Толстый и тонкий

[Prospero]

spajs mast flou
 

Exxon Russia Exposure Surges as Long View Outweighs Politics
March 3, 2015

Exxon’s Russian Exposure Balloons

(Bloomberg) -- Exxon Mobil Corp. shook off the chill of sanctions and continued to snap up drilling rights in Russia last year, giving it more exploration holdings in Vladimir Putin’s backyard than in the U.S.

 

Taking the long view, Exxon boosted its Russian holdings to 63.7 million acres in 2014 from 11.4 million at the end of 2013, according to data from U.S. regulatory filings. That dwarfs the 14.6 million acres of rights Exxon holds in the U.S., which until last year was its largest exploration prospect.
While U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia forced Exxon to shut down an Arctic drilling project in October, there were no legal obstacles barring the company from staking claims to areas that could yield tens of billions of barrels in coming decades. The bet on Russia follows a string of drilling failures elsewhere and spending cuts that will likely be addressed in Chief Executive Officer Rex Tillerson’s investor meeting Wednesday.
 
Exxon is “definitely looking at the longer-term opportunity,” Brian Youngberg, an analyst at Edward Jones in St. Louis, said in an e-mail. “Even before oil fell, it was going to be a longer-term play with no contribution until at least 2020.”
Sanctions to punish Russia for supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine and for the annexation of Crimea prohibit companies based in the U.S. and EU from probing Russia’s deep-sea, shale and Arctic fields. They don’t bar activities such as seismic surveying or acquiring drilling rights, opening an avenue for Exxon’s bold campaign.

Drilling Rights

The producer, based in Irving, Texas, added drilling rights in the Laptev and Chukchi seas last year to holdings it already had in the Kara and Black seas under joint-venture agreements with state-controlled OAO Rosneft, the filings showed. The exploration rights have various expiration dates spanning from 2017 to 2023.
Geologists have no estimate of how much oil is trapped beneath the acreage Exxon amassed. In 2012, Russian officials said the resources were so vast that they would require new airports to be built to handle thousands of roughnecks and scores of offshore platforms to manage crude production.
The Kara and Black sea assets alone will cost as much as $350 billion to develop, Igor Sechin, the Rosneft chairman who was deputy prime minister at the time, said in April 2012.
The work with Rosneft that was halted by sanctions in late 2014 may produce a maximum loss of $1 billion, Exxon said in a public filing last week.

No Siding

Tillerson is scheduled to brief a gathering of investors and analysts on the company’s growth outlook at the New York Stock Exchange on Wednesday. Exxon closed the transaction for the additional acreage in May, completing an agreement made 15 months before, said Patrick McGinn, a company spokesman. The May closing was about two months after the Russian annexation of Crimea that spurred U.S. and EU leaders to escalate sanctions.
“We don’t take sides in any geopolitical events,” Tillerson said of the conflict in Ukraine in a meeting with reporters a year ago. “We have navigated these kinds of challenges before.”
The company’s fourth-quarter output tumbled to a 15-year low, and its shares lost 8.7 percent of their value in 2014, the steepest annual decline since 2009.
The U.S. oil explorer’s willingness to expand in Russia when western governments are working to isolate President Putin’s regime may indicate it expects sanctions to be short-lived, said Timothy Ash, chief economist for emerging markets at Standard Bank Plc in London.
“They’ve got people much better at reading geopolitics internationally than anyone else,” Ash said. Still, the EU appears more likely to “extend, deepen, enlarge” sanctions rather than suspend them.

Ukraine Situation

Exxon has scant prospect of exploiting those holdings as long as Russia remains committed to separatists in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, said Philipp Chladek of Bloomberg Intelligence.
European leaders “cannot accept one country annexing another’s territory like that,” said Chladek, a petroleum analyst based in London and former strategist at OMV AG, central Europe’s biggest oil company. “Europe is very keen on not creating any precedents for similar moves.”
Worldwide, Exxon’s exploration failure rate worsened last year to 39 percent from 33 percent in 2013. The company had so-called dry holes, or wells that failed to locate commercially viable amounts of oil or gas, in two-thirds of the regions in which it operates.
Of the seven exploratory dry holes Exxon drilled in 2014, four were in the U.S. The company’s costs to extract a barrel of crude from the ground rose 9.3 percent last year to a global average of $12.55.

[apostata]

Obama Rojtersu o Rusiji i ubistvu Njemcova:

 

(...)

