NATO

[Gandalf]

18 minutes ago, namenski said:

Ili mozda izistinski verujes da bi americka benevolentnost isla dotle da u slucaju ozbiljne krize ne bi iskoristili mogucnost da se cenjkaju na racun zapadne Evrope?

imam nešto jače od vere, ozbiljnu krizu. 

 

The reason was that, for Kennedy, the crisis was not centrally about missiles in Cuba; it was about Berlin... If Kennedy showed weakness in face of Khrushchev's challenge, the effect might be to embolden Khrushchev to ignore American warnings about Berlin. It would then be Kennedy, not Khrushchev, who would bear the onus. 'A Soviet move on Berlin,' Kennedy said to the joint chiefs of staff, 'leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative.'

 

(potpuno nebitno da li je Hruščov imao Berlin na umu. u ovoj diskusiji je bitno samo to da je Kenedi verovao da na Kubi brani i Berlin, pa je braneći Berlin rizikovao sudbinu Kolumbusa. nije se cenjkao.)

[namenski]

1 minute ago, Gandalf said:

(potpuno nebitno da li je Hruščov imao Berlin na umu. u ovoj diskusiji je bitno samo to da je Kenedi verovao da na Kubi brani i Berlin, pa je braneći Berlin rizikovao sudbinu Kolumbusa. nije se cenjkao.)

Zaista mislis da se ne bi cenjkao?

A u pricu o bilo cijoj veri veri da se na Kubi brani Berlin, ma daj bre mani me idealizacije Kenedija...

Pa jebote, ubih se pokusavajuci da raspravim da se upravo u tome sastoje ekstremne negativnosti hegemonizma, ma bio i benevolentan^tm: kriza na Kubi, potencijalno ugrozavanje americkog kopna, neposredno se odrazava - Amerikanci je odraze - na odnose u Evropi koju bi - sa ili bez NATO - boleo kurac za to sto se neko usudio da zagrozi Svetoj Americi i to u situaciji kada je cela na meti.

Uostalom, zar ti samo stavljanje Berlina u kontekst kubanske krize ne govori dovoljno upravo o onome na sta sam pokusao da ti skrenem paznju: na cinjenicu da kad benevolentni hegemon kine na Kubi ili Indokini, svejedno, Evropa dobije kijavicu.

Sustina hegemonizma, onako kako ga ti pokusavas da predstavis se, bez maske, odlicno vidi danas: pritisak na Evropu da uvede Rusiji sankcije, nepotrebno i pogresno zaostri odnose, guranje u raznorazne intervencije u kojima Evropa nema ama bas nikakvog interesa - razlika je samo u tome sto hegemon nije vise benevolentan, nego ogoljeno sirov u pokusaju da zastiti svoje interese to po pravilu na racun benevolentno hegemonisanih.

 

Uostalom, ne vidim sta te sprecavalo da potegnes i jednu drugu krizu, inace skolski primer americke benevolentnosti glede zapadnoevropskih interesa: pogledaj, na primer, pod Suec 1956...

[dillinger]

1 hour ago, Gandalf said:

hebem li ga, to da je neko u proleće 2014-e tripovao kako je državni udar u Kijevu nekakva američka ujdurma... imalo je nekog smisla.

 

više nema nikakvog smisla. previše vremena je prošlo, bez ikakvih indicija da su Ameri (ili EU) imali iole bitnu ulogu u protestima ili u puču.

 

A ko se uopšte bavi istragom, od koga očekuješ da obelodani te konekcije?

 

To je ko i slučaj ekspresnog naoružavanja opozicije u Libiji i Siriji. Nema dokaza, sve grassroots pokreti!

[Lord Protector]

11 hours ago, Gandalf said:

ponudili im dogovor nakon što su protesti uzeli maha, čime su samo stvorili percepciju da je Janukovič Putinova kučka. 

