NATO

[namenski]

Sta je bilo u glavi onom celavom s flekom samo Bog zna.

 

Mozda:

 

Ali ce pre biti:

[frn1782]

Pa nije game over

Rusija i dalje moze da izbrishe chovechanstvo nekoliko hiljada puta ko i Amerika

Problem je sto imas ludake ko Vesli Klark koji ladno izvale "ako Rusija baci nuklearku na Varshavu nato se nece predati" lol

[mackenzie]

Jel' to onaj general što je uništio 14 tenkova 1999?

 

Ko njega shvata ozbiljno. 

[Eraserhead]

Jel' to onaj general što je uništio 14 tenkova 1999?

 

Ko njega shvata ozbiljno.

Skroz smo ih zajebali te 99.

[Tribun_Populi]

Jasno je da u u pitanju emotivna a ne racionalna ponašanja.

Ja bih rekao da su i više nego racionalna. Sprečiti vozdizanije Njemačke u glavnu europsku silu, kao i njeno zbližavanje sa Rusijom. Najednostavnije, sprečiti spajanje nemačke tehnologije sa ruskim prirodnim resursima.

 

Onaj tanz tetke i Volodimira, recimo.

[mackenzie]

Skroz smo ih zajebali te 99.

 

Pa vojnički realno jesmo.

 

Ko nam je kriv što nismo imali više tenkova da ih Vesli kidiše.

[hazard]

Dakle, puc sa ulice obori legitimno demokratski izabranog gospodina premijera Aleksandra Vucica koristeci kao neki pretekst toboznji incident u nekakvoj "savamaloj", na vlast dodje 1 siroka koalicija a za premijera se pogodi da bude onaj Obradovic iz Dveri. Kad ono medjutim, Djarme kazu "a nenene, ne moze to tako da se obara legitimno izabrana vlast gospodina premijera genija Aleka Vucka, vidi ove Dverase kakvi su sad ce da kolju nasu sabracu mirne Magyare u Backoj samo sto nisu", upale tenkove, podignu avione, upadnu u Vojvodinu, pobodu kocice oko Backe i kazu "ovo je sad Magyarska, a vi samo nastavite da obarate vlade legalno izabranih premijera koji su gospoda ljudi i da stavljate fasiste na vlast ako bas insistirate". I niko se ne iznenadi jer legitimno izabrana vlast je legitimno izabrana vlast, jel' te.

 

Kako ti se svidja narativ?

 

U tvom narativu fali

 

1) Da pucisticka vlada izjavi da joj je prvi spoljnopoliticki cilj ulaz u vojni savez koji Madjarska direktno smatra kao pretnju po sopstvene granice, kada bi tako nesto postojalo;

2) Da povod puca ne bude incident u nekoj Savamali nego bas spoljnopoliticki odnos prema Madjarskoj, tj. pitanje da li se prikloniti pro- ili anti-madjarskom bloku u svetu/regionu (kada bi, opet, tako nesto postojalo);

3) Da Madjari znaju da je puc organizovao/znatno potpomogao njihov najveci geopoliticki protivnik (ko god to bio);

4) Jasna i glasna predistorija Obradovica i Dverasa kao velikih madjaromrzitelja;

5) Da jedan od prvih poteza pucisticke vlade bude najava kako ce zakonom zabraniti upotrebu madjarskog jezika i zestoko ograniciti prava madjarske manjine.

 

Drugim recima, ne seri, 'leba ti.

Edited May 14, 2016 by hazard

[hazard]

Dobar je Kenanara. Sta su rekli Poljaci kad su procitali da ih je to samo sovjetski rezim karao, Rusi pak nikada?

 

Docim Poljake nikada nisu karali Nemci u bilo kom obliku osim u nacistickom? Ili pak jesu, kroz ono kao, celu istoriju? Pa ih to ne sprecava da sa tim Nemcima budu danas u saveznistvu na 2 nivoa (NATO i EU).

[mackenzie]

Cela Istočna Njemačka je karana od Njemaca pa to nije problem da se ujedine sa zapadom u sojuz.

