Svetska Kriza 2008-....

[Tresko]

Nije stvar samo u veličini javnog duga, već i u strukturi istog. Problem južnjaka je u tome što je skoro 100% tog duga ulupano u suvu potrošnju, bez ulaganja u bilo šta. Recimo, Italija već 20 godina skoro ništa ne ulaže u infrastrukture bilo kog tipa, a sve pare se ulupavaju u suvu potrošnju. Opet, unutrašnji dug države prema dobavljačima je fantazmagorično veliki, sa kašnjenjima u plaćanju od po 1000 do 3000 dana.Ako je dug veliki, ali se dosta toga uložilo, mnogo je manji problem od ovakve situacije.Bolje je ostati u euru dugoročno. Ono zbog čega se u južnim zemljama bune protiv eura je to što su oni navikli da mnogo problema rešavaju devalvacijom domaće valute. Sad to ne mogu da rade, a navikli su, i to im smeta, jer mnogi koji odlučuju drugačije i ne znaju da rade.

[borris_]

Pa u spaniji su bas ulagali u tu infrastrukturu. Otvorili ohohoj pustinjskih aerodroma (i to kakvih) od kojih rijetko koji radi, svaki grad se ugledao na Bilbao pa je pozeleo da ima i on neki svoj "gugenajm". Doduse otvorili su i brzu liniju izmedju Barcelone i Madrida sto se ispostavilo isplativo jer su dobili onaj posao brze linije u Saudijskoj Arabiji izmedju Meke i Medine a imaju nekoliko firmi koje se dobro kotiraju u svijetu.

[Lancia]

Javni dug u Spaniji je posledica stambene izgradnje i balon efekta a ne promasenih investicija, koje stvarno jesu za rubriku 'verovali ili ne'. Naravno da je struktura bitna, Japan npr ima javni dug duplo veci od Spanije.

Bolje je ostati u euru dugoročno.

Ne rece zasto. Po meni je ideja odlicna ali preuranjena i politicki zasnovana. Privreda Evrope je multiplicirana u onim segmentima koji su najprofitabilniji i vuku ostale grane, sto nije lose samo po sebi, koliko je nezdravo konkurentna. Firme se tuku za prevlast u Evropi umesto evropski za prevlast u svetu. Los rezultat pojedinih placaju pobednici kroz pomoc i kredite. Evro je tesko razumna jedinica evrozone, od cije niske pozicije imaju korist samo Nemci, Holandjani i Finci.

[MayDay]

Pa nije samo struktura cinilac, vec i po kojoj stopi mozes da se zaduzujes. Ako ti je kamatna stopa ispod stope rasta ekonomije onda si na konju, a ako je iznad, ko sto je slucaj sa juznjacima, onda je valjda jasno da oni nisu u stanju da zarade koliko je potrebno da bi se servisirali dugovi.

[Lancia]

Pa nije samo struktura cinilac, vec i po kojoj stopi mozes da se zaduzujes. Ako ti je kamatna stopa ispod stope rasta ekonomije onda si na konju, a ako je iznad, ko sto je slucaj sa juznjacima, onda je valjda jasno da oni nisu u stanju da zarade koliko je potrebno da bi se servisirali dugovi.

To je jasno naravno koliko i slika u ocima jednog svrsenog fakultetlije da nema preca posla da ceka duuugorocno uravnotezenje ekonomija u evrozoni, vec ce da zapali u Svabiju. Tako da se posle privrednog javlja i obrazovni disbalans u ime cega? Finansijska getoizacija.

[fonTelefon]

A massive € sculpture (identical to the one in front of the European Central Bank) was dismantled and removed from the Frankfurt International Airport in Germany Thursday. The official explanation is ‘the plastic parts are getting weak after 11 years and the terminal needed the space‘.Srpska se vlada ne priprema za nestanak evra.

