Svetska Kriza 2008-....

[Hella]

antidemokratski šabani su ovde opanjkavali posao veka s fiatom a sad vidimo da je to tako svugde u svetu

Edited March 18, 2016 by Hella

[Tribun_Populi]

Erm, i zato će, kad naši konačno dođu, biti zajebano za sve.

 

 

Millennials – people between 20 and 35 also known as Generation Y – have been advised to stay in education and work hard to secure a fulfilling job, which in turn will lead to homes, families and happy lives. But when many of them have gone on to graduate they have found there simply aren’t enough jobs to go around. Young adults have found themselves unemployed and burdened with huge student debts. And the future looks dreary.

The psychological burden of not living up to expectations can be heavy, yet people feel reticent about sharing their concerns and failures out of shame, guilt, and a worry that others won’t relate.

The Series

 

 

Chief among the accusations levelled at millennials is that of political apathy. But the real problem could be even worse than disengagement: it seems many members of Generation Y could be ready to back a despot.

 

Millennials themselves, asked why they do not back democracy, mostly say it “only serves the interests of a few” (40%) and that there is “no real difference between the policies of the major parties” (32%).

 

[Ariel]

pa da. to čeka sve kapitalističke države u kojima je "liberalizam" postao označitelj za deregulisan i neoporezovan kapital koliko i za prava ljudi da se jebu s kim hoće. Amerika, kao i uvek, prednjači u tome i evo već sada im po celoj maskaradi piša zli klovn.

[Tribun_Populi]

Vodimo sličnu raspravu samo domestic (ČvP) lokalizovanu, meni je to u startu i smrduckalo na generation conflict. A tek smo počeli (mislim globalno, i sa diktatorima i sa svim tim), ima ovo još da se otpetljava.

Edited March 18, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[Indy]

  sada im po celoj maskaradi piša zli klovn.

 

:D  

[Muwan]

Nije direktno vezano za svetsku krizu ali evo malo pikanterija iz Credit Suisse:

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-23/credit-suisse-the-jailed-banker-and-an-oligarch-s-missing-money

 

 

Teaser: kako se lik bez bankarskog iskustva zaposlio u CS, zabo poziciju u Rusiji i tamo mu dali da se igra sa bogatstvom najvećih klijenata™, i kako je sve izmaklo kontroli...

[hazard]

http://atimes.com/2016/03/italys-banks-should-scare-janet-yellen-even-more/

 

 

 

Non-performing loans stood at about 18% of Italian banks’ total loans at the end of 2014 and the total probably has increased since then.

 

Nonperforming assets are larger than shareholders’ equity in all the top four Italian banks. The basket case is Monte dei Paschi, the third-largest private commercial bank, with non-performing assets at more than 500% of equity. Depending on recovery value, Unicredito and Intesa San Paolo, the two largest banks, might be solvent, presuming that they aren’t lying about their non-performing assets. By contrast, Bank of America and Citigroup have non-performing assets valued at 3% to 4% of their equity.

 

Chinese banks–the subject of endless scrutiny by foreign analysts–reported nonperforming loans of just 1.6%, and the Hong Kong brokerage house Reorient Group estimated NPL’s at 4.2% of bank assetsin a recent report.

 

Europe’s banks have nowhere to go. The European Central Bank pushed interest rates below zero in the hope of forcing banks to lend their money rather than hoard it in money-losing investments. Italian bank loan books are shrinking because they have no creditworthy customers, and their liquid assets are losing money. They can’t earn their way out of the hole. Italy’s GDP is still 10% smaller in real terms than it was before the 2007 crisis.

The good news is that an Italian bank crisis, and even an Italian government debt crisis, aren’t enough to topple the world financial system. The rest of the world has had plenty of time to reduce its exposure to the weakest institutions. But a new financial shock out of Europe would push down the Euro, force up the value of the dollar, and send a deflationary wind through world markets.

 

 

 

NPA Intese San Paolo (nenaplativi krediti i slicno) su 1,33 puta veci od kapitala...da podsetimo samo Intesa San Paolo je vlasnik najvece banke (po aktivi) u Srbiji (to su odvojena pravna lica, naravno, ali ipak)...

[bigvlada]

Goldman Sachs to pay $5bn for its role in the 2008 financial crisis

 

The settlement holds the bank accountable for its ‘serious misconduct’ in falsely assuring investors that securities it sold were backed by sound mortgages

 

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/11/goldman-sachs-2008-financial-crisis-mortagage-backed-securities

 

Vidim da visina kazne odgovara zločinu. 

