Ljudske posade u međuplanetarnim misijama - za i protiv

[porucnik vasic]

Dajte gde je taj spisak samoubica za mars da se prijavim :D Bez zezanja, vrlo malo stvari moze da me uzbudi ali odlazak na mars... Pa makar ziveo u garsonjeri od balata i gajio tartufe, neprocenjivo.Ovo koliko birokratija jede para u NASA i slicnim agencijama je rekao bih problem sto vec dugo niko nema od njih konkretna ocekivanja i zadatke za ispuniti. Zato verujem da ce se masinerija pokrenuti cim kinezi odluce da bi bilo kul naseliti neki drugi kosmicki objekat. Patkometrija je iz raja izasla ;)

Али ти везе немаш о стању финансирању фундаменталних истраживања у САД

[Shan Jan]

Pa podeli s nama to znanje.

[Roger Sanchez]

Pa podeli s nama to znanje.

nemoj, ako boga znaš, načet ćemo još jednu osobu iz šiirokog vasićevog kruga primarnih izvora za novu povijest svijeta..

[расејан]

Evo ga i onaj članak o pripremama kosmonauta

Свака част, мајсторе, одустао сам од филма који сам хтео да погледам... никако да престанем да читам :)

[bigvlada]

Hoćeš još? Kamanjinovi dnevnici:Summary of the diary of a principal source in Soviet space historyNikolai Petrovich Kamanin headed the Soviet cosmonaut corps from 1960 to 1971. His diaries are a key documentary source for the history of the Soviet space program. They remained secret during the life of the Soviet Union. The first volume was only published in 1995, thirteen years after Kamanin's death. They portray a man engaged in a constant struggle with an indifferent hierarchy for an expansion of air force military operations into space. He blamed Soviet loss of the space race after 1966 to the unwillingness of Soviet engineers to let the cosmonauts actively control their spacecraft (as was the American practice). A good Communist and a bit of a martinet, he was scathing in his critiques of the unfocussed Soviet leadership of the space program and especially the failings of Korolev's successor, Mishin. Despite some failings, Kamanin's diaries are the only accounts we have for many key events and the only contemporary account of the inside workings of the Soviet space programme. They convey marvelously the human vitality of the space race on the Soviet side. The periods spent out on the steppes in Kazakhstan for launches have all the atmosphere of a male-bonding camping trip. They work hard, all hours, but also party hard and spend Sundays on hunting or fishing expeditions. The stories are reminiscent of American accounts of the hard work and sheer pleasure of pioneering space from similar hardship posts -- from the swamps of Cape Canaveral to the deserts of New Mexico. This brief summary of the diaries includes key points relevant to space history that I have picked up in reading the diaries. The diaries span the period from 1960 to 1971, with occasional entries through 1978. I have omitted most private material related to Kamanin's family affairs and military career before 1960 as not being of interest to the space historian. Unfortunately for English readers, Kamanin's work remains only available in Russian.izvodi ovde: http://www.astronautix.com/articles/kamaries.htm

[bigvlada]

Čertokovi dnevnici:Summary of the memoirs of a principal source in Soviet space historyBoris Yevseyevich Chertok was a talented and pioneering guidance and control engineer, and a key member of Korolev's team from 1946 on. He was a Deputy Chief Designer 1956-1992 at Korolev's design bureau and its successors. He was an intimate witness to the key events of the space race on the Soviet side, and his memoirs are a major historical source for Soviet space history. What follows is a brief summary of passages from his memoirs, key points relevant to space history that I have picked up in reading the diaries. Most fascinating are Chertok's accounts of key meetings where decisions were made on the course of the Soviet program. These are extremely lively and seem to be taken from contemporary notes or even verbatim transcripts. These were rough-and-tumble sessions, where the Chief Designers were pressed to defend their projects. The diaries span the period from 1946 to 1991. Chertok's complete works remain available only in Russian and German. However NASA has begun a slick translation of all of the volumes - with, however, many unexplained deletions and additions from the original. The first volumes can be purchased or downloaded from NASA's official web site.ostatak ovde: http://www.astronautix.com/articles/chemoirs.htm

