Crtice o prvom svetskom ratu

[Prospero]

...

Наставак о Лењину, можда читава тема о руском Грађанском рату, неки други пут.

 

 

Evo neki "ekskluzivni" dokumenti oko tvoje omiljene teme, javnosti poznati samo 60ak godina:

 

 

 

The State Secretary to the Foreign Ministry Liaison Officer at General Headquarters 

TELEGRAM NO. 461

AS 1125 Berlin, 23 March 1917

 

The Imperial Minister in Bern has sent the following telegram:

'Federal Counsellor [bundesrat] Hoffmann has been told that leading Russian revolutionaries here wish to return to Russia via Germany as they are afraid to travel via France because of the danger from submarines. Please send instructions in case applications to this effect should be made to me. Romberg.'

 

Since it is in our interests that the influence of the radical wing of the Russian revolutionaries should prevail, it would seem to me advisable to allow transit to the revolutionaries there. I would therefore support the granting of permission. Would Your Excellency please inform the High Command of 

the Army and ask for their opinion in this matter? 

 

ZIMMERMANN 

 

 

 

The Liaison Officer at General Headquarters to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 371 

AS I 148 

25 March 19 1 7, 12.15 a.m. 

Received: 25 March, I. I 5 a.m. 

In reply to telegram No. 461. 

 

High Command of the Army instructs me to telegraph as follows:

'No objections to transit of Russian revolutionaries if effected in special train with reliable escort. Organization can be worked out between representatives of IIIb in Berlin and Foreign Ministry.'

 

LERSNER 

 

 

The Under State Secretary to the Minister in Bern 

TELEGRAM NO. 348 

AS 114 8 Berlin, 26 March 1917

 

Special train will be under military escort. Hand-over at frontier-station, either Gottmadingen or Lindau, by responsible official of the consulate. Send information immediately concerning date of journey and list of names. Information must reach here four days before frontier-crossing. General Staff unlikely to object to individual personalities. In any case, return transport to Switzerland is guaranteed.

 

BUSSCHE 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to. the Chancellor 

REPORT NO. 879 

A 10630 29 March 1917

 

The Imperial Consul-General in Basel received the following information from a reliable source: 'The Russian socialist and nihilist committees in Switzerland, in Bern, Zurich, and Geneva, have asked the representatives of the German press in Switzerland to work in their newspapers against Germany's undertaking an offensive against Russia, because this would disturb the peace plans of these committees.'

 

ROMBERG 

 

 

 

Captain Hiilsen [Political Section oj" the General Staff in Berlin] to the Foreign Ministry 

AS 1234 Berlin, 30 March 1917 

 

A confidential agent working for us, who spent a few days in Switzerland on our behalf and returned here on 29 March 1917, reports the following: 

 

'A large number of the Russians living in Switzerland wish to return to Russia. In principle, the Entente agrees with this plan, but those members of Russian revolutionary parties who favour an immediate peace are to be kept out of Russia by English pressure. Three such Russian revolutionaries were refused entry into France in the last few days, although they had been issued with passports by the Russian consulate in Bern. These Russian revolutionaries asked me, in confidence, to suggest to the German government that it should help them to reach Russia in spite of all this, and they made the following suggestion: 

 

"The German government should approve an application which the Russians living in Switzerland would arrange to have made by the Swiss government, for these Russians (about 300 to 400) to be transported to Sweden in a special train, travelling through Germany because of the shortness of this route. Among these 300 to 400 Russians (of all parties) there would also be those unacceptable to the Entente. As soon as the German government agrees to the proposal, he (the confidential agent) should unobtrusively inform the relevant people in Switzerland, so that they could begin to take the necessary steps with the Swiss government. The basic conditions demanded for the success of the operation seemed to be speed of execution and the arousing of as little attention as possible in Switzerland. It would not be advisable to make any conditions as to those travelling on the train, such as excepting those liable for military service. It was considered advantageous to Germany to bring out the members of Lenin's party, the Bolsheviks, who were about forty in number. Among them were Lenin and RJasanov in Bern, and Semjonov, Grigoriev, Abranov, Dora Dolin, and Marie Gutstein in Zurich. The fact that twenty to thirty so-called 'revolutionary patriots' and Mensheviks who were in favour of continuing the war would travel through at the same time seemed unimportant, as they would get back to Russia in any case, with the aid of the Entente." 