 

Ah, kučka...dve godine pre tih događaja EU i MMF su ucenjivali Ukrajinu nemogućim finansijkim uslovima i nisu hteli da pomognu raspaloj ukrajinskoj ekonomiji, već su zatezali kratak dužnički lanac kojim je bila privezana Ukrajina: 

 

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The reason given for the (stop preparations for signing EU-agreement) decree was that the previous months Ukraine had experienced "a drop in industrial production and our relations with CIScountries".^[26] The government also assured "Ukraine will resume preparing the agreement when the drop in industrial production and our relations with CIS countries are compensated by the European market".^[26] During two years of negotiations, Ukraine did not raise the issue of large, unconditional grants from the EU and IMF until the eve of the Vilnius summit.^[27] According to Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov "the extremely harsh conditions" of an IMF loan (presented by the IMF on 20 November 2013), which included big budget cuts and a 40% increase in gas bills, had been the last argument in favor of the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement.^[28][29] On 7 December 2013 the IMF clarified that it was not insisting on a single-stage increase in natural gas tariffs in Ukraine by 40%, but recommended that they be gradually raised to an economically justified level while compensating the poorest segments of the population for the losses from such an increase by strengthening targeted social assistance.^[30] The same day IMF Resident Representative in Ukraine Jerome Vacher stated that this particular IMF loan is worth US$4 billion and that it would be linked with "policy, which would remove disproportions and stimulated growth".

 

Onog trenutka kada je Janukovič odlučio da olabavi omču ekspresno je dobio Desni sektor na ulicama. 

Edited July 15, 2018 by slow

[Anduril]

Slucajno si zaboravio sta je prethodilo - sankcije Kremlja. To naravno nikad ne bi okarakterisao kao nemoguce i udarac ekonomiji. Kako te ne mrzi da stalno precutkujes? Ako te zanima analiza, obda uzimas sve u obzir, ako te zanima propaganda onda radis ovako kao sada.

 

In Mid-August 2013 Russia changed its customs regulations on imports from Ukraine.^{[8][nb 1]} Ukrainian Industrial Policy Minister Mykhailo Korolenko stated on 18 December 2013 that because of this Ukraine's exported had dropped by $1.4 billion (or a 10% year-on-year decrease through the first 10 months of the year).^[8] The State Statistics Service of Ukraine reported in November 2013 that in comparison with the same months of 2012 industrial production in Ukraine in October 2013 had fallen by 4.9 percent, in September 2013 by 5.6 percent and in August 2013 by 5.4 percent (and that the industrial production in Ukraine in 2012 total had fallen by 1.8 percent).^[10] In June 2010 (a few months after the 2010 Ukrainian–Russian Naval Base for Natural Gas treaty^[11]), Ukraine paid Gazprom(the Russian government controls 50.002% of shares in Gazprom^[12]) around $234 per 1,000 cubic metres of natural gas.^[13] In January 2013 Ukraine paid $430 per 1,000 cubic metres.^[14]And at the time of the 17 December 2013 agreement Ukraine still paid more than $400.^[3]Since August 2011 Ukraine seeks to reduce imports of Russian natural gas by two-thirds (compared with 2010) by 2016.^[15] Natural gas is Ukraine’s biggest import at present and is the main cause of the country’s structural trade deficit.^[16]

[Gandalf]

15 hours ago, namenski said:

Zaista mislis da se ne bi cenjkao?

Kenedi i njegovi savetnici su bili uvereni da su sovjetske nuklearke na Kubi u suštini pokušaj da se Ameri prisile da predaju zapadni Berlin*. to uverenje je bilo toliko jako da je Kenedi bio ubeđen da bi se lako dogovorio sa Hruščevom, ukoliko Berlin ne bi bio toliki problem. umesto da Hruščovu ponudi ono što je Hruščov navodno najviše želeo (tj. Berlin), Kenedi se kockao i rizikovao nuklearni rat u kome bi nuklearke padale po američkim gradovima. pri tome je Kenedi pred saradnicima procenjivao rizik nuklearnog rata tu negde između 1:3 i 1:2. 

 

u najgorem trenutku, američki predsednik nije ponudio da preda zapadni Berlin kako bi spasao Kolumbus.

 

nije se cenjkao.

 

*to uverenje je bilo potpuno pogrešno, ali to u ovoj diskusiji nije bitno. takođe je poptuno nebitno da li je Kenedi bio lep, dobar, pametan... nebitno da li je ono što je uradio valjalo ili ne... ništa od toga nije bilo tvoje pitanje.

