Tačerizam - ideja, pozadina i posledice

[boshoku]

neokonzervativizam vs paleokonzervativizam: hm, same bs with a different coloured bow, perhaps.

[Filipenko]

Najsmesnije je sto sam (Budjinim rezonom) dosao do toga da su neoliberali = neokonzervativci.(Jer, recimo, ne bi se nuzno od konzervativaca ocekivale radikalne reforme... to je na neki nacin contradictio in adjecto, ili kako se to vec kaze).

Nije to toliko besmisleno, jer smo u teoriji toliko odmakli od principa i ideja za koje se konzervativci tradicionalnog tipa zalažu, da bi isti morali da radikalno izmene postojeće stanje da bi se društva vratila u okvire u kojima ponovo mogu da dremkaju bezbrižno...

[Budja]

Zapravo, Robinova teza se odnosi i na libertarijance:Liberali su, naravno, druga priča.

Procitao sam clanak i van tvog citiranog dela.I izgleda mi slabiji. Clanak citira pozitivisticke stavove o ulozi porodice (koji mogu biti tacni ili netacni) i intepretira ih kao normativne (da je porodica do jaja). Nisam siguran da je to dobra logika.

[Indy]

da je porodica do jaja

Pa, to je tačno. (Zato ih neki još zovu family jewels).

[mandingo]

Porodica do jaja? Kad je Syme izdvojio taj quote, odmah sam pomislio na Adornov & co. " The authoritarian personality."

When these libertarians look out at society, they don’t always see isolated or autonomous individuals; they’re just as likely to see private hierarchies like the family or the workplace, where a father governs his family and an owner his employees.

Trebao sam da procitam celi clanak, ocigledno. :P

[Indy]

Nesto u vezi sa Budji omiljenim pop-kulturnim referencama... Margaret Thatcher: punk's patron saintMargaret Thatcher, the so-called Iron Lady, was one of God's gifts to music. In the history of popular music, there has probably never been a head of state more reviled in song than the former British prime minister, who died this week.You could say Thatcher exerted a remarkably creative influence on British music from the late 1970s to the late '80s and beyond. The ridicule and rage heaped on her prompted some of the spikiest lyrics, angriest guitars and most indelible percussion to be heard during one of the most rancorous eras in modern British music and politics.During her 11-year reign, Thatcher was the conservative politician who British musicians (and a few non-Brits) of many stripes - ska, punk, rock, new wave, folk, reggae, even electronic dance music - loved to hate. The vitriolic song titles alone - never mind the lyrics - left listeners in no doubt about the depth of loathing: the Beat's Stand Down Margaret; Heaven 17's (We Don't Need This) Fascist Groove Thang; Klaus Nomi's Ding-Dong! The Witch Is Dead; the Specials' Ghost Town; the Varukers' Thatcher's Fortress; the Larks' Maggie Maggie Maggie (Out Out Out); Morrissey's Margaret on the Guillotine; and Elvis Costello's Tramp the Dirt Down and Shipbuilding.Illustration by Dionne Gain.A couple of years before Thatcher rose to power, the Sex Pistols launched punk's attack on the English public school power elite with God Save the Queen, proclaiming ''there is no future in England's dreaming''. But when Thatcher became the official face of conservatism, British musicians and other artists instantly substituted her for the more benign Queen Elizabeth.I lived in England from 1980 to 1982, and again in 1984. In many respects, it was a grim time, economically and socially. Those years were marked by double-digit unemployment, a prolonged and bitter miners' strike, a surreal war with Argentina (which Thatcher, in her Britannia battle-dress mode, championed from start to finish), vicious soccer hooliganism fed by neo-Nazi propaganda, escalating Cold War nuclear tensions and ethnic-based rioting in London, Liverpool and Bristol.But musically, it was a brilliant period of innovation, and at least some of that dynamism was due to the massive youth discontent rumbling up from the streets of Brixton and Aberdeen. Much of the best pop music of the Thatcher years was a response to the perceived bleakness, and it expressed itself in different forms. On one side was the aggressively politicised engagement of groups such as the Clash and early UB40 (whose name referred to a British unemployment-benefits form). On the other was the flamboyant, clothes-horse escapism of new romantics groups such as Duran Duran, Spandau Ballet and Culture Club.But all these forms could be interpreted, at least partially, as responses from some musicians to a growing sense of anger and confusion, if not despair, about the transformations unleashed on British society by Thatcher's determinedly - some would say ruthlessly - free-market economic policies, which vivisected Britain's decades-old social safety net. In response, many young musicians got off the dole, picked up a guitar and started to slash away at the Conservative Party agenda with what some young people thought was the only real weapon at their disposal: popular culture.Even years after she left office, Thatcher was still the bete noir of left-leaning British musicians, much as Richard Nixon remains a bogyman for many US baby boomers and boomer musicians. Thatcher was long gone from her peak of power in 1996 when the great working-class troubadour Billy Bragg unleashed Thatcherites. Even now the ''tributes,'' some of whose titles are unprintable here, continue to roll in.Historians will debate for centuries whether Thatcher's legacy left Britain better or worse than before. But the gleam from the creative fury that Thatcherism ignited among the young Britons who bore the brunt of her policies still burns brightly today.