A decision on this proposal is humbly requested here. Our confidential agent is available for co-operation.

 

HULSEN 

 

 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 568 

AS 1242 3 1 March 19 1 7, 1.15 a.m. 

Received: 31 March, 5.20 a.m. 

 

National Counsellor [Nationalrat] Grimm has told Federal Counsellor Hoffmann, in the name of the Zurich Committee, that Russian emigres, most of whom are in favour of peace, have asked to be allowed to return to Russia immediately. Negotiations with the Swedish government would waste valuable time.

Travel through the Entente countries was impossible, quite apart from the danger from submarines, because the Entente would only allow those emigres to travel who were in favour of continuing the war. After their return to Russia the emigres would work for the release of a number of German prisoners from Russia.

After a discussion with me, Herr Hoffmann advised Grimm that representatives of the committee should make direct contact with me and should also send a telegram to Kerensky. Grimm considers the latter move inadvisable, as he does not trust Kerensky. A representative of the committee will probably approach me tomorrow. I intend to inform him according to the terms of telegram No. 3481 and to instruct him immediately to present lists of those travelling. 

 

ROMBERG

 

 

The Minister in Copenhagen to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 528 

AS 1273 2 April 19 1 7, 3. 1 3 a.m. 

Received: 2 April, 5.45 a.m. 

 

Had detailed discussion with Scavenius about the situation in Russia. The Minister rates the political significance of the Socialist Skobolev's inflammatory speeches lower than the press of the Entente countries might lead one to believe. Nevertheless, Scavenius does see in them a sign that the English are also in contact with the extremist Socialist circles. 

 

In face of the Russian revolution, we can, in my opinion, adopt one of two attitudes: Either we are both militarily and economically in a position to continue the war effectively until the autumn. In that case it is essential that we try now to create the greatest possible degree of chaos in Russia. To this end, any patently apparent interference in the course of the Russian revolution should be avoided. In my opinion, we should, on the other hand, make very effort surreptitiously to deepen the differences between the moderate and the extremist parties, for it is greatly in our interests that the latter should gain the upper hand, since a drastic change would then be inevitable and would take forms which would necessarily shake the very existence of the Russian empire. However, even if the moderate wing should remain in power, I could not imagine a transition to normal conditions taking place without considerable turmoil. Nevertheless, I think that it would be preferable, from our point of view, to back the extremist element, as this would be a more thorough way to work and would lead more quickly to some conclusion. In all probability, we should, in about three months time, be able to count on the disintegration having reached the stage where we could break the power of the Russians by military action. If we were now to launch a premature offensive, we should only give all the various centrifugal forces a motive for uniting and even, perhaps, lead the army to rally in its fight against Germany. If, on the other hand, we are not in a position to continue the war until the end of this year with any likelihood of success, then we should try to achieve a rapprochement with the moderate parties now in power and to convince them that if they insist on continuing the war, they will merely be doing the work of the English for them, opening the gates to reaction, and thus Jeopardizing even such freedom as they have won. As an additional argument, it should be pointed out to the Miliukovs and the Guchkovs that, in view of the uncertainty of the position in Russia, the English might attempt to reach an agreement with us, at the expense of the Russians. 

 

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU 

 

 

 

The Under State Secretary to the Minister in Bern 

TELEGRAM NO. 380 

AS 12 4 2 Berlin, 2 April 1917

 

According to information received here, it is desirable that transit of Russian revolutionaries through Germany take place as soon as possible, as the Entente has already begun to work against this move in Switzerland. I therefore recommend all possible speed in your discussions with representatives of the committee.

 

BUSSCHE 

 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry 

 

TELEGRAM NO. 601

AS 1288 

3 April 1917 

Dispatched: 4 April, 9.45 a.m. 

Received: 4 April, 1 1.35 a.m. 

In reply to telegram No. 380. 

 

Although I have made our willingness to co-operate known to the emigres through various channels, and although I have repeatedly been warned to expect a visit from a representative, nobody has yet contacted me, apparently because the emigres are afraid of compromising themselves in Petrograd. Some of them definitely want to wait for instructions from the government in Petrograd or from the Soviet; others still seem uncertain as to whether or not they wish to avail themselves of our offer. I do not think that we can do anything but wait. Perhaps German Socialists could also sound the emigres.

