(Neo)Liberalizam

[MayDay]

Cini mi se da si sama odgovorila u cemu je problem, plus "rent seeking" vazi u smislu da je finansijski sektor zasticen implicitnom drzavnogm garancijom (bailout), sto ohrabruje moral-hazard.

na teoretskom planu, finansijski sektor bi trebalo da internalizuje i ogranicenje s kojim se drzava kao garant suocava.npr, ako pogledas irsku, onog trenutka kad je vlada najavila da ce pruziti garancije za banke sovereign credit spread se priblizio credit spreadu privatnog bankarskog sektora, a to znaci da ce dinamicki gledano za drzavu biti sve skuplje da u buducnosti obezbedjuje novac za potencijalni bailout. ne mozes ocekivati da ces prikupiti dovoljno poreza ako ce sovereign dug biti sve skuplji. ako je vec tako, onda bi i moral hazard trebalo da bude ublazen zato sto preuzimanjem velikih rizika danas i iskamcivanjem bailouta danas izazivas negativne efekte na mogucnost za bailout sutra, a i posledicni veci porezi kontrahuju privatni sektor, obaraju vrednost kolaterala, itd...naravno, to sve ako menadzment u finansijskom sektoru ima dug horizont. ako im je plan da nabrzaka zarade, onda jebes ga..treba uskoro da izadje rad virala acharye o sovereign debt implikacijama cele krize i preporucujem ti ga jer je i model jednostavan, a i ima odlican pregled cinjenica.-----------------Sto se tice boldovanog dela, zamisli equity long-short hedge fond. Da bi radio stock-picking na tom nivou (sa tolikim investment flows) moras da imas jak interni analyst coverage i pracenje tih kompanija generalno. Hocu reci, takav fond sigurno ima bolje informacije o fundamentals te firme nego tamo neki retail investor ili closet index fond. Ako je firma dobra i ima blistavu buducnost, fond ce da grune lovu u nju i da joj poveca cenu i obori cost of capital. Suprotno vazi ako je firma govno. Edited February 4, 2011 by MayDay

[Budja]

na teoretskom planu, finansijski sektor bi trebalo da internalizuje i ogranicenje s kojim se drzava kao garant suocava.npr, ako pogledas irsku, onog trenutka kad je vlada najavila da ce pruziti garancije za banke sovereign credit spread se priblizio credit spreadu privatnog bankarskog sektora, a to znaci da ce dinamicki gledano za drzavu biti sve skuplje da u buducnosti obezbedjuje novac za potencijalni bailout. ne mozes ocekivati da ces prikupiti dovoljno poreza ako ce sovereign dug biti sve skuplji. ako je vec tako, onda bi i moral hazard trebalo da bude ublazen zato sto preuzimanjem velikih rizika danas i iskamcivanjem bailouta danas izazivas negativne efekte na mogucnost za bailout sutra, a i posledicni veci porezi kontrahuju privatni sektor, obaraju vrednost kolaterala, itd...naravno, to sve ako menadzment u finansijskom sektoru ima dug horizont. ako im je plan da nabrzaka zarade, onda jebes ga..treba uskoro da izadje rad virala acharye o sovereign debt implikacijama cele krize i preporucujem ti ga jer je i model jednostavan, a i ima odlican pregled cinjenica.-----------------Sto se tice boldovanog dela, zamisli equity long-short hedge fond. Da bi radio stock-picking na tom nivou (sa tolikim investment flows) moras da imas jak interni analyst coverage i pracenje tih kompanija generalno. Hocu reci, takav fond sigurno ima bolje informacije o fundamentals te firme nego tamo neki retail investor ili closet index fond. Ako je firma dobra i ima blistavu buducnost, fond ce da grune lovu u nju i da joj poveca cenu i obori cost of capital. Suprotno vazi ako je firma govno.