[bigvlada]

Kako i zašto je SSSR izgubio trku za MesecWhy did the Soviet Union lose the Moon Race? The reasons the Americans were first on the moon, as given by the major Soviet participants.Why didn't the Russians beat the Americans in the moon race? Reviewing the matter with hindsight, it might better be asked -- how did they expect to win? The matrix below shows the reasons as given by the main Russian observors of the project. These are:

• Vasiliy Mishin, the Project Manager for eight years after Korolev's death, fired in 1974
• Nikolai Kamanin, commander of the cosmonauts and diarist, dismissed in 1972
• Boris Chertok, design leader within Mishin's organization for guidance and control systems, who left extensive memoirs
• Chief Designer Korolev, who confided his concerns, to Chertok before his premature death
• The observations of key other decision-makers as recorded by Kamanin and Chertok.

The investigation team of a plane crash usually finds several causes, a chain of events and mistakes, one leading to the other, thence to the final disaster. It was the same thing with the failure of the Soviet lunar program. The table is followed by a commentary. Systemic Problems No proper organization structure to execute non-military space programmes. Mishin: Lack of coordination and agreement on a programme between Academy of Sciences, Ministries, Industry No recognised authority to order all involved organizations to cooperate. Mishin: Lack of organization/authority - 500 organizations in 28 departments had to produce equipment for N1, but only nine took orders from VPK Chertok: Without direction from above many factories refused to complete necessary components Lack of Soviet quality control. Kamanin: This can only point to widespread poor quality control in the factories. There is no discipline at these factories, and few qualified workers. The investigative commissions can cite specific reasons for each failure all they want, but as far as Kamanin is concerned, there is a general problem in the Soviet industrial system. Incorrect management and development practices. Afanasyev: Both the management and the development practices of the Soviet space programme were inferior to the Americans. Continued use of artillery development practices (many test flights instead of extensive ground test) complex systems outdated. Soviet Five-Year Plan structure - cannot change 'plan', no one wants to deliver bad news to leadership. Chertok: But who would want to be the bearer of such bad news? No one volunteered. Lack of Support for Project No consensus within leadership to support manned spaceflight, let alone mission to the moon. Mishin: Lack of comprehensive long-term space programme. Trying to 'beat Americans' instead of orderly program leading to earth orbit infrastucture and lunar base. Kamanin: No single direction, no disciplined execution when a decision is finally made Korolev: Ustinov and the military were not interested in lunar spaceflight Andrei Grechko: Categorically against manned space, though required to foot much of the bill. 'It was only due the political machinations of Ustinov that the Ministry of Defence even ended up paying for this'. Leading to: Started three years late. Mishin: Late start - leadership not interested after early successes, then asked to beat US to moon only in 1964 Insufficient funding, resources. Mishin: Lack of resources, Funds - one tenth funding of USA, Higher priorities for state and Mishin. Chertok: Mishin had to support other higher priority military programs -- the 7K-OK earth orbit version of the Soyuz, the 7K-L1 circumlunar version, the Molniya communications satellite, and the R-9 and RT-2 ICBM's. Pilyugin: Concentrating on the Temp mobile ICBM, Chelomei and Yangel ICBM projects more important. No funds for N1 first stage test stand, N11 flight tests, or other requested elements of development program. Mishin: Inability to test engine assemblies prior to launch without reassembling Chertok: For Block A first stage, only single engine tests could be undertaken at Kuznetsov's OKB-236. Korolev: Military refused to spend any funds to build a test stand at Tyuratam Ustinov: Ministry of Defence had not approved funds for development of engines which could be static tested prior to launch, or to build a test stand for the first stage, or for N11 rocket tests (the upper stages of the N1). Single launch decision, required by time and funding constraints, leading to… Korolev: leadership was only willing to fund N1 production at the rate of four per year, and