[Filipenko]

Unuk Margaret Tačer, koji inače živi u Teksasu, sprovodi lokalni outreach republikanaca ka hispanoamerikancima. Ludilo :D

[MancMellow]

ne baš tako sveže, ali i dalje oooodlično: što nije ni čudo obzirom od koga je...nemojte čitati na preskok.

Hugo Young "Margaret Thatcher left a dark legacy that has still not disappeared"The first time I met Margaret Thatcher, I swear she was wearing gloves. The place was her office at the Department of Education, then in Curzon Street. Maybe my memory is fanciful. Perhaps she had just come inside.But without any question, sitting behind her desk, she was wearing a hat. The time was 1973. This was the feminine creature who, two years later, was leader of the Conservative party. Steely, certainly. The milk snatcher reputation absorbed and lived with. Lecturing me about the comprehensive schools, of which she created more than any minister before or since. But a woman who, at the time, thought that chancellor was the top mark at which she might aim. Conscious of being a woman, and incapable of pretending otherwise. Indeed a person – with a chemistry that repelled almost all the significant males in Edward Heath's cabinet – who could never become the party leader.Being a woman is undoubtedly one of the features, possibly the most potent, that makes her ascent to power memorable, 25 years on, in a way that applied to no man. Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home, Heath: they seem, by comparison, evanescent figures.Thatcher is remembered for her achievements, but more for a presence, which was wrapped up with being a woman. Several strong women on the continent have risen to the top, but this British woman, in Britain of all places, became a phenomenon, first, through her gender.The woman, however, changed. The gender remained, its artefacts deployed with calculation. But it was overlaid by the supposedly masculine virtues, sometimes more manly than the men could ever assemble. She became harder than hard. Sent Bobby Sands to an Irish hero's grave without a blink. Faced down trade union leaders after her early years – apprentice years, when Jim Callaghan's Britain was falling apart – in which the commonest fear was that the little lady would not be able to deal with them across the table.Thatcher became a supremely self-confident leader. No gloves, or hats, except for royalty or at funerals, but feet on the table, whisky glass at hand, into the small hours of solitude, for want of male cronies in the masculine world she dominated for all her 11 years in power.Draining down those 11 years to their memorable essence, what does one light upon? What is really left by Thatcher to history? What will not be forgotten? What, in retrospect, seems creative and what destructive? Are there, even, things we look back on with regret for their passing? Would we like her back?I think by far her greatest virtue, in retrospect, is how little she cared if people liked her. She wanted to win, but did not put much faith in the quick smile. She needed followers, as long as they went in her frequently unpopular directions. This is a political style, an aesthetic even, that has disappeared from view. The machinery of modern political management – polls, consulting, focus groups – is deployed mainly to discover what will make a party and politician better liked, or worse, disliked. Though the Thatcher years could also be called the Saatchi years, reaching a new level of presentational sophistication in the annals of British politics, they weren't about getting the leader liked. Respected, viewed with awe, a conviction politician, but if liking came into it, that was an accident.This is a style whose absence is much missed. It accounted for a large part of the mark Thatcher left on Britain. Her unforgettable presence, but also her policy achievements. Mobilising society, by rule of law, against the trade union bosses was undoubtedly an achievement. For the most part, it has not been undone. Selling public housing to the tenants who occupied it was another, on top of the denationalisation of industries and utilities once thought to be ineluctably and for ever in the hands of the state. Neither shift of ownership and power would have happened without a leader prepared to take risks with her life. Each now seems banal. In the prime Thatcher years they required a severity of will to carry through that would now, if called on, be wrapped in so many cycles of deluding spin as to persuade us it hadn't really happened.These developments set a benchmark. They married the personality and belief to action. Britain was battered out of the somnolent conservatism, across a wide front of economic policies and priorities, that had held back progress and, arguably, prosperity. This is what we mean by the Thatcher revolution, imposing on Britain, for better or for worse, some of the liberalisation that the major continental economies know, 20 years later, they still need. I think on balance, it was for the better, and so, plainly did Thatcher's chief successor, Tony Blair. If a leader's record is to be measured by the willingness of the other side to decide it cannot turn back the clock, then Thatcher bulks big in history.But this didn't come without a price. Still plumbing for the essence, we have to examine other bits of residue. Much of any leader's record