BrExit?

[MancMellow]

Meni je hit sto raznorazni brexitovci misle da oni imaju nekakav upper-hand kada su u pitanju ekonomski pregovori s Briselom...alo, ne izvozi ostatak EU 45% svoje proizvodnje i usluga u UK, nego obrnuto.

 

pa to je sama Mrs Svibanj rekla u aprilu. 8% vs 44%. Ali zato će oni pokušati da ih "posvađaju"...

Edited July 22, 2016 by MancMellow

[Roger Sanchez]

Da pojasnim, glavni će im problem biti ovo.

[MancMellow]

Kažem, "brexit means brexit" mantra ima dva kraja. A jedan je namenjen za brexit ekipu. Dobili ste izlazak iz EU, to je ono za šta ste glasali. Za ostalo nije bilo glasanja. 

[Budja]

A da nije smirivanje ekonomije posledica cinjenice da je jasno receno da aktiviranja clana 50 nema do pocetka sledece godine te da je tako jasno da Brexita nece biti jos 2,5 godine? Logicno je da je posle prve panike malo mirnije jer trziste ceka da vidi sta ce brexit zapravo biti u privrednom smislu.

 

Smirivanje i odredjen rast berze je posledica smanjenja neizvesnosti.

 

To sto Brexita nece biti jos dve godine, ne menja ocekivanja na srednji rok - Brexit means Brexit, te ja ne bih to stavio kao novu informaciju koja pokrece trzista.

 

 

Takodje, kada se govori o padu ekonomije, hajde da poredimo britansku ekonomiju sa ekonomijom ostatka EU, kao kontrolne grupe. U tom smislu mi se cini da je marginalni pad i berze i ekonomije  u poredjenju sa EU manji nego apsolutno gledano.

[bigvlada]

Da pojasnim, glavni će im problem biti ovo.

 

Auto i avioindustrija zavise od velikog broja dobavljača koji su često raštrkani po celom kontinentu. Svaki zastoj u isporukama usled njakanja na granici se piše sa mnogo nula. Samo je pitanje vremena kada će britanski komponentaši biti zamenjeni kontinentalnim. Najveći problem će biti za Airbus jer Britanci prave krila. Japanske automobilske firme sa proizvodnjom na ostrvu će smanjiti svoju VB proizvodnju (do nivoa da zadovolje domaću tražnju) a ostatak će prebaciti na kontinent. 

[Prospero]

Teška artiljerija za komšije s one strane Lamanša 
 
 
 

European Commission appoints chief Brexit negotiator but says he won't speak to UK until Article 50 triggered

Known as a tough negotiator and against a 'pick and mix' approach to the single market, he will not start in his role until 1 October

• Ashley Cowburn Political Correspondent
• @ashcowburn

Michael Barnier will not engage with the UK until Article 50 is formally triggered Getty

The European Commission has appointed a chief Brexit negotiator but has made clear he will not engage with Britain until Article 50 is formally triggered - nor start work until 1 October.

Michel Barnier, a former French government minister and ex-European Commission vice-president, will start work after the holiday season and then spend the next few months preparing the ground in Brussels for the negotiations. His appointment was announced by commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, who said he wanted "an experienced politician for this difficult job".
 
Describing Mr Barnier as "a skilled negotiator with rich experience in major policy areas relevant to the negotiations", Mr Juncker said: "I am very glad that my friend Michel Barnier accepted this important and challenging task. I wanted an experienced politician for this difficult job.

"He has an extensive network of contacts in the capitals of all EU member states and in the European Parliament, which I consider a valuable asset for this function. "Michel will have access to all Commission resources necessary to perform his tasks. He will report directly to me, and I will invite him to brief regularly the College [of commissioners] to keep my team abreast of the negotiations. I am sure that he will live up to this new challenge and help us to develop a new partnership with the United Kingdom after it will have left the European Union."

Mr Barnier, who is known as a tough negotiator, said in a Tweet he was "honoured" by the appointment.

He is known to be a purist on the principles of the single market as a fundamental tenet of the EU.