 

REUTERS - We're running short of time. So I'm going to ask you about Russia. A top opponent of President Putin was gunned down last week. What does this say about Vladimir Putin's Russia and do you believe that the Kremlin was not involved?

 

OBAMA - What I've called for is a full investigation and, hopefully, an independent investigation of what happened. Whether that can occur inside today’s Russia is not clear. The individual involved is somebody that I actually met with back in 2009.

This is an indication of a climate at least inside of Russia in which civil society, independent journalists, people trying to communicate on the Internet, have felt increasingly threatened, constrained, and increasingly the only information that the Russian public is able to get is through state-controlled media outlets. That is a problem. It's part of what has allowed, I think, Russia to engage in the sort of aggression that it is has against Ukraine.

 

REUTERS - You don't want to say whether or not the Kremlin was involved?

 

OBAMA - I have no idea at this point exactly what happened. What I do know is more broadly the fact that free - freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of information, basic civil rights and civil liberties inside of Russia are in much worse shape now than they were four or five, ten years ago.

 

(...)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/02/us-usa-obama-transcript-idUSKBN0LY2J820150302

 

Lavrovljev odgovor:

 

"Оставьте (это) на его совести", - сказал глава МИД журналистам.

"Написать ему (Обаме) не успели, а сам он не может формулировать достойно", - считает Лавров.

http://tass.ru/politika/1804915

 

"Pomalo" nediplomatski.

[Prospero]

kritičan tekst o njemcovu koji (što je mnogo bitnije) dobro oslikava komplikovanu strukturu ruske političke elite i klanovskih borbi:

 

 

 

 

Boris Nemtsov: Death of a Russian Liberal

By Mark Ames

On March 2, 2015

 

I bought a couple of bottles of Yarpivo in a Chinese-owned discount store around the corner here in Brooklyn, and poured one out for Nemtsov, who ended his life as a Yaroslavl city councilman. I never liked him much, but his murder was brutal, and frightening — and the dark fear it’s brought to Moscow is very real.

 

 

Nemtsov was a very different kind of liberal or “ultra-liberal” than what we think of as liberals. In the best sense, that means he was never a mealy-mouthed coward. But as one of the leaders of the 1990s liberalization catastrophe, Nemtsov was much more the problem than the solution to that problem. And even when he was in power in the late Yeltsin Era, serving as the half-dead boozer’s first deputy prime minister and heir-apparent, Nemtsov represented the very worst and shallowest in liberal Russia’s “virtual politics,” a kind of precursor to the manufactured PR-as-politics that was perfected under Nemtsov’s choice for Russia’s president in 2000: Vladimir Putin.

 

Boris Nemtsov first crossed my radar screen in early 1997, a few months after I launched The eXile in Moscow. He was hailed as the Second Coming of Liberal Jesus by the cream of Moscow’s foreign correspondent community, back when the American media still had the money to pack places like Moscow with full-staffed local bureaus. Not that all that staffing made their reporting any better—most of the reporting was regurgitated neoliberal pamphleteering and Peak Clinton jingoism; a case study in mass journalism malpractice. Every single western reporter was completely blindsided by the 1998 financial collapse, at the time the most catastrophic and complete financial collapse in modern history — all except our annoying satirical rag.

Which brings me back to Nemtsov, whom Yeltsin appointed as his first deputy prime minister in March 1997, just a couple of months after the The eXile came to life. Everyone in the west went ga-ga over Nemtsov, the young handsome free-market governor of Nizhny Novogorod. Larry Summers, who ran Clinton’s Russia policy from his post as deputy Treasury Secretary, hailed Nemtsov’s appointment sharing the first deputy premiership with Anatoly “Bonecracker” Chubais as the “an economic Dream Team.” When Nemtsov traveled to Japan, he wowed the world media by telling a meeting of Japanese businessmen he’d give them his personal cell phone number to call him if they were having any problems doing business in Russia.

Typical of the Anglo-American Nemtsovophilia we were up against was LA Times correspondent Carol Williams, who cheered him on in language that reads like a cheap parody of Soviet propaganda:

 

 

In the four months since he left the helm of this prosperous Volga river reform showcase to become first deputy prime minister in Moscow,

the charismatic crusader has taken aim at the corrupt and the greedy who have made post-Soviet Russia a vast and terrifying gangland…

The 37-year-old former physicist has presided over the first promising signs of economic recovery since Russia jettisoned communism and,

to the cheers of the struggling masses [yes, you read that right: cheering struggling masses—M.A.],

has waged war against government fat cats junketing in imported luxury cars and chartered planes…

 

That was the cheerleaders’ version—and it was backed by everyone rich and powerful the world over. Except in Russia.

