Da li je trebalo stvarati Jugoslaviju, iz raznih perspektiva

[MancMellow]

Kulturološki jesu.

 

Ma ok, samo to je manje bitno. Rumunija prosto nema ulozene deonice na Poluostrvu. Nema sta da je interesuje tu.  

[MancMellow]

Нема потребе за тим фитиљем бар што се тиче Европе. Генералну пробу је Европа имала са задњим таласом избјеглица. Када се сљедећи пут појави два милиона на вањским границама, пуца цијела Европа.

 

 

Ako se pojavi "dva miliona" ljudi na granicama Evrope (Grčka, Italija) politika na tim granicama će biti znatno drugačija. Možemo da razgovaramo o moralnom aspektu stvari i kome se od nas to sviđa ili (i šta ja o toe mislim), ali prosto neće ući. I biće odvratno. 

[Simon]

Политика на тим границама може да "пуца" док се цијев не растали, међутим ца. три милиона је критична маса за разваљивање ЕУ , уз ТТИП и до оружаних сукоба....

[MancMellow]

Политика на тим границама може да "пуца" док се цијев не растали, међутим ца. три милиона је критична маса за разваљивање ЕУ , уз ТТИП и до оружаних сукоба....

 Sad si dosao do tri miliona :D 

[Lord Protector]

Нема потребе за тим фитиљем бар што се тиче Европе. Генералну пробу је Европа имала са задњим таласом избјеглица. Када се сљедећи пут појави два милиона на вањским границама, пуца цијела Европа.

 

Nije to isto. Izbeglički talas neće nužno značiti radikalnu islamizaciju. Radikalna islamizacija je ciljano delovanje a ne haotičan proces, što je u suštini izbeglički talas. Problem neće biti izbeglice već delovanje saudijski sponzorisanog vehabističkog projekta. Na Balkanu neće biti cilj izbeglice već džamije, verska struktura, zamena nepodobnih imama radikalima. Zamena tradicionalnog sunitizma sa radikalnim i opasnim vehabizmom. To se već događa uveliko i postaje realna opasnost. Izbeglice će tu biti manje cilj a više će delovanje biti usmereno ka domicilnom muslimanskom stanovništvu.

Edited May 18, 2017 by slow

[namenski]

Generalno (generalno) se slažem. Ali u najkracem, za Srbiju (a i RS) je stvarno najbolje da se bave, kad je to potrebno, i kad one to uopšte mogu, podrškom statusu quo i, pre svega, ekonomskim razvojem i, posebno, posebno, slobodom i demokratijom iznutra. 

У добру је лако добар бити  -_-

Hocu reci, lako bismo da nam zapadne ovo sto ti pises.

Ovde spekulisem(o) o jednom, bojim se, drugacijem svetu, svetu koji se menja na nase oci i u kome trenutni raspored snaga i 'aj da kazem politicki, pa i ideoloski mejnstrim u drugi plan stavlja demokratiju, principe, odrzavanje statusa kvo, itd, itd...

Ukratko, govorimo o kako se nekad govorilo nastupajucim, nedajboze, smutnim vremenima.

Koja, za to barem ne treba mnogo dokaza, izuzetno pogoduju svim vrstama suspendovanja vrednosti na kojima zelimo da mislimo da pociva danasnji svet i medjunarodni pravni poredak.

Necu da idem toliko daleko da kazem da je u takvim uslovima sve moguce, ali se politika - tamo gde je ima, naravno - mora da zasniva na premisama najgorih mogucih scenarija: videli smo, na zalost, kako lako se iz koliko toliko uredjenog stanja, i u sred svetskog prosperiteta i, kako je izgledalo, otvaranja svetlih perspektiva za sve, lako prelazi u stanje rata i svake druge drustvene kataklizme i kakve sve nakaze svih vrsta pocinju da izlaze iz svojih jazbina, od ideja do ljudi.

Turbulentna vremena imaju jos jednu osobinu: vole^tm lidere, izbacuju ih na povrsinu po prirodi stvari, a cini mi se da - vise nego ikad posle kraja Hladnog rata, imamo pojavu politicara sa imenom i prezimenom nasuprot bezlicnoj masi birokrata kojoj smo bili skloni da se podsmevamo u vremena opsteg prosperiteta, a ne smemo zaboraviti da su ex-jugoslovenske krvave 90-te pale u period istinskog cvetanja EU i njenog najprosperitetnijeg perioda.

Nadam se ne i labudove pesme.