[Muwan]

http://atimes.com/2016/03/italys-banks-should-scare-janet-yellen-even-more/

 

 

 

NPA Intese San Paolo (nenaplativi krediti i slicno) su 1,33 puta veci od kapitala...da podsetimo samo Intesa San Paolo je vlasnik najvece banke (po aktivi) u Srbiji (to su odvojena pravna lica, naravno, ali ipak)...

 

Ako Intesa Sanpaolo prsne to će pokrenuti lavinu u kojoj će Intesa u Srbiji biti tek sićušna grudvica. Ništa nam ne vredi da se zgražavamo nad vlasnicima srpskih banaka - sve je to sistem spojenih sudova i nema evropske banke koja je čista i neizložena riziku jedno 20x više nego što realno može da podnese.

[hazard]

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21702751-what-japans-economic-experiment-can-teach-rest-world-overhyped-underappreciated

 

 

Abenomics

Overhyped, underappreciated

 

What Japan’s economic experiment can teach the rest of the world

Jul 30th 2016 | From the print edition

 

IN THE 1980s Japan was a closely studied example of economic dynamism. In the decades since, it has commanded attention largely for its economic stagnation. After years of falling prices and fitful growth, Japan’s nominal GDP was roughly the same in 2015 as it was 20 years earlier. America’s grew by 134% in the same time period; even Italy’s went up by two-thirds. Now Japan is in the spotlight for a different reason: its attempts at economic resuscitation.

 

To reflate Japan and reform it, Shinzo Abe, prime minister since December 2012, proposed the three “arrows” of what has become known as Abenomics: monetary stimulus, fiscal “flexibility” and structural reform. The first arrow would mobilise Japan’s productive powers and the third would expand them, allowing the second arrow to hit an ambitious fiscal target. The prevailing view is that none has hit home. Headline inflation was negative in the year to May. Japan’s public debt looks as bad as ever. In areas such as labour-market reform, nowhere near enough has been done.

 

Compared with its own grand promises, Abenomics has indeed been a disappointment. But compared with what preceded it, it deserves a sympathetic hearing (see article). And as a guide to what other countries, particularly in Europe, should do to cope with a greying population, stagnant demand and stubborn debts, Japan again repays close attention.

 

This arrow points up

Take monetary policy. The lesson many are quick to draw from Abenomics is that the weapons deployed by the Bank of Japan (BoJ)—and, by extension, other central banks—since the financial crisis do not work. The BoJ has more than doubled the size of its balance-sheet since April 2013 and imposed a sub-zero interest rate in February; still more easing may be on the way (the BoJ was meeting as The Economist went to press). Yet its 2% inflation target remains a distant dream.

 

The naysayers have it wrong. Unlike other countries, Japan includes energy prices in its core inflation figure. Excluding them, core consumer prices have risen, albeit modestly, for 32 months in a row. Before Abenomics, Japan’s prices had fallen with few interruptions for over ten years; they are now about 5% higher than they would have been had that trend continued. Japan has increased inflation while it has fallen in Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

 

If central banks have more sway than some pundits allow, Abenomics also shows the limits of their power. The BoJ has buoyed financial assets, but it has failed to drum up a similar eagerness on the part of consumers or companies to buy real assets or consumer goods. Household deposits are high. And despite bumper corporate profits, firms doubt such plenty will persist. They have been happy to raise prices but less eager to lift investment or base pay (which are harder to reverse). Japan’s non-financial firms now hold more than ¥1 quadrillion ($9.5 trillion) of financial assets, including cash.

 

Herein lies another lesson of Abenomics: monetary policy is less powerful when corporate governance is lax and competition muted. Mr Abe has handed shareholders greater power. In 2012 only 40% of leading companies had any independent directors; now nearly all of them do. But if Japan’s equity culture were more assertive still, shareholders might demand more of the corporate cash hoard back—to spend or invest elsewhere. And if barriers to entry were lower, rival firms might expand into newly profitable industries and compete away these riches. They might also pay more. In theory, reflating an economy should be relatively popular, because wage rises should precede price increases. In reality, the price rises came first and pay has lagged behind. That is why the IMF has pushed for Japan to adopt an incomes policy that spurs firms to raise wages.