In fact, Nemtsov’s Nizhny Novgorod “miracle” was, like everything else Nemtsovian, a matter of canny PR masking a brutal reality. Out of Russia’s 89 miserable regions in 1996 — when Russia was in the throes of the worst national economic collapse of any industrialized nation in the 20th century — Nizhny Novogorod ranked dead middle in terms of median income, despite attracting more foreign investment than almost any region. Nemtsov attracted foreign investment by reciting all the neoliberal platitudes in vogue in the 1990s, which made him a favorite of the World Bank set.

 

Nemtsov joined the Kremlin as the anti-corruption “young reformer” who promised Russia a fair, clean, “western” capitalism. The first thing he did was push a law forcing government bureaucrats to ditch foreign cars for Russian Volgas — which just happened to be produced in Nemtsov’s Nizhny Novgorod region. Then he lobbied through anti-corruption decrees that, upon closer reading, featured “loopholes through which an entire fleet of Volgas could be driven.” The decrees were supposed to end one of the worst examples of Yeltsin era corruption: rigged tenders for state contracts. Nemtsov’s reform decreed that in future, government tenders had to be open, transparent and competitive — except in cases when a closed non-competitive tender was deemed “the best method.” In other words, not only was nothing changed, but rigging tenders now were given legal gloss, thanks to Nemtsov.

 

 

A few months later, Nemtsov pushed for a new law forcing bureaucrats to disclose their incomes (but not their assets or their families’ assets) — but then was caught on tape arranging a bribe in the form of an obscene book advance, $90,000, with a Yeltsin family bagman/entrepreneur named Sergei Lisovsky. (A year earlier, Lisovsky, while working for Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election campaign, was caught in central Moscow hauling a Xerox copy paper box packed with 500,000 dollars worth of Ben Franklins.) Nemtsov’s leaked discussion with Lisovsky about the $90,000 “book advance” came just as he took credit for running one of the most controversial sell-offs of a state asset — the state telecommunications company Svyazinvest, which went to a consortium that included George Soros and Oneximbank, whose then-chairman is now Brooklyn Nets owner Mikhail Prokhorov. Initially the Svyazinvest auction was PR’d as the cleanest and bestest Yeltsin-era state auction of public assets; and then it was discovered that the winner of the auction, Oneximbank, had funneled huge book advances to the very same US-backed “young reformers” in Yeltsin’s government, including “Bonecracker” Chubais, who were in charge of awarding Svyazinvest to the Oneximbank-led consortium.

The rigged auction — Nemtsov’s showcase for what “anti-corruption” governance looked like —led to the “bankers’ war” between rival oligarch clans, the firing of many of Nemtsov’s fellow “young reformers” from government, and an open war of words between Nemtsov and the late oligarch Boris Berezovsky, whose consortium lost the auction. Berezovsky’s television stations were used to savage Nemtsov and his young reformers; Nemtsov responded by demanding Yeltsin fire Berezovsky from his Security Council. That was when Berezovsky hit back with one of those memorable lines that made it hard for anyone who remembered it, myself included, to ever take Nemtsov seriously again. To understand the context — Berezovsky was born Jewish, and Nemtsov was half-Jewish, in a country known for its, say, complicated relationship towards Jews. Berezovsky made a bunch of snide remarks about their Jewish patronymics (Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov and Boris Abramovich Berezovsky) in comparison to Yeltsin’s Russian-Christian patronymic (Nikolayevich), when he told an interviewer:

 

It seems to me that Mr. Nemtsov has a purely genetic problem: He is a Boris Yefimovich, at times he is a Boris Abramovich, but wants to be Boris Nikolayevich.

You don’t become a president, presidents are born. If Boris Yefimovich realizes this then I think that he will stop with his allegations.

In his vicious pithy way, Berezovsky showed up not just Nemtsov’s delusional megalomania, but also his moral delusions as well. They were both creatures and agents of the same liberal revolution.