Korolev concluded the only moon mission he could propose at such a rate was the single-shot lunar orbit rendezvous scheme selected by the Americans. N1 - changes made to achieve higher payload…. Korolev: N1 would have to be upgraded using the existing Lox/Kerosene propellants. No time for preferred course of developing Lox/LH2 upper stages. Kurushin, Commander of Baikonur: Mishin had made a large number of changes to the N1 to increase its payload. However these at the same time negatively impacted the booster's reliability …but N1 unable to achieve payload for single-launch lunar orbit rendezvous mission anyway. Chertok: The USA Apollo translunar injection payload was 45 tonnes. The nominal payload of the N1, for the same mission, which it could not really have achieved, was 30 tonnes. Korolev: Korolev knew from beginning N1 could not deliver payload needed to fullfill single-launch mission he sold to leadership. Glushko: the N1 could only carry air. The gross lift-off mass was about that of a Saturn V, but the stage dry masses were 2.5 x, 5 x, 3.5x greater. Korolev only sold lunar landing mission to leadership in order to get N1 built. Korolev: Korolev and later Mishin couldn't admit they had miscalculated the minimum payload mass needed -- that would result in the whole project being killed. They wanted to see the N1 built for a range of manned space projects to earth orbit, moon, and Mars. Decision to build N1 in Tyuratam. Korolev: Due to schedule constraints, decision only brute force approach would work: to build an enormous factory, launch complex, and city in the remote desert of Kazakhstan Personal Incompetence Poor leadership in government. Mishin: 'Stagnation' in leadership - superficial and contradictory orders from leadership…'Korolev too could have lost his job'. Kamanin: No qualified Soviet government leadership in space research. Ustinov and Smirnov operate without rhyme or reason or plan. Chertok: The entire record of the leadership was one of hundreds of failed decisions. Lack of Korolev's leadership. Mishin: Death of Korolev - 'proverbial drive, determination, and prestige' could have pulled project off. Chertok: N1 would have been successful if Korolev had not died prematurely. He would have had authority to not test until ready, and to change engine vendors if needed. Mishin's incompetence. Kamanin: Mishin appointment huge mistake. Cannot cope with the huge number of projects assigned. He is coarse, rude, doesn't listen to critics. Weakness in sticking to unrealistic schedules of leadership. Lack of discipline of staff, can't work with other bureaux. Chertok: Mishin unable to cope with such development work. 'Khrushchev's project' Korolev: Only support Korolev had in the government at the time the moon project was approved was from Khrushchev Chertok: Khrushchev, it seemed, was to blame for such enormous unaffordable projects. This in turn put Ustinov in danger, as Khrushchev's point man for space. ..leading to Brezhnev's lack of interest. Korolev: Brezhnev, a Ukrainian, backed Yangel, since it would put work into the Ukraine. Mercurial support from Keldysh, Head of the Academy of Sciences. Korolev: Keldysh, the 'eminence grise' -- supported Yangel for ICBM's, Chelomei for the UR-500/LK-1 manned flyby, and Korolev for the N1/L3 lunar lander. Keldysh was preoccupied with the Sakharov issue and was working with Suslov to get Sakharov expelled from the Academy of Sciences. Perpetual conflict within leadership and between Chief Designers. Chertok: Glushko and Ustinov waged a perpetual struggle against Afanasyev, Keldysh, and Mishin. Glushko responsible for convincing Keldysh, and then Ustinov, to cancel N1-L3. Korolev: Yangel had the backing of Brezhnev, a Ukrainian, since it would put work into the Ukraine. Korolev viewed Chelomei as a 'Fifth Column', working through his employee, Khrushchev's son, to undermine and hinder everything Korolev was trying to do. Technical Approach Propellant controversy: use of Lox/Kerosene propellants. Kamanin: Korolev and Mishin's rejection of Glushko's engines, and the leadership's rejection of the UR-700 as an alternative Glushko: I opposed these propellants in the 1960's because the required schedule and technology resulted in too many independent Lox/Kerosene engines in the N1 design. By 1974 there were many years of development, and the technology was in place to proceed with development of the RD-170. ….leading to use of Kuznetsov engines. Chertok: In Glushko 1961 offered - if Korolev would use the 'packet' scheme for the N1 as on