[bigvlada]

Za sve je kriv NemacChancellor Schröder's LegacyGermany's Leading Role in Weakening the EuroBy Christian Reiermann and Klaus WiegrefeDPAIn the early 2000s, Germany was struggling to adhere to euro-zone criteria aimed at ensuring common currency stability. Instead of introducing austerity, however, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder simply launched an effort to change the rules. New documents show just how key his role was in weakening the Stability Pact.....http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-key-in-weakening-the-euro-stability-pact-a-844458.html

[boshoku]

madrid, on going riotisanje, live

[bigvlada]

Special Report - Inside Mario Draghi's euro rescue plan

(Reuters) - On a warm summer day on the eve of the Olympic Games, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi stood up at a business conference in London and dropped a bombshell."Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro," Draghi told the audience in Lancaster House, a grand building in central London, then paused for effect. "And believe me, it will be enough."Global markets, full of talk of a euro zone break-up, rallied sharply on Draghi's unexpected message. Just as shocked were the ECB boss's aides and his colleagues on the bank's policymaking Governing Council, none of whom knew Draghi would make such a sweeping promise."Nobody knew this was going to happen. Nobody," one senior ECB official said of the speech.The truth was, the speech was just the beginning. Draghi was in no position to guarantee "whatever it takes." His words were a gamble that set off weeks of frenzied backroom diplomacy and public sparring that would severely test the relationships of the main protagonists in the euro zone crisis.Through conversations with senior ECB officials and leading political actors in the euro drama, most of them on condition of anonymity, Reuters has pieced together a detailed picture of the negotiations that led from Draghi's late-July speech to his September 6 announcement that the ECB stood ready to buy "unlimited" amounts of bonds issued by the most stricken euro members.Key to Draghi's gambit was peeling off enough members of the ECB's Governing Council. One of them, Jens Weidmann, head of the powerful Bundesbank, has become a vocal critic of Draghi's plan. He and his hawkish German colleagues believe it will compromise the ECB's sacred independence and stoke inflation, a taboo in Germany since hyper-inflation in the 1920s gave rise to the Nazis.Yet getting Germany on board was essential. Europe's biggest economy, it has served as the bloc's paymaster during the crisis. If Draghi's policies ran up against a German wall, they would surely fail.In the end, Draghi won over everyone on the council but Weidmann, and crucially secured the backing of Europe's dominant leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel."Mario is someone who, when he is convinced he's right, is not worried about going ahead and saying he's right," said Francesco Giavazzi, an Italian economics professor who has often worked with Draghi since they studied together at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1970s.This is the story of how Draghi got his way.PRUSSIAN HELMETWithin hours of the London speech, the ECB president's surprised colleagues had recognised its significance and leapt into action.Joerg Asmussen, a 45-year-old former deputy finance minister who had joined the ECB in January, alerted Merkel.Asmussen would emerge as a key player in the hectic weeks to come. A pragmatic German with strong European leanings, he had close ties to all the main players - Draghi, Merkel and Weidmann - giving him leverage and putting him in a unique position to help forge consensus.While Asmussen informed his Berlin contacts, his French colleague on the ECB board Benoit Coeure sent word to Paris. Within 24 hours of Draghi's speech, Merkel and French President Francois Hollande had spoken by phone and issued a statement echoing Draghi's promise.It was a first sign that the Italian's risky, and still murky, plan might fly.But the manoeuvring had only just begun. On the other side of Frankfurt, in the 70s-era cement colossus that houses the Bundesbank, officials were seething at Draghi's London speech and demanding he come clean about his intentions.Early last year, the head of the German central bank Axel Weber had resigned abruptly in protest at the crisis-fighting policies of Draghi's predecessor, Jean-Claude Trichet. The Frenchman had embarked on the ECB'S first-ever round of sovereign bond buying to drive down the borrowing costs of heavily indebted countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Weber, who had been in line to replace Trichet at the top of the ECB, denounced this as dangerous money printing to finance profligate states.When Weber bolted, it opened the door to both Draghi and Weidmann, a former student of Weber's who had served as Merkel's top economic adviser in Berlin.The youngest Bundesbank president ever, Weidmann was now in the same difficult position as his mentor had been. The ECB was on the verge of what looked like a new and ambitious bond-purchase programme.Draghi needed to ensure Weidmann did not flee as Weber had. If he did, it might set off a backlash in Germany that would kill his plan even before it got off the ground.The two met for coffee in Draghi's office on the 35th floor of the Eurotower on July 30, four days after the speech.Displayed on a shelf behind Draghi's conference