There were other sordid stories. Nemtsov was tasked with breaking up Russia’s natural monopolies and introducing fair, free-market competition. So he “took on” the state utilities monopoly, RAO-UES by placing his favorite young Nizhny Novgorod banker, Boris Brevnov, in charge of the company. Brevnov had by this time married an American woman who was one of the World Bank’s top officers in overseeing its investments into Nizhny Novogorod when Nemtsov was governor. Less than a year after Nemtsov put Brevnov in charge of the utilities monopoly, the company’s board of directors charged Brevnov with corruption and abuse of office, including the use of company jets to fly to Kentucky to pick up Brevnov’s wife, mother-in-law and dog and bring them back to Moscow. After getting fired from RAO-UES, Brevnov moved to the US and went to work for Enron.

 

By August 1998, Nemtsov’s government went down in one of the largest and most devastating financial collapses of modern times.

 

The problem with Nemtsov’s politics wasn’t so much his adherence to radical neoliberalism, but his shallowness, his grotesque elitism, and his authoritarianism. Nemtsov is one of the top-down Russian liberals, cut from the same authoritarian cloth as Chubais, though not as wily as “Bonecracker” (so nick-named because in 1996, when Chubais summoned a meeting of top Russian newspaper editors to the Kremlin, he told the uppity editor of the then-independent Izvestiya newspaper, “You will write what we tell you to write or bones will crack”; a few months later, after Izvestiya broke the story on Chubais taking a $3 million interest-free loan from a banker who rigged an auction, that editor was out on the streets, and today Izvestiya is a wholly owned propaganda organ of the FSB.)

After the financial collapse, it looked like the entire rotten Yeltsin-era liberal elite was heading for exile or jail, until their savior on the white horse — Vladimir Putin — rode in from Lubyanka to save Russia’s liberals. The Nemtsov of our fantasies would say that it was somehow out of character for him to support an authoritarian spook like Putin in 2000, well after Putin launched the second bloody war in Chechnya.

 

In fact, the liberals thought Putin was their Pinochet savior, and that they would essentially control him, that Putin was one of them. Which he largely was, and in many ways still is — cut from similar liberal authoritarian cloth.

 

Here are some choice quotes from Nemtsov’s op-ed, co-authored with Ian Bremmer, in the New York Times published in early 2000, after Putin was named Yeltsin’s successor:

 

 

Some critics have questioned Mr. Putin’s commitment to democracy. True, he is no liberal democrat, domestically or internationally. Under his leadership Russia will not become France. The government will, however, reflect the Russian people’s desire for a strong state, a functioning economy, and an end to tolerance for robber barons — in short, a ”ruble stops here” attitude. Russia could do considerably worse than have a leader with an unwavering commitment to the national interest…

And it is difficult to see how to do better.

… Mr. Putin’s vocal support for a free-market economy boosted the prospects of reform candidates in the parliamentary elections last month

and provided a firm footing for meaningful economic reform to be passed this year.

The reformers are back…

 

Deep down Nemtsov had no problem with Putin’s authoritarianism. His problem with Putin came after being ignored for too long. As George Washington University professor Peter Reddaway wrote in his book on the dark Yeltsin years, “The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy”, Nemtsov supported a Yeltsin proposal in 1993 to create an unelected upper chamber, the Federation Council, consisting of appointed oligarchs, in order to marginalize the then-powerful, opposition-dominated Supreme Soviet parliament. One of the reasons Yeltsin brought him into his government in 1997 was to protect Yeltsin and the all-powerful presidency, as enshrined in the authoritarian 1993 constitution — the same presidential powers that allowed Putin to become who he is. As Yeltsin’s presidential power was being threatened again by the Duma, Nemtsov made his position on reducing presidential powers clear: “For Russia, the weakening of presidential power would be extremely deleterious. Those who insist on transforming Russia into a parliamentary republic are consciously or unconsciously pushing the country toward chaos.”

Reddaway, one of just a handful of American academics who got the Yeltsin catastrophe right (along with Stephen Cohen and Janine Wedel), concluded:

 

 

Nemtsov was recruited by Yeltsin because, unlike Yavlinsky, he believes in the salutary role of authoritarian institutions for Russia,

be they monarchical or presidential. This view is evident from Nemtsov’s book, in which Yeltsin is depicted as a ‘genuine Russian tsar.’

 

After Putin won with the support of the free-market liberals, Nemtsov remained happy for the next few years as a leading voice in the Duma. Even after his liberal party got hammered in the 2003 elections, Nemtsov remained in the loyal opposition. But over time Putin had no need for a discredited liberal from the Yeltsin era, and by 2007, Nemtsov started warming up to the more radical opposition led by our former eXile columnist Eduard Limonov and chessmaster Garry Kasparov.

