NDH

[Lord Protector]

[Lord Protector]

deo podvučen olovkom:

 

Edited May 18, 2016 by slow

[Topola]

Za ilustraciju: neka od katoličkih "procesija" u Zagrebu 1942. Uredno uz barjak antihrišćanskog Trećeg rajha.

 

[Dr Arslanagić]

Zanimljivi su Orlovi, Nikola Žutić je nešto malo pisao o njima davno. Ne znam ima li čega valjanog u novijoj hrvatskoj istoriografiji o tome.

 

btw, Protulipac koji je pomenut u jednom od tekstova je bio prvo smaknuće OZBA-e u inostranstvu. 

[hazard]

,,Orlovi" su odgovor katolicke crkve na ,,Sokolove" koji su posle 1929. imali jaku drzavnu podrsku (i bili fakticki paradrzavna organizacija)?

[dillinger]

P.s. kolega slow, zanimljivi prilozi koje si postovao. Dobro ocrtavaju genezu ustaskog ludila i ono sto ce doneti.

 

Jer, ja sam sebi nikada nisam uspeo da objasnim kako je bilo moguce da toliko "obicnih" ljudi odjednom postanu ubice, i to ne na "industrijski" nacin kao sto je bio slucaj u nemackim logorima smrti, vec brutalni koljaci, okupani i bukvalno krvlju nevinih zrtava. Njih nije bilo stotinak vec je rec o desetinama hiljada koljaca sa kamama i maljevima, i to najvise onima koji su po selima od Korduna do Hercegovine vadili oci i sekli grkljane svojim komsijama i poznanicima.

 

Jedino objasnjenje koje mogu da sebi dam jeste da su u svom primitivizmu i banalnosti duse, sve mogli da opravdaju oprostom lokalnih svestenika. Da im je jednostavno sve bilo prosto na "poslu" istrebljenja inovernika i jeretika. Klasicna kruzada sa oprostom grehova na kraju i pranjem krvavih ruku. Prica o "katolickoj akciji" i njenom lokalnom nivou, tj. tom "kapilarnom" prodiranju medju "narod" moze da objasni broj i obim zlocina.

 

Nemacki nacizam je dao okvir za istrebljenje citavih delova stanovnistva ali je moralo da postoji to nesto drugo sto je skroz omasovilo zlocin po svim nivoima, do najudaljenijih sela. Cini mi se da je samo to moglo da bude slucaj. Unapred obecan oprost lokalnog svecenika...

 

Možda da priupitaš živuće sunarodnike iz BiH šta sve ume da porodi bezakonje i rašireni stav bolje mi njih pre nego što oni nas.

 

E da i oduzmi nacistima tehnologiju pa da vidimo gde su.

Edited May 18, 2016 by dillinger

[Prospero]

Kad smo kod NDH@BiH
 

 

When Croatia Needes Serbs: Nationalism and Genocide in Sarajevo, 1941-1942
Emily Greble Balić
Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Spring, 2009), pp. 116-138.
 
 ...
Like everywhere else in the lndependent State of Croatia, the Ustasha regime launched а genocidal campaign against Sarajevo's Serbs in the spring of 1941. But because of the city's traditional political culture, war­ time needs, and the goals set forth Ьу members of the local elite, not all Serbs were targeted. This pattern happened in other places as well, but in Sarajevo it was particularly pronounced. In 1941, Sarajevo's 85,000 resi­dents were dispersed among four communities that had lived and worked side Ьу side for centuries: 34 percent of the population  was Muslim,  29 percent Catholic, 25 percent SerЬian Orthodox, and 10 percent jew­ish. Although Sarajevo's heterogeneous demographic, Ottoman heri­tage, and urban character does not conform to standard conceptions of the wartime Croatian nation-state, it is precisely this diversity and heritage that make it ап intriguing community study. Local leaders were bound to face difficulties in the process of removing "non-Croats," both for alto­gether pragmatic reasons- keeping the city economically and politically afloat during the transitional era- and avoiding disruptions to cultural and community networks. Civic leaders thus attempted to negotiate with the state, and the regime sometimes responded Ьу deviating from core tenets of its national ideology. In charge of а fledgling state embroiled in а multisided civil war, the Ustasha periodically calculated that the quest for national homogenization needed to take second place to the struggle for political survival.
 