is unremarkable dross, and Thatcher was no exception. But keeping the show on the road is what all of them must first attend to, because there's nobody else to do it. Under this heading, Thatcher left a dark legacy that, like her successes, has still not disappeared behind the historical horizon. Three aspects of it never completely leave my head.The first is what changed in the temper of Britain and the British. What happened at the hands of this woman's indifference to sentiment and good sense in the early 1980s brought unnecessary calamity to the lives of several million people who lost their jobs. It led to riots that nobody needed. More insidiously, it fathered a mood of tolerated harshness. Materialistic individualism was blessed as a virtue, the driver of national success. Everything was justified as long as it made money – and this, too, is still with us.Thatcherism failed to destroy the welfare state. The lady was too shrewd to try that, and barely succeeded in reducing the share of the national income taken by the public sector. But the sense of community evaporated. There turned out to be no such thing as society, at least in the sense we used to understand it. Whether pushing each other off the road, barging past social rivals, beating up rival soccer fans, or idolising wealth as the only measure of virtue, Brits became more unpleasant to be with. This regrettable transformation was blessed by a leader who probably did not know it was happening because she didn't care if it happened or not. But it did, and the consequences seem impossible to reverse.Second, it's now easier to see the scale of the setback she inflicted on Britain's idea of its own future. Nations need to know the big picture of where they belong and, coinciding with the Thatcher appearance at the top, clarity had apparently broken through the clouds of historic ambivalence.Heath took us into Europe, and a referendum in spring 1975 confirmed national approval for the move. Prime Minister Thatcher inherited a settled state of British Europeanness, in which Brussels and the [European] Community began to influence, and often determine, the British way of doing things. She added layers of her own to this intimacy, directing the creation of a single European market that surrendered important national powers to the collective.But on the subject of Europe, Thatcher became a contradictory figure. She led Britain further into Europe, while talking us further out. Endeavouring to persuade the British into an attitude of hostility to the group with which she spent 11 years deepening their connection must take a high place in any catalogue of anti-statesmanship. This, too, we still live with.One also can't forget what happened to the agency that made Thatcher world‑famous: the Conservative party, of which she seemed such an improbable leader. Without it, she would have been nothing. It chose her in a fit of desperation, hats and all – though it quite liked the hats. It got over a deep, instinctive hostility to women at the top of anything, and put her there. Yet her long-term effect seems to have been to destroy it. The party she led three times to electoral triumph became unelectable for a generation.There are many reasons for this. But Thatcher was a naturally, perhaps incurably, divisive figure. It was part of her conspicuous virtue, her indifference to familiar political conventions. It came to a head over her most egregious policy failure, Europe. She lost seven cabinet ministers on the Europe question, a record that permeated the party for years afterwards. It still does. So the woman I met in Curzon Street, dimpling elegantly, can now be seen in history with an unexpected achievement to her credit. She wrecked her own party, while promoting, via many a tortuous turn, Labour's resurrection.The last time I met her was after all this was over. We had had a strange relationship. She continued for some reason to consider me worth talking to. Yet I wrote columns of pretty unremitting hostility to most of what she did. It became obvious that, while granting that I had "convictions", she never read a word of my stuff.For years, in fact, she despised writers, except those who did her speeches. Why don't you get a proper job, she once sneered at me. Yet, at that last encounter, her tone was different. She had just finished the first volume of her memoirs, which she insisted was all her own work. This has been a terrible labour, she said. It was all very well for me to write books. I was a professional writer. She was not a writer. It came very hard, getting the words and paragraphs in the right order, a task for which, she eventually admitted, she had hired some help.But now the history was what mattered. Getting the record straight.Making sure the verdict wasn't purloined by others. Everything has its season. Promises. Action. Words. Hats. Gloves. Handbag. Now it was the turn of the words, and no one, of course, would, against all the odds, do them better than the lady who, 25 years before, once thought the sky was beyond her limit.Hugo Young was a political columnist for the Guardian from 1984 until 2003 and biographer of Margaret Thatcher. He wrote this piece in 2003, two weeks before he died.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/interactive/2013/apr/11/margaret-thatcher-legacy-best-writing#undefined