Still, up through 2008 — when I was last in Russia before the Kremlin closed my paper and one of their goons made some scary pronouncements over the radio about me — Nemtsov, like the other leading 90s-era liberals, hedged his opposition to Putin. He never seemed willing to burn all of his bridges with the Kremlin and go all-in as a radical oppositionist, not like Limonov anyway.

I asked Limonov why Nemtsov, Khakamada and the others still seemed to be hedging their opposition to Putin in 2007 — if it was because they were too covetous of their cozy bourgeois trappings they’d acquired since the Yeltsin years. Limonov’s answer is worth quoting:

 

 

It’s much more simple than that. The Putin regime is a liberal regime, so it’s natural that liberals like Khakamada or Nemtsov do not seriously oppose it.

Just look at Putin’s economic program: Low taxes, concentration of wealth in oligarchs’ hands, strict budgets.

The Kremlin’s ideology is basically the same as that of Nemtsov’s and Khakamada’s, so of course it makes no sense to confront them as my organization does.

They can only argue over the details of this liberalism, over who should own what and how it should be implemented.

 

Nemtsov’s politics since he went into opposition were little changed from his politics when he rode into Yeltsin’s Kremlin in 1997: anti-corruption. It’s the same neoliberal tune, and it always has a funny way of turning out badly every time. Anti-corruption is not a politics, it’s some kind of aspiration that always has a way of leaning neoliberal, oligarchical, and authoritarian, at least in our times it does.

 

During the Yeltsin era, there were so many assassinations and hits on journalists and political figures that no one can even remember them: Vladislav Listyev, the TV presenter whose assassination hit Russians harder than any other murder I remember from that era, believed to have been killed by Yeltsin’s top “family” oligarch Boris Berezovsky; investigative reporter Dmitry Kholodov, who was killed with an exploding briefcase while investigating Yeltsin’s defense minister; liberal firebrand Galina Starovoitova, gunned down in her apartment stairwell in 1998. We don’t remember any of these murders as the fault of Yeltsin, nor the hundreds killed when Yeltsin sent tanks against his parliament in 1993, nor the tens of thousands killed in Yeltsin’s war in Chechnya. Those murders, and the deaths of millions who went to their graves early from the shock therapy reforms, are the fault of impersonal forces, not free-market liberalism and its western missionaries and funders.

Pity and sympathy and outrage aren’t resources we distribute fairly or evenly. Nemtsov’s murder matters more than Starovoitova’s or Listyev’s or Kholodov’s mattered because we don’t know anymore where Russia is heading, or who exactly Vladimir Putin represents. We know he’s more popular than ever, and that Russian liberalism is more marginalized than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and underneath that has been a kind of lingering anxiety that maybe we had something to do with that, that maybe we were a part of the problem. Just like Nemtsov was part of the problem.

 

But now Nemtsov’s dead, his bloated naked torso beamed on Livestream for all to gawk at. His murder is frightening for Russians who live there, but for us out here, it’s something more than that — a kind of karmic salvation, retroactively absolving all who played a part in Russia’s tragic post-Soviet history, a narrative arc that made no sense until Nemtsov was murdered at the foot of Putin’s Kremlin.

 

 

Edited March 4, 2015 by Prospero

[Lord Protector]

DW

Brige NATO i EU oko Moldavije

NATO i Evropska unija sve češće izražavaju zabrinutost zbog mogućnosti da Moldavija u potpunosti potpadne pod uticaj Rusije i podstiču „proevropski“ kurs male istočnoevropske zemlje.

Najnovije upozorenje NATO da bi „ruska agresija“ mogla da se proširi i na Republiku Moldaviju izazvalo je različite reakcije u toj bivšoj sovjetskoj republici. Prošle nedelje, glavnokomandujući NATO, general Filip Bridlav, u američkom Kongresu je rekao da ruske jedinice stacionirane u Pridnjestrovlju treba da „spreče približavanje Moldavije Zapadu“. On tvrdi da postoji i široka informaciona kampanja ruskih medija u Moldaviji.

I Nemačka kancelarka Angela Merkel je sa zabrinutošću reagovala na razvoj situacije u pomenutom regionu. Pole razgovora sa rumunskim predsednikom Klausom Johanisom u Berlinu, ona je rekla da se „nada da se ukrajinski scenario neće ponoviti u Republici Moldaviji“. Dodala je i da ne treba zaboraviti zamrznuti konflikt u u Pridnjestrovlju kao ni činjenicu da su „propali svi međunarodni pokušaji da se ta kriza reši“.