The Sarajevo case thus suggests that, at least in some instances, а reciprocal relationship existed between local and national prerogatives whereby local identities could and did affect state genocidal policies. То this end, it adds complexity to our understanding of "resistance" as ап analytical framework to suggest that actions against а genocidal agenda cannot Ье understood solely in terms of virtuous opposition. Moreover, this story calls attention to the ways in which members of the victim, or "foreign," group negotiated space for themselves to remain part of the local, and even national, community.
...
In occcupied Yugoslavia, various antiliЬeral groups united in their disdain for the left.20 The unlikely partnership in­ cluded Muslims who sought the revival of shariat law, Catholic reactionar­ ies who detested Islam, and secular ideologically driven Croat nationalists. The Ustasha claimed to represent all of their interests, but Ьу late April it had become clear to Sarajevans that this was not the case. Within days of coming to power, Zagreb deployed more than а thousand Ustasha sol­diers, policemen, and politicians to oversee the city and impose the пеw national agenda. Local factory bosses protested that пеw managers fired loyal Muslim and Catholic workers, rescinding their benefits and pen­sions, and hired friends and relatives from Zagreb and northern Croatia at higher salaries. Civilians complained that the Ustasha soldiers acted crudely toward them, harassing them on the streets, raiding their stores and homes, and Ьlatantly disregarding local cultural norms. One Mus­ lim woman sent а distraught letter to the Ustasha command complaining that eleven soldiers had been quartered in her home. She and another Muslim woman lived there alone, and they found it inappropriate and uncomfortaЫe to live with so many soldiers. The proЫem was essentially one of culture: most of the Ustasha soldiers came from working-class, ru­ ral, and purely Catholic regions, and the regime never instructed them on how to behave in а complex, multiconfessional city like Sarajevo.

The ensuing clash between city and state soon encompassed every aspect of social and political policy. Sarajevo's leaders realized that their vision of the new European order, as well as their understanding of Croa­tian national ideology, conflicted with the vision projected Ьу Pavelic's regime in Zagreb. Gradually, they began to show signs of resistance to the new order, not because they opposed fascism рег se, but because they opposed the Ustasha regime's ineptitude, the limitations it placed on mu­nicipal autonomy, and the indiscriminate campaign waged against mem­bers of the city now labeled "non-Croats."
...
From the moment the Ustasha leaders arrived in Zagreb, they made it clear that "Serbs" were the principal group of "foreign nationals" who should Ье removed Ьу any means necessary.27 Ап early emphasis on the anti-Serbian agenda stemmed not only from the regime's perception that Serbs were а Ьiological and cultural "other" but also from two pragmatic reasons: Serbs comprised а significant chunk of the population of Croatia and they were deemed responsiЬle for the political oppression of Croats during the interwar ега. The Ustasha believed that eradicating Serblan culture, politics, and religion, as well as eliminating Serbs themselves, was vital to building the Croatian nation-state. Thus the regime's earliest laws outlawed the Serblan Orthodox Church, the Cyrillic alphabet, and Serblan books and culture. At the same time, the regime purged Serbs from the government bureaucracy and state-owned industries. Ustasha militias traveled the countryside rounding up Serbs, whom they inducted into forced labor battalions, interned in camps, deported to German­ occupied Serbla, ог killed.

But who exactly were these "Serbs"? What did "Serb" mean in the legal context? Other than being "foreign nationals" living on Croatian land-a term that could easily Ье applied to Slovenes, Italians, Hungarians, Ger­ mans, and Russians- how did the regime identify Serbs? Ustasha racial laws descriЬed non-Aryans as Jews, Roma, and "others," but never specified Serbs.28 Although Ustasha propaganda used racist terms to descriЬe Serbs and the discourse on the "Serb question" mirrored that on the 'Jewish question," nothing in the legal code stated explicitly what made someone а Serb.29 The regime created various caveats and categories of Serb, dis­tinguishing between SrЬi- Serbs born in Croatia-and SrЬijanci-Serbs born in Serbla proper. The Germans offered little guidance on the Serb question. In contrast to their elaborate codes regarding the racial identity of Jews and Roma, German theories of race did not categorize Serbs as non-Aryan .3° Furthermore, Zagreb deliЬerately left the definition vague because some top Ustasha leaders wanted to issue exemptions for SerЬian colleagues and friends.31 What becomes clear, quite ironically, in this le­gal vagueness is the centrality of the social as а means of achieving (ог at times, evading) а political reality. The more latitude such laws permitted, the more it was possiЫe to hand-select particular individuals for privilege, to help friends avoid persecution, and to leave room for one traditional form of politics- nepotism.