Edited July 15, 2018 by Gandalf

[namenski]

3 minutes ago, Gandalf said:

nije se cenjkao.

Gandalfe, Gandalfe, cenjkanje je sustina te igre, koreografija^tm ponasanja u nuklearnim krizama se oko Kube tek ucila, uspostavljala su se neka pravila igre: cenjkanja je bilo onoliko, sa sve americkim pristankom na izjavu da ni u kom slucaju nece napadati Kubu, pristankom da povuku svoje rakete razmestene u Turskoj poprilicno pre Kube i obostranom zeljom da ni jedna strana u sukobu ne bude javno ponizena i dovedena u polozaj gubitnika.

Ne mogu da verujem da se (bas toliko) pravis blesav: Berlin je bio kolaterala, za Sovjete u svakom slucaju lak i ako vojno nevazan cilj s obzirom da se nalazio u sred srede DDR, dok za SAD ni u kom slucaju nije bio nista vise od objekta prestiza.

Na sve to uporno izbegavas da komentarises tvrdnju da je zapadna Evropa pod americkom benevolentnom hegemonijom bila - izmedju ostalog - talac americke politike i odbrane americkih interesa diljem Planete sto je donekle i danas, da nema dobre ili po tebi benevolentne hegemonije, bas kao sto nema ni onog cuvenog besplatnog rucka: uostalom, zar ti samom ne smeta sopstvena tvrdnja da se igre oko evropskog Berlina igraju na i oko tamo neke Kube sa koje je - gle slucaja - ugrozen ne Berlin ili bilo koji evropski cilj, nego Svete Americke Drzave.

I to od strane 2 hegemona: onog benevolentnog i onog drugog^tm...

Ali, 'ajde...

 

A sto se tice Kenedijeve kocke i slicnih mitova za mlade, lepe i pametne: nema tu, niti je bilo ikakve kocke.

Danasnja novokomponovana istoriografija pokusava da romantizuje i ideologizuje Kenedijevu kratkotrajnu vladavinu, prenebregava da je on covek koji je nepovratno uvukao Ameriku u Vijetnam, itd, itd...

A sto se tice same kubanske krize, ona je bila upravo suprotno od kocke: zaboravlja se da su sa Kenedijem u Belu kucu usli likovi poput Maknamare i kompanije, 1 tehnokratska elita i to u sred perioda nevidjenog tehnoloskog entuzijazma - bila je verovatno prva lekcija modernog, tehnokratskog pristupa politici i ratovodstvu, sa sve uvodjenjem teorije igara u arsenal, ali jeste bila i prilika u kojoj je Kenedi dokazao da poseduje osobine kao sto su odlucnost, cvrstina ali i sposobnost citanja i slanja diplomatskih signala u najboljoj tradiciji klasicne diplomatske tradicije.

 

Pricam ti pricu su procene o 1:3, 1:2..., a unapred ti kazem zajebi me sa citatima  

 

23 minutes ago, Gandalf said:

u najgorem trenutku, američki predsednik nije ponudio da preda zapadni Berlin kako bi spasao Kolumbus.

Nije, a i zasto bi:

Quote

 

...Khrushchev broadcast (27. oktobar)  from Moscow a second message saying the missiles would be removed if, in addition, the United States withdrew nuclear missiles and other 'offensive means' from Turkey.

The second Khrushchev message provoked furious debate. With Ball in the lead, Kennedy's advisers said almost unanimously that Khrushchev's new condition was unacceptable. America's NATO allies would think the United States was sacrificing their security for the sake of its own. Kennedy alone seemed unconvinced. When Ball said, 'If we talked to the Turks... this would be an extremely unsettling business', Kennedy replied with asperity, 'Well, this is unsettling now, George, because ... most people would regard this as not an unreasonable proposal ... I think you're going to have it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba ... when he's saying, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba."'.

 

Na sta sledi potez da se sacuva obraz, svi vuci siti, a ovce na broju:

Quote

He sent Robert Kennedy to see the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to tell him that the missiles in Turkey were obsolete, and that the US planned to pull them out within about six months.