Oko kratkog i dugog roka i incentives si sama odgovorila. Drugo, SAD nisu Irska, tako da su rezerve za buduci bailout prilicne. Trece, sto announcement efekta oko Vlade Irske tice, nisam siguran da li je to pre ili posle EU podrske.Hedge-fund, ok, u okviru fuknkcije hedge fondova za povecanje efficiency. U tom smislu je itneresentatno da neortodoskni, behvaioural ekonomisti, koju su inace sklonij intervenciji, podrzavaju short-selling kao mehanizam da se sprece baloni dok se drzave ubise od hajke na hedge fondove i short-selling.Da, model... Ipak sam ja racunovodja, ne mogu ja sa matematikom, cak i jednostavnim modelom, da se izborim. Edited February 4, 2011 by Budja

[Anduril]

Mislim da nije problem samo u bejloutima nego je problem mnogo dublje. Kombinacija papirnog novca, centralnih banaka pod sve jacim uticajem vlasti i fractional reserve banking gde banke prakticno imaju monopol na stvaranje novca je na duzi rok ubitacna za ostatak ekonomskog sistema. Takodje, koliko mi je poznato, mnogi hedz-fondovi su delimicno ili u potpunosti u vlasnistvu banaka pa se ceo taj sistem moze i tesko zamisliti odvojeno. Mislim da je tu zbog relativno kratkorocnog politickog interesa nastala citava industrija koja na duzi rok pije krv svima.

[MayDay]

Oko kratkog i dugog roka i incentives si sama odgovorila. Drugo, SAD nisu Irska, tako da su rezerve za buduci bailout prilicne. Trece, sto announcement efekta oko Vlade Irske tice, nisam siguran da li je to pre ili posle EU podrske.

SAD ima 90% GDP-a javnog duga ali samo on sheet. Sta cemo sa pokrivanjem obaveza Freddie Mac i Fannie Mae, zatim time sto bi federalna vlada morala da uskoci ako drzava Kalifornija ne bude mogla da ubaci dovoljno para u CalPers, da ne nabrajam sad sva osiguranja kojih se SAD prihvatila. Cini mi se da su sve zapadne drzave izdale malo previse put opcija u odnosu na ono sto mogu da podnesu.Inace, EU podrska Irskoj moze samo da jointly spusti spred i Irskoj kao drzavi i bankama, ali primarni efekat je da onog trenutka kada najavis garanciju nekome sa visokim spredom tvoj spred takodje mora da ide gore, a koliko to vec zavisi od visine obaveza koje ima onaj za koga garantujes.Za Rajku i komentar da je bankarski sektor najregulisaniji prilazem jedan insightful rad od meni veoma dragog Tobija Ejdrijena. O shadow bankingu i implikacijama za regulaciju.http://newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf

[Gandalf]

e, sada, moze se reci da je problem sto su za menadzera rizici asimetricno rasporedjeni, tj. moze da zaradi neograniceno mnogo, ili da izgubi novac investitora i nikom nista.

sto kazu Ameri, "heads, I win. tails, you lose."nije to ni tako lose. jedna od namena finansijskog sektora je da uzme novac od budala i preraspodeli pametnima.

[Gandalf]

Mislim da treba da ignorises ovaj pooll gore, mislim da to niko ne uzima stvarno ozbiljno.

jos jednom: pitanje je ko najbolje opisuje stvarnost. tu je Marks za duzinu ispred svih ostalih.to ne znaci da su njegove preporuke i vizija buducnosti dobre, vec se odnosi samo i iskljucivo na opis realnosti kakva jeste. ne kakva bi mogla ili trebala da bude.

[Indy]

Bogme, kad citam Hayeka, sve je tacno kako on pise, kao da skida koprenu s ociju. Verovatno su i jedan i drugi znacajni na svoj nacin. (Interesantno je da mislim mnogo bolje i o Hayeku i Marksu nego o njihovim sledbenicima).

[Gandalf]

kad citam Hayeka, sve je tacno kako on pise. Verovatno su i jedan i drugi znacajni na svoj nacin. (Interesantno je da mislim mnogo bolje i o Hayeku i Marksu nego o njihovim sledbenicima).

+1 :D Edited February 7, 2011 by Gandalf

[Zabalujev]

Lako je teoretisati, zato svi vole ucitelje, a ne ucenike

[Indy]

They work for usIn democracies the elites serve the masses

Bila je sad debata na Economistu na ovu temu. Ne mogu se oteti utisku da je nekako lepse biti bogat i zdrav nego siromasan i bolestan, te da iz tog ugla gledano, svet izgleda savrseno pravedan. + short-term gledano, svaka transakcija ima smisla ("danas cu da te servisiram, sutra cu da te ubijem... dakle, cinim ti uslugu".) Ili ono o hranjenju curke 1000 dana. Svaki dan dobija lep obrok, servisirana je. Sve dok je se ne zavrne sija.