the R-7, Glushko would develop needed 600 tf engines. Korolev rejected after consulting Mishin. Led to use of Kuznetsov engines - but Kuznetsov was a turbine engine designer with no experience in rocket technology. Glushko: Kuznetsov engines for the N1 were rotten N1 - 'inherently flawed design?' Kamanin: N1 may one day fly, but it can never be a reliable booster due to the inherent design flaws Glushko: There was a fundamental error in gas dynamics in the design of the N1. Over-automated approach to spacecraft design. Kamanin: Korolev, Keldysh, Mishin, and Feoktistov are all dedicated to automated spacecraft - 'over-automation' Decision to abandon Vostok early, leading to push for early Soyuz flights. Kamanin: Ustinov and Smirnov's cancellation of the 18 day Voskhod 3 mission, even though the crews had been trained, and the associated pressure on development of Soyuz. This resulted in Soyuz being flown before it was mature, resulting in the death of Komarov and Not to mention Exhaustion due to limited staff resources, demoralization due to failures. Mishin: Exhaustion, demoralization due to setbacks Kamanin: Death of Korolev and Gagarin both badly affected morale Chertok: Engineers at TsKBEM were tired, burned out, and dispirited. Bad Luck Mishin: Bad luck - N1 was being debugged flight-by-flight, would have got there Failure of Vasiliy Kharchev and Chertok to capture Wernher Von Braun. Tyulin: "this is all Chertok's fault. In 1945 he should have stolen Von Braun from the Americans". "True", Chertok replied, "my adventure with Vasiliy Kharchev didn't turn out too well". This is quite a list, and all the points are valid. Each actor has his own prejudices -- naturally the engineers don't see anything wrong with their design approach or development practices. But in my opinion, although all of these factors played a part, the overriding factor was very simple: they started too late. IF the leadership had taken seriously Kennedy's challenge in 1961, and given Korolev the go-ahead to build his original N1 according to his original plan, and IF Korolev had the full backing of the Soviet state, then it would have been quite possible to beat the Americans to the moon. He might have even seen the first flight of the booster before his untimely death. Instead, the limited schedule and budget led to the following fault-tree: Many of the other issues listed pointed to fundamental problems revealed by the N1 failure. At the very top level were the fundamental systemic problems. These prevented the Soviet Union from successfully completing a number of major projects begun in the 1960's. These included virtually every large-scale aerospace project attempted: the moon program, the supersonic transport, the new generation of military aircraft, and development of digital avionics. The rather personal style of Soviet project management, which depended on the force of personality of the Chief Designer, became inappropriate. Aerospace projects had grown to such a scale that no single organization could do everything and no one person could be watching everything. These problems were recognised by the Soviet leadership, and led in the late 1970's to a drastic revisions in the structure of the Soviet industry, and the implementation of American-style project management and quality assurance techniques. These were learned in part through the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which gave the Soviets unprecedented access to the nuts and bolts of American technology and management styles. At the next level was the total lack of support for manned space projects by the Soviet military, who at the same time were required to provide the bulk of the funding. A similar antipathy existed within the American military. (one result was that no American military manned space project, except a few military shuttle flights, ever reached flight status). In the Soviet Union, the rocketry industry had an absolute priority to beat the US in the missile race. This was seen as a matter of national survival, and the civilian space program always took a back seat to the ICBM programs. Therefore even though the moon project was authorised by the VPK Military-Industrial Commission, many ministries and factories not reporting to the VPK simply refused to deliver the equipment required. This led to work-arounds and delays.Na kraju je Kuznjecov, koji je prvenstveno bio dizajner mlaznih motora, usavršio revolucionarni NK-33, motor zatvorenog ciklusa. Njegov praunuk, moćni RD-180 se danas ugrađuje i u američke rakete.