[Turnbull]

Procitao sam clanak i van tvog citiranog dela.I izgleda mi slabiji. Clanak citira pozitivisticke stavove o ulozi porodice (koji mogu biti tacni ili netacni) i intepretira ih kao normativne (da je porodica do jaja). Nisam siguran da je to dobra logika.

Svakako misliš pozitivne, ne pozitivističke. Ali tvrdnja ti opet ne stoji. Pa centralni ideološki sleight of hand je upravo u tome da se neke stvari izuzmu iz politike kao pozitivno utvrđen deo ljudske prirode. Kada Tačer kaže "There's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.", prividno, i ona samo iznosi pozitivnu tvrdnju, a zapravo iznosi ideološki moto.

[Prospero]

The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations Agreement against German Unification Encouragement on Economic Reform Argument over Nuclear Abolition National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 422Posted – April 12, 2013Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom BlantonWashington, D.C., April 12, 2013– Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister who passed away this week, built a surprising mutual-admiration relationship with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s – including behind-the-scenes agreement against the reunification of Germany, and profound disagreement about nuclear abolition – according to translated Soviet records of key meetings between the two leaders, posted online today for the first time by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org). BackgroundThatcher met Gorbachev in 1984 in London, before he came to power in the Soviet Union, and famously pronounced him "a man we can do business with." By 1987, when Thatcher visited the Soviet Union for the first time, the documents show the two world figures engaging in vigorous debate, frequent agreement, and mutual learning. By 1989, the record documents Thatcher trying to get Gorbachev to stop the unification of Germany, supporting his approach toward the gradual (as opposed to radical) transformation of Communism in Eastern Europe, sympathizing over the difficulties of economic reform, and disagreeing only – but profoundly – on the role of nuclear weapons.Here the documents illuminate the complexities of the Thatcher's triangular relationship with her American partner, Ronald Reagan, and her Soviet interlocutor, Mikhail Gorbachev. Both of the latter were nuclear abolitionists, who almost reached an agreement at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 for a nuclear-free world - against Thatcher's vociferous objections. The British leader believed nuclear weapons had preserved the peace for the previous 40 years, and that they were essential for deterrence and security. As did Gorbachev, she thought Reagan's notion of missile defense was dubious at best, and at worst destabilizing. As did Reagan (not Gorbachev the demilitarizer), Thatcher never met a military spending proposal she didn't like.The close Thatcher-Reagan relationship was hardly news, since both were politically conservative leaders of countries in historic alliance. More surprising was the common ground she found with the Communist leader – her ideological opposite even when he became a social democrat at the end of his tenure in office. Starting from their early jousting over ideas, they were able to overcome the ideological divide and develop a trusting, respectful and often mutually admiring relationship, which grew stronger with each of the spirited discussions they had. The documents show Thatcher's remarkable influence on Gorbachev's thinking about economic reform, conventional weapons in Europe, and local conflicts, among many other topics.Today, the National Security Archive publishes Soviet records of several Gorbachev-Thatcher conversations in 1987 and 1989, together with Politburo discussions of their meetings, and excerpts from the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, who, as Gorbachev's senior foreign policy adviser, was present at each of those meetings. According to Chernyaev and to Gorbachev's own memoir, Thatcher became one of his closest peers among Western leaders, with whom Gorbachev "could discuss anything," and from whom he learned a great deal. The documents show that each meeting they had was full of discussion of the internal aspects of perestroika, Thatcher's own attempts to change Great Britain, the virtues and vices of socialism and capitalism, and the most pressing issues of international relations. Most of the time they argued, and enjoyed the argument, but then found some middle ground and were able to agree on surprisingly many issues, such as resolving local conflicts, reforming the Soviet economy, and even working through the intensely controversial issue of the unification of Germany.These conversations also played a very positive role by pushing Gorbachev to learn about the Western perceptions of threat emanating from the Soviet Union – reinforcing his goal of reducing that sense of threat on both sides of the Cold War. But at the same time, one might argue that the strong positions taken by the British prime minister on nuclear weapons indirectly contributed to a major missed opportunity – that Gorbachev and Reagan never could realize their dream of a nuclear-free world, or even make much progress towards the arms race in reverse that Gorbachev so desired.West German chancellor Helmut Kohl behind Margaret Thatcher. The Thatcher-Gorbachev MeetingsThatcher's first visit to the USSR in March 1987 was a stellar event. She spent the entire day in Moscow arguing with Gorbachev seemingly about every global and internal issue. (Document 1) Of her many forthright statements, one in particular had a huge impact on Gorbachev - when Thatcher spoke of the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Looking at Soviet behavior through Thatcher's eyes seems to have made Gorbachev acutely aware of how threatening the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan looked to Western Europe. (Document 2)The March 1987 meeting included a forceful delineation of positions on arms control and the role of nuclear weapons. Thatcher also spoke about Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, again emphasizing the perception of threat this created throughout Europe. Gorbachev would later repeat Thatcher's point in a Politburo discussion of deterrence – which in turn had a significant impact on the development of the new defensive emphasis in Soviet military doctrine. (Document 3) Even though Thatcher was not willing to move an inch on her position against cuts in the British nuclear arsenal, the threat perception discussion reverberated in specific changes that occurred in the Soviet INF negotiating positions. Quite likely the Thatcher discussions also affected Soviet behavior during the subsequent visit by then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow, and Gorbachev's willingness (over Soviet military objections) to include the advanced short-range OKA missile in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty at the end of 1987.An interesting aspect of the March 1987 