Itd, itd, uostalom nevazno, valjanost koju potezes sa ovom pricom nema ama bas nikakve veze.

 

 

(The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May (W.W. Norton, 2002)

[Gandalf]

13 hours ago, namenski said:

Berlin je bio kolaterala, za Sovjete u svakom slucaju lak i ako vojno nevazan cilj s obzirom da se nalazio u sred srede DDR, dok za SAD ni u kom slucaju nije bio nista vise od objekta prestiza.

1) pre svega, ovde si napisao jednu potpunu besmislicu. Berlin je Amerima i saveznicima bio daleko bitniji od prostog prestiža. Ameri su obećali da će zapadni Berlin braniti svim sredstvima - u praksi, to je značilo da su Ameri obećali da će Berlin braniti nuklearkama. eventualna predaja zapadnog Berlina, bez američkog nuklearnog odgovora, bi predstavljala gubitak kredibiliteta i američke bezbednosne garancije bi izgubile smisao. to ti je pitanje kredibiliteta (jako bitna stavka u teoriji igara, između ostalog).

2) e sad... šta god ti o svemu tome mislio, šta god ja o tome mislio, šta god su Sovjeti tada mislili i planirali, da li je to bilo dobro ili loše... potpuno je nebitno.

za američku administraciju, tu i tada, vrtelo se oko Berlina. jer su Amerikanci na osnovu njima tada dostupnih informacija izvukli neke pogrešne zaključke. i na osnovu tih pogrešnih zaključaka su donosili odluke. to često biva u međunarodnim odnosima (kao i u svim drugim ljudskim delatnostima). pre nego su pregovori krenuli, Kenedi i društvo su tripovali da se rizikuje nuklearni rat zbog Berlina. i Kenedi tada nije bio spreman da popusti, jer je status Berlina ipak bio previše bitan. In response to RFK’s question, the president estimated the odds of nuclear war between one-third and one half, and that 20 million to 90 million Americans could be killed.

 

nije se cenjkao na račun zapadne Evrope. ispostavilo se da nije bilo potrebe, ali to Kenedi nije znao barem do 27-og oktobra.

 

da te podsetim, ovo je bilo tvoje pitanje: Ili mozda izistinski verujes da bi americka benevolentnost isla dotle da u slucaju ozbiljne krize ne bi iskoristili mogucnost da se cenjkaju na racun zapadne Evrope?

Edited July 16, 2018 by Gandalf

[Budja]

Quote

Back to Videos

Rand Paul: Russians Aren't Going To Admit Election Interference, "We Also Do The Same"

 

Posted By Tim Hains
On Date July 15, 2018

 

 

Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) says Russia isn't ever going to admit to interfering in the 2016 US presidential election, while also stating NATO expansion stimulated nationalism in Russia and helped lead to the rise of Vladimir Putin.

 

[Gandalf]

31 minutes ago, Budja said:

We Also Do The Same

tako je. a kada Rusi uhvate nekoga svog ko radi za Amere, oni dotičnog obese za jajca. ugledajmo se na Ruse. za početak, Rend Pol radi za Amere.

Edited July 16, 2018 by Gandalf

[Budja]

1 hour ago, Gandalf said:

tako je. a kada Rusi uhvate nekoga svog ko radi za Amere, oni dotičnog obese za jajca. ugledajmo se na Ruse. za početak, Rend Pol radi za Amere.

 

Nista te ne shvatam.

 

Ko je od ovih 12 GRUovaca americki drzavljanin?

 

Kada su to Amerikanci izrucili, na primer, 1 VIlijama Vokera?

[Gandalf]

1 minute ago, Budja said:

Nista te ne shvatam.

valjalo bi se ugledati na Ruse = besiti za jajca one Amere koji su radili sa GRUom, Asanžom...

[Budja]

1 minute ago, Gandalf said:

valjalo bi se ugledati na Ruse = besiti za jajca one Amere koji su radili sa GRUom, Asanžom...

 

Snouden se seta Njujorkom a Celzi ni cetiri godine nije provela u zatvoru a Asanz zivi punim plucima u 4 kvadrata.