 

ROMBERG 

 

 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 603 

AS 13014 April 1917, 5. 35 p.m. 

Received: 4 April, 7.20 p.m. 

In continuation of telegram No. 601.

 

Platten, the secretary of the Social Democratic party, came to see me on behalf of a group of Russian Socialists and, more particularly, of their leaders, Lenin and Zinoviev, to voice a request that a number of the most important emigres, twenty to sixty at the most, be allowed to travel through Germany immediately. Platten states that matters in Russia are taking a turn dangerous to the cause of peace, and that everything possible should be done to get the Socialist leaders here to Russia as soon as possible, as they have considerable influence there. Unfortunately, he said, many of the emigres had no identity documents and, except for Lenin and Zinoviev, they were very anxious that their names should not be mentioned at all. Apart from this, they were prepared to submit to any conditions, such as travelling through without any stops and in sealed or even shuttered compartments. However, they did insist that none of them be left behind, that their carriage be assured extraterritorial rights, and that each of them be accepted regardless of his position for or against continuation of the war. For their part, they promised to make efforts in Russia to secure the release of a number of German prisoners.

 

Platten, who wants to travel to Stockholm to set up an information service, would join up with the emigres and would be prepared personally to guarantee each one of those travelling and to provide them with an authorization from [one word garbled]. This authorization should, if possible, contain no names. Platten could take the emigres to the frontier together with a German official, and could take them through the frontier post one by one. Since their immediate departure would be greatly in our interests, I urgently recommend that permission should be granted at once, accepting the conditions laid down. Taking into account the suspicious nature of the Russians, who would not at first believe in the possibility of safe transit, together with the ruthless counter-activities of the Entente and the differences of opinion among the emigres themselves, there would otherwise be a considerable danger of their allowing their decision to be altered again. If we show them unreserved confidence, we shall put them into a friendly frame of mind. I would consider it especially helpful that we should show our confidence in the Swiss Socialists by accepting their guarantee as a sufficient one. This would place us high in their estimation and would, I hope, enable us to establish a permanent relationship which would be extremely useful for maintaining connexions with Russia. Platten admits himself that there are two sides to the question of the justification and the logic of the conditions laid down by the emigres for their journey. He said that they believed that they had, in this way, insured themselves against being compromised in Russia, and that, after laboriously reaching agreement, one should not reopen any discussion. Their departure should take place not later than Friday. Finally, Platten regards it as quite impracticable to consider the possibility of so-called Social Patriots, i.e. opponents of peace, presenting themselves for the journey. Please telegraph at least provisional instructions as to whether or not the Russians should hold themselves in 

readiness for Friday.

 

ROMBERG 

 

 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to the Chancellor 

REPORT NO. 970 

AS 1317 5 April 1917

 

I have the honour to present the enclosed draft of the conditions for the passage of Russian emigres from Switzerland to Stockholm, given me by Herr Platten. 

Enclosure: 

Basis for discussions concerning the return of emigres to Russia. 

1. I, Fritz Platten, will conduct the carriage carrying political emigres wishing to travel to Russia, through Germany, bearing full responsibility and personal liability at all times.

2. All communication with German organizations will be undertaken exclusively by Platten, without whose permission absolutely nobody may enter the carriage, which will be locked at all times. The carriage will be granted extra-territorial rights. 

3. No control of passports or persons may be carried out either on entering or on leaving Germany.

4. Persons will be allowed to travel in the carriage absolutely regardless of their political opinions or their attitude towards the question of the desirability of war or peace. 

5. Platten will buy tickets at the normal tariffs for those travelling. 

6. As far as possible the journey shall be made without stops and in a through train. The emigres may not be ordered to leave the carriage, nor may they do so on their own initiative. The journey may not be interrupted except in case of technical necessity. 

7. Permission to make the journey is granted on the basis of an exchange of those travelling for Germans and Austrians imprisoned or interned in Russia. 

8. The negotiator and those travelling undertake to exert themselves, publicly and especially among the workers, to see that this condition is fulfilled. 