Edited February 28, 2011 by bigvlada

[bigvlada]

I ključni sastanci na kojima su donošene odluke koje će ih na kraju upropastiti:Key Meetings in Soviet Spaceflight The key meetings, the main decisions that led to the Soviet loss of the moon race and shuttle race.Here are summaries of the key meetings where the decisions were made that set the course of the Soviet Union in the space race. These summaries demonstrate the clash of engineers and managers working within the system they dubbed 'space feudalism'. The chief designers would agree to impossible schedules, often based on political anniversaries, in order to get a project approved. But getting a go-ahead was only the beginning. The engineers had to rely on their network of friends and supporters within government and industry to actually implement the projects. Soviet aerospace projects were incredibly chaotic compared to those in America, with their clear-cut management, funding, planning, and monitoring systems. The reality was very far from the top-down monolith NASA believed it was facing in the space race. The context for these meetings is as follows: In early 1961 America announced the Apollo programme to put a man on the moon by 1970. The Soviet response was hesitant. Chief Designers Chelomei and Korolev managed to get a go-ahead in 1962 from Khrushchev to start design activities for launch vehicles that could support manned lunar flyby and lunar landing projects But the original rationale for these UR-500 and N1 boosters was purely military. It was not until 1964 that the chief designers managed to get backing to start development and construction of the lunar spacecraft, booster hardware, and launch facilities. Even then Korolev was told to limit the number of N1 superboosters built. This forced him to propose a single-launch lunar orbit rendezvous mission profile. But Korolev knew from the beginning that the single launch mission was not technically possible with the N1 booster. His objective was to get the booster and spacecraft built at all costs. He figured he could break the bad news later, and then convince the leadership to provide more resources. Just after the lunar decision Khrushchev was ousted from power and Chelomei lost his main patron. Chelomei's circumlunar spacecraft was cancelled and Korolev took over the project. It would now be achieved using Chelomei's booster but Korolev's L1 spacecraft. In January 1966 Korolev died unexpectedly. After months of argument within the leadership his deputy, Mishin, was placed in charge of the L1 and L3 lunar programmes. The L1 circumlunar programme foundered in a horrendous series of failures of both Chelomei's booster and Korolev's spacecraft in 1967-1968. At the end of 1968 Apollo 8 entered lunar orbit, and it was clear to the Soviets, that barring an Apollo disaster, the moon race was lost. The N1 was just being prepared for its first launch, years behind schedule. Keldysh, head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had conceived a back-up plan in 1968 for the Lavochkin bureau to develop an automated lunar soil-return robot. This was based on the Ye-8 lunar rover lander already in development to support the N1-L3. These could be flown alone or in parallel with whatever manned lunar orbital missions might be flown in 1969. The claim could be made that the Soviet Union was never in the moon race, that they wouldn't jeopardise the lives of their cosmonauts like the Americans. However these robot probes relied on the same Chelomei booster that had so many failures on the L1 program. Launch after launch was made in 1969 in attempts to steal Apollo's thunder. The final cliff-hanger came while the Apollo 11 crew rested in their lunar module at Tranquillity Base. The Luna 15 soil-return spacecraft crashed as it attempted to soft land on the surface, ending the last chance to beat the Americans. The Ye-8 and Lunokhod robot rovers were finally flown successfully from late 1969 to 1970. The Western media accepted the party line that the Soviet Union had never been in the moon race. The post-Apollo American project was the Skylab space station. Dissenters within the bureau of Mishin and Chelomei created the 'DOS Conspiracy' - a plan for the two bureaux to co-operate and conduct a crash program to build the Salyut space station before the American Skylab. This ultimately succeeded, but triumph turned to despair when the first crew to the station died - their capsule depressurised on the way back to earth. Meanwhile the Soviet manned lunar programme continued to play out, through two more N1 launch failures. It was on the brink of finally launching a reliable booster, leading to a Soviet lunar base in the late 1970's, when it was cancelled in 1974. The Soviet Union instead embarked on the enormous Energia-Buran project, an attempt to copy and improve on the US space shuttle. Both space powers abandoned useful heavy launch systems in-being for the chimera of a more advanced, supposedly less costly system. The decisions in both countries led their manned space programmes to withdraw to low earth orbit, never to leave again. The era of manned space exploration was ended.http://www.astronautix.com/articles/keylight.htmStvarno tužno, od 1972 ljudi nisu napuštali nisku orbitu, ekvivalent bi bio da niko iz Beograda ne ide dalje od Niša. I to zbog fucking satla i burana.