U moldavskom parlamentu sedi i „peta kolona Rusije“, kaže politikolog Oazu Nantoi

U Pridnjestrovlju je stacionirano još oko 2000 ruskih vojnika, iako se Rusija još 1999. obavezala na povlačenje svojih jedinica i oružja odatle. Separatistički region se posle krvavog rata početkom 90-ih godina otcepio od Moldavije i proglasio nezavisnim. Njegovo prorusko rukovodstvo se nada da će se priključiti Ruskoj Federaciji.

Politički zaokret u Kišinjevu?

Nova vlada Moldavije dosad nije reagovala na signale upozorenja. Premijer Čiril Gaburići, koji je tek dve nedelje na funkciji, pokušava da ubedi Evropsku uniju da će Moldavija ostati na svom „proevropskom“ kursu. „Proevropska“ alijansa tri stranke koja je pobedila na parlamentarnim izborima, nije uspela da formira vladu. Dve od te tri stranke, Liberalne demokrate i Demokrate, posle dugog natezanja su formirale manjinsku vladu koja je upućena na podršku opozicionih komunista. Sada zagovornici približavanja Evropskoj uniji strahuju da bi Moldavija mogla da se više približi – Moskvi.

„Upozorenja treba ozbiljno shvatiti“

Moldavski politikolog Oazu Nantoi vidi čitav niz opasnosti za svoju zemlju. U razgovoru za DW on je rekao da je jedna od tih opasnosti „takozvana peta kolona Rusije“ u moldavskom parlamentu. To, kako kaže, nije samo Socijalistička partija, koja je na otvorenom proruskom kursu, već su i poslanici drugih stranaka protiv „proevropskog“ usmeravanja Kišinjeva.

Ovaj politikolog upozorava na opasnost od uticaja Rusije na predstojeće izbore u autonomnoj moldavskoj oblasti Gagauziji. I tamo su proruski separatisti zapretili priključivanjem Ruskoj Federaciji. Nantoi je potvrdio da je Moskva u „informacionoj ofanzivi“ o kojoj je govorio general Bridlav i rekao da ruski televizijski kanali dominiraju na moldavskom medijskom tržištu.

No, najveću opasnost još uvek predstavljaju rasprostranjena korupcija i slaba vlada. Država koja nije u stranju da obezbedi pravni poredak, red i političku stabilnost dok se na njenoj granici vodi rat, „neće biti u stanju da se suprotstavi agresivnoj ekspanzionističkoj politici Ruske Federacije“, rekao je Nantoi za DW.

„Situacija se zaoštrava“

Bivši moldavski ambasador u Moskvi, Anatol Taranu, smatra da njegova zemlja treba da računa sa novim provokacijama Rusije. „Kada evropski i američki političari ukazuju na moguće pretnje, onda je to jasan znak da se situacija zaoštrava“, rekao je Taranu u razgovoru za DW. On smatra da to vlada u Kišinjevu mora da uzme u obzir i poveća bezbednosne strandarde da bi sprečili moguću vojnu akciju.

Anatol Taranu očekuje „nove provokacije Rusije“

Relativna bezbednost za Moldaviju će postojati samo ako Kišinjev bude produbio svoje odnose sa EU i NATO, smatra Taranu. Ali on nije siguran da nova moldavska vlada sledi taj cilj. Neutralnost te zemlje, ugrađena u njen ustav, prevaziđena je, dodaje, „jer dokle god su ruske trupe stacionirane na moldavskom tlu bez odgovarajuće odluke vlade ili parlamenta u Kišinjevu, ne može da se govori o neutralnosti.“

Novi moldavski ministar odbrane, Viorel Čibotaru, ne vidi nikakav konkretan rizik u pogledu širenja ukrajinskog konflikta na Moldaviju. I pored toga, on je zabrinut. U jednom novinskom intervjuu je rekao da su sve odbrambene strukture Republike Moldavije u permanentnom stanju pripravnosti da bi odmah reagovale na moguće rizike.

Prema poslednjem izveštaju Međunarodnog instituta za strateške sturije, moldavska armija ima 5.300 aktivnih vojnika. U slučaju vojnog sukoba, mogla bi da mobiliše još 700.000 građana. Oružani sistemi Moldavije potiču uglavnom još iz sovjetskih vremena. 2014. je budžet za odbranu iznosio – preračunato u evre – 20 miliona, što je 0,3 odsto bruto društvenog proizvoda. Toliki je i budžet Moldavske akademije nauka.