table was a black-and-gold spiked Prussian helmet from 1871, a gift from Germany's Bild newspaper to symbolise its confidence that the Italian ECB boss would adhere to German-style discipline.The conversation was civil and professional, sources familiar with the meeting told Reuters. But Weidmann made clear he would oppose any revival of bond-buying.The two most powerful central bankers in Europe were at odds. Within days, Draghi was due to chair the first meeting of the ECB's policy-setting council since his speech. Markets were expecting him to unveil concrete steps. But he had yet to flesh out his plan, and was still unsure how many of his colleagues shared Weidmann's doubts.A dinner in the Eurotower on the eve of the council meeting went well for Draghi. Sitting around a large table in a conference room down the hall from his office, four members of the ECB's board - Asmussen was on vacation in France - and national central bank governors from the 17 euro member states exchanged ideas over baked goat's cheese, roast beef and caramel mousse.Draghi and Coeure presented the outlines of a bond-buying proposal put together by the board. Some, including Dutch central banker Klaas Knot and Finn Erkki Liikanen, had reservations. Only Weidmann was dead-set against it. The council agreed that ECB experts would be given several weeks to hone the plan.On August 2, as the council put the finishing touches on the statement Draghi would deliver at an afternoon news conference, Weidmann made a special request. He wanted the ECB president to make clear to reporters that support for bond-buying had not been unanimous. Draghi agreed.A few hours later, Draghi told reporters in Frankfurt and investors watching screens around the globe that the ECB could soon begin buying bonds to reduce borrowing costs in countries like Spain and Italy. But his lack of specifics disappointed markets. And he made one crucial mistake. Instead of sticking to past practice and remaining vague about who had dissented, he named Weidmann as the lone rebel, infuriating officials at the Bundesbank and on the ECB council who sympathised with the German, according to several sources."It wasn't right for him to single out Weidmann," the senior ECB official said.In the following weeks, a stung Bundesbank would work overtime to undermine Draghi and his plans through a combination of public statements and aggressive leaks. Calling Draghi "soft," Bild threatened to reclaim its Prussian helmet.The debate reverberated in Berlin, unsettling Europe's most powerful leader.TIGHTROPEAngela Merkel has been walking a tightrope since the euro crisis erupted in late 2009, using tough rhetoric to appease an electorate deeply sceptical about supporting crisis-hit euro members like Greece, while nudging bailout deals through parliament to keep the single currency intact.Draghi's plan presented the cautious 58-year-old chancellor with a dilemma. Her former adviser Weidmann and many in the conservative German establishment opposed it.Yet for Merkel it was a godsend. With European leaders at odds over plans to integrate their fiscal policies and banking systems, the ECB was the only body capable of calming markets and keeping the euro zone stable.Merkel, facing a re-election battle in 2013, was loath to see the euro zone explode on her watch. "Super Mario" had offered her a lifeline.In private, sources say, the German leader complained to aides that Draghi was being unfairly attacked in Germany because he was Italian. In public she kept studiously quiet for weeks.Then, in mid-August on a trip to Canada, Merkel backed the ECB chief unequivocally for the first time, describing his policies as "completely in line" with hers and other European leaders.Back home in Germany, though, a backlash was building.On August 26, influential weekly Der Spiegel published an interview with Weidmann in which he likened Draghi's bond plan to a dangerously addictive drug. Days later, Alexander Dobrindt, a top politician from Merkel's Bavarian sister party, slammed Draghi as a "Falschmuenzer," or forger.Even Draghi's allies seemed to be abandoning him. Asmussen had pulled overnighters with Weidmann in Berlin during the height of the global financial crisis and had studied with him at Bonn University.The two were very different. Weidmann, reserved and serious, had refused to move his family from staid Frankfurt when he came to the German capital to advise Merkel. Asmussen, his partner and two daughters, couldn't imagine uprooting from trendy Prenzlauer Berg in Berlin when he joined the ECB.Born a year and a half apart, they are not close friends but call each other on birthdays and sometimes give each other a heads-up on the content of their newspaper interviews. Both were outraged when Bild, without talking to either of them, ran a story on August 27 saying they had turned against each other.Asmussen was bothered by Weidmann's isolation and began pushing back against Draghi, giving interviews and speeches in which he attached tough conditions - such as IMF involvement - to his boss's bond-buying programme. The Italian's wiggle-room was shrinking by the day.Then on August 30, Bild reported that Weidmann had considered resigning, just as Weber had. It wasn't true - the youthful Bundesbank chief never seriously thought about stepping down, according to sources at the German central bank.But the report heaped new pressure on Draghi. As August drew to a close, the ECB president cancelled plans to attend a central