[Muwan]

Dakle, puc sa ulice obori legitimno demokratski izabranog gospodina premijera Aleksandra Vucica koristeci kao neki pretekst toboznji incident u nekakvoj "savamaloj", na vlast dodje 1 siroka koalicija a za premijera se pogodi da bude onaj Obradovic iz Dveri. Kad ono medjutim, Djarme kazu "a nenene, ne moze to tako da se obara legitimno izabrana vlast gospodina premijera genija Aleka Vucka, vidi ove Dverase kakvi su sad ce da kolju nasu sabracu mirne Magyare u Backoj samo sto nisu", upale tenkove, podignu avione, upadnu u Vojvodinu, pobodu kocice oko Backe i kazu "ovo je sad Magyarska, a vi samo nastavite da obarate vlade legalno izabranih premijera koji su gospoda ljudi i da stavljate fasiste na vlast ako bas insistirate". I niko se ne iznenadi jer legitimno izabrana vlast je legitimno izabrana vlast, jel' te.

 

Kako ti se svidja narativ?

Predivan je, suzu sam pustio

 

Ima samo jedna stvar: Majdan nije počeo zato što su Janukovičevi fantomi uz pomoć berkuta pod maskama porušili nešto u Kievu već zbog toga što je Janukovič odlučio da odloži potpisivanje jednog medjunarodnog političkog sporazuma.

 

Sad, koliko se ja razumem u demokratiju, ta vrsta odlaganja je potpuno legitimna spoljnopolitička odluka za koju vlast plaća ili ne plaća cenu na izborima. Kada neko napravi ulični prevrat jer mu se ne svidja spoljnopolitička strategija aktuelne vlasti (a ta vlast je smenjiva i izbori su koliko-toliko slobodni) onda to baš i nije demokratija. Živo me zanima šta bi se desilo tu gde ti živiš, kada bi 100k nezadovoljnika došlo da okupira Capitol jer im se ne dopada Obamina politika prema Meksiku i približavanje Iranu. Pa im se usput pridruže neke čike iz Michigana u maskirnim uniformama i krenu da overavaju prisutne policajce kaldrmom u potiljak. Ono, izbori su precenjeni kada je viši cilj u pitanju?

 

A narativ ti je svejedno faličan. Da valja, u njemu bi počeli protesti na Terazijama zbog odluke vlasti da Srbija udje u NATO. Protesti su u početku urbani™ ali posle par nedelja ih lagano prisvaja i preuzima hardcore ekipa iz SRS/Zveri/Obraza/Naših i naravno napaćena deca Srbije poznatija kao navijači. Skandiranja protiv vlasti zamenjuju poruke mira tipa: 'Pola Madjar pola ustaša' i 'Ubijzakolji da djarma ne postoji'. Zatim ta ekipa sprovodi puč i dok se uspostavlja nova vlast oni najavljuju pohod i čišćenje Subotice i Sente.

 

To je narativ za kojim si neuspešno tragao.

[Gandalf]

Pa to vazi i za Rusija = SSSR dakle nivi Hladni rat.

 

Ako Rusiju stalno smatras za neprijatelja onda ce se ona u nekom trenutku zaista postaviti kao neprijatelj.

naravno. Gorbi i Jeljcin su pokusali da prekinu taj krug, Klinton & co su zahebali stvar.

[Dagmar]

Ja bih rekao da su i više nego racionalna. Sprečiti vozdizanije Njemačke u glavnu europsku silu, kao i njeno zbližavanje sa Rusijom. Najednostavnije, sprečiti spajanje nemačke tehnologije sa ruskim prirodnim resursima.

 

Onaj tanz tetke i Volodimira, recimo.

 

Ne pričam o tome kao iracionalnom, nego toj nekoj osobini Poljaka da su im Nemci koji su ih anihilirali OK, a Rusi koji su ih držali okupirane nisu nikako i oni su najstrašniji i Poljaci im nikako ne mogu oprostiti taj neki sedamnaesti deo onoga što su im napravili Nemci.

[Prospero]

Preserving the New Реасе
The Case Against NATO Expansion

Michael Mandelbaum

Christian А. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul Н. Nitze School of Advanced International Stud­ ies, Јohns Hopkins UniYersity, and Director of the Project on East-West Rela­ tions at the Council оп Foreign Relations.



Proponents of extending NATO member­ ship to the Visegrad countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slo­vakia - can bе divided into two camps. Those in the first camp assert that the purpose is solely to promote democracy and free markets in central Europe and has nothing to do with the military power and political aspirations of any other country. For the second group, NATO expansion has everything to do with the threat frorn Russia.