Ako sam u pravu, a voleo bih da nisam, ostaje samo da se nadamo da Srbiju nece da zapadne najgora od svih zamislivih mogucnosti: Vucic kao lider    i вучићизам kao osnov definisanja srpske pozicije u slucaju mogucih sranja.

Neko je ovde, mrzi me sada da trazim ko, uzasnuto odbio mogucnost razmatranja rata i sranja kao opcije^tm: budalastina - ni rak se ne razmatra kao opcija, ali, eto, dogadja se, postoji.

 

Uostalom, ovo je manje-vise, jedan od izglednih scenarija.

I to - samo jedan :(:  

 

Ako se pojavi "dva miliona" ljudi na granicama Evrope (Grčka, Italija) politika na tim granicama će biti znatno drugačija. Možemo da razgovaramo o moralnom aspektu stvari i kome se od nas to sviđa ili (i šta ja o toe mislim), ali prosto neće ući. I biće odvratno. 

[Simon]

Sad si dosao do tri miliona :D

 

Није била намјера;) Довољно је у принципу 100.000 на граници у датом моменту да пукне.

[Simon]

Nije to isto. Izbeglički talas neće nužno značiti radikalnu islamizaciju. Radikalna islamizacija je ciljano delovanje a ne haotičan proces, što je u suštini izbeglički talas. Problem neće biti izbeglice već delovanje saudijski sponzorisanog vehabističkog projekta. Na Balkanu neće biti cilj izbeglice već džamije, verska struktura, zamena nepodobnih imama radikalima. Zamena tradicionalnog sunitizma sa radikalnim i opasnim vehabizmom. To se već događa uveliko i postaje realna opasnost. Izbeglice će tu biti manje cilj a više će delovanje biti usmereno ka domicilnom muslimanskom stanovništvu.

Није то толико алармантно колико ово друго повлачи за собом које сам ја навео. Не претјеруј са том радикалном исламизацијом на овим просторима. Вријеме ће показати ко је од нас у праву. Да се Европа тога плаши није спорно, а у страху су велике очи.

[urkozamanje]

Ovo me podseti na odusevljavanje objektivnoscu i profesionalizmom al dzazire na pdf mediji.

[Lord Protector]

Economist, 1980

 

 

From the archive

The shadow after Tito

Can anyone else hold Yugoslavia together? And will the argument that nobody can be Russia’s chance to revenge 1948? 

 

Feb 16th 1980 

 

THE optimists who blandly said, when President Tito fell ill last month, that a post-Tito Yugoslavia would be much the same as a Tito one were underestimating the danger. Now that the last great victor of 1945 seems to be moving to his end, it has to be reckoned that Russia will sooner or later try to recover for the Soviet sphere of influence the one country which has defiantly escaped from it.

The danger is not that a Soviet Union with a half-digested Afghanistan under its belt will make an immediate grab for a Yugoslavia confused and numbed by the death of the man who led it for 35 years. It is that the multinational federation which Tito managed to hold together with the skill of a Habsburg emperor will start to disintegrate when he is no longer there, and the ensuing confusion will eventually offer Russia a temptation it cannot resist.

Yugoslavia is a small country of 22m people with no great natural wealth but sitting, in the phrase of an American diplomat, “atop one of the major political fault lines on the earth's surface”. It would manifestly be to Russia's advantage to haul it back on to the Soviet side of that line. Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast could give Russia a warm-water port under Nato's nose. Yugoslavia's westernmost republics, Slovenia and Croatia, are the key to the Ljubljana gap, from which Soviet tanks could command the route to Trieste and Italy's Po valley. And to these considerable strategic attractions is added the lure of at last regaining for Russia's political orbit what Stalin lost in 1948.

The battle in post-Tito Yugoslavia will be for the hearts and minds of its 1.8m party members, especially those in the party apparatus, the government, the army and the security services. In theory, there is no reason for this party power elite to worry about the future. Tito leaves behind a set of institutions designed to perpetuate one-party rule. To be sure, the “self-management” system is a glove that softens the party's grip, and occasionally makes economic decision-making cumbersome; but it has not interfered with the party's essential control over most aspects of public life.

Nevertheless, these men are going to feel insecure. The claim to legitimacy of the regime that Tito created in 1945 was based on the fact that he had fought his way to the top of the fight against the German occupation. That personalised legitimacy goes with Tito to his grave. A possible substitute began to take shape during Yugoslavia's period of liberalisation between 1966 and 1971, when most of the country's constituent republics came to be led by men of calibre, who carried weight in their regions and could speak for them. But most of those politicians, who had a genuine constituency of their own, were removed in Tito's deliberalising purge of 1971-72.