[bigvlada]

Kako je nastajala međunarodna svemirska stanica. btw. uskoro će se desiti jedinstven momenat - u istom trenutku će biti prikačeni dva sojuza, progres, ATV, HTV i šatl - bukvalno svaki tip letelice koji se ikada kačio na ISS.Izvinjavam se ali morao sam ovako - forumski softver ne prihvata swf ili pdf fajlove. Preimenujte ekstenziju na *.swf - u pitanju je flash animacija gradnje ISS-a

ISS flash.pdf

Edited March 5, 2011 by bigvlada

[Roger Sanchez]

The oldest and most traveled space shuttle, Discovery, glided back to Earth on Wednesday after its final space flight before ending its days as a museum piece to delight the crowds.NASA's oldest shuttle touched down on a mostly clear day at noon at its home base in Cape Canaveral, Fla."To the ship that has led the way time and time again, we say, 'Farewell Discovery,'" radioed the Mission Control commentator.

[расејан]

Један симпатичан детаљ - позивни за источну страну Орланда и остатак тог краја до обале, тј до рта Канаверал је... 321. Тј 3...2...1...

[bigvlada]

specijalno za Rodžera i njegovu robofiliju. NASA's humanoid Robonaut to be unpacked this monthBY STEPHEN CLARKSPACEFLIGHT NOWPosted: March 6, 2011 A humanoid robot delivered to the space station by the shuttle Discovery should come out of its packing crate by the end of March, and ground crews could start tinkering with the Robonaut soon after, according to NASA officials. Robonaut 2 demonstrates its skills on Earth. Credit: NASA Space station officials hope to unpack Robonaut 2 later this month, but it could be months before NASA trusts the robot to help astronauts do chores on the complex. Astronauts moved the robot Wednesday from the space station's new Permanent Multipurpose Module to the Destiny laboratory, where the crew expects to take the Robonaut out of its packaging and set it up on the lab's sidewall. The dextrous robot, also called R2, includes a computerized torso, head and two arms with hands and five fingers. It is designed to accomplish many of the same upkeep tasks astronauts do every day aboard the space station. It doesn't have legs yet, but officials hope to launch a lower body and upgraded computers in the next few years. "The idea was that robot would be doing that work side-by-side with astronauts," said Rob Ambrose, chief of the automation, simulation and robotics division at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. The $2.5 million Robonaut could pave the way for humanoid robots to assist spacewalking astronauts, do housekeeping chores and be caretakers in the absence of humans. R2 itself could be ordered to clean handrails and air filters, and NASA officials say it may even be positioned outside the station in several years. But NASA wants to take it slow with R2 at first, and it could be a while before the robot is crawling around the space station. "We'll have it set up and then there's a relatively extensive checkout period that we have to do on Robonaut, and then we'll incrementally increase the number of tasks that it does," said Royce Renfrew, the lead space station flight director during Discovery's mission. Discovery will undock Monday and return to Earth Wednesday, then the space station crew plans to unlimber the outpost's Canadian robotic arm Thursday to move Japan's HTV cargo craft from one berthing port to another. The HTV was temporarily relocated to the Harmony module's zenith, or space-facing, port last month to make room for Discovery's visit. The ship will spend the rest of its time at the station on Harmony's Earth-facing port. R2 was packed inside the Leonardo module for launch last fall. It arrived at the Kennedy Space Center last summer. Credit: Stephen Clark/Spaceflight Now Managers want the station astronauts to remove R2 from its carrying crate before the HTV cargo logistics freighter is scheduled to leave the complex March 28. Renfrew said Robonaut's protective packing foam needs to be stowed inside the the HTV to get rid of it. Once it leaves the space station, the Japanese spacecraft will be commanded to fall back to Earth and burn up during re-entry, disposing of the lab's garbage. Mission controllers in Houston could start checking R2's health and putting the robot through a test program later this spring. "I can't forecast how long that will go on before you ever actually see Robonaut move," Renfrew said. "We'll spend a lot of time checking out the system and seeing how it behaves after the forces that we put on it during the launch." R2 was