, by 1945 it was less relevant. Germany had been defeated completely. And the Soviet Union was emerging as America’s greatest post-war adversary.

But the the initial discussions and wartime agreements had an inertia and a logic of their own. So by the time the U..N was established in late 1945, its central organizing principle was obsolete.

Even worse, due to the fact that the Soviet Union was granted permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council, replete with veto power, the U.N. was almost powerless to stand in Soviet dictator Josef Stalin’s way as he carved out an empire in Eastern Europe, subverted Western European governments, and undermined U.S. and British interests and power around the world.

NATO, then, was established because the U.N. was incapable of handling the actual strategic environment dominated by the Cold War.

And NATO was successful. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, in large part due to American leadership in NATO.

It was no doubt NATO’s success that precluded discussion of its continued usefulness after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Rather than contract its operations, NATO rapidly expanded into the former Soviet sphere, extending membership to states that had lived under Soviet domination since the end of World War II.

There was little discussion then, or since, of the desirability of NATO’s eastward expansion. No one asked if the U.S. would really fight to keep the likes of Lithuania out of Russia’s sphere of influence, or whether it ought to fight to do so. NATO had just won the Cold War. Obviously, so the thinking went, it should be expanded ad infinitum.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO intervened in the Yugoslavian civil war — twice. After invoking Article 5, the NATO Treaty’s mutual defense clause, after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO served and continues to serve as the leader of the coalition in the war in Afghanistan. NATO was the banner under which the U.S. and European nations intervened in the insurrection in Libya in 2011. NATO trainers have also been used in Iraq.

In an interview with Bloomberg last week, German Defense Minister Ursula Von Der Leyen insisted that the most important goal of Thursday’s summit would be “unity.”

She explained, “I think it is important to talk about the issues that really affect the alliance. Who are our opponents? Our opponents would be delighted if there’s a division in NATO. So, to work on the strengthening of the alliance, to work on the unity is the most important goal for this summit.”

Notably, Von Der Leyen failed to mention who NATO’s opponents are. That was no fluke. The one thing that has been lacking in all of NATO’s post-Cold War interventions has been a common sense of strategic purpose.

If the purpose of NATO during the Cold War was to defend Western Europe from the Red Army, what is its purpose now? Is it to fight Russia? If so, why has it been so ineffective in combatting Russian aggression? Why is Germany Russia’s largest export market? Why is Europe Russia’s largest export market for its oil products?

In 1949 Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, famously said that the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out [of Western Europe], the Americans in [Western Europe] and the Germans down.”

Today it is fairly apparent that the Europeans view the alliance differently. On the one hand, Europe is still interested in “keeping America in.”

But as Trump has noted repeatedly, what Europe wants most for the United States to do is to provide the financial and military resources to secure Europe from Russia and other external threats.

Beyond refusing to abide by their financial commitments to spend two percent of their GDP on their own defense, European nations use NATO as a means of vetoing or undermining U.S. freedom of action. This came across clearly in 2003, when NATO allies France, Germany, and Belgium refused to have NATO serve as the framework for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. They also refused Turkey’s request for consultations over a possible Iraqi attack against it.

Today, NATO members Britain, France, and Germany are working through the EU to undermine U.S. sanctions against Iran, in the interest of preserving the Iranian nuclear deal from 2015. As Trump noted when he announced U.S. abandonment of the Iran deal, far from preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the agreement gives Iran an open road to a nuclear arsenal. So today, key NATO allies are operating against the U.S on behalf of the Iranian regime in furtherance of its nuclear ambitions.

Then there is NATO ally Turkey.

Turkey, with its strategic location on Europe’s southeastern flank, was a vital member of the anti-Soviet alliance. But for the past decade or so, Turkey’s central achievement in NATO has been to block any chance of the alliance ever becoming reconfigured to combat and defeat the new common foe of all of its members except Turkey – radical Islam.

In 2009, Turkish leader Recep Erdogan nearly blocked then Dutch prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s bid to serve as NATO Secretary General. Erdogan opposed Rasmussen due to the latter’s firm defense of Denmark’s Jyllands Posten newspaper’s decision to publish cartoons of Mohammed in 2005. To appease Turkey, Rasmussen delivered a humiliating speech in Istanbul in 2009 where he proclaimed his personal opposition to the cartoons. Then-President Barack Obama sealed the deal by giving Turkey several senior positions in NATO.

Erdogan’s actions in 2009 neutralized NATO as an organization capable of fighting radical Islam. And as Erdogan has grown increasingly extreme in his support for jihadists and his open subversion of European governments, Turkey’s continued membership in NATO and its access as a NATO member to sensitive intelligence and weapons platforms has further hindered NATO’s cohesiveness and strategic rationale.

Under the circumstances that have developed since NATO helped win the Cold War, several things are clear.

First, NATO as it stands is incapable of developing a coherent strategic objective common to all of its members.

Second, NATO is a hindrance to U.S. strategic independence, shackling Washington to partners who do not share its interests or objectives, while requiring it to underwrite and secure their defense.

Finally, it is clear that NATO is incapable of shifting its mission to address current threats to U.S. security interests.

Today the U.S faces two main threats: China and radical Islam. Obviously, European nations have no capacity to play a significant role in containing or deterring China militarily. And as a military alliance, it is hard to see why NATO would be the tool of choice for developing common trade policies among allied nations to rein in China economically. Certainly NATO has been unable or unwilling to assist the U.S. in confronting the malign influence of North Korea, China’s most dangerous satellite.

As for radical Islam, due to Turkish membership in NATO, and due to European refusal to take any significant steps to rein in radical Islamic forces in Europe or anywhere else, it is abundantly clear that NATO is not the proper vehicle for U.S.-led collective defense against Iran or other jihadist powers.

To the extent that the U.S. seeks to work in the framework of a collective defense organization, it will need to look beyond NATO. It will require new alliance structures. Those can be informal, or transactional, or limited in scope, rather than formal and brittle, as NATO has been. But whether or not such alliances form, it is abundantly clear that scaling back NATO is a reasonable — indeed, a necessary — move.

As for President Trump, despite the bloviations of his critics, he bears no responsibility for NATO’s irrelevance. Trump did not cause NATO to have little role to play in fighting the key threats to American and global security. NATO has had nearly three decades to figure out how to do that. But it failed.

All that Trump has done is point out the reality of NATO’s decline — which his four predecessors refused to acknowledge.

 

 

Edited July 11, 2018 by slow