 

Someone must spend

If companies are determined to spend far less than they earn, some other part of the economy will be forced to do the opposite. In Japan that role has fallen to the government, which has run budget deficits for over 20 years. Mr Abe set out intending to rein in the public finances. But after a rise in a consumption tax in 2014 tipped Japan into recession, he has backed away from raising the tax again. This week he signalled a large new fiscal-stimulus package worth ¥28 trillion, or 6% of GDP (although it was unclear how much of that money will be new).

 

Abenomics has not only demonstrated how self-defeating fiscal austerity can be, particularly when it comes in the form of a tax on all consumers. It has also shown that, in Japanese conditions, sustained fiscal expansion is affordable. Without any private borrowers to crowd out, even a government as indebted as Japan’s will find it cheap to borrow. Japan’s net interest payments, as a share of GDP, are still the lowest in the G7. Politicians in Europe make fiscal rectitude a priority. Abenomics shows that public thrift and private austerity do not mix.

 

Many people argue that Mr Abe’s monetary and fiscal stimulus has served only as an analgesic, masking the need for radical structural reform. To be sure, greater boldness is needed—to encourage more foreign workers into the country, for example, and to enable firms to hire and fire more easily. But a revival in demand has encouraged supply-side improvement, not simply substituted for it. Stronger demand for labour has drawn more people into the workforce, despite the decline in Japan’s working-age population. The increased presence of women in the labour force has prompted the government to create 200,000 extra places in nurseries, and to make life harder for employers who discriminate against pregnant employees. In recognising that reflation and reform go hand in hand, Abenomics is an unusually coherent economic strategy.

 

Abenomics has fallen short of its targets and its overblown rhetoric. That makes it easy to dismiss as a failure. In fact, it has shown that central banks and governments do have the capacity to stir a torpid economy. And in some senses, the hype was needed. Japan’s stagnation had become a self-fulfilling prophecy; Abenomics could succeed only if enough people believed it would. This is a final lesson that Japan’s economic experiment can impart to the rest of the world. Aim high.

[eumeswil]

https://www.versobooks.com/books/2103-the-city

 

 

 

rivju 

 

 

That said, The City is an ambitious, compelling assessment of the way Britain works and it provides the basis for an analysis that would probably include three points. First, it is no surprise that Britain is radicalising; British capitalism is amongst the most rapacious and parasitic in the world. Second, Britain’s economic imbalances, volatility and vulnerabilities are becoming critical. Lastly, the City’s dominance at home and abroad means that while a left-wing Labour government will, hopefully, make a welcome start in tackling its power, it is going to need a popular movement of some size, and international reach, to really tame it.

Edited September 17, 2016 by miki.bg

[eumeswil]

Long read u Guardianu o Libor skandalu.
 

 

Libor scandal: the bankers who fixed the world’s most important number

Edited January 20, 2017 by miki.bg

[bigvlada]

Long read u Guardianu o Libor skandalu.

 

 

Libor scandal: the bankers who fixed the world’s most important number

 

[noskich]

Mark Fisher, teoreticar 'kapitalistickog realizma' nije vise mogao da podnese da zivi u ovoj distopiji i ubio se 13 januara.

Pomen u Danasu: http://www.danas.rs/dijalog/kolumnisti.1079.html?news_id=337400&title=Samoubistvo+Marka+Fi%C5%A1era

 

Ovde mu je najznacajnija knjiga: https://libcom.org/files/Capitalist%20Realism_%20Is%20There%20No%20Alternat%20-%20Mark%20Fisher.pdf

 

Tesko je ne biti depresivan u ovoj distopiji u kojoj zivimo.

 

“The current ruling ontology denies any possibility of a social causation of mental illness. The chemico-biologization of mental illness is of course strictly commensurate with its depoliticization. Considering mental illness an individual chemico-biological problem has enormous benefits for capitalism. First, it reinforces Capital’s drive towards atomistic individualization (you are sick because of your brain chemistry). Second, it provides an enormously lucrative market in which multinational pharmaceutical companies can peddle their pharmaceuticals (we can cure you with our SSRls). It goes without saying that all mental illnesses are neurologically instantiated, but this says nothing about their causation. If it is true, for instance, that depression is constituted by low serotonin levels, what still needs to be explained is why particular individuals have low levels of serotonin. This requires a social and political explanation; and the task of repoliticizing mental illness is an urgent one if the left wants to challenge capitalist realism.” 