conversations, characteristic of almost all of the Thatcher-Gorbachev meetings, was Thatcher's reminiscences about her own experience with economic reform in Britain. Even though Gorbachev's reform, especially as early as 1987, had little in common with the radical free market changes Thatcher had introduced in her country, she felt the need to share her wisdom with him. And he, a convinced Communist evolving toward becoming a social democrat, listened and learned. One could hear echoes of these conversations in his subsequent speeches and discussions with advisers.During his visit to Britain in April 1989, Gorbachev was mostly concerned about the new U.S. President, George H. W. Bush, and the American's reluctance to engage with him. Gorbachev complained to Thatcher about the so-called Bush "pause," which paralyzed the process of arms control and other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1989. (Document 5) And yet, Gorbachev launched into a passionate argument in favor of nuclear abolition again – this time linking the failure to abolish nuclear weapons to future proliferation among unstable regimes. If nuclear weapons were not abolished, the situation would get out of control, Gorbachev argued to the resistant Thatcher.At this meeting, Gorbachev gave his British counterpart a remarkably candid analysis of the Soviet economic situation and the difficulties facing perestroika and reform. Thatcher again talked about her own experience and even claimed that she "was the first to start an analogous perestroika in my country." She called the first free elections that had just taken place in the Soviet Union (March 1989) "a real watershed," but also prodded Gorbachev to focus his attention on economic reform.In their first meeting of the visit, held on the way to London from the airport on April 5, the British and Soviet leaders engaged in an impressive review of regional conflicts. Thatcher told him about her visit to Southern Africa and her worries about the situation in Namibia. Gorbachev complained about the U.S. position on Afghanistan, and Washington's failure to comply with the Geneva accords. They disagreed on the situation in Cuba and Havana's behavior in Africa. (Document 4)In September 1989, during her visit to Moscow on the way back from Japan, Thatcher mostly wanted to discuss the Soviet internal situation, but her hidden agenda was to reach an understanding with Gorbachev on how to prevent the unification of Germany. She expressed her continuing admiration and support of Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country and her understanding of his difficult position in Eastern Europe. Citing support and a personal message from Bush, she assured the Soviet leader that they would not do anything to try to "decommunize Eastern Europe" or destabilize the Warsaw Pact.Asking that no notes be taken during a confidential part of the conversation, Thatcher told Gorbachev that nobody in Europe was in favor of German unification, and that although the NATO communiqué said otherwise, he should disregard it. Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his diary on October 6, 1989, "Thatcher, when she asked to go off record during the conversation with M.S., expressed her views decisively against Germany's reunification. But, she said this is not something she can openly say at home or in NATO. In short, they want to prevent this with our hands." Chernyaev wrote down the confidential part of the conversation from memory as soon as he left the room. (Document 7)During the same meeting, even though Gorbachev got the assurances he wanted from Thatcher on Germany, Eastern Europe and domestic reform, the Soviet leader tried to push further on the issue of disarmament – now suggesting abolition of all tactical weapons – the so-called "third zero." As in all their previous meetings, Madam Prime Minister was adamant about keeping tactical nuclear weapons as key to British and broader European security. (U.S. and NATO tactical nuclear weapons exist even today in Europe, a hangover from the Cold War.) ConclusionOverall, the documentary record suggests that Margaret Thatcher played a complex role at the end of the Cold War. Her conversations with Gorbachev on general issues of arms control helped make him more open to compromise with the United States, and to carrying out deep unilateral conventional arms reductions in Europe. However, her influence worked in the other direction on nuclear weapons policy, because of her close relationship with Reagan. Her strong stance in defense of nuclear weapons was one factor that prevented the historic breakthrough that Reagan and Gorbachev almost achieved in Reykjavik, and kept trying to return to afterwards.This deep and principled disagreement between Gorbachev and Thatcher on the value and role of nuclear weapons ultimately meant her influence on Gorbachev was stronger in the sphere of domestic politics, and especially the economy, but not as strong on overall foreign policy and arms control. The Documents[Note on sources: Soviet records of Gorbachev's meetings with foreign leaders generally come from two sources. Since few of the formal Soviet Foreign Ministry memoranda of conversation have been released from the Moscow archives, the most important available source is the Gorbachev Foundation. The transcripts translated below are taken from the Foundation's records of those meetings, which Foundation staff transcribed during the 1990s. The records consist of handwritten notes taken by Chernyaev and other aides, including Gorbachev's trusted interpreter, Pavel Palashenko. In recent years, the Foundation has published portions and excerpts from the transcribed records in several document volumes. During the 1990s however, and in certain cases after that, researchers were able to gain access to the full transcripts using computers at the Foundation. Chernyaev donated his copies of many of these texts to the National Security Archive, as part of his contribution to a series of conferences in 1998 and 1999 on the end of the Cold War. He also subsequently donated his personal diary to the Archive covering his years as a high-level official of the Soviet Central Committee from 1972 to 1985, and as a top Gorbachev aide from 1985 through 1991. Without Anatoly Sergeyevich's commitment to openness and the documentary record, our mutual history would be immeasurably poorer. ]Document 1: Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, March 30, 1987, Moscow.Document 2: Politburo discussion of Margaret Thatcher visit, April 16, 1987. Notes of Anatoly S. Chernyaev.Document 3: Politburo Discussion of the New Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, May 8, 1987. Notes of Anatoly S. Chernyaev.Document 4: Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, April 5, 1989, London.Document 5: Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, April 6, 1989, London.Document 6: Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, April 16, 1989Document 7: Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, September 23, 1989, Moscow.