On their point of disagreement, the second group has the stronger argument. NATO expansion is about Russia. But on the policy they commonly advocate, both are unpersuasive. NATO expansion, under present circumstances and as currently envisioned, is at best premature, at worst counterproductive, and in аnу case largely irrelevant to the problems confronting the countries situated between Germany and Russia.

If NATO is to bе а vehicle for the pro­ motion of democracy in the post-Cold War world, and, judging from Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's recent article ("America, а European Power," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995), this is the position of the Clinton administration, there is no reason that all the formerly communist countries of Eurasia should not join. Certainly, if the promotion of democracy is NATO's new mission, then the expansion under consideration does not reach far enough to the east. For the countries under active consideration are precisely those best placed to make а successful transition to democracy and free markets without NATO membership. It is in Russia and Ukraine that the development of Western political and economic systems will bе most difficult, where failure would bе most costly for Europe, and where, therefore, success would have the greatest benefit.

In fact, however, NATO is not an effective instrument for promoting either free markets or democracy. In the second half of the 1940s, when the fate of demo­ cracy and free markets in Western Europe was the preeminent international issue, the principal response - and an extremely successful one - was the Marshall Plan. The plan provided capi­tal, market access, and incentives for economic cooperation, аll of which cen­tral Europe currently needs. The logical source for аll three is not NATO; it is the European Union, membership in which is а matter of the highest priority for each of the Visegrad countries.

ANXIETY ABOUT RUSSIA

NATO is not only not the most effective instrument for promoting democracy, it is not in essence an organization for doing so. Rather, it is а military alliance, an association of some sovereign states directed against others. The "other" in this case is Russia. Anxiety about Russia makes NATO membership attractive to central Euro­ peans. In the words of Bronislaw Gere­mek, а prominent democratic politician in Poland speaking in the September 6, 1993, Washington Post, ''At the moment Russia is weak. But we know that this is а transi­ tional period. The Soviet empire could bе succeeded Ьу the Russian empire. In some years, Russia will become а superpower again--and the memory of this period of weakness will have an important psycho­logical impact on а new generation of Russian leaders." Poles have been dominated and oppressed bу Russia for most of the last two centuries. It is hardly surprising that they should want some insurance against the revival of Russian imperial behavior, which is what NATO membership offers them.

Americans who favor expanding NATO for reasons having to do with Russia rather than the promotion of democracy agree. In the post-Cold War era, they say, NATO should bе more or less what it was during the Cold War: а mechanism for containing а smaller, no longer communist, but still aggressive Russia. Peter W. Rodman, а senior foreign policy official in the last four Republican administrations, has made the point with admiraЬle clarity in the December 13, 1994, Washington Post: "Some will lament that [in expanding NATO to central Europe] we have drawn а new line divid­ ing the European continent. Nonsense.

Russia is already getting back on its feet geopolitically, even before it gets back on its feet economically. The only potential great-power security problem in central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the јоb of counter-balancing it. Russia is а force of nature; all this is inevitable."

As with the argument that NATO will promote democracy, however, even if the premise of this "neo-containment" ratio­nale for NATO expansion is correct, even if Russian imperialism is bound to revive, the proposed extension of the Atlantic alliance does not go sufficiently far eastward. Poland, after all, is not directly threatened bу Russia. The country most important to the West that is immedi­ately vulnerable to а renewal of aggressive Russian behavior is Ukraine. Yet no one is suggesting that Ukraine join NATO. Indeed, discussions of NATO tend to treat Ukraine as marginal.

Ukraine, however, is the opposite of marginal: it is central. So long as it remains independent it is а buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will remain а peaceful nation-state. Conflict between the two would have adverse repercussions to the west. And if Moscow absorbed Ukraine or attempted to do so, Russia would again become а multina­tional empire harboring а large, resentful subject nation, with poor prospects for the construction of а staЫe democratic system. It is not an exaggera tion to say that NATO expansion will Ье good or bad depending on its effect on tЬ е peaceful coexistence of Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainians, at least, do not seem to believe that expanding the Atlantic alliance will benefit them. On the con­ trary, they appear to feel that the exten­sion of NATO membership to central Europe would relegate Ukraine to the dangerous side of а new dividing line. The Ukrainian government, unlike its Polish counterpart, has not advocated eastward NATO expansion. Leaving Ukraine feeling isolated would in all likelihood weaken its commitment to relinquishing to Russia all the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union, а major goal of the last two American administrations.

