Hladni rat

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Kuba

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Redovni učesnik vlažnih snova svih nastavnika ONO i DSZ-a, taktička nuklearna bomba nakon čijeg ispaljivanja sledi čuvena komanda: "Atomski zdesna".  -_-

 

[bigvlada]

Gledano iz današnje perspektive ovo je genijalan članak, kao da ga je pisao senator Mekarti lično. Radi se o (po njima) prvom pokušaju da se laički proceni šta Sovjeti imaju i u kojim količinama. Zaključili su da imaju 400-800 podmornica, mnogobrojne kontejnere za vuču i lansiranje balističkih raketa, zatim oko 20.000 raketa srednjeg dometa i i industrijski kapacitet za proizvodnju od 2000 takvih raketa mesečno. Ovo je pisano u februaru 1957.godine, nekih pola godine pre (po njima) tehnološkog Perl Harbura. Ta naknadna drama začuđuje (što je bilo i Ajzenhauerovo mišljenje) jer se godinama pisalo o tome šta Sovjeti rade i nije izgledalo da zaostaju mnogo. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited March 27, 2016 by bigvlada

[bigvlada]

Ispostavilo se da Kertis Le Mej nije u pravu i da je lakše držati okidač pomoću podmornica sa raketama nego strateškim bombarderima.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[namenski]

Redovni učesnik vlažnih snova svih nastavnika ONO i DSZ-a, taktička nuklearna bomba nakon čijeg ispaljivanja sledi čuvena komanda: "Atomski zdesna".  -_-

 

 

-_-

 

 

 

Hladni rat je isao u paketu sa tehnoloskim entuzijazmom.

Podvrsta nuklearni mada oko ovog nuklearni i nije imalo mnogo da se tehnologise – principi su, naime, bili savladani – nego je ostalo resiti i resavati problem takozvanih vektora, sto ce reci gadget-a koji ce nuklearno, bilo veliko ili malo, da otpreme odnosno dopreme tamo gde treba.

Davy Crockett Weapon System, kako bese inspirativna vojna M oznaka nije ni vazno, zamisljen je i ostvaren u vreme atomskog entuzijazma, vreme kada se pokusavalo i sebe i druge ubediti da to i nije toliko strasno.

Bilo je to vreme kada su bolje prodavnice obuce u Americi kupcima na raspolaganje stavljale rentgen aparate u kojima su ovi mogli da natenane razgledaju ponasanje svog stopala u obuci koja im se svidja i koju nameravaju da kupe. Polako i natenane.

Racun(i) su poceli da stizu kasnije.

Bolnicki i oni postbolnicki.

Ideja je bila jedna u nizu ideja koje su trebale da rese problem zaustavljanja cuvene lavine sovjetskih tenkova i svega onog sto uz njih i iza njih ide, a koje bi provalile iz Istocne Evrope, severnonemackom ravnicom i juznije gde se to moze, jureci ka atlantskim obalama.

Jula 1962. je u pustinji Mojave opaljen prvi, operacija se zvala Sunbeam, uz prisustvo glavonja, danas se to kaze VIP-ova.

Postojao je samo jedan mali problem: glavonje ni izbliza nisu bile toliko blizu mestu lansiranja ili mestu eksplozije – u slucaju ovog oruzja to je skoro svejedno jer mu je domet bio oko 2 km – koliko je to trebalo da budu pripadnici specijalnog troclanog tima koji je to trebalo da radi u takozvanoj i notornoj stvarnoj ratnoj sutuaciji.

A takozvani troclani atomic squad je trebalo da puca iz obicnog bestrzajnog topa kalibra nekih 105 mm.

Oruzjem koje je bilo tesko nekih 37 kg, veliko kao bostan i koje je imalo domet od 2 km.

Tamo gde padne bilo je zamisljeno da pobije, unisti ili ucini – eto vojnog recnika – neoperativnim sve sto se mice, raste ili se ne mice, i to otprilike ovako: unutar 150 metara od tacke 0 sve, sve, sve, ukljucujuci i tenkovske posade bi bilo mrtvo, koje eksplozijom, koje radijacijom. Unutar kruga od 300 metara radijacija bi ekspresno brzo cinila svoje, pa se izlozenima davalo najvise par dana do bolne (sluzbeni izraz) smrti.

Ukratko, instant smrt u radijusu od nekih petstotinak metara.

Sve to montirano na terensko vozilo ili noseno na ledjima, tegljeno, svejedno i povereno grupi od 3 coveka nivoa odgovornosti prosecnog podoficira. Koji mogu opravdano da budu ljuti, neraspolozeni ili prosto, naprosto – neodgovorni.