Compounding the proЫem of classifying and removing Serbs was the issue of local identity. Put simply: "SerЬian" meant different things to dif­ ferent people in different parts of the country. For some local officials it was а political identity; for others it referred to members of the SerЬian Orthodox faith; and for many it was simply the "other" in Croatia's racial laws. As а result, some towns created strict laws for Serbs, while others al­ lowed more flexiЬility. 32 Even institutions had their own systems for ascriЬ­ ing identities. For instance, Sarajevo's National Theater followed Zagreb's orders to fire non-Aryan employees Ьу removing а ':Jew" and а "Serb" but keeping twenty ''Aryan Orthodox" in its employ.33 Such а distinction suggests that these officials treated "Serb" as а racial category, but they ap­plied the term subjectively. Politics became, in effect, personal: а matter of how people interpreted racial categories, а process of "cultural intuition" rather than positive law.
...
But at the same time, the vast majority of Sarajevo's Muslim and Catholic elite did not view their ordinary Orthodox SerЬian townsmen as а threat to society nor seek to torture and massacre them just because they were Serbs. And they certainly did not understand- or agree with -the regime's at­ tempt to label Serbs unilaterally as outsiders. On the contrary, Sar,yevo's leaders believed there were many good Serbs who played important roles in their society. These Serbs belonged to Sarajevo and-in the minds of many city leaders- to the national collective.

Thus when the Ustasha army and police arrived in Sarajevo in late April 1941, they encountered fairly widespread resistance to their harsh treatment of Serbs. On 29 April, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik , Croatia's minister of defense, issued а severe puЫic warning to residents of Sara­ jevo who were hiding SerЬian soldiers, suggesting the practice was not uncommon. 34 In а few cases, Ustasha army commanders faced off with local Croat officers who refused to participate in executions of Serbs.35 When the new authorities began purging Serbs from puЫic institutions, Reis-ul-ulema Fehim Spaho, the highest ranking Muslim religious leader, petitioned Sarajevo's Ustasha command on behalf of а fired Orthodox SerЬian schoolteacher, arguing that "nobody has ever heard her insult а Croatian Muslim or Catholic during her time in service. . . . I think that dismissing this old schoolteacher is unfair, even if it is based on some legal regulation."36 Spaho's request was successful and the teacher was reinstated in her јоЬ. The Ustasha authorities clearly did not want to risk offending an important Muslim ally so early in the war, and thus they acquiesced to certain requests- even those that went against their own codes of identity.
...
Sensing the city's discomfort with the sweeping attack against Serbs, on 7 Мау 1941, local Ustasha authorities authorized exemptions for Serbs who were domaići-a word meaning domestic or native, although in this context it would Ье best translated as "our local Serbs."37 Domaci Serbs was а loosely defined category that generally applied to Sarajevans of Orthodox background who posed no discerniЫe threat to the politi­ cal goals of the Croatian nation-state. The group primarily consisted of lower-level bureaucrats, women, children, and the elderly. There was no formal means of differentiating "local Serbs" from those other Serbs who were considered racially inferior and potentially criminal. Some of Sara­ jevo 's Serbs tried to apply for the special status Ьу emphasizing that their families had resided in Sarajevo since before 1918 and that they were thus not Yugoslav imports but genuine Sarajevans.38 Others sent family histo­ ries to the mayor's office to prove they were "100 percent Aryan Serb."
...
At times, the amЬiguity of the term Serb worked against city leaders. Because SerЬian could denote а national orientation, the term encom­passed more than simply members of the SerЬian Orthodox faith. When the Ustasha launched its anti-SerЬian campaign, Muslims who supported Yugoslavia got caught in the crossfire. According to the national ideolo­gies of the time, Bosnia's Muslims did not constitute а separate national group and were classified instead as Croats, Serbs, or Yugoslavs. Although lslam was an official religion of the Croatian nation, being Muslim did not automatically qualify one for Croatian status. In April and Мау 1941, the Ustasha police arrested dozens of Sarajevo Muslims who owned prop erty in Belgrade, wrote in Cyrillic, or were "SerЬian oriented."44 They also closed Muslim organizations that had advocated а Yugoslav platform.
...
But Zagreb also recognized the importance of creating strong local alliances, which meant deviating from core policies at different points in the war. То this end, the Ustasha had more leeway with Serblan policies, which fell under the regime's domain, than with Jewish policies, which had to conform to the rules of the local Nazi German occupation. In June, for instance, Zagreb requested that Sarajevo's mayor compile а list of all Jewish properties in the town, as well as any SerЬian properties that his office thought should Ье confiscated .71 City officials thus main­tained some agency in the confiscation process, which was essential to their ongoing support of the regime. Months later, Zagreb tried to reverse this strategy and develop а more centralized process, but the precedent had already been set.