When he was European commissioner for internal markets in 2013, Mr Barnier attacked UK eurosceptics for attempting to negotiate a “pick and mix” approach to EU financial services regulation while remaining in the EU.

He told a group of MPs in London at the time: "The single market cannot be pick and mix. I have heard some people say financial services should be repatriated. It is clearly the wrong cause to fight for because financial services are an integral part of the single market and the single market is the heart of Europe.

"By definition there cannot be two single markets; one for financial services and one for other sectors; one for the City and one for the rest of the EU. This is out of question.

“Repatriating powers of financial services would mean leaving the single market and de facto the EU. I believe the UK would lose out on many of its own interests.”

Mr Juncker acknowledged earlier this week that the UK Government may need several months to prepare its position before negotiations start. In a French TV interview on Monday, he said he had no "deadline" for the talks to begin, adding: "The British Government needs several months to fine tune its position. Our British friends know that there will be no negotiation before notification of their farewell letter."

However he reiterated that Britain will have to accept four EU freedoms - including the free movement of people - "without exception or nuance" if it wants to keep full access to the single market after Brexit.

It comes as Ms May continues her diplomacy tour of Europe with a visit to Italy on Wednesday to meet Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in Rome. This will be followed by a trip to Slovakia and Poland on Thursday where she is expected to engage with the European leaders on Brexit. A Number 10 spokesman said Mrs May wanted an early visit to Italy after becoming PM earlier this month, because of the close relations it has with the UK.

 

Inače je i Junkerov specijalni savetnik za odbranu i bezbednost.

[Prospero]

E još i ovo pa da bežim:
 
 
 
Ian Dunt ‏@IanDunt 6h6 hours ago

Very quietly, Liam Fox admits that everything he's said since he entered government is nonsense.
 






 

[bigvlada]

To je izgleda u skladu sa ovim:

 

After Brexit, a game plan for the EU: unleash Project Pain

 

Joris Luyendijk

 

 

Nobody wants to be vindictive, but maximum political and economic damage would stop other arsonists. And it could help British democracy reinvent itself.

 

A prospect far more threatening than Brexit is emerging: a reasonable deal for the UK. Reports from Brussels suggest a compromise is doing the rounds under which it would be given continued access to the single market plus concessions on freedom of movement. This would be a grave mistake. If Britain comes out of this looking anything less than severely diminished it will be devastating for the EU.

 

Call it Project Pain. When the EU starts negotiating the terms of its divorce from the UK it must aim to inflict maximum political and economic damage. Financial powers should be repatriated from London and it must become nearly impossible for Asian, US or African multinationals to continue to have their EU headquarters in the UK. Universities, companies and cities must receive generous help to attract the best minds from their UK rivals, for instance by offering EU passports. There are many more blows the EU can deliver to make sure the UK faces a dark decade of economic stagnation and political isolation. Ideally, its economy should not get back to its pre-referendum size before, say, 2030.

 

The first argument for hurting the UK is by now well rehearsed: prevent another reckless exit on the basis of lies. Europhobe parties across Europe are anxious to repeat the feat of their British counterparts: using distortions, half-truths, racism and delusional fantasies to cheat their way to victory. The Europhobes are fully aware that there exists a clear trade-off between national sovereignty and economic prosperity, with more of the one meaning less of the other. They also know that if they frame the dilemma of European cooperation in these terms they will never win. So they lie, cheat and incite. Taking a leaf from the leave campaign playbook, they are sure to dismiss as Project Fear warnings by experts about the disastrous consequences. What better way to puncture these myths than pointing to the economic disaster that will be Britain?

 

As with all divorces, hurting one’s former partner is sure to provoke feelings of guilt. But these will dissipate as Europeans finally face up to just how abusive the political relationship has been. Especially in the past decade, the EU has been patient as the UK government has missed no opportunity to undermine, disparage, blackmail and even actively sabotage European politics. Push harder than anyone for enlargement, as the UK did, then criticise the EU for being too big and unwieldy. Pull yourself out of the coalition with Angela Merkel’s party in the European parliament to join a motley crew of Europhobe fringe parties, as David Cameron did with his Conservatives, then claim you are not getting anything done in the European parliament.