9. The time of departure from the Swiss frontier for the Swedish frontier, which should be as soon as possible, shall be agreed immediately.

 

Bern- Zurich , 4 April 1917 

FRITZ PLATTEN 

 

 

 

 

The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 742 

A 13733 27 April 1917, 12.45 p.m. 

Received: 27 April, 1.47 p.m. 

 

The secretariat of the organizing committee of the Russian revolutionary emigres in Zurich has asked me, through the intermediary of a reliable Swiss Social Democrat, to get permission for its five members, Martov, Martin [one syllable garbled], Axelrod, Semkovski, and Astrov, together with their associates, to travel through Germany to Sweden immediately, under the same conditions as Lenin's group. Having failed in its efforts to get a guarantee of travel through the Entente countries from the provisional government, the committee has decided to throw aside all its worries and considerations on the score of being compromised. They are unconditionally in favour of immediate peace and, next to Lenin, are the most important revolutionaries here. The number of those to travel is not yet certain. I would tentatively suggest that Mtinzenberg, who was the subject of my telegram No. 722,1 should accompany them, but that we should also arrange for a German military escort, as we did in the first case. A speedy decision of the principle is imperative, to prevent any contrary influences from making themselves felt. Date of journey would still have to be arranged with those taking part. The English are supposed to be detaining a ship carrying Russian emigres back from America, and this story favourably influenced the decision of the committee here. 

 

ROMBERG 

 

 

 

GERMANY AND THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 1915-1918 - Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry 

edited by Z. A. B. ZEMAN 

Oxford University Press. London, New York, Toronto

1958 

 

str. 25-52.

[Korki]

То нису сва документа, има новијег датума, али ионако показују сарадњу Лењина и другара са Немцима.

Оно што еј занимљио у свему томе је следеће

 

The Minister in Copenhagen to the Foreign Ministry 

TELEGRAM NO. 528 

AS 1273 2 April 19 1 7, 3. 1 3 a.m. 

Received: 2 April, 5.45 a.m. 

 

Had detailed discussion with Scavenius about the situation in Russia. The Minister rates the political significance of the Socialist Skobolev's inflammatory speeches lower than the press of the Entente countries might lead one to believe. Nevertheless, Scavenius does see in them a sign that the English are also in contact with the extremist Socialist circles.

 

Са тиме у вези, сва прича око доласка Троцког у Русију 1917, па онда његов став око Брест-Литовска, одлазак из дипломатије да ствара Црвену армију, добијају већи смисао. Нарочито када се зна да је за Троцког ургирао код Британаца, гле чуда, Павел Миљуков.

[Prospero]

Zanimljivo je to šta je Lenjin obećao Nemcima (preko posrednika jer nisu imali direktne kontakte) - rad na oslobađanju nemačkih zarobljenika - što dovoljno govori o tome koliko (ni)je bio "pion" u nemačkim planovima nego čovek svoje misije.

 

Za Trockog smo ranije utvrdili kako je pušten iz NY* kao i to da ruska privremena Vlada nije imala problem sa povratkom političke emigracije u zemlju jer je to smatrala političkom obavezom u skladu sa novim okolnostima i objavljenom opštom amnestijom za sve političke zatvorenike i emigrante. Sad, što ti to uporno vadiš iz konteksta i predstavljaš kao "urgiranje Miljukova kod Britanaca" je drugi par cipela.

 

 

 

* koga mrzi da čita Britanci su (kao i svi ostali) imali kontakta sa svakakvom emigracijom ali su podržavali samo one koji su bili za nastavak rata, što je bio glavni razlog zašto je jedn ekipa obaveštajaca (postojale su 2 ekipe britanskih obaveštajaca u NY i bile su u međusobnom ličnom sukobu) odlučila da ga ekspeduje u Rusiju, da ojača pro-ratnu grupu socijalista u Rusiji.

[Korki]

Допуњено градиво, новијег датума

 

 

Bislang
unbekannte Dokumente belegen
nun das Ausmaß der geheimen Kooperation:
Jahrelang unterstützte das Kaiserreich die
Bolschewiki mit Geld, Waffen und Logistik.

http://magazin.spiegel.de/EpubDelivery/spiegel/pdf/54841257

 

 

Али то уопште није спорно, то се види и изнад, Лењин је сарађивао са немачким службама. Пуштање немачких затвореника је само део, његов однос према Брест-Литовск споразуму је други пример итд.