Voluntary transactions benefit both parties. If they did not, they would not happen. In a free market, everyone serves those they deal with. Anyone who gets rich must have done others a lot of service.

From the 1970s onwards the Western elite have retreated from the notion of progress. Although they pay lip service to economic and social advance they have become strikingly ambivalent in practice.

Bill Gates is indeed extremely rich. So is the owner of IKEA, as are the most successful actors, musicians, sportspersons and writers. But they have become rich by doing things that have made the lives of others easier or more pleasant. This assertion may appear to be of limited merit if one happens to be engaged in the thankless task of putting an IKEA wardrobe together. [Or facing the Windows Blue Screen of Death, NB Indy] But we buy these things, so we must value them.

Ili ih kupujemo zato sto ih vrednujemo, ili zato sto smo suckeri. Obe mogucnosti mi izgledaju jednako verovatne.

[Indy]

[hazard]

Drzavni kapitalizam novi trend? Mogu li se drzavne firme ponasati kao privatne, i ostati u drzavnom vlasnistvu, dugorocno?http://www.economist.com/node/21543160

Emerging-market multinationalsThe rise of state capitalismThe spread of a new sort of business in the emerging world will cause increasing problemsJan 21st 2012 | from the print editionOVER the past 15 years striking corporate headquarters have transformed the great cities of the emerging world. China Central Television’s building resembles a giant alien marching across Beijing’s skyline; the 88-storey Petronas Towers, home to Malaysia’s oil company, soar above Kuala Lumpur; the gleaming office of VTB, a banking powerhouse, sits at the heart of Moscow’s new financial district. These are all monuments to the rise of a new kind of hybrid corporation, backed by the state but behaving like a private-sector multinational.State-directed capitalism is not a new idea: witness the East India Company. But as our special report this week points out, it has undergone a dramatic revival. In the 1990s most state-owned companies were little more than government departments in emerging markets; the assumption was that, as the economy matured, the government would close or privatise them. Yet they show no signs of relinquishing the commanding heights, whether in major industries (the world’s ten biggest oil-and-gas firms, measured by reserves, are all state-owned) or major markets (state-backed companies account for 80% of the value of China’s stockmarket and 62% of Russia’s). And they are on the offensive. Look at almost any new industry and a giant is emerging: China Mobile, for example, has 600m customers. State-backed firms accounted for a third of the emerging world’s foreign direct investment in 2003-10.With the West in a funk and emerging markets flourishing, the Chinese no longer see state-directed firms as a way-station on the road to liberal capitalism; rather, they see it as a sustainable model. They think they have redesigned capitalism to make it work better, and a growing number of emerging-world leaders agree with them. The Brazilian government, which embraced privatisation in the 1990s, is now interfering with the likes of Vale and Petrobras, and compelling smaller companies to merge to form national champions. South Africa is also flirting with the model.This development raises two questions. How successful is the model? And what are its consequences—both in, and beyond, emerging markets?The law of diminishing returnsState capitalism’s supporters argue that it can provide stability as well as growth. Russia’s wild privatisation under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s alarmed many emerging countries and encouraged the view that governments can mitigate the strains that capitalism and globalisation cause by providing not just the hard infrastructure of roads and bridges but also the soft infrastructure of flagship corporations.So Lee Kuan Yew’s government in Singapore, an early exponent of this idea, let in foreign firms and embraced Western management ideas, but also owned chunks of companies. The leading practitioner is now China. The tight connection between its government and business will no doubt be on display when the global elite gathers in the Swiss resort of Davos next week. Among Westerners there, government delegates often take the opposite view to those from the private sector: Chinese delegates from both sides tend to have the same point of view, and even the same patriotic talking-points.The new model bears little resemblance to the disastrous spate of nationalisations in Britain and elsewhere half a century ago. China’s infrastructure companies win contracts the world over. The best national champions are outward-looking, acquiring skills by listing on foreign exchanges and taking over foreign companies. And governments are selective in their corporate holdings. Overall, the Chinese state has loosened its grip on the economy: its bureaucrats concentrate on industries where they can make a difference.Let a thousand mobiles bloomYet a close look at the model shows its weaknesses. When the government favours one lot of companies, the others suffer. In 2009 China Mobile and another state giant, China National Petroleum Corporation, made profits of $33 billion—more than China’s 500 most profitable private companies combined. State giants soak up capital and talent that might have been used better by private companies. Studies show that state companies use capital less efficiently than private ones, and grow more slowly. In many countries the coddled state giants are pouring money into fancy towers at a time when entrepreneurs are struggling to raise capital.Those costs are likely to rise. State companies are good at copying others, partly because they can use the government’s clout to get hold of their technology; but as they have to produce ideas of their own they will become less competitive. State-owned companies make a few big bets rather than lots of small ones; the world’s great centres of innovation are usually networks of small start-ups.Nor does the model guarantee stability. State capitalism works well only when directed by a competent state. Many Asian countries have a strong mandarin culture; South Africa and Brazil do not. Coal India is hardly an advertisement for efficiency (see article). And everywhere state capitalism favours well-connected insiders over innovative outsiders. In China highly educated princelings have taken the spoils. In Russia a clique of “bureaugarchs”, often former KGB officials, dominate both the Kremlin and business. Thus the model produces cronyism, inequality and eventually discontent—as the Mubaraks’ brand of state capitalism did in Egypt.Rising powers have always used the state to kick-start growth: think of Japan and South Korea in the 1950s or Germany in the 1870s or even the United States after the war of independence. But these countries have, over time, invariably found that the system has limits. The Chinese of all people should understand that the best way to learn from history is to look at its long sweep.But it may take many years for the model’s weaknesses to become obvious; and, in the meantime, it is likely to cause all sorts of problems. Investors in emerging markets, for instance, need to watch out. Some may be taking a punt on governments as much as companies. State-capitalist governments can be capricious, with scant regard for minority shareholders. Others may find their subsidiaries or joint ventures in emerging markets pitted against state-backed favourites.Another concern is the impact of the model on the global trading system—which, at a time when the likely Republican nominee for president wants to declare China a currency manipulator on his first day of office, is already at risk. Ensuring that trade is fair is harder when some companies enjoy the support, overt or covert, of a national government. Western politicians are beginning to lose patience with state-capitalist powers that rig the system in favour of their own companies.For emerging countries wanting to make their mark on the world, state capitalism has an obvious appeal. It gives them the clout that private-sector companies would take years to build. But its dangers outweigh its advantages. Both for their own sake, and in the interests of world trade, the practitioners of state capitalism need to start unwinding their huge holdings in favoured companies and handing them over to private investors. If these companies are as good as they boast they are, then they no longer need the crutch of state support.