The Ustasha regime's national strategy for dealing with Serbs was not static, and changes in Zagreb's policies both reflected and affected poli­ cies in Sarajevo. In the fall of 1941, the Ustasha introduced their best­ known strategy to rid Croatia of Serbs: mass and forced conversions of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. Biondich has descriЬed the protracted shifts in Ustasha rhetoric over the summer and fall of 1941 that culmi­ nated in the пеw policy. The Ustasha ceased talking about Serbs as "aliens" in Croatia and instead referred to them as Catholic Croats who had con­ verted to Orthodoxy during the Ottoman era and then assumed а SerЬian consciousness. Such а discursive shift could also Ье seen in the debates over domaci status, though these arguments were not yet clearly articu­ lated. The Ustasha reasoned that they could herd these lost Orthodox souls back to the Catholic flock, converting roughly 100,000 Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism in late 1941.72 The forced conversions did not have а great impact оп Sarajevo's Serbs, partly because the regime had forЬid­den conversions of SerЬian intellectuals (who had developed too great а SerЬian consciousness) and partly because Sarajevo's leaders already treated "SerЬian" identity primarily in local terms. But the rhetorical shift from identifying Serbs as ап ethnic and racial "other" to а political threat confirmed а longstanding belief in Sarajevo: that "Serb" was not а Ьiologi­cal category.

In addition, the coercive conversions indirectly affected Sarajevo in that they fueled the rural insurgency in Bosnia. This did not go unnoticed Ьу the local Axis officials, who expressed outrage and frustration with the Ustasha regime's military incompetence and its zealous anti-Serb agenda. As the communist insurgency began to pose а more serious threat to Axis interests, both German and Italian officers working in the Sarajevo vicinity bypassed their local ally, the Ustasha, and instead sought assistance from the SerЬian nationalist resistance army, the Chetniks. Some officials even contemplated turning Sarajevo and eastern Bosnia over to the Chetniks in exchange for а ceasefire and help fighting the communists.
...
The Croatian Orthodox Church was founded on 3 April 1942. As an institution, it is relegated to the margins of histories of the Independent State of Croatia, often portrayed as а propagandistic move Ьу Pavelic and his regime to appease the Germans and stem Chetnik-Ustasha violence. It is true that the church had no national influence and little domestic sup­ port. It was officially а branch of the Ministry of Religion, which appointed clergy and monitored church activities. The few SerЬian Orthodox cler­ ics who had survived the regime's killing spree the previous summer re­ fused to participate in it, forcing Zagreb to import exiled Russian clergy to fill the church's hierarchy. The Croatian Orthodox Church was critical for Sarajevo, however, because it functioned as the vehicle for the return of Sarajevo's Serbs to the puЫic sphere. In joining the пеw church, а Sarajevo Serb declared his loyalty to Croatia. Не left the class of outcasts with contingent and amЬiguous racial and national identities and-on paper- became а Croat. More than 6,000 Sarajevo Serbs took advantage of this opportunity over the next year.

Оп 4 April 1942, а day after Pavelic founded the church, Sarajevo's city government announced that "Sarajevo's Orthodox" could again Ье bur­ied in the old SerЬian Orthodox graveyard.76 This right had been denied to them for а year. The next month, the Ustasha police reported that а large number of Orthodox Croats started to return to the city from their hiding places in the forests. The police noted with some surprise that most of the returnees were harmless civilians, who hoped to resume nor­mal lives and showed little interest in moving to Serbia or fighting for the Partisans or Chetniks. Astounding them further, some of these Orthodox Croats volunteered to join the Croatian Ноmе Guard. Newspapers high­ lighted the fact that Croatia's first Orthodox volunteer battalion саmе from the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza.