 

When the eurozone was hanging by a thread, George Osborne thought it necessary to announce to the world that no country was better prepared for Grexit than Britain. Then, when there was a deal on the euro mess, the UK vetoed it. Think, too, of when France was trying to reduce inequality by raising taxes on the rich, and the UK government sadistically rolled out the red carpet for French millionaires. Remember the daily heaps of abuse aimed at Europe in British newspapers over the past decades. And then there is Nigel Farage, who seems to have a compulsive need to insult his colleagues in Brussels.

 

The fact is that much of the British political elite has been using the EU as a football for their own irresponsibly petty ends. Cameron promised a referendum for party political purposes while expecting to trade that promise in coalition talks with the Lib Dems – only to see his side win an absolute majority in the elections, forcing him to act on his promise. Cameron then went to Brussels to blackmail other European leaders into giving him “concessions” – otherwise he would back the leave camp. Boris Johnson, for his part, believed that losing the referendum would land him the job of next prime minister so he joined leave – only to see his side win.

 

Which brings us to the second argument for Project Pain. Not since the Iraq war has British democracy looked less legitimate, and the parallels are striking: the use of deceitful manipulation to sell the idea, the macho swagger of its proponents and delusions about the outcome. There is no hope of British democracy cleansing itself until the architects of this Brexit disaster are hung out to dry, their careers and reputations destroyed. Indeed, this will be a good way to measure a decade from now if Project Pain has been a success. Will the names of Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Andrea Leadsom and Nigel Farage evoke the same disgust as Tony Blair and George W Bush do today?

 

Calling for the ruining of a fellow European country feels terrible, but it is not Europe’s fault that the UK has voted to pit itself against a bloc nine times its size. Still, Europeans need to remind themselves that millions of Britons did everything they could to prevent this catastrophe. It is vital, too, that European leaders – as Merkel and François Hollande did last week – continue to emphasise that this very raw deal for the UK is not about punishment – indeed, the EU has far too much on its plate to indulge in therapeutic vindictiveness.

 

Project Pain is about protecting the EU from arsonists elsewhere and about helping British democracy reinvent itself. Were the latter to happen this story would have at least something of a happy ending, and we could look back on it perhaps not as Project Pain but as Project Tough Love.

 

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/24/eu-britain-must-suffer-for-brexit

[bigvlada]

Nothing simple about UK regaining WTO status post-Brexit

27 June 2016

Peter Ungphakorn

 

In the weeks that preceded the UK’s EU referendum, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo broke his silence over the UK leaving the EU (Brexit), first with the Financial Times, followed byReuters, the Guardian, and others. One of his key points was that the UK would face complex talks in the World Trade Organization. What did he mean?

A common assumption in the June 23 referendum debate is that after leaving the EU, the UK could “simply” operate as an ordinary WTO member. Eventually that’s true, but getting there would be far from simple.

Some experts believe that the adjustments would be little more than technical, and that any negotiations would be straightforward. They could be right. It would depend on whether the WTO’s membership is determined to accommodate the UK’s wishes.

But recent experience in the WTO suggests that is unlikely. A closer look at the details suggests some key issues could be politically contentious among the WTO’s members, currently 162 countries.

On top of that, recent negotiating experience suggests that willingness to accommodate each other’s interests quickly is a scarce commodity in the WTO and even a final agreement cannot be guaranteed.

If that is true, then post-Brexit, the UK can expect a long and rough ride.

Negotiating with diverse countries

To be clear, these negotiations would be about sorting out the UK’s legal status quo in the WTO. They would be separate from any free trade agreement such as with the US, EU or anyone else, although the complicated web of talks would feed into each other.

The UK is already a WTO member, but its membership terms are bundled with the EU’s. Re-establishing the UK’s WTO status in its own right means both the UK and the EU would negotiate simultaneously with the rest of the WTO’s members to extract their separate membership terms. Agreement on the UK’s terms is unlikely before those of the EU.