bankers' conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. He had a week to forge consensus on his bond-buying plan, yet virtually all the details still needed to be hammered out.A PLAN COMES TOGETHERDraghi scrambled over the weekend of September 1-2, and on his 65th birthday a day later, to stitch together his plan.A reserved man, he had a breadth of experience most central bankers would envy. After earning an economics doctorate from MIT, he worked at the World Bank in Washington, headed the Italian Treasury, did a stint at Goldman Sachs, ran the Italian central bank and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a global regulation body.In contrast to his micro-managing predecessor Trichet, Draghi likes to delegate so that he can focus on the big strategic issues. He has earned a reputation for taking his time and listening carefully before making decisions. Once he does commit, people close to him say, he doesn't look back.Top secret papers had been circulating at the ECB since June exploring new alternatives for bond market intervention and the conditions that might be attached to it. Draghi needed to narrow down the options and clinch agreement - fast.By insisting that any ECB bond buying be tied to an aid programme involving the notoriously tough IMF, Asmussen had staked out a position that could discourage countries from asking for help in the first place.His hard bargaining aimed to ensure ECB action did not lead countries to soft-pedal reforms. This was a concern borne of experience. In 2011, the ECB had bought Italian bonds only for Italy's then-prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, to drop reform promises days later. The half-dozen or so members of the policy council who sympathised with Weidmann were particularly worried about being taken in again.Riled by some of the public debate about the ECB's plans, Draghi argued that the risks facing the euro zone meant the ECB had to act. After a period of intense negotiations, he won out. At the September 6 policy meeting, all members of the Governing Council bar Weidmann backed the plan to buy sovereign bonds on secondary markets.But Weidmann's stance and the manoeuvring of others sympathetic to his cause ensured any ECB intervention would come with a strong dose of "conditionality".Countries who wanted the ECB to intervene must first sign up to a formal aid programme. IMF involvement would be sought and bond purchases restricted to maturities of up to 3 years. The ECB could choose to sell as well as buy bonds - a veiled warning to countries that it might pull the plug if they failed to deliver on their promises.The new initiative just needed a name. Initially dubbed "Outright Open Market Operations" or (OOMO), the ECB board ditched that for "Monetary Outright Transactions" (MOT), before settling on the more grammatical "Outright Monetary Transactions" (OMT) shortly before the programme was unveiled.Beginning his news conference with a wry smile, Draghi announced: "Under appropriate conditions, we will have a fully effective backstop to prevent potentially destructive scenarios."He then made clear the volume of bond purchases would be unlimited. Euro zone blue chip stocks soared to levels not seen since March and the euro extended its upward march. A week later, Germany's Constitutional Court gave a green light for Europe's new bailout fund and Dutch voters handed pro-European parties a sweeping election victory.After three years of seemingly constant crisis, Europe could breathe again.PROOF IN THE PUDDINGIt is far too early to hail Draghi's plan as a solution to the crisis.The central bank has bought no bonds yet and its members are already sending conflicting signals over how the plan will be implemented.Many questions remain. Will countries need to sign up to tough new reforms on top of those already being implemented before the ECB jumps to their aid? If they do, will it dissuade governments in Rome and Madrid from seeking aid at all?And are Draghi and his colleagues really prepared to put their money where their mouth is and buy an unlimited amount of bonds? A hesitant approach, inhibited by German doubts, doomed Trichet's Securities Markets Programme (SMP) to failure."It will work if the expectation of unlimited support is not altered or compromised in some way," said Domenico Lombardi, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former IMF executive board member, who knows Draghi."The key word is unlimited," he added. "It has been said in words, but the actions that follow will have to be consistent."Perhaps a bigger question is the longer-term impact of Draghi's plan on sentiment in Germany. At the single currency's birth, the ECB was sold to sceptical Germans as a euro-wide carbon-copy of the Bundesbank. Combating inflation was to be its sole objective and its independence sacred.Now many Germans feel betrayed, some convinced the ECB has been taken over by a cabal of dovish southerners. A poll released the day Draghi announced his plan showed nearly one in two Germans had little or no confidence in him.Still, Draghi has bought Europe time, and given politicians more space to sort out the mess. The currency's fate hinges on whether those politicians grab the opportunity Draghi promised them on that warm summer day in London.(Paul Carrel reported from Frankfurt, and Noah Barkin and Annika Breidthardt from Berlin; Edited by Simon Robinson and Sara Ledwith)http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/25/uk-ecb-draghi-plan-idUKBRE88O09820120925