[MancMellow]

The Thatcher-Gorbachev Conversations Document 7: Record of Conversation between Thatcher and Gorbachev, September 23, 1989, Moscow.

Ovo sam ja čitao ima bar jedno 3 godine. Sovjeti su očigledno mislili da Thatcherka hoće da ih iskoristi, što je delom i tačno, ali su sami ispali još veće budale. No, bez obzira na to što bih ja lično voleo da je ona uspela u ovoj konkretnoj misiji, ovaj njen pokušaj, onako po metodu, pokazuje kako neke diplomatske navike teško i zapanjujuće sporo umiru, naročito u konzervativnim krugovima. Prvo, milionsko stanovništvo GDR hoće ujedinjenje, ali to nema veze :) To jedno, drugo - "Now I would like to say something in a very confidential manner, and I would ask you not to record this part of the conversation." :D

[Prospero]

meni je highlight svih tih razgovora s kraja 80ih, između sovjeta sa svojom "sinatra doktrinom" i zapada koji se naprasno zabrinuo kako će da hendluje promene u IE, bio "predlog" američkog ambasadora u rumuniji svom sovjetskom kolegi, negde krajem decembra 89-te , da sovjeti intervenišu i spasu čaušeskua, ili barem da ga izvuku iz zemlje. amer je to uradio na bejkerov zahtev, cenim da ga je sovjet gledao ko budalu.