For its part, the UK would have to negotiate with the EU itself, the US, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and any trading nation or group of nations that matters, large or small, rich or poor. It would only take one objection to hold up the talks because the WTO operates by consensus, not voting, one reason why WTO negotiations take so long.

The UK government would have to balance conflicting interests domestically as well.

This is not an argument for or against Brexit. Proponents on either side can weigh up the costs and benefits and make their own cases. But they cannot assume that becoming an independent WTO member will be simple and quick for the UK.

The only way it could, would be if a post-Brexit UK became — as some propose — much more of a free trader, with low import duties across the board, and minimal subsidies for farmers. This would be simple to establish in the WTO, but domestic opposition would have to be overcome first.

Otherwise, much of the UK’s negotiations in the WTO would be tough, and could still be hotly debated domestically. For example, how much in subsidies for farmers would the UK want to negotiate? Since that would come out of the EU’s entitlement, how much would Brussels want to keep for itself? How much potential protection against imports would the UK want to reserve for its producers? Negotiating those would be complex, with almost all WTO members demanding a say.

Tricky subjects

The complexity comes from the EU’s strange situation in the WTO. The EU is 29 WTO members: the 28 member states plus the EU itself. They have combined “rights” (e.g. to be able to export to other countries, and not to be discriminated against), balanced against shared “obligations” (e.g. to open up to imports from them, and not to discriminate against them).

In the WTO, the EU has agreed to keep its import duties within certain limits. For example, for some types of shoes this is a maximum of 17 percent. That limit applies to all EU members when they import from outside the EU. The EU’s quotas — allowing quantities of certain products to be imported at special lower-duty rates — are for the whole single market, not any individual country such as the UK. Limits on agricultural subsidies are also for the entire EU.

To be an independent WTO member, the UK would be creating its own rights and obligations out of the EU’s. That’s not as simple as it sounds. One reason is because other countries with different interests would want to ensure the balance is also right for them.

Take just one hard-fought issue: low-duty import quotas for high-quality beef, just two of almost 100 EU quotas. The EU opened these beef quotas after lengthy negotiations with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the US.

Extracting UK beef quotas out of the EU’s would require negotiations with all of them, plus possibly other suppliers such as Botswana, India, and Namibia, and definitely the EU itself — Ireland, Germany and France have particularly strong beef lobbies.

While the exporting countries are pressing for the UK’s quota gates to be opened wider, and jostling with each other for paths through the opening, UK farmers would be pushing in the opposite direction. Remember, to reach agreement, the WTO’s consensus rule would apply.

The EU’s black hole

Now comes the surprise. We don’t know what most of the EU’s current commitments in the WTO are. The UK would be negotiating a share of key quantities that are unknown.

The only confirmed commitments on tariffs, quotas, and farm subsidies are from before 2004 when the EU had 15 member states. The EU has expanded three times since then, but in 12 years it has been unable to agree with the WTO membership on revised commitments.

That in itself is a warning. The UK will be negotiating a share of numbers that are unknown, with no guarantee of agreement. There may be practical solutions but again they will have to be negotiated.

Take agricultural subsidies that have a direct impact on prices or on how much farmers produce. The EU’s limit for its (pre-2004) 15 members is €67.2 billion. However, when informing the WTO about its subsidies, the EU says the limit is now €72.4 billion, perhaps from a secret updated draft that has not yet been agreed by the WTO’s membership.

Actual subsidies are currently way below the limits, so the UK might have room to manoeuvre. Unless the UK decided to scrap support for prices or production volumes completely, it might try to negotiate a percentage of the EU’s limit (whatever it is). A number of responses is possible.

The hardest bargaining would take place if Australia and others persisted with their desire for everyone in the WTO to scrap this type of subsidy — allowing only a minimal amount worth up to 5 percent of the value of agricultural production. UK production is currently around £10 billion, implying a £500 million subsidy ceiling, considerably less than the £3 billion some have mentioned for a post-Brexit UK. British farmers would react.