[Gandalf]

12 minutes ago, Budja said:

Snouden se seta Njujorkom a Celzi ni cetiri godine nije provela u zatvoru a Asanz zivi punim plucima u 4 kvadrata.

Snouden se šeta Njujorkom!? možda si mislio na Moskvu? Čelzi je odslužila i to je završena priča.

 

ali nisu njih dvoje bitni u ovoj priči. bitni su oni koji su (svesno) sarađivali sa GRUom u ovoj izbornoj zajebanciji (aka election interference).

 

edit: a ako se u istrazi veštica omakne, pa nezasluženo i ničim izazvano najebe Rend Pol... 

Edited July 16, 2018 by Gandalf

[Lord Protector]

On 15.7.2018. at 9:52, Anduril said:

Slucajno si zaboravio sta je prethodilo - sankcije Kremlja. To naravno nikad ne bi okarakterisao kao nemoguce i udarac ekonomiji. Kako te ne mrzi da stalno precutkujes? Ako te zanima analiza, obda uzimas sve u obzir, ako te zanima propaganda onda radis ovako kao sada.

 

ne prećutkujem ništa, Rusija i Ukrajina su imale veliki broj ekonomskih sporova i blokada pre 2013, svojevrsnih gasnih "ratova", ali se sve završavalo uglavnom dogovorom. Ono što je je poremetilo tektonski njihove odnose je Sporazum o pridruživanju Ukrajine EU. EU je bila isključiva i odbijala je bilo kakav dogovor u trouglu EU-Ukrajina-Rusija, a sporazum je (između ostalog) povlačio sa sobom gomilu bezbednosnih problema.

 

Iz knjige britanskog istoričara:

 

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 Political and economic matters were deeply entwined. However, it was a third element that provoked no less concern in Moscow: the surprising degree of security concerns. The Wider European agenda, as argued above, united not just the EU’s traditional political and economic interests, but collapsed into the Euro-Atlantic security partnership. This was a dangerous elision, and now produced bitter fruit. A number of clauses in the Association Agreement inevitably raised concerns in the Kremlin. Article 4 talks of the ‘Aims of political dialogue’, with section 1 stressing that political dialogue in all areas of mutual interest shall be further developed and strengthened between the Parties. This will promote gradual convergence on foreign and security matters with the aim of Ukraine’s ever-deeper involvement in the European security area. Article 7 called for EU–Ukrainian convergence in foreign affairs, security and defence, while Article 10 on ‘Conflict prevention, crisis management and military–technological cooperation’ notes in section 3 that ‘the parties shall explore the potential of military and technological cooperation. Ukraine and the European Defence Agency (EDA) will establish close contacts to discuss military capability improvement, including technological issues.’ Thus the EU asserted exclusivity in security matters, which would have become operative as soon as Ukraine signed up at the Vilnius summit. Although couched in classic European language of peace and development, the agreement in effect announced a formal state of contestation with Russia over the lands between. The EU ‘slid involuntarily into competition with Russia’. 51 By the same token, yet another step was taken in the EU’s move away from being a peace project to perpetuating conflict in new forms, and thus undermining the credibility of the European project in its entirety.