[MancMellow]

pa to :D koliko se samo voli mistifikovati nekakva nadnaravna pamet tih diplomata i milioni zavera na osnovu neke knjige u nekom institutu, a oni u mnogo slučajeva počnu nešto pa onda gledaju šta će da ispadne i pitaju se šta će sad da rade...

[Zaz_pi]

Gresis, to je bilo navlacanje Rusa da intervenisu sto bi neminovno vodilo ka velikom ratu iz kojeg bi Rusija izasla manja nego sto je danas. A, vec su bili iznureni sa Avganistanom. To je jedna od retkih ispravnih stvari rukovodstva SSSR iz tog perioda. O, tome moze da se cita u obavestajnim podacima koje su izasli iz KGB posle 1991. Poljska je bila na ivici ratnog sukoba a koji bi se prenosio po celom I. Bloku, pa cka i SSSRu.Kada je ekonomija pocela da puca sredinom 80ih, zbog pada cene nafte, Severno more u Britaniji i Aljaska u SAD plus pumpanje S. Arabije, Rusija se nasla u grdnim problemima. Rusi su ulozili ogromna sredstva da pokrenu velika nalazista nafte u Zapadnom Sibiru(poput gigantskog polja Samotlora), plus rat u Avganistanu, racunajuci da cena nafte ostati dovoljno visoko, kao u 70im, da im se to realtivno brzo vrati.Inace, i ovde je Gorbacjov pogresio u proceni. Zapadni Sibir je imao jos puno nafte, problem je bila tehnologija vadjenja nafte, kao i sto danas ima jos dosta nafte ali vadjenje zavisi od tehnologije(tehnologija koja se danas koristi za vadjenje nafte(npr. na velikim dubinama) je medju najkompleksnim na svetu. Uporediva, ako i ne kompleksnija, od tehnologija koja se koriste u svemirskim istrazivanjima).Gorbacjov je bio od onih koji su bili ubedjeni da se prvo ljudi menjaju, poput mnogih u Srbiji, a onda ostalo. Naravno, pogresio je. I, dok je on promovisao Glasnost, u Pekingu, 1989, Kinezi izvode tenkove na ljude na Tjenanmen pod rukovodstvom Deng Sjaopnig. Sjaoping se danas smatra reformator Kine(macke itd.) a Gorbacjov se smatra gubitnikom koji je rasturio veliku drzavu.Inace, sa danasnje pozicije, odluka da se dopusti ujedinjenje Nemacke, od strane Rusa, i nije losa. Kada se pogledaju njihovi interesi. A, to je i tradicionalna politika Rusije jos od sredine 18. veka( od kraja Sedmogodisnjeg rata), kada je Pruska(u kratkom periodu i ujedinjena Nemacka) cesto bila trojanski konj Rusije ;) , pa sve do poslednje decenije 19. veka. Nisu dzaba protestantsko-svapske princeze dolazile u Sankt Peterburg

[Zaz_pi]

Hajde kada sam vec kod teme. Tokom Sedmogodisnjeg rata(1756-1763), Rusi su razbucali Prusku, iako su Nemci bili ubedjeni da ce pobediti, cak su Rusi usli i u Berlin i samo je smena na ruskom tronu spasila Nemce. Posto je car Petar III bio naklonjen Frederiku Velikom. To ce za posledice imati naklonst Pruske u narednom periodu spram Rusije, nekada cak i kao vazal.Nesto se slicno desava posle dopustanja Rusije da se Nemacka ujedini. Verovatno ostanak americkih trupa u Nemackoj ima veze sa ovim saznanjem, pa Nemci moraju da balansiraju. Nemci itekako tehnoloski pomazu Rusiju i cesto stanu na stranu Rusije oko raznih pitanja. Iako formalno kritikuju razne pojave u pozadini razvijaju ogromne poslove.Eto, nadam se da ne zamerate.edit: Inace, Ruska poltika u Evropi je bila slicna Britanskoj ali su bile sukobljenje. Ni Rusija, ni Britanija nisu zelele jake zemlje u kontinentalnoj Evropi i zato je Rusima takva pozicije Pruske fenomenalno dosla.

Edited April 17, 2013 by Zaz_pi