A mountain of work

Some issues would be simpler. Many EU commitments could be converted to the UK’s without the need to negotiate, although the WTO membership would still want to confirm the conversions. This would be the case where no changes are needed.

For example, the UK could continue to observe the EU’s ceilings on tariffs (such as the 17 percent on shoes), and its market-opening pledges in services sectors. It could also simply translate EU regulations — on food safety, animal and plant health, and product standards and labelling — into its own. And so on.

That’s still a mountain of work: the EU (and UK) has around 20,000 products listed for collecting customs duties, thousands of product standards and regulations, and extremely complicated limits on access to its services market.

Besides, the UK would still be applying EU rules. Moving away from them, one of Brexit’s objectives, would require further negotiation or at least peer review in the WTO. (See also BBC Reality Check on a possible “lifetime’s worth of Parliamentary legislative sessions” in order to separate UK law from EU law)

None of this is impossible, but it won’t be sorted out quickly.

This is a slightly updated version of a post that first appeared on the Trade β Blog. A comprehensive report on these issues was published by AgraEurope in March 2016: ‘Brexit’ and WTO — Part 1: The complex search for the UK’s WTO status quo (subscription required); ‘Brexit’ and WTO: 11 facts about the EU and its strange relationship with the WTO (free to view); ‘Brexit’ and WTO — Part 2: Hard bargaining over the UK’s ‘commitments’ (subscription required)

Peter Ungphakorn was a senior information officer with the WTO Secretariat until 2015. Since then he has returned to journalism, writing part time for AgraEurope, Intellectual Property Watch and other publications, focusing mainly on international trade rules, agreements and institutions.

 

http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-wto-status-post-brexit

 

Mislio sam da će po izlasku iz EU automatski biti član WTO ali to izgleda nije slučaj. Trebaće im dva bataljona pregovarača za sve članice. 

 

[MancMellow]

Moraju da pregovaraju i sa Rusijom o clanstvu u WTO? To ce biti zanimljivo...

[Tribun_Populi]

Pa ne baš o članstvu jer im članstvo nije upitno (EU nije članica, već svaka zemlja ponaosob) već o okvirima sopstvene ekonomske politike. Tj. manevarski prostor za "reclaiming sovereignity and regaining control" im je i van EU poprilično sužen.

[Prospero]

EU je član STO od 1995, a plus su to i države članice.

[Tribun_Populi]

EU je član STO od 1995, a plus su to i države članice.

Na koju foru, kad sve do lisabonskog ugovora EU nije imala status nikakvog međunarodnopravnog entiteta (kao što ima UN i njene specijalizovane agencije, npr)?

 

Tek od lisabonskog ugovora tj. od 2009 EU može da sklapa ugovore, ima diplomatska predstavništva, bude članica međunarodnih organizacija itd. Dotle je bila u limbu između država članica s jedne i EEC, ECSC, WEU i EUROATOM s druge.

 

To je možda bila EEC, koja je formalno postojala i posle Maastrihta, sve do Lisabona. Ali nisam siguran da li je ona imala status međunarodnopravnog subjekta, da bi bila članica WTO.

 

edit: OK, drugo je u pitanju, "members are states and customs teritories". Članica može da bude i upravljačko telo carinske unije, čak i ako nema ustanovljeno svojstvo međunarodne organizacije. Dakle i Putinova EAU.

Edited July 29, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[hazard]

Na koju foru, kad sve do lisabonskog ugovora EU nije imala status nikakvog međunarodnopravnog entiteta (kao što ima UN i njene specijalizovane agencije, npr)?

 

Nije EU bila clanica WTO do 2009., nego EZ (bivsa EEZ), ona je bila pravno lice i medjunarodni entitet.

[bigvlada]

Moraju da pregovaraju i sa Rusijom o clanstvu u WTO? To ce biti zanimljivo...

 

Biće još zanimljivije kada im Grčka bude tražila frizove sa Akropolja kao uslov za potpis. Ima ihaha država kojima je britanska monarhija po njihovom shvatanju na neki način dužna. Argentina, Španija, Kipar, Mauricijus...