 

Што се тиче Троцког, мени је само запало за око да је за њега ургирао англофилни Миљуков, а да је он служио касније британским интересима у оквиру Бољшевика попут супростављања Брест-Литовском споразуму, за разлику до Лењина, који је подржавао, као швапски играч. Затим, ставрање јаке, централизоване Црвене армије, чему се супростављао велики број Бољшевика, који су то сматрали издајом Револуције, нарочито када се зна да је Троцки убацио стари царистички кадар у Црвену армију.

Али све је то дошло касније, Троцки је био човек који је у пракси извео Октобарску револуцију, организационо, је л то значи да је и Британија стајала иза Октобарске револуције пошто и сам кажеш да га је послат од њих да ојача једну струју у оквиру црвеног покрета?

Edited July 20, 2016 by Korki

[Prospero]

Ne brate, to znači da su boljševici bili samo korisni idioti kao deo anglo-saksonsko-germansko-boljševičke internacionalne zavere koja je htela da upropasti ruskij mir.

 

To što su Britanija i Nemačka bile na suprotnim stranama rata zapravo ne znači ništa, londonsko-njujorške plutokrate su radile sinhronizovano sa kajzerom i socijalistima kako bi se skroz naskroz uništilo samodržavlje koje je bilo uteha i spas čelovečestva.

 

A i kad je ta zemlja digla glavu decenijama kasnije u novom obliku sovjetskog obrasca života i prva poslala čoveka u kosmos onda je došao čovek sa flekom na glavi da ih još jednom upropasti i doprinese najvećoj geopolitičkoj katastrofi XX veka.

 

 

Zašto? Zna se dobro zašto.

Slučajno? Ne bih rekao.

[Korki]

Ти можеш да исмеваш али је чињеница да су Немачка и Британија биле у преговорима око неутралности чак и у Јулској кризи и да је Британија на сваки начин покушава да избегне рат у Западној Европи.

Чињеница је и да Британија по сваку цену желела да спречи руско узимање Босфора, што потврђује обука и наоружаавње Турске 1913-1914, заједно са Немцима, док Руси луде и траже од Британије да коначно покаже да је у савезу са Русијом и постави се агресивније спрам Немачке(је л треба да вадим цитате Сазонова из 1913 и 1914?). Па се онда Греј извињава у парламетну да нема никаквих тајних договора са Русијом око морнарице(беше 1913 или 1914?). Какав изванредан савезник. Или ти тврдиш да ово што сам написао није тачно?

 

Да се разумемо, ја не тврдим да су Британија и Немчка сарађивале око Русије, штавише, али су једни други желели што слабију Русију, свако из својих разлога. При чему, то је од Немчаке разумљиво, Охрана је њих и надгледала и спречавала, проблем је настао када Миљуков и екипа растурају Охрану у  марту 1917. Британија да такве ствари ради током рата, где Русија спашава Западни фронт 1916, и да након тога праве хаос у Русији због руског напредовања у Турској, није лепо од "савезника".

.

Edited July 20, 2016 by Korki

[Prospero]

Dobro™, svakako nisam pogrešio u prethodnom postu....

[Korki]

Социјалистичка револуција, пољски/украјински/фински национализам, католичка црква/унијати-грко-католици, хаос на Кавказу а свима заједничка глава...

 

 

[Korki]

Са тиме у вези:

 

 

Okhrana

Отделение по Охранению Общественной Безопасности и Порядка

 

The February Revolution 1917

While, initially, the beginning of World War I moved the Okhrana’s attentions from countering revolutionaries to countering German espionage, the focus quickly shifted back as it was revealed that the Germans were heavily funding Russian revolutionary groups in order to destabilize the nation. Despite the renewed attention, the February Revolution took the secret police, and the nation, by surprise. Indeed, the Okhrana’s persistent focus on revolutionary groups may have resulted in the secret police not fully appreciating the deep-seated popular unrest brewing in Russia. 

The newly formed Provisional Government then disbanded the whole organization and released most of the political prisoners who had been held by the Tsarist regime.