Edited January 29, 2017 by noskich

[hazard]

https://www.politico.eu/article/global-regulators-celebrate-landmark-basel-deal-intended-to-make-banks-safer/

Usvojen Bazel III, set standarda koji bi trebalo da pojača stabilnost globalnog finansijskog sistema. Sumnjam da će sprečiti neku sledeću veliku krizu, no dobro...

 

Joy in bankville over Basel deal
Here’s why Mario Draghi is smiling.
By    FIONA MAXWELL    12/7/17, 6:53 PM CET Updated 12/7/17, 7:00 PM CET
FRANKFURT — A decade after the global financial meltdown, banking regulators from the world’s biggest economies on Thursday announced the final deal on capital rules that they hope will make banks safer.

Or at least less likely to unleash huge economic shock waves when they collapse.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s oversight board — the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, known as the GHOS — gave its green light to the new framework after a meeting in Frankfurt.

“It’s a great day,” said a beaming Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank who also heads the GHOS. “Today’s endorsement of the Basel III reforms represents a major milestone that … completes the global reform of the regulatory framework, which began following the onset of the financial crisis.”

Now, it is up to Basel Committee members — central banks and banking regulators from the world’s largest economies — to incorporate the standards into national law.

This was long in the making.

A deal on the so-called Basel III standards was initially targeted for the end of 2016, but global regulators were unable to agree on how to determine banks’ capital requirements, or the money they should have with their own un-borrowed funds to cover all kinds of risks.

The biggest — and so potentially the most systemically important — banks currently use their own internal models to calculate the minimum amount of capital they need to always hold. But the Basel Committee argued that internal models can be too easily gamed, as was the case when banks came up with too-low capital requirements in the run-up to the financial crisis. Regulators found that two banks with very similar lending portfolios could have wildly different capital requirements, with no obvious reason for the distinction.

The Basel Committee therefore introduced proposals for calculating capital requirements based on a standard, regulator-set methodology commonly referred to as the “output floor.” This refers to the threshold below which a bank’s capital requirements cannot go when calculated using its own internal model.

US-EU standoff

The wrestling match over capital requirements pitted principally EU against U.S. regulators.

The Americans argued for more stringent requirements. The Europeans claimed American banks would not be hit as hard by any potential floor as their businesses are less reliant on bank loans and more on capital markets. In addition, European banks keep potentially risky mortgages on their balance sheets, while U.S. banks offload them to government agencies.

EU regulators echoed European banks’ arguments that a high output floor would force them to hold too much capital, resulting in increased costs for them and ultimately for their corporate and retail borrowers. And if that squeezes the amount of capital available in the system, they argued that economic growth would suffer.

Some regulators were also concerned that the reduced reliance on internal models would do away with “risk sensitivity” — in other words, using a regulator-set, standardized approach may not sufficiently take into account the likelihood of a customer defaulting and prompt institutions to lend to more risky clients.

The EU stood firm on its desire for a 70 percent floor, while the U.S. pushed for a 75 percent floor.

Ultimately, they met half way — at 72.5 percent. The floor will be phased in over five years, starting in 2022.

“We should understand this is a compromise,” said Draghi. “There were members who wanted higher level, members who wanted lower.”

But this now leaves European banks to frantically calculate exactly what the final deal will mean for their businesses.

According to an impact study carried out by the European Banking Authority, the most systemically important banks in the EU would see their capital requirements rise on average by 15 percent. For the entire EU sample used in the study, which comprised 88 European institutions, the average minimum required capital would increase by 12.9 percent.

Banks generally welcomed the final deal, despite their earlier pushback. Mark Gheerbrant, head of risk and capital at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, said it provided “much-needed certainty for the industry.”

With global standards now set, work has only just begun for national regulators. Basel rules are not legally binding, and have to be writen into national laws. For the EU, this will mean a new legislative proposal, plus the usual scrutiny from the European Parliament and Council.

Ultimately, not everything that has been decided at the Basel level may trickle down into EU law. If European banks find that today’s agreement doesn’t work for them, the huge lobbying push will begin again — and may be more successful, given that they have the sympathy of many EU officials in Brussels and national ones in European capitals.

And new rules certainly don’t mean there won’t be any new banking crises.

“Nothing is crisis-proof,” said Draghi, but “[we can] clearly see the present system is much more resilient than the one we had before the crisis.”

His sentiments were echoed by Stefan Ingves, chairman of the Basel Committee: “My belief is that we’re in better shape once this is implemented but at the same time, it’s impossible to know what the future has in store.”