Since the establishment of the EaP, Putin had repeatedly advanced various formats for trilateral discussion between Moscow, the EU and the respective partnership countries. Various plans had been proposed to modernise Ukraine’s gas transit network and to manage the trade issues that would arise from signing the DCFTA. Such ideas were repeatedly rebuffed, with for example Barroso being quoted by news agencies as late as 29 November 2013 as saying: ‘Russia’s inclusion in the talks on setting up an Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine is wholly unacceptable.’ It is in this context that Moscow expended an extraordinary amount of effort to dissuade Kiev from signing the agreement, including various sanctions and trade bans. The ultimate goal was to encourage Ukraine to join what was planned to become the EEU, but this did not necessarily exclude closer association with the EU. Ways no doubt could have been found to ensure compatibility between the two free-trade zones, and indeed, if there had been the will, Ukraine could have acted as the bridge between the two. There were also ‘sentimental’ factors at work, with 3 million Ukrainians living in Russia, tied together by a plenitude of cultural and human ties. Emigrant remittances totalled some $10 billion a year, some 4 per cent of Ukrainian GDP. In 2012, Andrei Kostin, the head of VTB Bank, had already sought to convince Ukrainian politicians that the EU deal was an ‘arranged marriage’, whereas association with Russia offered the country ‘real love’. Putin repeatedly warned of Russia’s worry that once the Ukrainian market was opened to EU goods, the Russian market would be flooded by lower-quality Ukrainian items seeking new markets to the east. From July 2013 various crude sanctions were imposed, including a ban on imports of Poroshenko’s Roshen confectionery, on the grounds that they failed to meet food-safety standards. In September a ban was imposed on the import of railway wagons. Medvedchuk and what had now become his Ukrainian Choice party sponsored a publicity campaign to convince Ukrainian society that association with the EEU was in Ukraine’s best interests. The hardest line of all was pursued by Sergei Glazyev, Putin’s advisor on Eurasian integration, who in 2013 repeatedly warned Ukraine that signing the agreement could provoke social unrest and the possible secession of pro-Russian regions. 52 Equally, on the other side, Štefan Füle, the commissioner for enlargement and European neighbourhood policy, stressed that Ukraine really did face a choice, and that the two free-trade areas were incompatible. In September 2013 he noted that the approaching Vilnius summit was ‘wrongly’ perceived ‘in some quarters’ as a threat, and ‘as a result, we have seen enormous pressure being brought to bear upon some of our neighbours’. He insisted that the aim was to work with the eastern partners to ‘build a zone of prosperity and stability in our continent’. However, he conceded that it is true that the Customs Union membership is not compatible with the DCFTAs which we have negotiated with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. This is not because of ideological differences; this is not about a clash of economic blocs, or a zero-sum game. This is due to legal impossibilities: for instance, you cannot at the same time lower your customs tariffs as per the DCFTA and increase them as a result of the Customs Union membership. He went on to warn: The development of the Eurasian Economic Union project must respect our partners’ sovereign decisions. Any threats from Russia linked to the possible signing of agreements with the European Union are unacceptable. […] The European Union will support and stand by those who are subject to undue pressures. 53 In other words, the EU would forge ahead irrespective of Russian concerns, while appealing to universal principles of choice and sovereignty. 54 Few in the abstract would challenge these principles, but for the first time in the EU’s history they were running up against the finalité of the EU, fizzling out in the ragged conceptual and territorial frontier between the Atlantic and Eurasian worlds. The EU had never before encountered opposition from an external power to its enlargement plans, and simply lacked the experience and language to maintain dialogue with a power that challenged the advance of the Brussels-centric Wider Europe. Despite all the governance and economic problems, it was clear that the EU was intent on getting Yanukovych to sign up in Vilnius. The EU set the deadline of May 2013 for Tymoshenko to be released, and when she remained in jail the Polish and German governments sought to broker a deal whereby she could go to the West for medical treatment. Since May 2012 she had been in Kharkov Central Clinical Hospital No. 5 to treat her spinal disc herniation. Complicating the situation was the accelerating pace of Eurasian integration. On 31 May 2013 Yanukovych signed a memorandum on deepening cooperation with what was taking shape as the EEU. Putin later commented on how he saw the situation: Ukraine was supposed to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Using absolutely modern diplomatic tools, we proved that the document is at least inconsistent with Russian interests since the Russian and Ukrainian economies are closely intertwined. We have 245 Ukrainian enterprises working for us in the defence industry alone. The ‘diplomatic tools’ were on the rough side, yet sought to register Russian concerns. Instead, as Putin put it: They told us to mind our own business. Excuse me, I don’t want to hurt anyone’s feelings, but it’s been a while since I heard anything that snobbish. They just slammed the door in our face telling us to mind our own business. 