Today Yugoslavia is ruled by a group of men who, for the most part, owe their position to the president's favour. They are not particularly hardline, and certainly not pro-Soviet. Most of Yugoslavia's open admirers of the Soviet Union have been weeded out since the 1948 break with Stalin (the last clear-out was in 1974, when Soviet intrigues with them came to light).

But they are also men without real political roots. This is the longer-run danger. Tito's successors cannot control the perpetual elbowing for advantage among Yugoslavia's competitive republics with Tito's own encrusted authority. No doubt they will try a business-as-usual policy of accommodation and compromise, especially in economic matters. But in the current climate of austerity—high inflation, high unemployment and a mounting trade deficit—agreement will not be easy. In a multinational country, which Yugoslavia is, economic arguments turn only too easily into national ones, with Croats, Serbs or whoever claiming that Macedonians, Slovenes or whatever are getting the privileges they themselves are denied. Such quarrels are red meat to each national group's ambitious politicians. It took a Tito to control them; the post-Tito “collegiate” government will find it far harder.

The rootless may look east

This could be the Russians' opportunity. A government in Belgrade which felt that it was losing its hold on the country—or one faction in that government, if it felt that its rivals were carrying liberalisation too far in an attempt to maintain a federal consensus—might look to Moscow for support. Cornered and embattled post-Tito politicians might accept a shrewd Soviet offer of backing. And once political support had been accepted, the basis for a possible military intervention would have been created. The Russians went into Hungary in 1956, into Czechoslovakia in 1968—and into Afghanistan last December—on the Brezhnev-doctrine principle that they had the right to intervene to preserve those countries' “socialist achievements”.

A western policy to deny Yugoslavia to Russia now has to be devised. It should start with a declaration that the west does not want to see the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and that it would like to see the Yugoslavs move further towards pluralism but will accept their staying communist provided they also remain firmly non-aligned. The policy should include help for Yugoslavia's economy, which indirectly means help for its internal peace. But it will have to be based on a clear statement to Russia. Any Russian crossing of the border—in the form of either a military intervention or a KGB-backed coup that would pave the way for such an intervention—will be an attempt to overthrow the European balance of power, and will be met as such.

 

 

Edited May 23, 2017 by slow

[MancMellow]

So?

[Lord Protector]

So?

 

pa gde si ti imao ovo osamdesetih i devedesetih:

 

 

 

 But it will have to be based on a clear statement to Russia. Any Russian crossing of the border—in the form of either a military intervention or a KGB-backed coup that would pave the way for such an intervention—will be an attempt to overthrow the European balance of power, and will be met as such.

 

Nigde, Rusi nisu petljali po SFRJ području dugo, sve do 2004. Amerikanci su držali i nož i pogaču sve vreme. Čini mi se da su je presekli onako kako im je najviše odgovaralo.

 

Ispalo je kao sa dogovorom o neširenju NATO pakta na istok. Ugrabili su priliku vakuuma i prekonfigurisali sve po svojim interesima.

Edited May 23, 2017 by slow

[iDemo]

Nigde, Rusi nisu petljali po SFRJ području dugo, sve do 2004. Amerikanci su držali i nož i pogaču sve vreme. Čini mi se da presekli su je onako kako im je najviše odgovaralo.

 

Ispalo je kao sa dogovorom o neširenju NATO pakta na istok. Ugrabili su priliku vakuuma i prekonfigurisali sve po svojim interesima.

I ko se tu, s kim i kako dogovorio?? 

[Lord Protector]

I ko se tu, s kim i kako dogovorio?? 

 

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-shifrinson-russia-us-nato-deal--20160530-snap-story.html

 

 

 

After the Berlin Wall fell, Europe’s regional order hinged on the question of whether a reunified Germany would be aligned with the United States (and NATO), the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact) or neither. Policymakers in the George H.W. Bush administration decided in early 1990 that NATO should include the reconstituted German republic. In early February 1990, U.S. leaders made the Soviets an offer. According to transcripts of meetings in Moscow on Feb. 9, then-Secretary of State James Baker suggested that in exchange for cooperation on Germany, U.S. could make “iron-clad guarantees” that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward.” Less than a week later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to begin reunification talks. No formal deal was struck, but from all the evidence, the quid pro quo was clear: Gorbachev acceded to Germany’s western alignment and the U.S. would limit NATO’s expansion. 

Edited May 23, 2017 by slow

[iDemo]

ok je to a koliko im je (uvek) bilo za verovati - to smo videli, ne? :)