shipped to the space station with a board of simulated switches, latches and triggers to practice for jobs it might be called upon to do in the coming months and years. "We have a similar system here on the ground," Ambrose said before launch. "We will, of course, try everything first on a ground robot. But the questions remain as to how the robot will work in zero gravity. Will all those interfaces work the same when there's no gravity load on the robot?" Developed in partnership with General Motors, Robonaut 2 builds upon more than a decade of NASA experimentation and testing with humanoid robot concepts. Two first-generation Robonauts passed a series of analogue tests on Earth, and an identical R2 robot served as a pathfinder for R2B, the device shipped to the station aboard Discovery. Ambrose said R2 is covered with thousands of sensors, a camera in its head and control electronics in its torso. "The robot itself is very sensate," Ambrose said. "It's sensing forces. It's reacting to forces. It reaches out and grabs objects, and it feels when it grabs them. All of that is automatic." It doesn't use a battery and needs to be plugged in to the station's electrical supply when it is turned on. R2's backpack is a power adapter. Another Robonaut waved goodbye to R2 as space shuttle Discovery blasted off Feb. 24. Credit: Joe Bibby/NASA General Motors foresees Robonaut technology making its way to the factory floor in its automobile plants. "GM engineers are also studying how the technology embedded within R2 can be put to use within manufacturing facilities to help create a safer working environment," said Marty Linn, principal robotics engineer at GM. "The dexterity and endurance of R2 can be used alongside people to help reduce repetitive stress injuries and the R2 sensing capabilities can be used in collision avoidance systems." In a phone call with the shuttle and station crews Thursday, President Barack Obama traded jokes with the astronauts about R2's duties. "I understand that you guys have a new crew member, this R2 robot," Obama said. "I don't know if you guys are putting R2 to work, but he's gotten a lot of attention. And that helps inspire some young people when it comes to science and technology. Are you guys making him do chores up there, washing the dishes or something, or does he have more exciting jobs?" "He's still in packing foam, so we hope to get him out shortly," replied Steve Lindsey, Discovery's commander. "It's going to be fun see how he works." "He's still in packing foam," Obama said. "That's a shame, man. Come on guys, unpack the guy. He flew all that way and you guys aren't unpacking him?" "The poor guy has been locked in that foam for about four months now," Lindsey said. "Every once in a while, we hear some scratching sounds from inside and maybe 'Let me out, let me out' but we're not sure." Renfrew said the crews have just been too busy with transferring cargo, spacewalks and other tasks to unpack Robonaut so far. When the crew gets to extricating the robot, they will set up Robonaut on a fixed pedestal and turn it on, and then ground teams will start their testing. The astronauts will also be able to command R2. "The robot will first demonstrate its ability to do tasks with its hands in zero-g," Ambrose said. "For us, that will be mission success. But for the robot to really be useful, it will have to be mobile, so it can go around and do work."http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts133/110306robonaut/

[Roger Sanchez]

To je to. Tko bi plakao da on zagine?

Edited March 10, 2011 by Roger Sanchez

[расејан]

To je to. Tko bi plakao da on zagine?

Осигуравач?

[bigvlada]

Vidi, ja potpuno mogu da zamislim scenario gde će jedna osoba kontrolisati par stotina potomaka ovoga dok oni grade recimo solarnu centralu, ili bazu na Marsu, pre nego što dođe veći broj ljudi. Ali oni sami nikada neće raditi sve. To je i glavni problem sa robotskim misijama. Nešto što čovek može da popravi u kratkom vremenskom roku (pa čak i takve stvari kao pominjano čišćenje solarnih panela metlom) robot često ne ume pa zato ugrađuju četvorostruke komande i back up sisteme što drastično povećava cenu misija. Da imaju operatera na licu mesta, roveri bi bili mnogo jeftiniji jer bi postojao neko ko na njima obavlja redovan servis. Uostalom, pogledaj ovo : blizu pet milijardi dolara za robotsku misiju. A svaka prekorači budžet i probije rokove. http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1103/08decadal/