Edited March 4, 2015 by slow

[Cort0 Maltese]

Relativna bezbednost za Moldaviju će postojati samo ako Kišinjev bude produbio svoje odnose sa EU i NATO, smatra Taranu.

 

Vrhunac cinizma.

Edited March 4, 2015 by Cort0 Maltese

[x500]

Relativna bezbednost za Moldaviju će postojati samo ako Kišinjev bude produbio svoje odnose sa EU i NATO, smatra Taranu.

 

Vrhunac cinizma.

Cort0,

 

Vrhunc cinizma je sam podatak da zemlja trosi vise para na Akademiju nauka nego na vojsku. 

 

Kada ti dvoje u selu kazu da si pijan idi kuci i spavaj => „Kada evropski i američki političari ukazuju na moguće pretnje, onda je to jasan znak da se situacija zaoštrava“, rekao je Taranu u razgovoru za DW.

 

Pozdrav,

X500

[Budja]

kritičan tekst o njemcovu koji (što je mnogo bitnije) dobro oslikava komplikovanu strukturu ruske političke elite i klanovskih borbi:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Odlican clanak koji ima i eksternu validnost: objasnjava uspeh ne samo Putina vec i Erdogana, Cavesa, Koree...

Opozicija se ne moze graditi pozivima na bolju "demokratskiju" proslost jer takva proslost u ovidm drustvima ne postoji.

[Cort0 Maltese]

Cort0,

 

Vrhunc cinizma je sam podatak da zemlja trosi vise para na Akademiju nauka nego na vojsku. 

 

Kada ti dvoje u selu kazu da si pijan idi kuci i spavaj => „Kada evropski i američki političari ukazuju na moguće pretnje, onda je to jasan znak da se situacija zaoštrava“, rekao je Taranu u razgovoru za DW.

 

Pozdrav,

X500

 

Dakle nije problem sta Ameri koji su pola svijeta od Moldavije nesta ukazuju nego su problem Rusi koji su tamo preventivno da ne bi dizali glavu kojekakvi rumunjski Praviy Sektori i ostali novotkriveni najbolji prijatelji McCaina i bratije... Jasta. Jos se govori i o nekakvoj 5. koloni...

 

I bolje da ne trosi... Manje ce je bit po Afganistanu i drugim stratistima demokracije.

Edited March 4, 2015 by Cort0 Maltese

[Eraserhead]

Rusi svojim prisustvom i pokusajem drzanja zone uticaja gde im mesto nije samo pomazu razne Desne sektore.

Edited March 4, 2015 by Eraserhead

[Cort0 Maltese]

Rusi svojim prisustvom i pokusajem drzanja zone uticaja gde im mesto nije samo pomazu razne Desne sektore.

 

Pomazu ih oni koji im tepaju da su borci za slobodu. Od Balkana do bliskog istoka.

[hazard]

Rusi svojim prisustvom i pokusajem drzanja zone uticaja gde im mesto nije samo pomazu razne Desne sektore.

 

Mda, Rusima nigde nije mesto, a Amerima je svuda...

[Cort0 Maltese]

Mda, Rusima nigde nije mesto, a Amerima je svuda...

 

Bilo kuda, NATO svuda!

 

Rusi nemaju sta trazit u Moldaviji, al glavno da ovi i Englezi imaju u Afganistanu, na Filipinima i  Falklandima.

[dillinger]

Rusi svojim prisustvom i pokusajem drzanja zone uticaja gde im mesto nije samo pomazu razne Desne sektore.

 

 

E a šta bi da svojim prisustvom u Persijskom zalivu pomažu tako 1 Islamsku državu

[Eraserhead]

Pa kad pricamo o Islamskoj drzavi uvek pricamo i o tome da je americka besmislena okupacija Iraka pomogla da dodje do razvijanja ekstremizma. Po slicnom principu ruska akcija u Ukrajini i uopste pretenzija na okolne zemlje za efekat ima da stvara plodno tlo za razne Desne sektore i slican olos.

[apostata]

Dobro, ali ne odgovori ti gdje je (dopuštena/dozvoljena/pristojna/prirodna) ruska zona uticaja ... tj. da li u stvari ona uopšte ima pravo da postoji.