Sto nije bio problem da se proizvede, isporuci i u naoruzanje uvede, od 1961. do 1971. ni manje ni vise nego 2,100 ovih sistema.

Nije lako biti Nemac: Atomic Battle Group su bile rasporedjenje duz granice izmedju Istocne i Zapadne Nemacke.

Davy Crockett je bio poslednja americka atomska naprava koja je isprobana u atmosferi, na povrsini tacnije; posle nje je stupila na snagu zabrana atmosferskih proba pa se atomsko pucanje preselilo pod zemlju.

Nisu opisani efekti dejstva na svoje, misli se na ljude koji su imali da ih ispale.

Ili to nije bilo toliko bitno.

 

 

Za one kojima su drage tehnika i brojke, ovo se zvalo M-28, krsteno je bilo kao takozvano sub-kilotonsko atomsko oruzje, pa je – prebaceno na stari dobri TNT ekvivalenat – brojalo nekih 10 do 20 tona eksploziva.

Cuvena bojeva gadjanja nisu izvodjena.

I jos – tvrdili su da sve to nije nista strasno i da bi se za nekih 48 sati na zemljiste na kome je ovo eksplodiralo moglo da vrati bez problema; 48 sati bi im, naime, bilo dovoljno da prikupe NATO i krenu da zaustavljaju bujicu.

Poteraju je nazad takoreci; na nisan nekim drugim troclanim (plus politicki rukovodilac) timovima, ups - kolektivima.

 

[bigvlada]

Ma znam nego mi lepo naleteo članak za izjavu. 

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Kuka, drama, vrištanje, Treći Svetski Rat, demokratija ili ropstvo; predsedniče, ne dozvolite da pobede zli Rusi....  Kako su se oni tada usrali. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[bigvlada]

Of myths and missiles: the truth about John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap

by Dwayne A. Day

Tuesday, January 3, 2006

 

Historical myths persist for many reasons. One reason is that historians can be lazy. It is easier to use secondary sources such as books or articles than it is to find primary sources, such as documents or interviews. To be fair, no historian can afford the time to track down every reference, but far too many fail to dig for original source material and merely accept the work done by others. As a result, history books can repeat erroneous information for generations.

 

Another reason that historical myths can persist is similar to the reason that urban legends have power—because they serve societal biases and needs, people want them to be true. Perhaps an anecdote or explanation is funny or interesting and makes for a better story than the more ambiguous or nuanced reality. Or if the topic is political, the historian may prefer a story that portrays a historical character in a positive or negative light and accept accounts that satisfy those biases.

 

One historical myth that has persisted for many years is the belief that John F. Kennedy was unaware of the real nature of the so-called “Missile Gap” until after he became president. Once he had access to intelligence information, he realized that there was no gap and that the United States was not lagging behind the Soviet Union in deployed ballistic missiles but was instead significantly ahead. But while it has long been known that the gap never existed, the myth that Kennedy was kept in the dark until he became president is still commonly repeated. It is not true.

Moving targets

 

The Missile Gap, for those who are unfamiliar with Cold War history, was a controversy that raged soon after Sputnik concerning the number of Soviet ICBMs. Did the Soviets have hundreds of ICBMs whereas the United States had not yet deployed its own?While it has long been known that the gap never existed, the myth that Kennedy was kept in the dark until he became president is still commonly repeated. It is not true.

 

 

The public controversy was actually only the tip of the iceberg, for the real sparks flew within the American intelligence community, particularly between the US Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. Air Force analysts claimed that there could be hundreds of Soviet ICBMs, whereas CIA analysts argued that there were no more than a dozen.

 

We now know that there were only four.

 

Declassified CIA histories of the time have demonstrated that the gap was always a moving target—the numbers of deployed Soviet ICBMs that CIA and Air Force analysts argued over were constantly shifting. New intelligence data and new ways of interpreting that data did not initially resolve the dispute. The CIA was sporadically flying U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union, but these missions could not photograph all Soviet territory. As long as unexamined territory remained, Air Force analysts—and Air Force generals like Curtis LeMay—insisted that large numbers of Soviet ICBMs could be located in unseen areas, therefore requiring large numbers of American ICBMs. Arcane arguments raged over how much floor space was required in Soviet missile factories to produce each missile.

 

This controversy leaked to the press, where Democrats argued that Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not spending enough money on national security and was therefore placing the country in danger. In the 1960 election campaign John F. Kennedy echoed these charges—allegedly because he did not have access to the intelligence data.

Intelligence briefings

 

In July 1960 Senator Kennedy was provided an intelligence briefing about a broad array of subjects, including Soviet missile capabilities. Kennedy’s running mate, Lyndon Johnson, was also given a similar briefing at the time.