55 Instead, Ukraine was posed with a stark choice, one that it had tried to avoid for two decades. The failure to reform the energy sector, sluggish economic performance and poor governance compounded its geopolitical ambiguity. The Association Agreement promised a shock to the system that was intended to address the internal problems, but it was embedded in a larger geopolitical project that placed Ukraine in an impossible position. Yanukovych was not particularly ‘pro-Russian’, but he understood that the Association Agreement would force the country to undertake radical changes that could threaten his own position. It became clear that the EU’s conditionality in the Tymoshenko case was itself conditional, and that Yanukovych would be allowed to sign even while she languished in jail. Although demonised later, Yanukovych was clearly acceptable as a partner if the EU was so keen to sign him up for the Association Agreement. Yanukovych was running out of road. On 21 November 2013 he announced that he would not sign the document as it was presently constituted, and needed more time to study the effect it would have on Ukraine. A number of factors weighed in the decision to postpone accession. It was certainly not simply because he was a proRussian ‘puppet’, although he had come under brutal pressure not to sign the Association Agreement. Putin, who had very little respect for Yanukovych personally, showed him the work of Glazyev and others demonstrating just how damaging it would be to Ukraine’s economy. Like most other Ukrainian leaders, Yanukovych had long been playing Moscow off against Brussels, in an attempt to get the best of both worlds. He now realised that the EU in fact had placed very little on the table that would be of immediate benefit, while the reforms would destabilise an already precarious situation. Moscow, on the other hand, offered a $15 billion loan and a hefty discount on the gas price. On 17 December the deal was signed, and an addendum was signed to the gas agreement of 19 January 2009 that reduced the price of natural gas for Ukraine by one third, from $410 to $268.5 per tcm. The deal with Russia, however, did not mean that in Yanukovych’s mind the door was closed to the EU, and he certainly planned to return to Brussels. He also played the Chinese card, a country that he visited in December, hoping that it would offer an escape route from the impasse in relations with Ukraine’s neighbours. In the event, things blew up in his face. The crisis was the culmination of sharpening domestic contradictions and deteriorating international relations. Ukraine had long exploited the contradictions between Russia and the West, but in the end this proved a dangerous game. Ukraine mattered to Russia more than any other country, and now there was the danger of a permanent estrangement. As Dmitry Efremenko notes, ‘the Eastern Partnership policy, which had been conceived by its proponents as a dislodging of Russia’s influence in the Western part of the post-Soviet landscape, inevitably drew the EU into a competitive geopolitical conflict’. 56 Relations between the US and Russia also worsened. Putin considered the Orange Revolution a geopolitical challenge, as well as a model of political change that he feared could spill over into Russia. By then it was clear that the US had moved to become Russia’s main opponent. The September 2013 G20 summit in St Petersburg was marked by a bitter chill in relations between the two countries, exacerbated by attempts in Washington to lead a boycott of the Sochi Olympics, scheduled for February 2014. Equally, it was clear that the EU had blundered badly in its Ukraine policy. It had been unable to temper the partisan agendas of its ‘new Europe’ members allied with the more virulent Atlanticist countries elsewhere. The EaP in principle served an important purpose, but its implementation proceeded within the worst paradigm of competitive geopolitics. All the conditions were in place for the ‘perfect storm’ that hit Europe in late 2013. There was a deepening ‘Ukrainian’ crisis, with a president who had already destroyed civil society when he had been governor in Donetsk, and who was now generalising these corrupt practices to the country as a whole. The bureaucratic–oligarchic system of rule was also being destabilised by the greed of his ‘family’. This provoked a radicalisation of public opinion, as reflected in the 2012 parliamentaryelection results. At the same time, the ‘Ukraine’ crisis was also gathering pace as the Atlantic and Eurasian integration poles radicalised their positions. The catalyst was the Association Agreement with the EU, but this was only the culmination of a broader failure to negotiate a mutually acceptable structure to post-Cold War European international politics. The country’s central position meant that when the two crises intersected there would be a rapid escalation of both. Tony Wood summarises the situation nicely: For the US and Europe, the aim has all along been relatively straightforward: to wrest the country from Russia’s sphere of influence and continue the joint eastward expansion of NATO and the EU. […] For Russia, the basic goal has until recently been a symmetrical pushback: to keep Ukraine out of Western security and economic structures, leaving it as at the very least a neutral state, if not an active member of a ‘Eurasian Union’ dominated by Russia. 57 The two trains were hurtling towards each other.

 

Edited July 16, 2018 by slow