Still, the logic of extending the alliance for reasons of neo-containment is far from implausble. If Russia is bound to resume its traditionally impe­rial foreign policy; if, when it does so, the requirements of American security will demand the eastward expansion of NATO; and if taking this inevitaЫe step is better now when Russia is weak rather than later when it has grown strong, then it follows that alliance membershlp should bе promptly extended, althougl1 to include Ukraine and perhaps the Baltic states rather than simply the Visegrad four. But is all this correct?

It is not necessarily correct. Russia may again seek to disturb the реасе of Europe but is not destined to do so. There is no Russian national equivalent of а genetic predisposition to aggression. Neither Russia in general nor Russian foreign policy in particular is an impersonal, inevitable force of nature. "Nations are not constants," as the distinguished historian of Russia Martin Malia has written, arguing democracy and free markets can take root in Russia, although not instantly or easily. "It is pseudowisdom to deduce future prospects mechanically from past precedents."

Moreover, acting as if the neo-containment premise were correct runs two risks. The first is the risk оf weakeп­ing the democrats in Russian politics, who are struggling against powerful undemocratic political forces and whom the Russian pubic identifies with the West. No Russian with any semblance of democratic credentials, starting with President Boris Yeltsin, has endorsed the extension of NATO to central Europe.

Many emphatically oppose it. То bе sure, the struggle for Russia's political future will not depend principally on what NATO does: it is possble that democracy will triumph even if the Visegrad countries were to join NATO. It is also possiЬle­ perhaps, alas, even likely-that the cause of democracy will fail even if NATO expansion does not take place. But expanding the alliance will certainly not assist Russia's democrats.

There is а second risk: that Russia would regard the new configuration of European security that an expanded NATO would produce as illegitimate because it had been imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post-World War I settle­ ment an illegitimate "dictated" реасе.

According to Sergei А. Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe in Moscow and а Yeltsin adviser, if "NATO expands eastward, Russia under any government will become а revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order." It is significant that all the modifications in Europe's security arrangements from 1987 to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion would mark а departure from that pattern.

ТНЕ POST-COLD WAR SEТТLEMENT

The new post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe to which Russia has agreed are, in turn, the most impor­tant reason that NATO expansion is not only unwise but unnecessary. Proponents of expansion assert that а security vac­uum in Europe must bе filled bу "new security architecture," of which а NATO encompassing central Europe ought to bе an important part.

In fact, there is no such vacuum. The foundation of а new and radically different security order is in place. It consists of the remarkable series of arms control accords, covering nuclear and conventional weapons, negotiated in the five years between the December 1987 treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and the Јanuary 1993 START accord covering long-range nuclear weapons. Together these agreements form an arrangement that Europe has never had, а common security order based not on the age-old balance of power but rather on consensus and cooperation. It has three main features.

First, it is the product of negotiations. For the first time, the distribution of armed forces in Europe has been fixed Ьу treaties into which the countries of Europe and North America have freely entered. In this sense, each country's forces have the approval of all the others.
Second, Europe's military forces have been reshaped so that they are more suitable for defense than attack. This shift is partly bу design and partly а matter of numbers: the treaties both reduce and equalize the numbers of weapons in Europe, and equality favors the defense because а successful attack ordinarily requires numerical superiority.
Third, as а result of the verification provisions of the arms treaties and а supplementary series of confidence­ building measures, military forces in Europe are transparent: each country can see not only what forces all the oth­ ers have but also what the others are doing with their forces.

The terms of these treaties make virtu­ ally impossiЬle what, during the Cold War, it was NAтo's mission to prevent: а success­ ful westward attack Ьу а Russian army.

ТНЕ РЕАСЕ МАУ NOT ENDURE

This does not mean that NATO is now superfluous and should bе dissolved. The alliance is necessary to ensue the United States remains involved in Europe's political and military affairs. An ongoing American role will reassure Germany that it need not arm itself more heavily to remain secure, something that would make Germany's neighbors feel less secure. Keeping NATO in being will also assure the Europeans that, if Russia does resume an imperial foreign policy, the United States will Ье committed to tak­ing part in an anti-Russian coalition.