Over the coming months, Serbs returned to every aspect of Sarajevo's puЫic sphere. Certainly they still faced imprisonment and persecution for "suspicious" political activities, but their social position as а community gradually improved. Sarajevo's Serbs soon felt comfortaЫe petitioning the local government for food and clothing. Some began writing in Cyrillic again. The climax to these incremental changes occurred in December 1942, when Sarajevo's mayor, Mustafa Softic, announced the appointment of an Orthodox Croat, Milivoje Simic, as deputy mayor. Simic had been president of Sarajevo's local courts, and according to the local press, he was ''well known in our city" as а "hard-working man and puЫic servant, as well as а worthy intellectual and jurist." Не was also а registered member of the Croatian Orthodox Church, as were the other five Serbs appointed to the city council that month.78 Thus, Ьу the end of 1942, а Serb held the second highest position in the second largest city in а state whose ideo­ logical foundations called for the extermination of Serbs.
...
The story of Sarajevo's Serbs thus challenges traditional paradigms of wartime identity in Yugoslav historiography, which depict Serbs as either "victims" of Ustasha violence ог "heroes" of the resistance. The absence of а multilayered analysis of victimhood has created the false perception that "Serb" was а static and identifiaЫe category. In order to move be­ yond superficial accounts of the Ustasha regime's genocidal policies that emphasize methods of violence and debates over the number of dead, we need а richer analysis of the complexity of SerЬian experiences without the moral stigma attached to such terms as collaboration and resistance.
...
Such an analysis Ьу no means diminishes SerЬian victimhood or denies the anti-Serb policies of the Ustasha state. Rather it indicates that there is still room for а fuller understanding of this campaign, particularly when it is not reduced to а monolithic, top-down operation implemented evenly and consistently across the country. This argument is not new to genocide
studies, but it has yet to Ье accounted for in the nationalist narratives of eastern Europe, particularly Yugoslavia.
...
Among the regime's central mistakes in this regard was its failure to develop and enforce uniform laws on SerЬian racial and national iden­tity. This legal amЬiguity inadvertently created а system in which local leaders could interpret and implement SerЬian policies differently. Such discrepancies were not uncommon in Hitler's Europe. In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, officials ran into similar confusion with German laws that did not clearly stipulate who qualified as "German."
...

 

https://www.sendspace.com/file/al9ob2

 

[Lord Protector]

[Lord Protector]

[Kampokei]

Zanimljivo u onom tekstu o Sarajevu pod NDH ovo navodno postojanje srpskih jedinica u domobranima. u SFRJ je bio i napravljen film, kao partizani negde u Hrvatskoj zarobljavaju domobranskog oficira Srbina.

[Tribun_Populi]

Bilo ih je valjda čak i u vrhu NDH.

 

edit: za domobrane ne treba da čudi, to je bila regrutna vojska NDH popunjena predratnom rezervom, kao NOVJ od 1944. na dalje.

Edited May 20, 2016 by Tribun_Populi

[nautilus]

Zanimljivo u onom tekstu o Sarajevu pod NDH ovo navodno postojanje srpskih jedinica u domobranima. u SFRJ je bio i napravljen film, kao partizani negde u Hrvatskoj zarobljavaju domobranskog oficira Srbina.

 

U gori raste zelen bor

[Topola]

ima kod Ivana Šibla jedna neobična epizoda gde opisuje kako negde u okolini Zagreba 1943. (partizani) zarobljavaju nešto ustaša kojima komanduje oficir Srbin - iz Srbije, I to odlikovani Solunac!

 

Šibl navodi da je bila reč o čoveku koji se posle Velikog rata oženio negde u Hrvatskoj i 1941. zbog porodice pristupio "ustaškoj vojnici". Naravno, partizani mu nisu oprostili da li to što je bio ustaša ili Solunac ili jedno i drugo pa ga je, prema autorovim rečima, stigla "zaslužena pravda".

 

Verujem da je tih "komplikovanih" slučajeva (iz proste nacionalne vizure) bilo još, iako su samo kurioziteti koji ne potvrđuju nikakvo pravilo osim onog jednog: da je ljudski život neverovatna stvar.

[Hamlet Strašni]

Narocito im je smetalo sto je solunac. Sasvim je dovoljno sto je ustasa bio...

[Topola]

Da, nisam dovoljno dobro pojasnio: ostale ustase su pustili. Ovog nosioca "hegemonije" u ustaskoj uniformi - nisu. Dobio je metak u potiljak.

 

Šibl sa posebnim besom govori o tom momentu, ako se dobro secam, iako je knjiga (u tri toma) napisana nekim mirnim i skoro pa vedrim tonom.