 

Који оно беше новопостављени премијер у једној чланици Атнанте је имао симпатије према Привременој влади? Је л оно беше Охрана упозаравала француску и британску владу на деловање социјалистичке емиграције, због чега је Троцки напустио Француску и отишао у САД, у периоду 1914-17?

Edited July 23, 2016 by Korki

[bigvlada]

5MB

 

 

 

 

 

[namenski]

 

A za to vreme, na Zapadu, jos uvek se svi krecu i to poprilicno, sve se nadajuci da ce to biti brzo gotovo.

Nece.

Takozvani uvodni pokreti na Zapadnom frontu sa sve Bitkom na Marni, i jedan obican pesadijski puk popunjen po tadasnjem nemackom sistemu, dakle najnaprednijem i najrazvijenijem na svetu u ta vremena, modelu koji se u Evropi vazio do pre par decenija i koji se vazi jos po negde, o jedinici mobilizacijski popunjenoj do ratne jacine, sto ce reci sa oko 70% rezervista.

Puk je Füsilier-Regiment Königin Viktoria von Schweden (1. Pommersches) Nr. 34, pripada 6. pesadijskoj brigadi (6. Infanterie Brigade), 3. pesadijske divizije (3. Infanterie-Division) koja je u sastavu 2. korpusa (II. Armee-Korps).
Jedinica je popunjavana sa dna kace, pruske: Provinz Pommern, stab korpusa Stettin…

Pa kaze, po danima i kilometrima, crveno dani sa bijenjem:

17. avgust, 21 km

18. avgust, 40 km

19. avgust, 10 km, Gette

20. avgust, 35 km

21. avgust, 10 km

22. avgust, 12 km

23. avgust, 45 km

24. avgust, 16 km

25. avgust, 30 km

26. avgust, 20 km, Le Cateau

27. avgust, 36 km

28. avgust, 38 km

29. avgust, 8 km, Somme

30. avgust, 25 km

31. avgust, 33 km

01. septembar, 30 km

02. septembar, 14 km

03. septembar, 33 km

04. septembar, 31 km, Montmirail

05. septembar, 25 km

 

06. septembar, 0 km, Marne

07. septembar, 37 km, Marne

08. septembar, 33 km, Marne

09. septembar, 0 km, Marne

 

10. septembar, 36 km

11. septembar, 29 km

12. septembar, 12 km....

 

Sve u svemu, za 25 dana, iz dana u dan, 660 kilometara ili prosecno 25 kilometara dnevno, 11 borbenih dana i ni jedan dan odmora.

Pesaka i natovaren takozvanom punom opremom, sto je kod Prusa u to vreme znacilo oko 25 kila po coveku.

 

Samo 7. i 8. septembra, dakle tokom Bitke na Marni, tacnije prilikom pokreta u napadu na severno krilo francuske 6. armije, puk je presao 70 kilometara sa ukupno 3 sata zaustavljanja radi odmora.

Da ne bude zabune: ne radi se ni o kakvim takozvanim specijalcima ili slicnim modernim glupostima, vec o najobicnijim nemackim vojnicima na odsluzenju obaveznog vojnog roka i rezervistima drugog poziva.
Jednog obicnog pesadijskog puka na pocetku Prvog svetskog rata.

[namenski]

Onomad, krajem septembra, proslavila je 100 rodjendan masina koja je poprilicno obelezila 20. vek:

 

 

Rodjen iz teske muke i pokusaja da se izadje iz samog sebe, za svoj postanak - sa takozvane tehnicke strane - ima da zahvali obicnom poljoprivredniku, 1 seljaku takoreci - traktoru gusenicaru.

Ime, koje mu slucajno dobro pristaje, ima da zahvali obicnom buretu, sve ostalo je doslo samo po sebi i tako sve do danas:

 

 

Kada se ispilio, nije se nesto pokazao, u stvari nije nimalo: dokaz vise da problem nikad nije u gvozdjuriji.

[MancMellow]

Tenk. Vrhovno božanstvo centralne i istočne Evrope.

[Korki]

Континент, ту му је природно станиште. Зато Руси и дан данас имају огроман број оклопне технике у КоВ-у.

[namenski]