Both these tasks, however, can bе carried out without the eastward expansion of the alliance. Depending on the course of events in Russia, it may ultimately bе possiЬle to carry them out bу returning to the alliance's original form, as а guarantee pact rather than an integrated multina­tional army on the Europeaп continent.

On the other hand, Europe's new common security order may not endure. It will survive only so long as all parties voluntarily observe its rules. If' опе coun­ try abandons them, the order will col­lapse. The European power likeliest to abandon the rules is Russia.

Three developments would signal the end of the effort to transcend balance-of­ power politics in Europe. The first is Rus­sian violation of the political or territorial integrity of its western neighbors, Ukraine and the Baltic states. Such violations аre already occurring to Russia's south, in the Caucasus, but they do not threaten West­ern security as would comparable behavior to the west. А second damaging develop­ ment would bе а serious violation of the major European arms control treaties. The third deathblow would bе the adveпt of а xenophobic, hypernationalist, or neo­ fascist government in Moscow. While in theory even such а regime might conduct а peaceful foreign policy, in practice none of Russia's neighbors will wish to wait to see whether it does. They will want to join NATO, and in these circumstances they should bе admitted.

While the new common security order can fail rapidly, it can only succeed slowly. If Russia seeks to overturn the post-Cold War settlement, failure will bе obvious in short order; but its neighbors will not bе confident of Russia's commit­ ment to the rules of common security unless and until Moscow has followed them for а long time.

Because Russia is so weak, chaotic, and preoccupied with its internal affairs, the West has а long time. During the Cold War, the qualities it was important to bring to bear in dealing with the Soviet Union were constant vigilance, firm determination, and the capacity to respond instantaneously. Of comparable: importance today is а quality that is in some ways their opposite and is often in short supply: patience.


FOREIGN AFFAIRS • May/June 1995

[dillinger]

Prošao je momentum za Ruse. Da su se pre dve-tri godine ušetali u Estoniju, NATO bi se raspao jer se niko ne bi usudio aktivirati famozni član 5. Sad su u ozbiljnoj defanzivi, agresivna alijansa ih prisiljava na enormna ulaganja u sisteme odbrane a para sve manje.

[Lord Protector]

Prošao je momentum za Ruse. Da su se pre dve-tri godine ušetali u Estoniju, NATO bi se raspao jer se niko ne bi usudio aktivirati famozni član 5. Sad su u ozbiljnoj defanzivi, agresivna alijansa ih prisiljava na enormna ulaganja u sisteme odbrane a para sve manje.

 

Ulazak Rusa  u Estoniju pre dve-tri godine, kao i danas, bi bio jedenje sira iz NATO mišolovke. Rusi ni u ludilu ne bi izvršili invaziju na državu članicu NATO pakta bez direktne vojne pretnje koja bi ugrozila ruski vitalni interes. Ne samo zato što bi se aktivirao član 5. već zato što bi to bio neoboriv propagandni razlog za dalje američko prisustvo i ukupavanje u istočnoj Evropi. Došlo bi do totalne antiruske histerije mnogo veće i ozbilnije nego ove oko ukrajinske krize. NATO paktu treba razlog za postojanje i ruska intervencija bi bila upravo to. Rusi asimetrično odgovaraju na bezbednosni pritisak koji se zadnjih godina vrši na njihovim granicama i direktno vojno reaguju samo kada su pređene crvene linije (Donbas, Krim, Sirija). Jedna od crvenih linija je fizička bezbednost ruske nacionalne manjine u okolnim državama, i sve dok ona nije direktno ugrožena vojna sredstva su isključena. Kada bi Estonci fizički ugrozili Ruse tada bi došlo do vojne krize, ovako sve ostaje na nivou pokazivanja mišića i vojne igrice u međunarodnom prostoru.

Ni ovaj američki protivraketni štit trenutno ne predstavlja neki veći problem za ruske strateške nuklearne snage jer Rusi ubrzano naoružavaju nove nuklearne podmornice tako da zaobiđu štit koji bi se stvorio oko njihovih granica. Trenutna dreka i negodovanje ima više politički i propagandni karakter a manje vojni.

Edited May 14, 2016 by slow