 

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles summarized the briefings in a letter to President Eisenhower [PDF, 450KB] in early August 1960. The letter is contained in the Eisenhower Library and was declassified in 1976.

 

Dulles explained that he had briefed Kennedy on July 23 and Johnson on July 28 at their respective residences. Each briefing covered the same topics and lasted slightly over two hours.

 

“The two briefings covered the same general subject matter,” Dulles wrote. “Namely, recent developments in Sino-Soviet policy; an analysis of Soviet strategic attack capabilities in missiles and long-range bombers and of Soviet nuclear testing prior to the moratorium and the background of the RB-47 [aircraft shootdown] incident. This was followed by developments in the Berlin situation, in Cuba and the Congo and in other strategically important areas including the Middle East, Iran, the Formosa Straits, and Communist China; also NATO problems and France and Algeria.”A potentially lucrative line of inquiry for an intrepid historian would be to examine Kennedy’s speeches about national security before and after the briefing and see if they changed in any significant way.

 

 

All of those subjects and areas were particularly hot at the time. Berlin was a potential flashpoint as American and Soviet tanks faced each other over barbed wire. “Both candidates were particularly interested in developments that might arise during the campaign, particularly with regard to Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo,” Dulles wrote. Cuba would be the site of a botched invasion attempt in April 1961, and the Berlin Wall would replace the barbed wire starting in August of the same year.

 

The Missile Gap was also a topic of discussion. “Following the briefing on Soviet missile developments, Senator Kennedy asked how we ourselves stood in the missile race. I replied that the Defense Department was the competent authority on this question and the Senator remarked that he hoped to see Secretary Gates and also expressed a desire to have a talk with Secretary Herter. I said that I would mention this to you which I had the opportunity of doing at the NSC Meeting on Monday, July 25.” Dulles added that “Senator Johnson, in addition to his particular interest in Soviet missile development, gave particular attention to developments in the Caribbean, including Mexico.”

 

Dulles closed his letter to Eisenhower by noting that both men gave brief statements to the press following the briefings. Kennedy was informal, whereas Johnson read a short statement that he showed to Dulles before he read it. Dulles also provided the statement to Eisenhower.

 

What the letter makes clear is that Kennedy was given a detailed intelligence briefing in the middle of the presidential campaign, including information on the Missile Gap. A potentially lucrative line of inquiry for an intrepid historian would be to examine Kennedy’s speeches about national security before and after the briefing and see if they changed in any significant way. For instance, did he tone down his comments about the supposed gap in ICBMs after he received the briefing?

 

Of course, this does not completely settle the matter. Improved intelligence, particularly the success of the first CORONA spy satellite mission in late August 1960, helped reduce the range of uncertainty about Soviet ICBM deployment. But it was not until a satellite mission in late 1961 that the intelligence community obtained definitive proof that there were no Soviet ICBMs filling vast areas of unexplored Siberia. As long as this uncertainty raged, Air Force generals could argue the worst-case scenario, and Kennedy could legitimately take their side in the argument, even if unbiased analysts at the CIA argued that claims of large Soviet ICBM deployments were based upon bad interpretations of available data. However, Kennedy was not ignorant of the intelligence data, at least not after July 1960. Hopefully in the future historians will probe this issue in greater depth.

 

Dwayne A. Day is the associate editor of Raumfahrt Concret, a German spaceflight magazine, and frequently writes about space history and policy.

 

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/523/1

[bigvlada]

Jo[ jedan članak objavljen samo par dana pre "tehnološkog Perl Harbora"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[bigvlada]

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-navys-most-vital-and-secretive-submarine-base-is-in-1590794426

 

Sjajna ideja, bazu za istraživanje i razvoj  novih podmornica su smestili u slatkovodno jezero, gde ne postoji ni teoretska šansa da ih neko uslika. Izgleda čudno kada vidim modele podmornica klase Los Anđeles koje su npr. u razmeri 1:5 

[bigvlada]

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Rat Zvezda pre reganovog Rata Zvezda

 

 

[iDemo]

1968ma, rodna™ godina za podmornice

 

 

Minerve (FRA) was lost at about the same time as the INS Dakar (a few days apart), over 1,450 miles (2,330 km) away. Two more submarines were lost to unknown causes in the same year, the Soviet submarine K-129 and the US submarine USS Scorpion.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_submarine_K-129_(1960)

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Scorpion_(SSN-589)

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Dakar

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_submarine_Minerve_(S647)

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Interesantni su nazivi raketa koji nemaju veze sa mozgom.