[MayDay]

Nema akutno-neposredne veze s krizom 2008-, ali ovo nam je svastara topik.http://www.economist.com/node/21564556

Inequality and the world economy True Progressivism A new form of radical centrist politics is needed to tackle inequality without hurting economic growthBY THE end of the 19th century, the first age of globalisation and a spate of new inventions had transformed the world economy. But the “Gilded Age” was also a famously unequal one, with America’s robber barons and Europe’s “Downton Abbey” classes amassing huge wealth: the concept of “conspicuous consumption” dates back to 1899. The rising gap between rich and poor (and the fear of socialist revolution) spawned a wave of reforms, from Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting to Lloyd George’s People’s Budget. Governments promoted competition, introduced progressive taxation and wove the first threads of a social safety net. The aim of this new “Progressive era”, as it was known in America, was to make society fairer without reducing its entrepreneurial vim.Modern politics needs to undergo a similar reinvention—to come up with ways of mitigating inequality without hurting economic growth. That dilemma is already at the centre of political debate, but it mostly produces heat, not light. Thus, on America’s campaign trail, the left attacks Mitt Romney as a robber baron and the right derides Barack Obama as a class warrior. In some European countries politicians have simply given in to the mob: witness François Hollande’s proposed 75% income-tax rate. In much of the emerging world leaders would rather sweep the issue of inequality under the carpet: witness China’s nervous embarrassment about the excesses of Ferrari-driving princelings, or India’s refusal to tackle corruption.At the core, there is a failure of ideas. The right is still not convinced that inequality matters. The left’s default position is to raise income-tax rates for the wealthy and to increase spending still further—unwise when sluggish economies need to attract entrepreneurs and when governments, already far bigger than Roosevelt or Lloyd George could have imagined, are overburdened with promises of future largesse. A far more dramatic rethink is needed: call it True Progressivism.To have or to have notDoes inequality really need to be tackled? The twin forces of globalisation and technical innovation have actually narrowed inequality globally, as poorer countries catch up with richer ones. But within many countries income gaps have widened. More than two-thirds of the world’s people live in countries where income disparities have risen since 1980, often to a startling degree. In America the share of national income going to the top 0.01% (some 16,000 families) has risen from just over 1% in 1980 to almost 5% now—an even bigger slice than the top 0.01% got in the Gilded Age.It is also true that some measure of inequality is good for an economy. It sharpens incentives to work hard and take risks; it rewards the talented innovators who drive economic progress. Free-traders have always accepted that the more global a market, the greater the rewards will be for the winners. But as our special report this week argues, inequality has reached a stage where it can be inefficient and bad for growth.That is most obvious in the emerging world. In China credit is siphoned to state-owned enterprises and well-connected insiders; the elite also gain from a string of monopolies. In Russia the oligarchs’ wealth has even less to do with entrepreneurialism. In India, too often, the same is true.In the rich world the cronyism is better-hidden. One reason why Wall Street accounts for a disproportionate share of the wealthy is the implicit subsidy given to too-big-to-fail banks. From doctors to lawyers, many high-paying professions are full of unnecessary restrictive practices. And then there is the most unfair transfer of all—misdirected welfare spending. Social spending is often less about helping the poor than giving goodies to the relatively wealthy. In America the housing subsidy to the richest fifth (through mortgage-interest relief) is four times the amount spent on public housing for the poorest fifth.Even the sort of inequality produced by meritocracy can hurt growth. If income gaps get wide enough, they can lead to less equality of opportunity, especially in education. Social mobility in America, contrary to conventional wisdom, is lower than in most European countries. The gap in test scores between rich and poor American children is roughly 30-40% wider than it was 25 years ago. And by some measures class mobility is even stickier in China than in America.Some of those at the top of the pile will remain sceptical that inequality is a problem in itself. But even they have an interest in mitigating it, for if it continues to rise, momentum