[Indy]

Rekao bih da je ideologija ono što imate kada ne možete da date dokaz za stav koji zauzimate. To je tvrdnja koja proizlazi iz verovanja, a ne pukih činjenica. To je zaklon za one koji znaju u dubini duše da ne mogu pobediti u fer debati.Neideološke tvrdnje su one koje su poduprte faktima i logikom, i koje prihvata velika većina informisanih pojedinaca u datoj oblasti. Nasuprot tome, ideološke tvrdnje su stavovi bazirani na verovanju, na "osećaju" da su ispravne kod ljudi koji ih zauzimaju, a njihovo ponavljanje obezbeđuje utešni osećaj sigurnosti, premda su to u osnovi iluzije. One daju utehu ne uklanjajući sumnju, već gurajući je pod tepih.Evo nekih primera neideoloških stavova: zemlja se okreće oko sunca; to je sferoidni objekt sa određenom površinom i resursima na njoj; njen klimat je u osnovi zavisan od sastava gasova u atmosferi; sve vrste koje žive na zemlji, uključujući i ljude, zavise od zdravih ekosistema da bi preživele.A evo nekih primera ideoloških stavova: tržišta će uvek rasporediti resurse efikasnije i pravednije nego drugi mehanizmi; što su tržišta manje regulisana, to će bolje funkcionisati; ako državni aparat obezbeđuje dobra ili usluge, to će uvek biti inferiorno u odnosu na privatni sektor; ako je državna uprava manja, ona je bolja; rast može da se nastavi zauvek u svetu koji ima granice.

"Greens are the least ideological party in Australian politics", Chris Dickinson, ABC The Drum

[hazard]

Economist debata, sa pomalo zacudjujucim stavom "domacina":

State capitalismThis house believes that state capitalism is a viable alternative to liberal capitalism

http://www.economist.com/debate/debates/overview/221

[Indy]

Koliko vidim na brzinu, opet je glavna debata oko definicije šta je šta (kao što je bio slučaj i u onoj debati o free/fair trade koju sam ranije linkovao).