for change will build and may lead to a political outcome that serves nobody’s interests. Communism may be past reviving, but there are plenty of other bad ideas out there.Hence the need for a True Progressive agenda. Here is our suggestion, which steals ideas from both left and right to tackle inequality in three ways that do not harm growth.Compete, target and reformThe priority should be a Rooseveltian attack on monopolies and vested interests, be they state-owned enterprises in China or big banks on Wall Street. The emerging world, in particular, needs to introduce greater transparency in government contracts and effective anti-trust law. It is no coincidence that the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, made his money in Mexican telecoms, an industry where competitive pressures were low and prices were sky-high. In the rich world there is also plenty of opening up to do. Only a fraction of the European Union’s economy is a genuine single market. School reform and introducing choice is crucial: no Wall Street financier has done as much damage to American social mobility as the teachers’ unions have. Getting rid of distortions, such as labour laws in Europe or the remnants of China’s hukou system of household registration, would also make a huge difference.Next, target government spending on the poor and the young. In the emerging world too much cash goes to universal fuel subsidies that disproportionately favour the wealthy (in Asia) and unaffordable pensions that favour the relatively affluent (in Latin America). But the biggest target for reform is the welfare states of the rich world. Given their ageing societies, governments cannot hope to spend less on the elderly, but they can reduce the pace of increase—for instance, by raising retirement ages more dramatically and means-testing the goodies on offer. Some of the cash could go into education. The first Progressive era led to the introduction of publicly financed secondary schools; this time round the target should be pre-school education, as well as more retraining for the jobless.Last, reform taxes: not to punish the rich but to raise money more efficiently and progressively. In poorer economies, where tax avoidance is rife, the focus should be on lower rates and better enforcement. In rich ones the main gains should come from eliminating deductions that particularly benefit the wealthy (such as America’s mortgage-interest deduction); narrowing the gap between tax rates on wages and capital income; and relying more on efficient taxes that are paid disproportionately by the rich, such as some property taxes.Different parts of this agenda are already being embraced in different countries. Latin America has invested in schools and pioneered conditional cash transfers for the very poor; it is the only region where inequality in most countries has been falling. India and Indonesia are considering scaling back fuel subsidies. More generally, as they build their welfare states, Asian countries are determined to avoid the West’s extravagance. In the rich world Scandinavia is the most inventive region. Sweden has overhauled its admittedly huge welfare state and has a universal school-voucher system. Britain too is reforming schools and simplifying welfare. In America Mr Romney says he wants to means-test Medicare and cut tax deductions, though he is short on details. Meanwhile, Mr Obama, a Democrat, has invoked Theodore Roosevelt, and Ed Miliband, leader of Britain’s Labour Party, is now trying to wrap himself in Benjamin Disraeli’s “One Nation” Tory cloak.Such cross-dressing is a sign of change, but politicians have a long way to go. The right’s instinct is too often to make government smaller, rather than better. The supposedly egalitarian left’s failure is more fundamental. Across the rich world, welfare states are running out of money, growth is slowing and inequality is rising—and yet the left’s only answer is higher tax rates on wealth-creators. Messrs Obama, Miliband and Hollande need to come up with something that promises both fairness and progress. Otherwise, everyone will pay.

Savrsen tekst! Potpisujem svaku rec.

[Indy]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOP2V_np2c0

[Gandalf]

welcome to the dark side.

(neo)marksisticka kritika liberalnog kapitalizma se pokazala tacnom u kljucnoj stvari - bauk jos uvek kruzi. naime, jedan od uzroka ove krize je pokusaj americkih administracija da nejednakost i eventualno nezadovoljstvo sistemskih gubitnika (aka bauk) suzbiju kreditiranjem.subprime mortgages kao socijalni program.

Edited October 24, 2012 by Gandalf

[Indy]

welcome to the dark side.

"A retweet doesn't mean endorsement". -_-

[Аврам Гојић]

mnogo se oduzio ovaj topic

[Lancia]

mnogo se oduzio ovaj topic

obecava da bude jedan od najduzih, tamo negde do 2018-te, ako bog da.